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Abstract
The PhD thesis examines the independence in practice of telecommunications regulatory 
agencies in France and the UK. It builds on existing literature, which has selectively 
focussed on formal delegation and institutional design o f ‘independent’ regulators, in 
particular, on the statutory provisions defining their formal resources and formal 
constraints.
This thesis’ central research question is whether the independence o f regulatory agencies in 
practice reflects their formal independence. The thesis aims to explain whether and how 
factors other than different formal institutional arrangements influence the policy-making 
of the two agencies examined. It develops and applies an analytical framework for studying 
whether and how regulatory agencies exploit, or are hindered by, formal and informal 
policy resources.
Building on Nordlinger’s work on state autonomy, which is defined as translating 
preferences into action, five non-formal indicators are proposed to assess the 
independence of regulators in practice. Participants and resources, preferences, processes, 
time-length of decision-making, and outcomes, are the indicators applied to selected sub­
cases that help to evaluate the autonomy o f the two telecommunications regulators, the 
Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART) and the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel).
The findings counsel a comprehensive review of the conceptualisation of regulatory 
independence. The thesis shows that policy preferences guide whether and how formal 
institutional arrangements are used. The preference convergence and/or divergence that 
regulators face shape which policy resources will be deployed in support of, or in 
opposition to, the agencies as they pursue their policy preferences.
Three of the four sub-cases relating to 3G licensing and local loop unbundling (LLU) 
policies developed by the two regulators show that to achieve preferences persuasion was 
applied more than imposition. Only in one sub-case, the French regulator actively sought 
to use formal resources as well as non-statutory ones. Crucially, the thesis shows the 
significance of non-statutory resources such as policy expertise, informal ties and ‘physical’ 
assets for the regulators and other policy participants to pursue their preferences 
notwithstanding national formal arrangements.
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Introduction
I. Research Purpose
The spread of independent regulatory agencies across Europe constitutes a key element of 
the ‘regulatory state’, claimed to have replaced the ‘positive state’ as the mode of 
governance of markets from the mid-1980s1. The scholarly interest in the institutional 
change represented by the creation of ‘independent’ regulatory agencies bodies has fuelled 
a select body of research ‘measuring’ their formal independence from Governments. 
Exponents of the formal institutionalist approach assess and explain variation in regulatory 
agencies’ independence according to variation in formal institutional arrangements.
Instead, this PhD thesis examines the independence2 of national regulatory agencies in 
practice. It therefore explores whether regulatory agencies are ‘independent’, without tying 
the concept to formal independence, by asking two sub-questions that help to develop a 
new analytical approach. First, in the presence of a set of policy-specific constraints, is the 
regulator able to reach its policy objective? Second, is the achievement o f the policy 
objective based on the regulator’s degree o f formal independence, or can the agency’s 
exploitation o f non-statutory, ‘informal’3, resources be important?
Regulatory agency independence in practice, or autonomy, is here defined as the regulator’s 
ability to translate a policy preference into action. This definition is consistent with 
Nordlinger’s ‘state autonomy’ approach which describes how the unitary democratic ‘state’ 
he analyses pursues its preferences vis-a-vis powerful (non-state) ‘societal actors’4. 
Nordlinger’s analysis applies only to the preference fulfillment o f the state vis-a-vis societal 
actors, and so needs some refinement in order to delineate preference fulfillment by 
regulatory agencies. The thesis therefore adapts and develops Nordlinger’s analytical 
framework to allow an analysis of the extent to which one part o f the state, the regulatory 
agency, is able to translate its preferences into action with respect to other parts, as well as
1 Majone,G 1994 “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe”, 17 West European Politics; pp.77-101; (ed.) 
1996 “Regulating Europe”, London: Routledge; and 1997 Trom the positive to the regulatory state: causes 
and consequences o f changes in the mode o f governance’, Journal o f Public Policy 17(2): 139-167
2 For the sake o f clarity and convenience, throughout the thesis, the terms independence and autonomy will 
be used interchangeably
3 The analytical focus on formal independence thus far means that the use o f the adjectives ‘non-formal’, 
‘informal’ or ‘non-statutory’ in this thesis simply aims to distinguish from indicators, or instruments, directly 
tied to statutory arrangements governing the regulatory activity o f the selected agencies
4 Nordlinger,E 1981, “On the Autonomy o f the Democratic State”, Harvard University Press
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with respect to societal actors, notably regulatees. Building on Nordlinger, the thesis 
develops an analytical approach which distinguishes three types o f regulatory autonomy:
• Type III autonomy - preferences are achieved in the absence of divergent 
preferences between regulatory agencies and other policy participants, such as 
elected officials with formal powers and regulatees;
• Type II autonomy - the regulator persuasively shifts the preferences o f key actors 
that have divergent preferences from it (hereafter referred to as divergent actors), 
before translating its own preference into action; and,
•  Type I autonomy - the regulator acts upon its preference irrespective of divergence 
with the preferences of predominant actors - hereafter also referred to as divergent 
actors.
The proposed analytical framework addresses the key issues o f variation in agencies’ 
‘independence’ from policy to policy, and the consideration o f dynamic and ‘informal’ 
factors present in regulation in practice. Both issues are neglected by formal 
institutionalists, but are shown to be important herein.
The selected case is telecommunications regulation in France and in the UK. The sector’s 
development is ‘strategic’ for its direct impact on other industries5, and has featured a high 
degree o f Government intervention6. Comparing telecoms regulators’ independence in 
practice in France and in the UK is especially interesting given non-institutional similarities 
but dissimilar formal institutional arrangements.
The sub-cases examine salient policies concerning high-speed broadband internet provision 
through mobile and fixed telecoms networks. The 3G licensing policy sub-cases analyse the 
Governments’ sale o f unique national spectrum for the transmission of advanced mobile 
services. The local loop unbundling (LLU) sub-cases examine the introduction of fixed 
broadband competition by allowing new entrant operators to access incumbent operators’ 
local access networks, reaching end-users across the two countries. The selected sub-cases 
are comparable because both policies were developed in France and in the UK around the 
end of the 1990s.
5 ThatcherJVT 1999, “The Politics o f Telecommunications - National Institutions, Convergence and Change”, 
pp.22-3, 66-7, Oxford University Press (OUP)
6 Hulsink,W 1999, “Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications - Comparing Britain, 
the Netherlands and France”, p.5, Routledge
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The empirical evidence is that while the regulators faced preference divergence over both 
policies, three o f the four sub-cases show Type II autonomy. The British and French 
regulators both showed Type II autonomy for one policy (3G licensing), despite different 
formal institutional arrangements. Instead, the same regulator, the French ART, showed 
variation in its autonomy types across policies (3G licensing and LLU). So, in three sub­
cases regulators’ preferences were achieved through dialogue and persuasion, and only in 
one through imposition. Besides highlighting the importance o f preferences, the sub-cases 
explain the impact on policy development of controlling key sector-specific ‘physical’ 
assets, but most importantly the centrality o f regulators’ policy expertise and informal ties 
with influential actors to fulfill their preferences.
The wider implications o f the thesis, therefore, are that scholarly work focussing on formal 
independence of regulatory agencies omits ‘informal’ analytical factors that need to be 
researched in order to assess regulatory autonomy, especially by examining the resources 
held and exploited by preference divergent and convergent actors, whether Governments, 
regulatees or other policy participants.
II. Existing Approaches
The thesis proposes a new way to conceptualise and operationalise regulatory agency 
independence in practice. The framework has been developed by examining the body of 
existing research relating to agency independence, which focusses on the limits of the 
pervasive explanatory emphasis attributed to formal institutional arrangements (chapter 1). 
It is developed as a critique of the current literature. Early research from the United States, 
where ‘independent’ agencies were first created, has recently evolved into cross-country 
comparisons of Governments’ delegation of formal authority to regulatory agencies.
The scholarly attention to formal independence can be explained in terms o f principal- 
agent theory. A ‘principal’ (in this context, a Minister, Government or Parliament) creates 
an agent (here, the independent regulator) to perform a task to maximise the benefits of
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delegation, but does not want to incur ‘agency losses’. To avoid ‘shirking’ (the agency 
follows its own policy preferences), principals retain controls7.
Formal institutionalists assume that more formal Government controls over the agency, 
including powers of nomination and budget-setting, mean less agency independence. Fewer 
controls are associated with more independence. Different levels of formal control explain 
variation in formal independence. Selected indicators o f formal powers delegated to 
regulators and controls maintained by Governments are also used by writers such as 
Gilardi, and Edwards and Waverman, to construct ‘independence indices’ allowing 
quantitative comparisons of formal independence between agencies within and across 
countries8.
Close scrutiny of formal institutionalists’ approach, however, unearths important analytical 
limitations. Firstly, using different indicators to construct similar formal independence 
indices per se yields very different and contradictory independence values for the same 
agencies, undermining this method. Secondly, to ‘measure’ independence based on formal 
institutional arrangements means doing so at a set point in time, thus assuming that agency 
independence is a constant. Thirdly, and most importantly, whether formal arrangements 
regarding a single regulator lead to independence in practice remains unanswered.
Greater delegation o f formal instruments to a regulator, compared to others, does not 
entail their use or explain their usefulness in practice for a given policy. Institutional 
arrangements are incomplete, and powers and controls can be used in many different ways. 
To test the explanatory power o f formal independence, including verifying whether specific 
formal resources are more significant than others, agency independence in practice must be 
examined by considering how regulation is implemented after formal delegation.
Moreover, the non-statutory resources of actors without formal authority over regulators 
may affect regulatory autonomy, challenging an analysis based on independence from 
Government alone. The Chicago school theory suggests that, by providing financial
7 For example, McCubbins,M, Noll,RG & Weingast,BR 1987 “Administrative procedures as instruments o f  
political control”, Journal o f Law, Economics and Organisation, 3(2): 243-86; 1989 “Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control o f agencies”, Virginia Law 
Review:75, pp.431-482
8 Gilardi,F December 2002, “Policy credibility and delegation to regulatory agencies: a comparative analysis” 
Journal o f European Public Policy, pp.873-893; Edwards,G and WavermanJL, 2006, “The effects o f public 
ownership and regulatory independence on regulatory outcomes”, Journal o f Regulatory Economics, 
VoL29(l), pp.23-67
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support to regulators and politicians, concentrated interest groups in the form o f regulated 
firms try to influence regulatory decision-making in their favour, which exponents define as 
“capture”9. More recently, Coen et al have found that informal dependencies and 
relationships between regulators, competent ministries and regulatees in British and 
German utilities affect regulatory behaviour10.
Regulatory independence may, therefore, not be manifested in practice, or it may operate 
through the deployment o f influential non-statutory resources unaccounted for in formal 
institutional accounts. Indeed, the thesis explains that it is essential to assess the ‘informal’ 
linkages that affect policy-making, identifying any repercussions on the regulator’s 
independence from all potentially influential actors rather than just from Government. The 
formal institutionalist approach is therefore static, and omits dynamic policy-specific 
factors that influence outcomes, which must be allowed for in an analysis of agency 
independence in practice.
III. The Analytical Approach
The framework developed in this thesis to examine agency independence in practice is 
developed from Nordlinger’s dichotomous analysis of ‘state’ autonomy, identified as the 
unitary state’s ability to translate preferences into action, in response to society-centred 
claims that the state acts upon society’s wishes. He specifies that the definition does not 
relate to a set of institutional arrangements, which cannot be said to have preferences on 
the making of public policy. Nordlinger argues that variations in state-society preferences 
go a long way in determining the outcome of authoritative actions, and are the most 
important basis for distinguishing between different types o f state autonomy.
Thus, though not part o f the regulation literature, the value o f Nordlinger’s approach to 
this thesis is precisely that he defines and examines ‘state autonomy’ as a dynamic practice 
(preference achievement), not an endowment. Nordlinger uses preferences to identify what 
the ‘state’ wants to achieve, introducing policy objectives as explanatory variables, 
notwithstanding the preferences of well-resourced ‘society’ actors, which may be divergent 
and hence oppose the state, or may not be divergent.
9 Stigler.GJ 1971, “The Theory o f Economic Regulation”, Bell Journal o f Economics, Vol. 2(1), pp.3-21
10 CoenJD, Heritier,A and BollhoffJD 2002, “Regulating the Utilities: Business and Regulator Perspectives in 
the UK and Germany”, Anglo-German Foundation (Coen et al)
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Nordlinger identifies three types o f state autonomy. In Type III autonomy cases, the state 
translates its preferences into action in the absence o f divergent societal preferences (non­
divergence). In Type II autonomy cases, the state works to shift the divergent preferences 
o f key societal actors. In Type I autonomy cases, the state works to translate its preferences 
into action regardless of divergent societal preferences.
Nordlinger indicates an array of strategies and associated options at the state’s disposal to 
fulfill its preferences consistent with each of the three autonomy types. Since the state can 
achieve its preferences in three distinct scenarios, and in different ways even when ‘societal 
actors’ are preference divergent (whether persuasively in Type II cases or forcefully in Type 
I cases), it follows that autonomy depends on more than one explanatory variable, hence 
not just on formal institutional arrangements.
IV. The Thesis* Contribution: Operationalising ‘Agency Independence in Practice*
Since the actor of reference in this thesis is the ‘independent’ regulatory agency, which is 
only part of the unitary state discussed by Nordlinger, his dichotomous state-society 
framework constitutes a ‘first-level’ o f analysis. Chapter 2 is fully dedicated to adapting and 
refining Nordlinger’s framework into a ‘second level’ of analysis. Transposing Nordlinger 
to examine autonomy at the regulatory level, including the causal significance o f formal 
arrangements, entails the creation of a meso-level analysis, which takes differences between 
the ‘state’ and regulators into consideration. Building on Nordlinger, the chapter presents 
five generalisable indicators to examine whether agencies fulfill their preferences and how 
they seek to do so. These are used to develop three analytically distinct scenarios reflecting 
each of Nordlinger’s types of autonomy.
The five indicators o f independence are participants, preferences, processes, time-length o f 
decision-making and outcomes. In each sub-case, the thesis first identifies key policy 
‘participants’ and their influential resources; whether o f a formal nature or not. Second, 
‘preferences’ are identified, indicating when regulators face opposition and whether they do 
so from actors with key formal powers or others with highly influential non-statutory 
resources. Third, ‘processes’ undertaken for each type of autonomy are analysed to 
establish whether regulators develop policy by exercising formal arrangements, and the 
resources that are deployed if they do not. Fourth, the ‘time-length o f decision-making’,
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showing whether regulators formally expedited policy or prolonged its course, is analysed. 
Finally, the ‘outcomes’ are assessed. The five indicators provide a comprehensive picture of 
policy development from its inception to its accomplishment.
Indicator 1: Participants and Resources
Indicating policy ‘participants’ at the regulatory level is important. One key distinction 
between Nordlinger’s state and regulatory agencies is that analysing the latter must allow 
for a wider set of actors than the two-dimensional, dichotomous, dynamic of state 
autonomy. Nordlinger identifies the state as a whole, and another set of actors which he 
genetically calls ‘societal actors’. Since regulators are only a part of the state, ‘other state’ 
actors may also participate in policy-making apart from Nordlinger’s ‘societal actors’. 
Conceptually fragmenting the state is particularly important when examining whether 
formal controls retained by Government officials over regulatory agencies are the central 
explanation behind the latter’s preference achievement or not.
Another reason for identifying participants is that Nordlinger never specifies how his 
‘weighty’ and ‘best endowed’ actors are influential. Yet, state actors may possess relevant 
formal authority over regulators or have non-statutory resources with which to influence a 
specific policy. Certain non-state actors, particularly regulated firms, may have significant 
non-statutory resources too.
Thus, in the thesis, actor-specific resources are identified to trace their effect on policy in 
each sub-case. Some participants will be more influential than others, and the number of 
influential participants will vary in given policy scenarios, causing different degrees o f 
resource concentration.
When analysing the three autonomy scenarios, Nordlinger projects a wider range of 
participants involved in Type II autonomy scenarios - in addition to divergent ones, policy 
participants can be indifferent and/or convergent - and, accordingly, a more varied set of 
strategies than for Type I. The implication seems to be that there is a larger range and/or 
higher number of participants at the Type II regulatory level. So, for Type II autonomy, at 
the start o f a policy, it is expected that key resources are spread among distinct actors, 
unlike Type I where resources would be more concentrated. Instead, with Nordlinger 
referring to ‘best endowed’ and ‘significant’ non-divergent actors separately, the implied
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Type III scenario at the regulatory level is that the actual number of participants can vary. 
Participants could be few or many.
Indicator 2: Preferences
Identifying ‘preferences’ is critical to assess agency independence because preferences 
reveal what the regulator and other influential policy participants want to achieve, directing 
their use of resources accordingly. Without specific preferences to pursue, sectoral actors 
with influential resources will not participate in a given policy. Preferences indicate what 
significant opposition, or support, the regulator may face. Indeed, once participants and 
preferences are considered, each sub-case indicates whether the regulator faces obstacles, 
from whom and what kind (statutory/non-statutory), in fulfilling its preferences.
Type III autonomy’s central feature is ‘preference non-divergence’ (convergence and/or 
indifference), whether between the state and societal actors, or regulatory agencies and 
other policy participants. So, regardless of the distribution o f resources, preferences of 
influential participants in Type III autonomy cases will not differ from those of the agency. 
In Type II autonomy cases, preferences of influential participants over agency proposals 
are expected to differ at the policy-start. Facing both preference divergence and non­
divergence in Type II cases entails that the agency can rely on some influential support, 
hence, on useful resources it does not control directly, from the outset. Instead, in Type I 
autonomy cases, preferences of influential actors at the start o f a policy are expected to 
differ from those of regulators.
Indicator 3: Process
Once the distribution o f resources and preferences is established, the thesis examines the 
policy process to understand the extent to which formal powers are used by political 
principals to instruct or block agencies and, importantly, whether the regulators deploy 
statutory instruments to regulate industry. The process indicator outlines how regulators 
proceed to fulfill their preferences consistent with each type o f autonomy, entailing that 
regulators do not operate in a single way. Critically, ‘process’ shows whether agencies 
regulate by way of formal authority, or if alternative mechanisms and processes are used in 
order for regulators to fulfill their preferences.
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Nordlinger’s analytical framework usefully highlights a wide range o f different strategies 
and options, statutory and non-statutory, with respect to each type o f autonomy. However, 
there are a number of ambiguities arising from the apparent overlap of certain of the 
strategy options he identifies. Since participants and preferences identified for the three 
scenarios point regulators to adopt distinct processes, the indicator is developed here to 
provide a clearer analytical focus, in particular with reference to the use of formal authority 
that can be expected for the three autonomy types.
Since Type III autonomy is defined by non-divergence, by developing Nordlinger’s model 
for application at the regulatory level, the thesis expects that, instead of pursuing a policy 
by exerting formal authority, regulatory efforts are directed towards sustaining non­
divergence. This implies controlling the presentation and communication flow of agency 
actions. It is thus expected that regulators’ preferences under Type III are furthered by: (i) 
selective divulging o f information; (ii) projection o f competent engagement and policy­
making; (iii) transmitting apparent neutrality.
Shifting the preferences o f divergent actors is at the heart of Nordlinger’s Type II 
autonomy. Given the presence of influential divergence and non-divergence from the start 
of policy, the regulator alters divergent preferences o f actors and restrains their use of key 
resources by prioritising negotiation over imposition. In Type II cases, it is expected that 
preferences are shifted by: (i) making compromise proposals; (ii) repeated bargaining; (iii) 
exploiting influential actors with convergent preferences to avoid confrontation.
Type I autonomy processes present a radically different approach to preference divergence. 
Still, even in this confrontational scenario, the thesis expects that to diminish the 
constraining effects of the few divergent influential actors, who control key resources, the 
regulator alternates informal with formal approaches, deploying either to enact its 
preferences. Under Type I, agencies act upon preferences by: (i) identifying and widely 
exposing obstacles to direct policy as preferred; (ii) exploiting ties to construct a 
framework, against divergent preferences; (iii) using deterrents to address non-compliance.
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Indicator 4: Time-length o f  decision-making
Together with the additional ‘regulatory level’ analysis on policy ‘participants’ and the more 
focussed ‘process’, the thesis presents a subtle but important indicator by proposing to 
examine the ‘time-length of decision-making’, further refining the three types of autonomy. 
Though frequently omitted or overlooked, the distinct processes can be expected to require 
different and dynamic timeframes to translate preferences into action. Formal 
arrangements may not define minimum or maximum timescale powers for agencies to 
impose decisions. Yet, where timescale powers are available, it is interesting to examine if 
regulators use them and, if so, in what circumstances.
Type II autonomy includes a time dimension; preferences are not acted upon until those of 
divergent actors are shifted. Thus it is expected that in Type II cases regulators largely 
neglect available timescale powers and apply policy forbearance, prolonging the process, to 
translate preferences into action. In Type III scenarios agency officials will use available 
timescale powers unless this is likely to engender divergence. Regulators are also likely to 
apply available timescale powers under Type I, but in such cases to confront divergence. 
Any delays in the regulator fulfilling its preference are likely to have been forced on it.
This indicator also shows whether regulators deploying non-statutory resources to 
overcome the preference divergence of participants can hasten or slow policy development 
without having or using timescale powers.
Indicators: Outcomes
Once the factors affecting the course of policy are analysed, verifying the explanatory 
power of the formal independence of individual regulators, ‘outcomes’ indicates the 
success of the regulator in translating preferences into action. In Type III, the regulator’s 
preferences are implemented because of acquiescence. In Type II, the agency implements 
its preferences after divergent actors are persuaded to shift theirs, but makes some 
concessions. In Type I, preferences are fulfilled without the intention to compromise.
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V. The Case Study
The independence in practice of telecommunications regulators in France and the UK 
represents a particularly interesting case study since a considerable body of the regulation 
literature has studied the sector extensively, for instance Thatcher and separately Hulsink11, 
without focussing on the issue of interest here. Telecoms is considered a strategic sector, 
worth around 2% o f GDP in both countries in 1999, around the time the selected policies 
were developed. Respective formal arrangements have referred to the sector in terms o f 
national security, and it is one which through its development and growth has a significant 
impact on other economic sectors, notably the financial industry’s reliance on high-speed 
communication.
In analysing whether the French and British regulatory agencies fulfilled their preferences, 
the thesis looks at two sub-cases, 3G (third generation) spectrum licensing and local loop 
unbundling. The policy selection covers the different segments o f the telecoms sector, 
allowing for different sectoral issues and players (mobile and fixed). Both sub-cases relate 
to the highly salient spread o f high-speed internet, or broadband, which received increasing 
attention in both countries, and in the wider European Union (EU), between the 1998- 
2002 period focussed upon, spanning the eventful ‘telecoms boom and bust’.
The interest in these salient, comparable, national policies to establish the extent that the 
agencies’ independence in practice depended on formal independence is heightened by the 
fact that, despite progressive convergence, the two countries continued exhibiting 
significant institutional dissimilarities as indicated in chapter 3.
VI. Chapter Structure
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the studies examining agency independence. It focusses 
on formal institutionalist literature examining the formal independence o f regulators from 
Governments, identifying its limitations, but includes studies that focus on the influence o f 
industry on regulatory agencies. The chapter ends with an account of the useful analytical 
elements arising from Nordlinger’s state autonomy approach, which includes preferences 
and strategies, and goes beyond formal independence. Chapter 2 transposes Nordlinger’s
11 Thatcher 1999; Hulsink 1999
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approach to create a framework operationalising agency independence in practice, 
consistent with the key features o f the three distinct types of autonomy, through the five 
indicators explained above.
Chapter 3 compares the formal institutional arrangements regarding the British and French 
telecoms regulators. Similarities and marked cross-country differences are set out. For 
instance, in terms of similarities it is explained how single Government Ministers, the UK’s 
Secretary of State (SoS) for Trade and Industry and the French Minister for 
Telecommunications, retained significant formal controls over regulators with which they 
shared statutory objectives. Among the major differences, it is explained that the French 
Government possessed full formal policy-making authority with respect to the national 
regulator, unlike in the UK. The UK regulator could determine policy through licence 
modifications with operators’ consent, and even without it if supported by the Competition 
Commission - subject to no ministerial veto. In France, despite considerable enforcement 
powers including pecuniary sanctions, the regulator had no authority to determine policy 
and could only advise the Government.
Sub-case chapters 4 to 7 analyse how the two regulators pursued their respective policy 
preferences despite relatively different national formal institutional arrangements. It 
assesses their causal impact by applying the framework developed in this thesis.
Chapter 4 analyses how, when facing preference divergence from the four influential 2G 
incumbent mobile operators, Oftel pursued its preference for new entry in the nascent 3G 
licensing market, showing Type II autonomy. The chapter explains that, notwithstanding 
opposition from the incumbent operators, Oftel did not seek to deploy formal authority to 
fulfill its preference. Oftel avoided confrontation with the operators and exploited 
influential convergent actors. These were the Government, which had spectrum licensing 
powers, and its spectrum agency the Radiocommunications Agency (RA), which conducted 
3G policy development through a working group comprising Oftel from March 1998. The 
RA had no formal powers over Oftel. However, at meetings with key industry actors, it 
presented Oftel’s position on several occasions, following a private accord between them. 
Oftel influenced policy by intervening and providing input selectively.
The regulator’s advice to allocate five licences rather than four as initially foreseen was 
upheld by the RA and the Government, which statutorily determined policy. Moreover, 
Oftel had formal powers to modify licences and insert a condition requiring incumbents to
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grant new entrants access to the former’s 2G networks (roaming). Yet, despite the 
convergent Government’s urgency to auction 3G licences, Oftel persistently bargained and 
sought consensus from divergent incumbents through informal exchanges. To persuade 
the adversely affected operators, it delayed implementation and revised roaming details 
without losing sight of the key objective, ‘shifting’ their preferences by the end of 1999.
Chapter 5 examines how, notwithstanding preference divergence from the French 
Government which possessed key formal powers, the ART pursued its 3G policy 
preferences, showing Type II autonomy. The ART exploited prior work on 3G by a 
spectrum advisory body, and launched a consultation, not formally set out, to develop a 3G 
licensing policy in early 1999, which it had no formal powers to determine. The regulator’s 
proposals received overwhelming industry support, especially from 2G incumbent mobile 
operators. It prepared to finalise a document for the Government comprising its 
preferences of a ‘beauty contest’ licensing procedure allowing it to select licensees, and 
allocating maximum four licences.
However, a new Finance Minister risked opting for a different choice from the ART’s to 
improve state finances. His Ministry comprised the divergent Telecoms Minister with the 
relevant powers. The proposed beauty contest, comprising the low fixed-fee the ART 
proposed, contrasted with the French Government’s wish to maximise revenue from 
selling valuable ‘state’ 3G spectrum, following the huge sums gained by the British 
Government’s auctioning of five licences. The chapter explains that to make its case 
publicly and privately with Ministers, by exploiting its policy expertise, the ART built on 
the public pressure exerted by influential convergent mobile incumbents, which were 
opposed to foreign operators outbidding them in auctions, and their ties with senior 
Government officials. Furthermore, the regulator bargained with Ministers, indicating the 
possibility of revising its proposal to include higher entry fees for a beauty contest. It 
assuaged the Government and ensured a beauty contest allocating four licences.
Chapter 6 examines how, although the UK’s ex-state monopoly operator BT opposed 
competitors’ entry into the new ADSL broadband market by exploiting its unique network 
access to users through phone lines across the country, Oftel pursued its local loop 
unbundling (LLU) preference, showing Type II autonomy. The chapter explains that Oftel 
had licence powers to impose LLU from the start, but sought BT’s consent given the 
degree of network access the policy required and the need to define clear competitive entry 
terms. Starting in December 1998, the regulator launched two successive ‘informal’
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consultations. Major industry actors (except BT) and the parliamentary Trade and Industry 
Select Committee strongly supported the competitive development o f broadband services 
through LLU, increasing the issue’s public exposure.
Through its policy expertise, Oftel made compromise proposals, selecting two different 
technical options with distinct competitive implications. One accommodated BT, the other 
(LLU) did not. The regulator engaged in repeated bargaining, before formally consulting on 
and inserting a new condition in BT’s licence, adding to its powers. Oftel met with BT’s 
management privately to persuade them.
Oftel’s policy implementation continued with limited intervention even after the condition 
applied. BT made essential access to its sites and unique information very difficult for rivals 
through the second-half of 2000, delaying entry and advancing its first-mover advantage in 
ADSL. As entrants and the select committee complained, the European Union (EU) 
adopted a binding end-2000 Regulation deadline expanding national regulators’ LLU 
powers. Nonetheless, Oftel exploited the increased interest of an influential junior Minister, 
Patricia Hewitt, who confronted BT’s management in private. Thus the regulator 
prioritised dialogue, limiting its use o f powers, exploiting its expertise and allowing delays. 
Instead, following Oftel’s input among others, Hewitt forcefully asked BT to respect the 
EU deadline privately. BT reluctandy expedited entry, ultimately coming closer to 
complying with the deadline agreed with Oftel.
The Chapter 7 sub-case differs from the others in that the ART pursued its preference 
without having the powers to determine the policy and without seeking consent from key 
divergent actors, consistent with Type I autonomy. The regulator sought to introduce 
competition in the local access market for competitive broadband provision through LLU. 
It faced preference divergence from the then majority state-owned incumbent operator 
France Telecom (F-T) that controlled the local access network, the French Government, 
which had powers to introduce LLU, and vocal left-wing Members of Parliament (MPs) 
part of the Government coalition. Neither national nor EU legislation required LLU. The 
chapter explains that, without the Government’s powers, the ART first raised LLU in its 
annual report to the Government and Parliament in mid-1998, then sought the ‘analysis’ of 
a specialised advisory body, setting up two working groups.
Subsequently, the regulator launched a consultation on LLU identifying and exposing F-T’s 
network dominance, which was likely to generate huge commercial broadband advantages.
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Many ‘private’ operators, seeking competitive access to end-users, responded supportively 
and campaigned publicly in LLU’s favour, putting pressure on the Government. 
Significantly, the ART exploited informal ties with the European Commission to help 
frame an EU Recommendation, which was then turned into a Regulation binding all 
Member States to implement LLU. Thus the Government’s withdrawal of a national law 
amendment following coalition dissent over LLU did not stop the regulator. The 
Government passed a national decree in September 2000 to comply with EU legislation. 
The ART repeatedly ordered F-T to stop obstructing entry, before achieving a workable 
reference offer in July 2001.
The concluding chapter 8 summarises how the two regulators developed the two selected 
policies domestically. Considerable variation in formal independence did not prevent the 
agencies from applying a similar Type II autonomy approach, based on persuasion rather 
than statutory powers, to fulfill 3G licensing policy preferences. The regulators showed 
their autonomy in different circumstances. The UK regulator avoided confrontation with 
preference divergent actors in both sub-cases, achieving its preferences by means other 
than by deploying all formal resources at its disposal. Instead, in Type I autonomy style, the 
French regulator found the means to push through its LLU preference without the relevant 
statutory authority and despite opposition from influential actors, including the 
Government with key powers and the most powerful industry regulatee.
The thesis demonstrates the importance of the preferences of key policy actors to examine 
regulatory independence in practice. The fact that, compared to others, a Government 
retains more powers over one or more national regulators, must not be assumed to entail 
less regulatory agency independence in practice. Preferences shape the use of available 
resources. In both French sub-cases, the Government with key powers was initially 
opposed to the national regulator pursuing its preferences, unlike most industry actors. 
Conversely, in both UK sub-cases, the Government had preferences that were not 
dissimilar from those of the domestic regulator, unlike key industry actors. Where 
Governments retain considerable formal authority, their preferences can be highly 
influential as they inhibit or sustain regulators’ preferences.
Foremost, the evidence in this thesis shows that non-statutory resources are critical for 
regulators to achieve their preferences, through both persuasive and confrontational 
processes, thus demonstrating that agency independence in practice does not reflect formal 
independence. More specifically, findings indicate that Governments’ formal powers to
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veto regulators’ policy-making were not determinant, both in the UK sub-cases, when the 
Government and the regulator were not in disagreement, and in the two French sub-cases, 
when they had divergent preferences.
The key non-statutory resources emerging from the sub-cases are the ability to understand 
and exploit policy information or ‘policy expertise’, informal ties, ownership of physical 
(network) resources and to a lesser extent the ability to influence public opinion, whether 
through media or public venues such as Parliament. The need for further research on 
influential resources in other regulatory policy domains emerges from this thesis. Most 
importantly, the thesis has found that ‘measuring’ static formal institutional arrangements is 
inadequate to analyse regulatory agency independence in practice, which requires instead a 
dynamic policy examination of participants, their resources and preferences to establish the 
key resources that allow agencies to fulfill their objectives.
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Chapter 1; Existing Theories on Regulatory Agencies* Independence
and ‘State Autonomy*
I. Introduction
There is a growing literature on regulatory independence. Several studies have provided 
analyses o f independence discussing its positive implications12, while others have 
questioned its effectiveness13. These have complemented a wide body o f literature 
examining more theoretical, and occasionally normative, elements explaining why agency 
independence has become a widespread instrument for governments14, particularly to deal 
with market failures in different sectors15. This is in line with claims that the ‘regulatory 
state’ has gradually replaced the ‘positive state’16, with independent regulatory agencies 
playing an essential part in it and growing in numbers across Europe since the 1980s, albeit 
with sectoral and national variations17. This trend has redefined the governance of 
markets18.
The ‘regulatory state’ model explains that the delegation of powers to independent agencies 
by elected politicians is a functional response for the latter to maintain a credible
12 For arguments in favour of central bank independence; Alesina^A. 1988, “Macroeconomics and Politics” in 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual Vol.3, MIT Press pp. 13-52, especially pp.38-45; Goodhart,CAE 1993, 
“Central Bank Independence”, Special paper 57, Financial Markets Group - London School o f Economics, 
and Fischer,S & Debelle,G 1994, “How independent should a central bank be?”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Conference series; n.38, pp.195-225
13 For a brief but subde insight challenging the merits o f independence and why it might only be a 
complementary factor in terms o f effective sectoral regulation, SternJ 1997, “What makes an independent 
regulator independent?”, Business Strategy Review, Vol.8(2), pp.67-74.
14 Majone,G 1997, “Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical and Normative 
Discussions”, pp. 139-156 in “Political Institutions and Public Policy: Perspectives on European Decision- 
Making”, (eds.) Steunenberg,B & Van Vught,F, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Perhaps, Elgie’s April 2006 
paper exploring eight hypotheses explaining delegation to agencies provides among the most comprehensive 
analyses: “Why D o Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of 
Independent Administrative Authorities in France”, in Governance: An International Journal o f Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions, Vol.l9(2), pp.207-227. The choice o f France as a case study and the 
examination of agencies including the ART make it especially appealing, although the scope o f Elgie’s paper 
is only tangential to the argument made in this thesis
15 For a thorough analysis o f different market failures, Breyer,SG 1981, “Regulation and its reform”, Harvard 
University Press; also chapter 1, Baldwin,R and Cave,M 1999, “Understanding Regulation - Theory, strategy 
and practice”, OUP, for a more nuanced reference OgusA 1996, “Regulation - Legal Form and Economic 
Theory”, Clarendon Press
16 Majone 1994,1996, 1997. Also MoranJVf 2002, “Review article: Understanding the regulating state”, British 
Journal o f Political Science, Vol.32(2), pp.391-413, in which he sums up Majone’s insight on the EU as a 
reflection o f “historical context and institutional constraint”, p.404
17 Thatcher,M December 2002, “Analysing regulatory reform in Europe”, Journal o f European Public Policy 
9(6), pp.859-872
18 Thatcher,M and Coen,D 2005, “The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators”, 
Governance, Vol.l8(3), pp.329-346
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commitment in specific policy areas19. It is meant to limit the lack of discipline associated 
with elected policy-makers and the uncertainty deriving from their time-inconsistent 
actions20 which, some argue, are especially likely prior to elections21. It is similarly meant to 
constrain future Governments from changing regulatory policy-making, thus reducing 
sectoral unpredictability and providing investment incentives.
To achieve their statutory objectives, independent regulators are meant to operate at arms- 
length from governments. This may be on the grounds of greater area-specific expertise 
compared to the generalist government departments covering the respective sectors before 
the creation of such agencies. Similarly, agency independence is expected to overcome the 
information asymmetries arising in technical areas of governance, and enhance the 
economic efficiency o f rule making. Elected officials are meant to enjoy the additional 
benefit that the blame for any unpopular policies endorsed will be attributed to regulators22.
Thus, elected officials delegate powers to regulators for the latter to be, at the very least, 
considered responsible for specific policy areas. Some agencies are legally qualified as 
independent. This is the case in France where regulators, like the Autorite de Regulation 
des Telecommunications (ART)23 covered here, have been statutorily defined as ‘autorites 
administratives independantes’24. Accordingly, the extent to which political officials 
delegate powers to - or retain some form of institutional checks and balances25, like veto 
players26, over - agencies has been a straightforward, and rather uncontested, way to define 
independence. This explains why the formal institutional design of agencies has been the
19 Majone (see fns. above); Thatcher,M, & Stone SweetA 2002, “Theory and practice o f delegation to non- 
majoritarian institutions”, West European Politics, Vol.25, pp.1-22; Thatcher AT 2002 “Delegation to 
independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and contextual mediation”, West European Politics, 
Vol.25, pp.125-147
20 Kydland,F and Prescott,E 1977, “Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency o f optimal plans,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 85(3), pp.473-491, suggested that in a situation o f changing economic conditions, 
policy-makers following a particular policy would renege, hence not implement it, as soon as they realise that 
adopting a different policy may constitute an easier route to fulfill their ultimate goals
21 Nordhaus,W exposed this theory in April 1975 “The Political Business Cycle”, Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 42, pp.169-190. But Alesina has contested this view among others: 1988 paper cited-above, and 
AlesinaA- 1989, “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies”, Economic Policy, Vol.8, pp.55—98, 
in which he also discussed the benefits of delegation to independent Central Banks
22 Thatcher and Stone Sweet, and Thatcher, both in WEP Jan.2002. Also, ThatcherJM December 2002, 
“Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe”, Journal o f European Public Policy 
9:6, pp.954-972
23 The extension o f its regulatory role to the postal sector led to its name being changed to “Autorite de 
Regulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes” (ARCEP) in May 2005. Since the selected case 
studies refer to the agency’s earlier guise, the acronym ART is retained throughout the thesis nonetheless
24 Elgie 2006 gives an account o f how these authorities developed in France
25 KiewietJDR and McCubbins,MD 1991, “The Logic o f Delegation: Congressional Parties and the 
Appropriation Process”, University o f Chicago Press
26 For a study on the wide-ranging importance o f veto players, Tsebelis,G 2002, “Veto Players: How Political 
Institutions Work”, Princeton University Press
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focus of studies on regulatory independence27, particularly given the difficulties in
• • * 2 8  comparing it across countries .
Variation in formal institutional arrangements is, therefore, assumed to denote variation in 
regulatory agency independence. Yet, whether they determine regulatory independence in 
practice remains questionable, because past studies have not challenged this approach in- 
depth in order to verify their explanatory power. Goodhart’s definition o f regulatory 
independence, or autonomy as he calls it, relates precisely to “the powers used to achieve 
the statutorily defined objective”, but not to the freedom of choosing objectives29.
Referring to agencies’ independence in terms o f their instruments rather than in terms of 
their goals30 constitutes a complementary rather than a focal element of the analysis that 
follows. The underlying point remains that regulatory independence has been, and largely 
continues to be, formulated in formal terms. Assessing regulatory agency independence 
requires a thorough review of existing assessments and forms the research question o f this 
thesis, which asks whether formally independent regulators are independent in practice 
and, if so, whether powers granted through formal institutional arrangements are the 
determinant factor.
The thesis, therefore, aims to examine independence in practice, in particular by exploring 
the extent to which it reflects formal independence. It does so by comparing the regulatory 
activity of telecommunications agencies in France and the UK via four selected, salient 
sub-cases. In order to analyse independence in practice, it is necessary to develop non- 
formal indicators of independence. First, however, the literature that advocates formal 
institutional design as the source o f independence is reviewed in this chapter. Its 
weaknesses are discussed to strengthen the case for the adoption of a different approach.
27 Levy and Spiller emphasise the importance o f ‘institutional endowment’ in 1996’s “A framework for 
resolving the regulatory problem”, in “Regulations, Institutions and Commitment - Comparative Studies o f  
Telecommunications”, (eds.) Levy,B. and Spiller,PT. Cambridge University Press. Also Gilardi Dec.2002
28 Thatcher Dec.2002, pp.954-955; Gilardi Dec.2002; Levy and Spiller’s comparative case-study analysis
29 Goodhart 1993, p.6, and 2003 “The Constitutional Position o f the Central Bank”, p.3, in Friedman^M and 
Goodhart,CAE, “Money, Inflation and the Constitutional Position o f Central Bank” IEA Readings 57, 
Institute of Economic Affairs
30 Grilli,V, MasciandaroJD and Tabellini,G October 1991, anticipated that: “Political independence is the 
capacity to choose the final goal o f  monetary policy, such as inflation or the level o f economic activity. 
Economic independence is the capacity to choose the instruments with which to pursue these goals”, p.366 in 
“Institutions and Policies - Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial 
countries”, Economic Policy, pp.341-392.
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Then, in order to integrate non-formal and dynamic elements into the analysis, a new 
framework is proposed in the form of Nordlinger’s preference-based approach. This 
presents three distinct types o f autonomy. For Nordlinger, the autonomy o f the state is 
understood in terms of its achievement o f preferences vis-a-vis societal actors through a 
variety of strategies and their related multiple ‘options’, when neither policy specific 
preferences nor strategies can be read off statutes.
Nordlinger’s approach assumes a binary ‘state-society’ distinction. However, when 
considering regulatory independence, it is necessary to disaggregate the state and separate 
analytically the regulatory agency from other state institutions. Therefore in chapter two, 
Nordlinger’s approach is translated and adapted to make it relevant at the regulatory level, 
since his conceptualisation o f autonomy is based on the state as a single actor.
Accordingly, to establish whether regulatory agencies demonstrate a type of autonomy 
consistent with one of Nordlinger’s three typologies, five non-formal indicators, which take 
into account the differences between Nordlinger’s state and regulatory agencies, are 
developed. Treferences’ are retained as a central factor and his proposed strategies are 
refined into overall ‘processes’ consistent with the respective autonomy types. 
‘Participants’, ‘time-length o f decision-making’ and ‘outcomes’ are three additional 
indicators introduced here to challenge the assumption that formal provisions alone 
determine the independence o f regulators in practice. By applying the five indicators at the 
agency level and explaining relevant variations, three autonomy types are created for 
regulators.
The statutory arrangements projecting both the similarities and the differences regarding 
the formal resources and constraints of the two selected regulators are set out in detail 
subsequently. The awareness of formal provisions helps trace and examine, in the four sub­
case chapters that follow, what their impact is, whether any other intervening variables 
have a relatively more pronounced impact on the independence of the selected French and 
British regulators and, where so, how.
II. Historical background
To put the scope of this thesis and its contribution into context, it is critical to stress that 
the first scholarly contribution on regulatory independence is not recent and was largely
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focussed on formal institutional design. This renders the question examined here - whether 
identifying formal independence alone is sufficient to ‘measure’ regulatory independence in 
practice - all the more essential since only limited conceptual and analytical progress has 
been made for over a century. A novel attempt to define and explore regulatory 
independence in practice is overdue. Indeed, the importance awarded to formal 
institutional attributes of regulatory agencies dates back to the early literature on US 
‘independent regulatory commissions’, which followed the 1887 creation o f what is 
considered the first specimen; the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The legislative 
struggle surrounding the form that the ICC had to take with regard to its constitutional 
position, hence, its statutory mission, authority and constraints, as well as those concerning 
the creation of subsequent commissions have been vividly described by Cushman31.
In a detailed account about fifty years after the ICC’s birth, Cushman explains how from 
the start he was asked to join the President’s Committee on Administrative Management 
and prepare a memorandum setting forth precisely: the statutory basis o f the commissions, 
an analysis of their relations to the three major federal, government departments, and any 
possible alternative to independent commissions as administrative devices undertaking 
regulatory tasks. Yet, while focussing on formal arrangements32, besides portraying the 
political resistance to the setup of these bodies even before their creation, Cushman reports 
that shortly after the ICC’s inception, although it was relatively weak in formal terms, 
regulatees “refused to obey the orders of the commission regardless o f their 
reasonableness”33. Similarly, once its statutory powers were subsequently expanded, 
regulatees submitted proposals for other bodies to supplement or even take over the tasks 
carried out by the ICC34.
Thus, regulatory independence has been closely associated with formal independence since 
the first relevant study, despite indications that non-statutory factors matter in policy­
making. This approach has largely persisted thereafter. Fesler added to the insight by 
acknowledging that the independence o f commissions could be interpreted to have 
different meanings but, like Cushman, focussed his analysis on the “institutional
31 Cushman,RE 1941, “The Independent Regulatory Commissions”, OUP, refers to the ‘growth of the 
commission movement’. It also contains a brief account o f the British experience on regulatory structures 
and functions until the late 1930s
32 He defines an ‘independent’ commission “entirely outside any...executive department,...isolated from the 
integrated administrative structure o f the executive branch,...subject to no direct supervision or control by 
any Cabinet Secretary or by the President”,p.3
33 ibid.pp.65-66
34 ibid.p.119
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safeguards... that promise to increase an agency’s degree o f independence”35. He suggested 
that the supposed means was “the organizational status o f ‘independence’ or isolation from 
political and economic centres o f power”36, although a more notable, and more cited, 
contribution of his has been to label ‘myths’ both “complete independence from, and 
complete subordination to, the chief executive and the legislature”37.
Fesler also poignantly observed that two key political factors “important in freeing 
agencies.. .not recognised in the statutes” are the “alliance of agencies with pressure groups 
whose...power is sufficient to protect their wards against even such controls as are 
authorized by law” - a key issue expanded in the framework presented below -, and the 
“ability... to develop political power sufficient to resist the chief executive’s 
encroachment”38. The implication appears to be that the exclusive assessment of formal 
institutional arrangements constitutes a formalistic and static approach to independence, 
one which does not reveal much about how regulators actually behave or about their 
relationships with other actors.
In his operational account of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Katzmann has 
unambiguously stated that “lack of precision in statutory language and the absence of 
unambiguous directives with respect to policy ends are the sources o f wide discretionary 
authority”39. The view that statutes, and the powers and resources that are attributed 
through them, do not tell the whole story reflects Fiorina’s consideration that “legislated 
regulation and realized regulation are not identical”40.
35 FeslerJW, p.192, “Independent Regulatory Agencies”, pp. 191-218 in (eds.) Morstein-Marx,F 1946, 1959 
“Elements o f public administration”, Prentice-Hall
36 ibid.p.191
37 ibid.p.192. Regarding dichotomous interpretations, Moe has pointed out that “the term independence has 
always been an ambiguous one, used to describe varying degrees o f political insulation as well as simply the 
location o f agencies outside the regular executive departments”, specifying “it has remained unclear how 
these agencies are supposed to fit into the network o f political influence and governmental authority” in 
1982, “Regulatory performance and presidential administration”, American Journal o f Political Science, 26(2), 
p.199
38 Fesler 1946,1959, p.195
39 Katzmann,RA 1980, “Regulatory bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy”, p.5, 
MIT Press
40 Fiorina,M 1982, “Legislative choice o f regulatory forms: legal process or administrative process?” p.40, 
Public Choice: 39, pp.33-66, objects to the assumption that calculations, made by actors involved in a given 
regulatory process, will necessarily result in expected outcomes. While Fiorina emphasises that he does not 
believe that events occurring in regulatory contexts are merely accidental, he underplays the idea that 
outcomes are pure consequences o f intentionality
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A key related point is that while the “primary axis of regulatory independence is freedom 
from control by government”41, agency independence in practice must also be explored 
with respect to the way they monitor the activities of regulatees. Formal institutionalist 
studies largely circumvent this issue, subdy disguised in Fesler’s phrase ‘independence 
from’ and focussed upon by public choice ‘capture’ analysis discussed in s.III.2. Fesler’s 
reference to the usefulness of alliances that agencies create with powerful groups above 
suggests ‘capture theory’ ignores questions about who is using who in the relationship 
between regulators and regulatees. Nonetheless, ignoring regulatees appears a serious 
analytical omission since it conceals a whole dimension o f regulatory agency independence.
Indeed, thus far, with formal institutionalists studying the independence of regulators from 
senior elected officials retaining statutory controls, and ‘capture’ scholars examining (lack 
of) agency independence from influential regulatees, analyses have remained theoretically 
entrenched, not combining the approaches to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
agency independence. Thus an in-depth exposition o f whether formally independent 
regulators are independent in practice from regulated firms must be applied. Indeed, 
practising regulators have described the respective influence of both sets o f actors 
distinctly42. So, the question o f whether “formal independence is .. .a f^ade”43 needs testing 
with respect both to independence in practice from political actors and from regulated 
firms.
III. Existing Analytical Approaches
III.l Principal-Agent Theory
A central reason for the study of delegation o f formal powers to agencies being associated 
with regulatory independence from elected officials is the framing of independence 
through the influential principal-agent model, elaborated by US rational choice scholars44. 
The model accounts for the wishes of elected officials to exploit the benefits of creating 
bureaucracies for the reasons indicated above, while incorporating the risk that agents, in
41 Wilks,SM & Bartle,I January 2002, “The Unanticipated Consequences o f Creating Independent 
Competition Agencies”, p.151, West European Politics, Vol.25(l), pp.148-172
42 Cary,WL 1967, “Politics and the Regulatory Agencies”, McGraw Hill. He was Chairman o f the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), before becoming Law Professor at Columbia University
43 Wilks and Barde 2002, p.151
44 PollackJVLA January 2002, “Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study o f  
Delegation”, pp.200-219, West European Politics, Vol.25(l)
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this case regulators, may implement preferences differing from those of their political 
principals. The cost of agents acting differendy from the wishes of their principals45, 
commonly known as ‘agency loss’, is one the principals want to minimise.
Thus, when designing regulatory agencies, political principals ensure some control 
mechanisms are retained as they remain accountable to the electorate for the actions 
undertaken in the respective domains. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast have stressed that if 
politicians cannot control agency-related administrative procedures, and thus outcomes, it 
would be hard to explain why their performance in office should matter to voters when 
assessing their candidates46.
Accordingly, ‘shirking’ by agencies is limited through the adoption of a variety of measures, 
including institutional design enabling principals to learn about agency proposals, and 
hence keep the latter’s activity under some control47. Claims have been made that direct 
forms o f control by principals, notably ‘police patrols’ o f legislators conducting audits of 
agencies’ activities, are less common than ‘fire-alarm’ oversight, which is arguably less 
centralised and interventionist as legislators establish rules, procedures and informal 
practices enabling third parties to examine administrative procedures to seek remedies from
46agencies .
Procedural rules can help to lead to agencies generating the outcomes desired by principals, 
unlike ex post legislation, as they establish the sequence o f decision-making49. Principals 
establishing administrative agencies can manipulate the latter’s structure and design, 
‘hardwiring’ or pre-programming them accordingly50. The initial hardwiring, which entails 
defining the mission of the agency, is essential to attract ‘right-thinking staff51, and
45 For a detailed account o f transaction cost analysis relating to the P-A model, chapters 2-3, Horn,MJ. 1995, 
“The Political Economy of Public Administration”, Cambridge University Press
46 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, pp.244-246
47 McCubbins,M and Lupia^A. August 1994, “Who controls? Information and the structure o f legislative 
decision-making”, pp.361-384, Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIX
48 McCubbins,M and Schwartz,T 1984, “Congressional oversight overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire 
Alarms”, pp.165-179, American Journal o f Political Science, Vol.28(l) p.166. For a refined and 
‘reconstructed’ discussion on these forms o f oversight, McCubbins,M and Lupia^AD April 1994, “Learning 
from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed”, Journal o f Law, Economics and 
Organization, pp.96-125
49 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989
50 MaceyJR 1992, “Organizational Design and Political Control o f Administrative Agencies”, Journal o f Law, 
Economics and Organisation, 8:93-110, p.101
51 Shepsle,KA 1992, “Bureaucratic drift, coalitional drift and time consistency: a comment on Macey”, p.113, 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organisation, 8: 111-118. When citing the 1977 Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Moe,T 1982, “Regulatory performance and presidential administration”, American 
Journal o f Political Science, 26(2), p.202, also referred to the importance attributed to “right-minded people” 
for regulatory decisions to be consistent with the wishes o f the US President, especially with average
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influence policy subtly. Indeed, some argue that a critical control instrument held by 
political principals is the selection o f the head or the management of an agency, making the 
appointment process a critical factor to influence future decisions before the agency 
constructs its own policy path52.
Wood and Waterman have provided an extensive account supporting the fundamental 
political importance o f appointments in US agencies, indicating that “the greater the 
centralization of agency decision-making processes, the greater the executive control over 
bureaucratic outputs”53. Moe too has discussed the significance of appointment powers, 
but he has also emphasised how political principals’ controls over the allocation of 
agencies’ budgets risk affecting their performance54.
Budgets have organisational implications for agencies, since they determine the extent of 
non-financial resources that can be exploited. Noll has pointed out that “the extent of 
information dependence and professional bias in an agency is also to some degree under 
the control of political overseers...(since)...the magnitude o f the agency’s budget in 
relationship to the scope and complexity of its responsibilities affects the extent to which 
the agency can assure itself o f multiple and independent sources o f information”55.
Therefore, existing literature has suggested that there are a range of institutional factors 
that allow political principals to maintain some control over agencies, and the more 
extensive such controls, the greater agency responsiveness towards those political 
principals.
More recently, Gilardi has argued that the creation of formally independent regulatory 
agencies entails only some control mechanisms are present and overall ‘they are much less 
relevant than for ordinary bureaucracy’56. Yet, while playing down the above-mentioned 
control mechanisms, Gilardi acknowledges that in certain circumstances administrative
commissioners leaving office well before their fixed terms expired, allowing him to rapidly appoint a majority 
to a board contrary to formal design. However, Noll,R has argued that in practice Presidents do not exercise 
the authority they could over regulatory agencies, 1971 “Reforming Regulation”, p.36, Brookings Institution
52 McCubbins,M, Calvert,RL & Weingast,BR 1989, “A theory of political control and agency discretion”, 
American Journal o f Political Science, 33(3): 588-611, p.604
53 Wood,BD and Waterman,RW September 1991, “The Dynamics of Political Control o f the Bureaucracy”, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 85(3), pp.810-828, p.822
54 Moe 1982, p.200-1
55 Noll,RG 1989, “Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation”, p.1279, in (eds.) Schmalensee,R and 
Willig,RD, “Handbook o f Industrial Organisation”, Vol.2, pp.1254-1287. Brackets added
56 Gilardi Dec.2001, p. 10
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procedures ‘stacking the deck’57 in favour o f well-organised constituencies might apply, as 
m:ay institutional checks in the form of general competition authorities that share 
competencies with regulators, and ministers retaining some powers. Accordingly, the thrust 
o f  Gilardi’s analysis is that the principal-agent model is useful to evaluate comparative 
constraints on regulators, which entails that “the extent of independence varies significantly 
between agencies”58.
Gilardi has made an important contribution to the operationalisation of formal agency 
independence by refining an ‘independence index’59, previously elaborated by scholars 
measuring that of central banks60, some acknowledging the need for non-formal 
independence indicators61. He based his findings on the formal authority delegated to 
regulatory agencies across Europe; thirty-three in a first instance, more recendy expanded 
to  one-hundred-six62. To explore the degree o f formal authority renounced by time- 
inconsistent senior political officials, thus addressing principal-agent theory, he identified 
indicators for independence and divided them among five categories: the agency head 
status63; the management board members’ status; the general frame o f the relationships 
with the government and the parliament; financial and organizational autonomy, and the 
extent of delegated regulatory competencies.
In terms of explanatory intent, rather unambiguous indicators include: who appoints 
chairmen and boards; term of offices - on the grounds that terms longer than the duration 
o f the legislature and the executive being in office indicate that agency officials are 
supposedly less politically sensitive; dismissal procedures; whether management board 
members can hold other offices in government; who, other than a court, can overturn an 
agency decision where it has exclusive competency; the source of the budget; how the 
budget is controlled; who is competent for sectoral regulation. Similarly unambiguous 
indicators for a formal analysis o f independence, but seemingly less valuable given their
57 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, p.255
58 Gilardi 2001, p.9
59 Gilardi Dec.2002, pp.879-884
60 Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991
61 Alesina 1988, p.40, includes informal relationships and contacts between Central Bankers and members o f  
the executive, but states that quantifying these elements is not easy
62 Gilardi,F 2002; 2005 “The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison o f 17 Countries and 7 
Sectors”, Swiss Political Science Review 11(4): 139-167; 2008, “Delegation in the Regulatory State”, Edward 
Elgar
63 WilsonJ has commented: “no agency head can ever achieve complete autonomy for his or her organization 
(since) politics requires accountability”, 1989, “Bureaucracy - What Government Agencies D o and Why They 
D o It”, Basic Books, p. 188
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yes/no operationalisation, are those asking whether independence is a formal requirement 
for appointment at management level and if agency independence is formally stated.
Each indicator was coded and scored between 0 and l 64. Factors identifiable with 
independence received a score closer to 1. So, the less formal say political principals had in 
the management of, and policy conducted by, the regulatory agencies the more 
independent. Only four o f the seventeen European countries examined averaged over 0.5 
on Gilardi’s independence scale65. More importantly with regard to this thesis, France and 
UK were two of them, although Ireland was awarded the highest independence value.
III.2 ‘Capture* Theory
One limit o f Gilardi’s index is that it does not consider regulatory activity with respect to 
regulatees; presumably an essential justification for regulation being in place. A host of 
theoretical literature by the ‘Chicago school’ has made claims that regulation does not in 
fact work in the public interest or, in any case, according to the statutory mandates 
attributed to regulators. Stigler argued that small and well-organised interest groups manage 
to promote demands for specific and narrow regulatory policies benefiting their own 
economic status66. For example, organised groups o f regulatees are keen that controls over 
new entrants be implemented so as to reduce the chances of competition and increase their 
economic benefits at the expense of consumers, who are generally broad, diffuse groups. 
Peltzman claimed that organised “interest groups can influence the outcome of the 
regulatory process by providing financial or other support to politicians or regulators”67.
Regulators struggle to be independent from regulatees. Reasons include that their 
resources, financial or otherwise, are frequently inferior to those o f certain firms they 
regulate. Agencies will have some formal powers to control regulatees, and possibly be able 
to sanction breaches o f conduct. However, in aiming to carry out their statutory duties,
64 Scores for individual indicators were added for each category to derive the aggregate mean. By applying the 
same process to the five categories and averaging the scores out values were obtained
65 Gilardi 2005, Figurel, p.141
66 Stigler 1971
67 Peltzman,S 1989, “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade o f Deregulation”, Brookings 
Papers: Microeconomics, pp.1-59
33
regulatory agencies suffer from the same problem that political principals suffer with 
respect to their behaviour, namely information asymmetries68.
Regulators are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis regulated firms because critical information - that 
may cause certain policy decisions instead of others - is only possessed by a single regulatee 
or a group of them. Therefore, the agency bears an information dependency, which 
restrains its ‘independent’ outlook and decision-making. Another impediment may be staff 
shortages, with regulators not paying as much as regulated firms, as may be the ‘revolving 
door’69, with regulatees joining regulators and then returning to private sector jobs. Thus, 
the professional characteristics o f regulators are likely to be important70, as is evidence of 
litde conflict between the two sides71.
Indeed, Bernstein’s earlier analysis of captured agencies, framed in his life-cycle hypothesis, 
interprets the ongoing relationship between regulator and regulatee as the cause for the 
public interest being subordinated to the prevalent interests of the regulated industry. 
Subdy identifying time as an important factor for policy outcomes unlike Stigler and 
Peltzman, Bernstein’s rationale was that if the regulator does not make the effort to analyse 
its regulatory problems ‘objectively’, it would tend to accept the arguments of the industry’s 
dominant players and, thus, favour their preferred policies, mistaking them for the public 
interest. Over the years, weighted down by the paraphernalia of due process, the regulator 
faces a weakened capacity to evaluate important economic regulatory issues and 
formulating programmes to resolve them72.
The increasing closeness between the two parties makes the ‘independent’ regulator leam 
more about the regulatee, including the latter’s operational difficulties. The agency starts 
empathising with the dominant regulatee it interacts with frequendy and is led to adopt a 
favourable treatment. According to Bernstein, to retain its independence from organised 
groups trying to capture it, the regulator must show due consideration for rival demands,
68 Information asymmetry’ literature owes a lot to 2001 Economics Nobel Laureate George Akerlofs 1970 
“The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol.84, pp.488-500. While the original article focuses on the risks o f purchasing products from second-hand 
markets, because of lack o f publicly available information on their quality, the relevant underlying concept is 
simply the problem of dealing with a counterpart that holds more information
69 Makkai,T and BraithwaiteJ 1992, Tn and out o f the revolving door: making sense o f regulatory capture’, 
Journal o f Public Policy 12(1): 61—78
70 For a quantitative evaluation of the type o f academic and professional skills o f supervisory staff at central 
banks and supervisory agencies, Goodhart,CAE, SchoenmakerJD and Dasgupta,PS January 2002 “The Skill 
Profile o f Central Bankers and Supervisors”, European Finance Review, Vol.6(3)
71 Thatcher Dec.2002, p.958
72 Bernstein,MH 1955, “Regulating Business by Independent Commission”, Princeton University Press, p.144
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and assess the extent to which its authority should be used to modify the relationships 
among major groups in the industry of its competence73.
IV. Quantitative Evidence
Recent studies have sought to ‘measure’ the independence o f regulatory agencies by 
identifying quantifiable indicators. Some of Gilardi’s comparative findings on formal 
independence of regulators covering five sectors in seven countries have been surprising. 
For example, despite having a reputation for taking decisions in its own right, the UK’s 
Oftel scored 0.74, compared to France’s ART relatively high 0.6574, considering its 
reputation for experiencing significant state involvement in its policy-making procedures75. 
In fact, the values for both regulators are higher than the average formal independence 
values found by Gilardi in 2005 for the respective countries, making them stand out as 
especially ‘independent’. Since Oftel and the ART scored higher on the formal 
independence scale than other sectoral agencies, it is all the more appropriate to examine 
their independence in practice.
Edwards and Waverman also produced an interesting piece of work, particularly relevant 
here because of their focus on telecoms regulators, based on quantitative insights76. Instead 
of Gilardi’s independence values between 0 and 1 derived from the averages of five 
categories comprising selected indicators, Edwards and Waverman’s index is composed by 
the sum of 12 measures relating to formal institutional features of the agencies, hence 
giving scores between 0 and 12. Crucially, the latter’s findings contradict those of Gilardi, 
whereby they project a higher independence value for the French regulatory institution 
(6.5) than the British one (5.75), with both remaining unaltered over time. By translating 
the indices to make them comparable77, data by Edwards and Waverman also suggests that 
both the French and British regulators are much less formally independent than portrayed 
by Gilardi. Respective values o f 0.54 and 0.48 for the ART and Oftel make the latter 0.26 
‘less independent’; a drastic drop out o f a maximum score of 1.
73 ibid. p.155
74 Gilardi 2002, p.879
75 Dabler,T and Parker,D 2004, “Harmony or disharmony in the regulation and the promotion o f  
competition in EU telecommunications? A survey o f the regulatory offices”, Utilities Policy 12, pp.9—28, 
Elsevier, refer to Thatcher 1999, p.10
76 Edwards and Waverman 2006
77 Comparable index values are obtained by simply dividing total scores for each regulator by the number o f  
indicators accounted for in the index. So, Edwards and Waverman values were divided by 12
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The considerable difference in values is very significant given the similar conceptualisations 
o f  independence. Comparing the two quantitative assessments reveals that minor 
differences in the formal measurement and interpretation can translate into different 
degrees of independence for the same agencies, raising even more questions about how 
each index is constructed. Notably, Edwards and Waverman ask whether the agency has 
been in operation at least 2 years78, a point that is excluded by Gilardi. Quite aside from 
raising the question of why 2 years of existence are important and not longer or less and 
how this minimum period ties with formal independence, how can the impact of one or 
more specific, additional, indicators on an agency’s independence index be established? 
Also, how do Edwards and Waverman define and quantify the term ‘adequate’ when using 
it for certain formal institutional design indicators?79 Indeed, does the subjective 
implication o f the term not undermine the predominant use of formal indicators to define 
independence?
These simple questions address the fact that formal definitions o f independence are 
imbued with more subjectivity than their propagators convey and thus do not provide a full 
picture. As such, they raise concerns about the value of the indices in terms of 
independence in practice. In fact, Gilardi has admitted there is a need to devise 
comparative indicators o f informal or de facto independence80, buttressing the purpose of 
the informal indicators identified in the next chapter and the scope of the thesis overall.
Edwards and Waverman’s paper is nonetheless relevant for the scope o f this thesis, 
because they assess agency independence in terms of regulatory outcomes concerning the 
European telecommunications sector by examining interconnect charges national 
incumbent operators imposed on new entrants. Their real contribution of interest is that 
the role and implications of majority or part public (state) ownership o f incumbent 
operators are recognised, even at a basic level, as impinging on what is reputed to be 
regulatory agency independence. For example, a Government facing a seriously indebted
78 see their fn.40, p.41
79 The normative judgment is applied to several institutional ‘elements’ they use to measure independence, 
namely, whether the regulator has ‘adequate’: powers regarding interconnection issues; and resources (staff 
and budget)
80 Gilardi 2005, p.157. For a fuzzy-set analysis, Maggetti^Vf 2007, “De facto independence after delegation: a 
fuzzy-set analysis”, Regulation and Governance, Vol.l(4).pp.271-294; shortcomings o f  quantitative 
‘measurements’ indicated herein remain. Maggetti recognises the “ultimate” value o f a qualitative and 
systematic analysis o f explanatory factors of de facto independence; 2009 “The role o f independent regulatory 
agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis”, p.465, Journal o f European Public Policy 16(3), pp.450- 
470. Moreover, his work separates conceptually and empirically agency independence from elected officials 
and regulatees unlike the analysis developed here
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majority state-owned company for which it has direct or indirect management and financial 
responsibilities is likely to be especially sensitive to the firm’s needs81, and accordingly 
would have a resonant, though reasonable, interest in ‘adverse’ decisions by an 
‘independent’ regulator.
Regression results from the interaction between regulatory independence and public 
ownership are worth reporting since they indicate that “at the mean value of the index in 
the sample, a fully government owned PTO will enjoy a local interconnect rate 0.464 
Eurocents higher than if it were fully privatized. However, the addition o f an extra formal 
element promoting independence of the NRA from the government will reduce this 
advantage by 0.199 Eurocents. A level of independence...two points above the mean 
should therefore come close to neutralizing the bias in favour o f an entirely government 
owned PTO”82.
Edwards and Waverman also point to the insignificant coefficient o f the regulatory 
independence effect on interconnect outcomes. They stress that it matters only when in 
conjunction with Governments holding an ownership stake in the PTO83. Instead, a 
Government that has divested itself of all shares is likely to be less informed and interested 
in regulatory policy technicalities, though this may also depend on their political impact; 
say, preferences on national employment levels.
Although the index values awarded are based on formal independence criteria much like 
Gilardi, acknowledging the existence and effect o f political factors that are not explicitly 
laid in statutes granting independence is an important step forward per se. An additional 
merit of Edwards and Waverman is that they compare formal independence index values at 
two different points in time (1998 and 2003), thus showing variation over time and giving a 
dynamic perspective on how agency independence can change, however it is examined. A 
key implication o f the paper remains that political intervention into the management of 
regulation by agencies might be subtly taking place, and formal delegation of powers is a 
shrewd but insufficient method o f examination to account for such activity.
Thatcher has put forward a set of slighdy different, more nuanced, quantitative indicators 
comparing the autonomy of regulators across the four largest EU economies (Germany,
81 Edwards and Waverman, p.37
82 ibid.p.47 PTO stands for Public Telecommunications Operator, here intended as national incumbent 
operator, NRA means national regulatory agencies
83 One o f the selected French sub-cases expanded upon below (ch.7) illustrates this quite vividly
37
UK, France and Italy) using averages or aggregate data over set periods of time84. Party 
politicisation of appointments, departures (dismissals and resignations) of ‘independent 
regulatory agencies’ (IRA) members before their term ended, the average tenure of the 
latter, financial and staffing resources of IRAs as well as the use o f powers to overturn 
IRAs’ decisions by elected officials were used to define agency independence from 
politicians.
Italy was found to be the country where politicisation o f regulatory agencies was most 
pronounced by far. There was no evidence of formal dismissal o f agency officials or 
informal pressures for them to leave85, and it was suggested elected officials made limited 
use of powers to overturn decisions. So, the collected data suggests formal powers were 
not used by elected officials to influence regulators, supporting the scope and sense of the 
questions posed in this thesis. While Thatcher’s data does not prove that the regulators 
analysed were independent from political officials, it entails that more subtle forms of 
control, if any at all, must have been at work, such as the creation of resource dependencies 
or informal relationships86.
To examine the occurrence of capture - or at least establish the ‘relational distance’87 
between regulators and regulatees -, revolving doors, the number o f mergers blocked or 
made subject to conditions and the number o f legal challenges brought by regulatees 
against regulators were evaluated88. The evidence provided suggests the revolving door is 
considerably more present in the UK than in the continental countries studied. The trend 
concerning legal challenges brought by regulatees indicated they are more frequent on the 
Continent than in the UK. Although the UK witnessed slightly more merger rejections in
84 Thatcher Dec.2002, pp.954-972; 2005 “The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected 
Politicians in Europe”, Governance, Vol.l8(3), pp.347-373
85 The 2005 case of the, albeit delayed, resignation of former Bank o f Italy Governor, Antonio Fazio - who 
could not be formally dismissed by Government without new legislation being passed - following the 
controversy concerning his regulation of the Italian banking sector and the ensuing pressures, unequivocally 
challenges the suggestion that formal dismissal procedures reflect degrees of independence. If formal 
independence matters in practice, why did the Governor feel the need to resign when he could not be 
removed, especially since he had explicitly chosen not to quit straight after the outbreak o f the controversy?
86 Coen et al 2002
87 Black,DJ 1976, “The behaviour o f law”, New York. The reference to Black’s term should not suggest that a 
direct association is being made between capture and ‘relational distance’. The latter’s impact is nonetheless 
dependent on the scope, frequency, length of interaction, as well as the nature and number o f links. Quoting 
Black - “People vary in the degree to which they participate in one another’s lives. This defines their intimacy 
or relational distance”, p.40. As Hood,C, Scott,C, James,O, Jones,G and Travers,T stress in 1999 “Regulation 
Inside Government”, especially pp.60-65, OUP, the concept is a key theme in the business-regulation 
literature; it shapes the conditions in which law is used to order social relations, and law enforcement. 
Reflecting on Grabosky,P and BraithwaiteJ 1986 “O f Manners Gentle”, OUP , Hood et al have suggested 
indicators concerning the effect o f relational distance on regulatory formality
88 Thatcher Dec.2002, pp.962-966
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proportional terms, overall, few mergers were stopped by the regulatory agencies in all four 
countries.
V. Problems with ‘Measuring’ Independence
The complexity o f finding relevant indicators and data suggests that attempts to measure 
independence deserve much praise, given the interesting results drawn so far. Some 
measurement weaknesses remain nonetheless, underpinning a new effort to review 
evaluation techniques. Moe observes that popular models o f regulation as well as 
quantitative empirical work have tended to focus on very small parts of the whole either 
for reasons of clarity and mathematical tractability or for data collection and measurement 
problems89.
Indeed, in their study on Central Bank independence, Cukierman et al distinguished 
between legal’ independence, which they acknowledge as “only one o f several elements 
that determine...actual independence”90, and two sets o f distinct informal indicators. The 
latter were: (i) turnover of Central Bank Governors and (ii) “responses to a questionnaire 
that was sent to a non-random sample of specialists on monetary policy in various Central 
Banks”91. While this added a less formalistic touch to their analysis of independence, none 
of the indices was closely correlated92.
The fact that quantifying a subtle concept such as independence over-simplifies complex 
realities is exposed in other studies. One limit o f Gilardi’s analysis, which, unlike Edwards 
and Waverman93, he openly acknowledges, is the equal weighting o f all the indicators 
supposed to measure independence94. This approach is, for example, in stark contrast to 
Wood and Waterman’s finding that the political appointment o f heads o f bureaucracies is a
89 Moe,T 1985, ‘Control and feedback in economic regulation: the case o f the NLRB’, American Political 
Science Review 79(4): 1094-116, p.1095
90 Cukierman ,A, Webb,SB and Neyapti,B 1992, “Measuring the Independence o f Central Banks and its Effect 
on Policy Outcomes”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol.6(3), pp.353-398, p.361, while concerning Central 
Banks only, is an especially insightful and cited study
91 ibid. p.367
92 ibid Table 6, p.369
93 Edwards and Waverman 2006, p.41,fn.41, just state that “the approach is consistent with previous 
approaches to the construction of the indexes o f regulatory independence”
94 Gilardi Dec.2002, p.880
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key instrument for elected officials (more specifically the President and Congress, in the 
US) to influence future regulatory policy95.
Similarly, Noll has stressed the importance of the authority allocating agency budgets 
because of their likely impact on other resources96. Those of ‘independent’ UK utility 
regulators have been approved by Parliament and require some negotiation with the 
Treasury97. Yet, the importance of budgets, and hence of who allocates them, is likely to 
vary. At times of expanding markets, the degree of autonomy to budget for contingent 
needs, such as the external contribution of specialised consultants or the purchase of 
information from ‘gatekeepers’, may impede regulators in their quests, whereas at quieter 
times less generous budgets approved by Parliament may be more than sufficient to tackle 
the most important policies at stake. It, therefore, appears that the question of how 
indicators are weighted is a moot point. Subjectivity, in scoring independence indicators, is 
inherent98.
A further point raised above is that measuring independence by examining institutional 
arrangements at one point in time, as done by Gilardi and Thatcher, means independence 
is assumed to be a constant. If  agency independence is variable across countries, is it 
possible to assume that it will not be variable over time within the same country, given 
particular contexts99? In Thatcher’s case it may be possible to break data between periods 
of time rather than looking at aggregate values over a number of years. For example, it 
would be interesting to know in which years political affiliation was strongest and relate the 
findings to any major issues that had arisen at those times.
95 Wood and Waterman 1991, p.822
96 Noll 1989
97 McCarthy,C April 2003, (then Chairman o f UK energy regulator Ofgem and subsequently Chairman of the 
UK’s Financial Services Authority), “The Independence o f the Regulation Authority - Why Independent 
Regulators?”, (speech at Sciences-Po - Paris), p.10
98 Quite exceptionally Cukierman et al 1992, weigh differently indicator categories for the legal’ independence 
index o f Central Banks (p.358-9), and their emphasis is on generic indicator categories common to the other 
studies comprising indexes, such as appointment and dismissal o f CEOs; statutory rights over policy 
formulation and; specificity of key policy objectives and Central Bank authority over elected officials with 
respect to them. Indicators concerning activities specifically undertaken by Central Banks with respect to 
Government are weighted less instead. More importantly in terms of understanding independence in practice, 
the rationale for weights is not clearly explained, as is not that for the weights o f indicators in the 
questionnaire on independence sent to specialists. In addition, the authors do not deny that “the judgments 
of those responding to the questionnaire are subjective and not entirely uniform”, p.367, suggesting an 
inherent flaw in their exploration o f non-legal independence and limiting the benefits of this more dynamic 
analysis of operational aspects
99 Hood,C, Hall,C & Scott,C 2000, “Telecommunications Regulation - Culture, chaos and interdependence 
inside the regulatory process” Roudedge p.84 have stated that “the relative power o f (regulatory) actors...is 
likely to change over time” (brackets added)
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More notably, allowances are not made for particular policy issues which are of significant 
interest to different parties with opposed preferences. These are likely to see the agency 
under greater pressure than ones which cause litde political debate and/or unrest among 
regulatees and consumers. When regulators are under pressure from elected officials for 
having badly managed a policy receiving considerable media coverage, does the duty to 
submit an annual report to Parliament impinge on their independence as much as the 
potential prospect of being dismissed by relevant ministers? More to the point, can ‘visible’ 
factors set out in formal institutional arrangements be the only forces at work affecting 
regulatory policy?
Buiter has only very recently raised renewed attention over the importance of non-formal 
independence, depicting a prominent institution like the European Central Bank (ECB) as 
‘the most independent central bank in the world’. More crucially, he added: “While the 
treaty and protocols do not give the ECB the power to set either the ultimate targets of 
monetary policy or the operational targets, they do grant it an extraordinary degree o f 
operational independence.. .There is only formal accountability - reporting duties, that is 
the obligation to provide certain information and to explain its actions to the European 
Parliament”100, clearly sustaining the argument made here that formal institutions have 
limited explanatory power in terms of agency independence. Ranking indicators associated 
with formal independence, therefore, appears a useful but dry approach to examine 
regulators’ independence in practice. The arbitrary practice o f adopting quantitative 
indicators101 and even weighting them does not resolve the issue of accounting for specific 
complexities through rigorous, qualitative, interpretation of cases. The summary exercise 
undertaken through these indicators requires interpretation and judgment.
To the applied mathematician, using case studies and little or no quantitative data may 
seem a fuzzy and blurred approach. Nevertheless, if independence in practice has to be 
evaluated without incurring the limitations indicated above and by looking at the 
comprehensive influence exerted by elected officials and regulatees on the process 
undertaken by regulators on complex policies o f wide interest as intended here, this 
appears somewhat necessary. Political scientists exploring different issues by applying
100 Buiter,WH 19/1/07, “High degree of ECB independence in securities sector is undesirable”, Letters to the 
Editor, Financial Times
101 At the start of the PhD, a LSE Professor well-versed in European electricity regulation suggested, with a 
touch o f irony, that I measure the independence of French regulators by examining how many o f  their senior 
officials had studied at the ‘grandes ecoles’. Perhaps, for the sake o f ‘measuring’ independence, this is as good 
a quantitative indicator as others
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empirical quantitative methods admit to it too102 since, however useful, such indicators do 
no t tell the whole story. Maggetti’s fuzzy-set analysis combines quantitative and qualitative 
elements to challenge suggestions that formal independence explains de facto 
independence103. At the least, the quantitative approach does not allow for dynamic 
mechanisms among core actors, which Moe identifies as ‘mutually adaptive adjustment’, 
where each one is responsive to the decisions of each of the others and reciprocal 
relationships balance the system104.
In  this sense, Coen et al’s study105 examining how the relationships between regulators, 
competent ministries and regulatees, and the respective power balances, evolved in the key 
utilities sectors o f telecoms, energy and rail in both Britain and Germany provides an 
interesting portrait of regulatory (independence. It draws out the issue of how informal 
dependencies and relationships affect regulatory behaviour, assesses independence from 
both elected officials and regulatees and, while not giving formal arrangements prime 
importance, it does not undermine them.
Two preliminary but distinct conclusions can thus be drawn from the literature overview 
regarding regulatory independence. First, agency independence can be ‘measured’ with 
respect to different sets o f actors. Second, there is little agreement on how agency 
independence is defined, except for the questionable tendency to associate it with formal 
institutional design. The largely unsatisfactory and conflicting conceptualisations presented 
in scholarly work thus far should not distract from the need to examine agency 
independence by considering how regulation is implemented in practice after formal 
delegation. Indeed, besides noting that institutional arrangements are incomplete, thus 
mirroring Fesler’s earlier claim that “legislatures despair o f defining in crystal-clear terms 
the norms of conduct to govern economic or social life”106, Thatcher has crucially observed 
how powers and controls can be used in many different ways107.
Such claims raise important but distinct implications, which deserve to be addressed from a 
fresh perspective. The incompleteness o f institutional arrangements, which to an extent is
102 AllanJ and Scruggs,L 2006, “Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a replication and 
revision”, Journal of European Social Policy Vol.l6(l): 55-72, p.57
103 Maggetti 2007, suggests that regulatory agencies’ age, veto players and membership o f European agency 
networks matter
104 Moe 1985, p.1095
105 Coen et al 2002
106 Fesler 1946,1959, p.l 96
107 Thatcher Dec.2002, p.955
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unavoidable and defines agencies’ “zone of discretion”108 - explained as delegated powers 
minus formal controls retained by principals is the underlying factor in the critical 
exposition of existing approaches raised above. Quite aside from whether, comparatively, 
regulators have considerable formal powers or are subject to extensive statutory controls, 
this raises the question of whether other, informal, factors influence agency independence.
A separate, highly significant, point, which can be drawn from Thatcher’s remark, and is 
largely omitted in existing analyses on regulatory independence, is that agencies do not 
deploy formal, or informal, resources strictly according to their availability. The fact that 
regulators deploy them on a varying basis implies they decide to, or not to, do so, whatever 
the degree of powers actually held109. Thus, due consideration must be given to agencies’ 
policy preferences. The latter signal the propensity to act, and lead to the exploitation of 
available resources. Indeed, preferences of non-regulatory actors, who may have other 
resources, also need to be examined to understand who achieves their preferred policy 
outcomes. Therefore, to examine regulatory independence in practice, there is a strong 
need for an adaptable, relevant, framework that integrates analytically both the combination 
of preferences o f different actors as well as the distribution of resources between them, to 
evaluate which ones matter for given policies.
VI. State Autonomy: Definition and Types
The preceding sections have indicated that defining independence as a static state is 
inadequate. Nordlinger’s approach to state autonomy110, defined as “a seminal analysis” by 
some111 and “most ambitious” by others112, provides many useful elements and a ‘first level’ 
of analysis that deserves due consideration to assess regulatory independence. He identifies 
the autonomy o f the state with the ability to translate its policy preferences into 
authoritative actions, poignantly clarifying that the definition should not refer to a set of
108 Thatcher and Stone Sweet, p.5
109 BlackJ refers to “the ability and willingness to use them”; 2003 “Enrolling actors in regulatory system: 
Examples from UK financial services regulation”, reprinted from Public Law - Spring 2003, Sweet and 
Maxwell Ltd, pp.63-91, p.73
110 Nordlinger 1981
111 SmileyJD 1984, “Federal States and Federal Societies, with Special Reference to Canada”, International 
Political Science Review, Vol.5(4), pp.443-454, Pluralism and Federalism,p.450
112 Krasner,S January 1984, “Approaches to the State: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics”, 
Comparative Politics, Vol.l6(2), pp.223-246, p.231
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“ institutional arrangements” since it cannot be said that institutions have preferences; a 
condition for the “making of public policy”113.
By treating preferences and the diverse state strategies deployed to achieve them as the 
central aspects o f his framework, Nordlinger presents autonomy as a practice aimed at 
achieving a policy preference rather than just as an endowment. He usefully identifies three 
types o f autonomy, based on different preference scenarios for which different sets of 
strategies are used by the state to fulfill the preferred policy, as summarised in Table 1 and 
discussed in detail further below. The range o f  autonomy types reflects the key concept 
that there is variation in the practice o f being autonomous. Hence, different factors other 
than formal arrangements must be attributed due explanatory power, and preferences 
cannot be overlooked.
Table 1: Nordlinger’s State - Autonomy Type scenarios: Own Labels114 (Level 1)
Types of 
Autonomy
Preferences Strategies
Type III
Absence of divergent state- 
society preferences
State translates preferences into authoritative 
action when state-society are non-divergent by: (i) 
preservation (ii) entrusting; (iii) apathy
Type II
Combination of divergence, 
indifference, convergence
State shifts preferences of divergent societal 
actors over time by: (i) inducement; (ii) 
appeasement - conciliation; (iii) 
enfranchisement; (iv) empowerment - 
reinforcement
Type 1 Predominant divergence, similar 
preferences in the background
State translate its preferences into authoritative 
action without altering societal preferences from 
the start by: (i) counterbalancing - offsetting; (ii) 
obstruction; (iii) confrontation - disincentive
113 Nordlinger, pp.8-9
114 Note that each one of Nordlinger’s strategies, which are fully explained below in the lengthy fashion he 
does, are specifically attributed shorthand labels here, not found in the original text
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Nordlinger’s propositions on autonomy form part o f the scholarly movement to ‘bring the 
state back in’115, in response to society-centred perspectives claiming that the state acts 
upon society’s wishes. Yet, his arguments are relevant here because they mirror debates on 
who in politics gets what, when, how and on the “struggle o f us against them”116. Part of 
the exercise to examine policy-making independence is to understand that the concept is 
not static or rigidly definable - as contradictory findings from otherwise similar analyses of 
formal institutional arrangements demonstrate. So, the preference-based approach is 
valuable because, unlike formal institutionalist work, it incorporates dynamic policy-making 
factors to evaluate autonomy in practice.
Variations in the patterns of state-society preferences are considered by Nordlinger to go a 
long way in determining the outcome of authoritative actions117 and are important to 
understand ‘who gets what’. Nordlinger claims that whether state-society preferences are 
divergent or non-divergent, therefore whether actors have different or similar preferences, 
serves as the most important basis for distinguishing between the different types of state 
autonomy118. The combination o f preferences he refers to - whether the state faces 
convergence, divergence and/or indifference - generates complex scenarios requiring a 
range o f respective processes comprising the different strategies and options (discussed in 
the following sections) which Nordlinger identifies to explain how the state achieves its 
preferences. Thus allowing for a variety of preference patterns widens enormously the 
settings in which autonomy can be verified. Neither preferences nor the complex and 
varied processes engendered to achieve them are reflected in statutory definitions 
exhaustively, and could not be expected to do so within the context of specific policy 
issues.
Before going further, the importance of preferences in Nordlinger’s framework and for the 
scope o f the thesis requires an upfront clarification regarding the conceptualisation of 
preference-based state autonomy. Nordlinger distinguishes between what he calls 
‘behavioural (or objective) and subjective autonomy’. The latter refers to the self-generation 
of preferences, derived from internal attributes. Instead, the former reflects his definition - 
the state is independent in acting as it chooses to act - and is the one retained here.
115 Especially the introduction in Skocpol,T, Evans,PB, Rueschmeyer,D, (eds.) 1985, “Bringing the state back 
in”, Cambridge University Press
116 Lasswell,H 1958 “Politics: Who gets what, when, how”, World Publishing Company, also referred to in 
Krasner, p.225
117 Nordlinger, p.17
118 ibid.p.20
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Thus, like Nordlinger, the thesis does not examine independence by looking at whether 
preferences are internally generated. Nordlinger warns that it would be “unrealistic to 
expect any social entity to come even close to being fully autonomous in this subjective 
sense”119. He explains this by pointing to a reciprocal learning process in a given 
environment, with an increased effect when interactions are fairly close and frequent. The 
implication is that because o f this shared learning process among different actors there 
might be some common ground on how an issue is looked at. This explains, at least in part, 
why non-divergent preferences are a possibility120, notwithstanding the largely dichotomous 
approach to assess state autonomy, with preferences always achieved vis-a-vis ‘societal 
actors’ whoever they may be.
By defining autonomy as preferences translated into authoritative actions, Nordlinger 
observes that a state acting upon its preferences viz. societal actors under conditions of 
non-divergence is just as autonomous as one under conditions o f divergence: “the 
distinction between a state acting on its preferences under conditions of divergence and 
one doing so under conditions of non-divergence is hardly unimportant. But it is advisable 
to use the term autonomy inclusively, and then go on to differentiate among types of 
autonomy on the basis o f the fit between.. .preferences”121. Thus, the theory suggests that 
ascertaining autonomy does not have to be exclusively associated with elements of 
confrontation. Similarly, achieving state preferences does not always involve the alteration 
of private behaviour or structure.
Autonomy characterised by non-divergence constitutes a novel concept, especially 
compared to other perspectives on state autonomy which Nordlinger associates with 
Skocpol and Krasner. He indicates how their emphasis is on state actions running counter 
to the long-run interests of the economically and politically dominant class. This entails 
excluding cases in which the state acts on its preferences in the absence of such conflicts. 
Yet, “surely there is no a priori reason to refer to such actions as non-autonomous...or 
societally constrained; nor is it unreasonable to view them as autonomous actions”122.
119 ibid.p.25
120 This conflicts starkly with the top-down concept o f ‘deck-stacking’, which assumes that where preferences 
are similar it is because o f the influence o f principals over agents rather than some input parity
121 Nordlinger, p.24
122 ibid.pp.23-4
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While suggesting that non-divergence between state and societal actors can constitute 
autonomy123, Nordlinger insists that there is excessive reliance on societal constraint 
assumptions. He contends that the state’s preferences are not translated into actions only 
because o f societal consent, countering the pluralist tenet which takes the state’s role 
insufficiendy seriously. Nordlinger refutes the argument that the state aggregates and 
processes societal demands, mediating and arbitrating among different groups, adding 
marginal contributions to policies at best He contends that, in a non-divergence context, 
litde if any acknowledgement is given to the state’s impact in shaping societal 
preferences124. Nordlinger admits being more concerned with the frequency with which the 
state acts on its preferences than the frequency with which societal preferences are 
translated into public policy. Nonetheless, he argues “it is patendy appropriate for the state 
to constitute the vantage point”125.
Thus, examining autonomy through preferences generates greater causal variation and 
complexity than the more orderly conceptualisation of independence based on degrees of 
formal authority and powers. The implication is that the making of public policy under 
different circumstances, determined by distinct patterns o f actor preferences, entails 
varying types of state autonomy for which Nordlinger identifies a wide range of deployable 
strategies, many o f which do not reflect formal or hierarchical resources.
With these premises, three potential autonomy types are set out below, depicting the state’s 
ability to translate its preferences into authoritative actions with or without opposition. The 
three Types of autonomy (HI, II and I) reflect the different scenarios and factors 
Nordlinger identifies to explain state autonomy. His definition o f autonomy rests on two 
dimensions: preferences and strategies, the latter subdivided in multiple options, which vary 
in line with the typologies126. Variations in preferences and strategies lead to the respective 
achievement of desired outcomes. The three types o f autonomy that Nordlinger finds for 
the state are subsequently redefined at the regulatory level, in chapter 2.
123 ibid.p.20
124 ibid.p.43
125 ibid.p.18
126 Contrary to the elaborate effort to explain the strategies open to the state, Nordlinger remains slightly 
more evasive about specific resources decisive to achieve the three Type autonomies. The detailed options are 
suggestive o f non-formal instruments deployed nonetheless
47
VI.1 Type III Autonomy
Type III accounts of autonomy are the most straightforward, albeit interesting because of 
their premises. Public officials translate their preferences into authoritative actions in the 
absence of divergent state-society preferences. This occurs because: o f preference 
convergence between the state and the most powerful private actors; and/or the latter 
deferring to the state’s preferences; and/or being indifferent towards them127. Nordlinger 
reiterates nonetheless the rejection of the society-centred perspective that the state is “able 
to act upon its preferences because o f societal support or the absence of societal 
opposition”128. Clarifying this point appears particularly relevant in a scenario of general 
non-divergence.
Nordlinger disputes that societal preferences should be taken as the analytical reference 
point because “there is little justification for putting forward one-sided 
interpretations...Private actors must share the actual or hypothetical explanatory honours 
with the state when their preferences converge”129. He challenges the assumption that the 
state acts on its preferences only because societal actors want or allow it to do so. Where 
society defers or is indifferent to state preferences the latter enjoy “at least some 
explanatory priority...In terms o f the substantive cast given to authoritative actions, the 
state’s preferences have patent priority”130.
Fundamental ideas, or the ‘grand issues’ of politics, as Nordlinger calls them, are believed 
to cause convergence between the two sides, occasionally to the extent that they represent 
non-issues131. For example, if a government announces it intends to pursue economic 
growth or improve the health service it is unlikely to meet much opposition, yet how it 
goes about it may prove more complex. Another example is given by Krasner who argues 
that in the raw materials markets there is a convergence of preferences between the state 
and societal actors since “the state’s desire for secure and stable supplies may lead to 
policies that further the profits, growth or market”132. The clearly identified needs o f the 
state can simply coincide with the economic interests o f firms.
127 Nordlinger, ch.3
128 Nordlinger, p. 80
129 Nordlinger, p.83
130 ibid. Thus Nordlinger challenges ‘observational equivalence’; the fact that achieving preferences under 
non-divergence could be used to suggest its lack o f autonomy (see Thatcher July 2005, p.351)
131 Nordlinger, p.75
132 Krasner,SD 1978, “Defending the national interest: raw materials investments and US foreign policy”, 
Princeton University Press, p.75
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Nordlinger also argues that both crisis periods and routine decisions can be instances of 
non-divergence. In crises periods, the ‘weightiest’ societal actors might have preferences 
that may or may not diverge from those of the state, but deference to the latter is 
overriding. For instance, national states taking control of banks to recapitalise and save 
them during the 2008 financial crisis, despite private shareholders losing out on their 
controlling rights. For ‘fairly routine decisions’, private actors might not know the effect of 
one policy over another on their interests, allowing public officials to act as they prefer. 
Clearly, the claims sustain the importance Nordlinger attributes to preferences, but equally 
reflect the importance of issues and their salience133.
When societal actors are not totally indifferent, public officials can rely direcdy on ‘policy 
levers’ nonetheless. Nordlinger refers to ‘strategies’ when describing the various 
opportunities available to the state to implement its preferences. Strategies are identified to 
address the combination o f societal actors whom state efforts are directed at and, 
particularly, the way in which preferences can be accomplished. Each strategy has more 
detailed ‘options’, which point to “real, diverse, and meaningful choices” for public 
officials134.
Three main autonomy-enhancing strategies are identified for the state to reinforce non­
divergence among societal actors in Type III autonomy, through fifteen ‘options’ in total135. 
The first strategy suggested, termed here ‘preservation’, sees public officials maintaining or 
strengthening the degree o f commitment of those societal actors whose preferences 
converge with those of the state. One option is to control the spread of information 
casting doubts on the mutually preferred policy by restricting public knowledge o f intra­
state policy disputes. Other options include making ambiguous statements and taking 
contradictory actions for societal actors to read their preferences into them, or publicly 
overdoing the success of a policy undertaken. Discouraging consideration o f divergent 
preferences by discrediting those trying to put challenging issues on the agenda - for 
example by calling them extremists, and relating state actions to widely shared values and 
symbols - such as efficient administration, complete the options.
133 Wood and Waterman 1991, p.823
134 Nordlinger, p.90-91
135 Nordlinger, especially pp.92-98
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The second strategy is working to maintain or solidify deference to the state by those actors 
wanting it to act on its own preferences, termed here ‘entrusting’. Recruiting renowned 
experts for high official positions, exposing that societal problems are dealt with by seeking 
and developing relevant remedies, playing up situations and the consequent need for 
decisive action, capitalising on statist traditions and deferential attitudes towards authority, 
or generating the belief that they are highly competent to deal with a problem, are the 
options that Nordlinger believes public officials might exercise.
Thirdly, the state can maintain or foster indifference among societal actors with unaligned 
preferences. This strategy can be thought of engendering ‘apathy’. The state may stress 
impartiality among different groups, or declare that decision-making responsibility lies 
elsewhere. Alternatively, it may give the impression o f evaluating policy options rationally 
and apolitically, portray high responsiveness to societal expectations, or adhere to formal- 
legal procedures when considering policies - for example by stating the formal powers of 
the state units within which they were made.
Thus, apart from rare exceptions like the last option mentioned, the Type III autonomy 
strategies o f ‘preservation’, ‘entrusting’ and ‘apathy’ largely prioritise the use o f approaches 
employing non-formal resources. Indeed, the exploitation o f top-down features, consistent 
with relationships based on formal control, might engender divergence, hence, denying 
Type III autonomy success. Nordlinger openly accepts that there are several constraining 
implications for these autonomy-enhancing strategies, and that they are not equally 
applicable to all issues or societal actors, nor that where applicable they are equally 
effective. He suggests policy complexity makes it easier to convince other actors that the 
state’s chosen path is preferable. Similarly, he concedes that Type III strategies are 
expected to achieve more commitment from actors whose active involvement in given 
policies is lowest and whose awareness is limited.
Nordlinger also argues that the higher the number o f strategies which can be jointly used, 
the more likely preference convergence is maintained since several are deemed compatible 
and, therefore, mutually reinforcing. He suggests the use o f options will be frequent to 
avoid the potentially constraining effects of divergence. Since public officials using the 
options are likely to be viewed as furthering societal preferences, the effect would be that 
chances of ‘societal sanctions’ being imposed on the state are low136.
136 Nordlinger, p.98
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VI.2 Type II Autonomy
Divergence between state and societal preferences requires Nordlinger’s state to actively 
pursue its own preferences in dynamic ways. Type II and Type I autonomies introduce 
considerably different circumstances compared to Type III, both in terms of distinct 
preference patterns and the strategies adopted to translate them into actions. Type II 
portrays public officials producing a shift in the preferences o f those societal actors who 
hold divergent preferences from those o f the state. This is in contrast to the assumption of 
pluralism, with its ‘cash register’ interpretation of the state’s behaviour, which suggests the 
state would be dissuaded from trying to shift external preferences because of potentially 
unacceptable societal sanctions.
Nordlinger contests this assumption, for excessively downplaying the state’s ability to turn 
divergence into non-divergence, its autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities, the 
willingness o f public officials to use such capacities, and reasonable chances o f success 
when trying137. He rejects as overly presumptive assumptions suggesting the scarcity and 
ineffectiveness o f autonomy-enhancing capacities as well as the high risks associated with 
them, while accepting that weak states facing a substantive distance between their 
preferences and societal ones may experience a considerable obstacle. This would be the 
case particularly when issues at stake strongly affect the interests of private actors 
controlling a range of resources that can hold the state back.
Yet, raising the strong-weak state comparison between France and the United States allows 
Nordlinger to observe poignantly that since American congressmen have undertaken 
successful policy initiatives, it is “all the more likely that officials in very different kinds of 
institutional settings also engage in Type II autonomous actions”138. Given varying 
institutional settings and resources available to public officials across countries, in practice 
there have to be alternative, less visible, explanations for the occurrence of Type II 
autonomy within countries. Nordlinger refers to Heclo and his findings on income 
maintenance policies in Britain and Sweden139, indicating that bureaucratic explanations - 
civil servants identifying deficient policies, taking the initiative in formulating remedial
137 Nordlinger, pp.99-100
138 ibid.p.106. Skocpol also refers to the capacity of weak states, claiming that “autonomous state 
contributions to domestic policy making can occur within a ‘weak state”’, 1985 “Bringing the State Back In: 
Strategies o f Analysis in Current Research” pp.3-44 in Skocpol et al p.13, based on her previous work with 
Finegold,K. 1982 “’State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal”, Political Science 
Quarterly, pp.255-78
139 Heclo,H 1974, “Modem social politics in Britain and Sweden”, Yale University Press
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changes and, orchestrating support for the preferred corrective policies - deserve the 
greatest attention.
Krasner is also cited as a proponent of autonomous state actions although, unlike 
Nordlinger, he does not distinguish between Type II and Type I autonomy. In his research 
exploring American foreign raw materials investment policies, Krasner anticipated a Type 
II analysis stating that public officials can alter divergent preferences “by offering a 
compelling interpretation o f events”140. Nordlinger draws particular attention to Krasner’s 
notion o f ‘political leadership’ by the state. He observes nevertheless that Krasner’s 
conceptualisation is predominantly applicable with respect to oligopolistic corporations 
rather than many small units. Moreover, Krasner does not identify ways in which officials 
can exploit societal divisions, so that less prominent actors can help the state enhance its 
autonomy at the expense o f the large, divergent corporations.
Nordlinger believes there are four strategies which bureaucrats can engage in to shift 
societal preferences away from the status quo141, for a total o f sixteen options. Their 
deployment hardly refers to formal authority, in spite o f the manifest intent to shape policy. 
The labels for the four strategies given herein are: (i) inducement; (ii) appeasement142- 
conciliation; (iii) enfranchisement; (iv) empowerment-reinforcement.
The first Type II strategy is labelled ‘inducement’ because it revolves solely around the 
persuasion of divergent societal actors by public officials. As such it is highly indicative of 
the uniqueness of Nordlinger’s analysis on autonomy and its largely non-formal scope. 
Public officials aim to persuade those with divergent preferences to alter them, or to instil 
uncertainty about their merits, rather than dictate policy. Thus, the state: plays up and plays 
on shared interests and values, by appealing to shared loyalties; advocates that state and 
societal goals are the same but the former’s policy preferences are more effective; or 
convinces societal actors that their real interests are not what they think, offering an 
alternative interpretation o f reality.
In the second strategy, ‘appeasement-conciliation’, public officials can try to minimise the 
extent societal actors with divergent preferences choose to deploy the resources they 
control, which counts the most Type II options. They can: point out that the endorsement
140 Krasner 1978, p.75
141 Nordlinger, p.107
142 Intended as to pacify or placate
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o f the state preferences will also result in their societal rivals incurring value losses - for 
example by issuing data projecting the latter’s financial losses; highlight the visibility of the 
preferred policy’s advantages compared to its negatives; assert that despite divergence they 
are not motivated by the wish to negate societal actors’ interests; or offer them every 
chance to alter the public officials’ preferences, perhaps by inviting them into private 
discussions. Public officials can also capitalise upon the ways in which they continue to 
promote and fulfill societal actors’ other interests, or propose mutually advantageous 
exchanges that are practically costless to the state, such as offering to promote other 
policies that are jointly favoured.
A third strategy, ‘enfranchisement’, entails the mobilisation o f support from indifferent 
actors. Altering the definition and the wider perception o f the issue causing divergence, by 
drawing their attention to indirect consequences would be one path. Another is to 
superimpose the issue upon existing divisions, for example, by revealing that divergent 
actors concentrate in one societal segment in order to raise interest among those excluded 
from it. Public officials can also try to generate an emotionally charged response to the 
issue, for example by playing upon societal fears or, perhaps, more effectively aim to make 
them feel their support is highly important and needed, by referring to loyalties and 
responsibilities.
The fourth strategy is working to increase the level and weight o f political resources 
deployable by actors with convergent preferences and those wanting the state to act on its 
own, reflecting ‘empowerment-reinforcement’. Public officials can: induce them to 
mobilise and deploy more resources than their related interests would dictate, like offering 
to place an issue o f mutual concern on the formal agenda and perhaps deal with it rapidly; 
providing them with special advantages, such as additional visibility to facilitate their 
organising efforts; and, facilitating the effective use o f their resources by helping to build an 
‘issue coalition’, for example by establishing quasi-public advisory committees143.
Thus, Nordlinger’s Type II autonomy-enhancing strategies entail wide-ranging solutions to 
preference divergence, none o f which is unusual or requires fairly scarce skills for the state 
to be effective. The options are suited for issues o f different degrees o f complexity. 
Nordlinger indicates nonetheless that, unlike for Type III, public officials cannot combine 
any o f the options which might seem most effective. Options from the first two strategies
143 Nordlinger, p.112
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could be combined, as could those from the third and fourth. But mixing options from the 
two sets is expected to be less effective since the former are more appeasing strategies than 
the latter.
The risk of societal sanctions is expected to rise from “low to moderate”, if action reflects 
strategies one and two, to “decided” if three and four are applied, since the state would be 
“visibly, purposefully and actively attempting to transform today’s resource-predominant 
winners into tomorrow’s losers”144. So, Type II autonomy proposes distinct strategies, 
some with shades of confrontation. It, nonetheless, remains a distinct scenario in which the 
state refuses to be actively conflictual and coercive with societal actors, despite wishing to 
take authoritative action. The strategies reflect an exceptional interpretation o f the 
workings of the state, whereby the approach is to adopt policies after achieving a shift in 
the divergent preferences o f certain societal actors to make them ‘congruent or consonant’ 
and thus prioritise dialogue unlike Type I autonomy.
VI.3 Type I Autonomy
Type I is the most radical and direct account o f autonomy, whereby public officials 
translate their preferences into authoritative actions when state-society preferences are 
divergent. Nordlinger claims the state’s Type I autonomy-enhancing capacities for freeing 
itself from societal constraints have been given less attention than Type II counterparts 
since Type I is directly at odds with societal constraint assumptions145. A key particularity of 
Type I cases, which goes beyond the presence of overcoming preference divergence, is that 
the societal actors the state acts contrary to are “the best endowed actors who predominate 
consistently within society”146.
The aim of autonomy-enhancing capacities in this case is to ensure that the state is not 
stopped from implementing its preferences because o f the divergence of the ‘politically 
weightiest actors’. Krasner’s leadership explanation contends, among other things, that 
public officials “can themselves redefine a dispute and change both its scope and the arena 
in which it is decided”147. Contrary to Type II, public officials avoid attempting to alter 
societal preferences or resource distribution, which are accepted as they are. This
144 ibid.p.116
145 ibid.pp.l 18-9
146 Nordlinger, p.l 18
147 Krasner 1978, p.86
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acceptance frees public officials from their constraining impact, allowing the state to turn 
its preferences into public policies148.
Type I entails three autonomy-enhancing strategies focussing entirely on societal actors 
with divergent preferences, although closely scrutinising the sixteen options suggests some 
latent convergence. The first Type I strategy is ‘counterbalancing-offsetting’. While not 
denying the importance o f privately controlled resources deployed by actors holding 
divergent preferences, public officials neutralise or diminish their constraining effects. 
Options include employing state resources or those controlled by it to neutralise similar 
private resources, such as state generated data to offset information imbalances with 
respect to societal actors; using a decision-making style hard to interpret, such as taking 
authoritative actions in an informally nuanced, or possibly even secretive, manner; or 
selecting decision sites whose occupants are relatively insulated from societal pressures, for 
example, to state units made up of securely tenured civil servants.
Other ‘counterbalancing-offsetting’ options are: taking visible, formal authoritative actions 
that conform to societal preferences, while negating these publicly proclaimed goals in less 
visible ways; serving as ostensible mediator between opposing societal groups, possibly, by 
manipulatively negotiating compromises that favour groups with convergent preferences, 
and; turning to actors with convergent preferences for substitute support, taking advantage 
when rival groups control almost equally weighted resources.
The second strategy, ‘obstruction’, provides a set o f options for public officials to mitigate 
the extent and effectiveness with which societal actors can deploy their resources. One 
option is disengaging or co-opting some o f the leaders or group members, possibly by 
distributing rewards. Similarly, the state can fracture the unity of societal actors, 
disaggregating the issue to isolate coalition members with different interests, or work to 
exacerbate divisions previously considered marginal and cause mistrust, weakening societal 
cohesion and pressure on the state. Alternatively, public officials can work so that societal 
actors channel some o f their resources toward other non-divergent issues, or drain their 
resources by prolonging the policy information process.
148 Nordlinger, p.129
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The third strategy is to dissuade149 actors with divergent preferences from exploiting most 
o f their resources and exerting implacable pressure on the state, which is labelled the 
‘confrontation-disincentive’ strategy; the full list o f strategies is contained in Table 1 above. 
Confrontation options include: threatening societal actors with the implementation of 
other, undesirable, policy preferences or reminding them of their dependence on the state; 
demonstrating reluctance in the provision o f particular ‘benefits’, for example by 
interceding with other officials processing their requests or applications; or jeopardising 
their position vis-a-vis rival societal actors, by extending equivalent privileged 
representation to the latter. Other available options are to alter their advantageous relations 
with the state by cutting back on the openness o f consultations, or direcdy endangering 
their organisational cohesiveness.
Thus, Type I portrays autonomy largely identifiable with authority-based confrontation. It 
projects a state applying a more assertive approach in the presence of divergence with 
powerful private actors, portraying its formal role. Opting for direct and private 
communication is only suggested as part of the third strategy150, unlike the more 
conciliatory approach envisaged for Type II. Nordlinger specifies that, with respect to this 
direct strategy, “occasionally carrots can be dangled openly, but sticks, which is what these 
options are, must usually be brandished informally”151. He observes how the last two 
options (cutting back consultation openness and endangering their organisational 
cohesiveness) reflect the importance o f relations, which seem advantageous to societal 
actors but equally enable public officials to put them at risk.
More importantly for the argument here, Type I scenarios acknowledge that public officials 
‘periodically rely(ing) upon the inherent powers o f the state’, whereby they have exclusive 
authority, including regulatory powers. In fact, Nordlinger explains how non-cooperation 
between actors with divergent preferences is prohibitively cosdy, and that it might not be in 
the interest of societal actors to act upon their dispositions and apply sanctions. If  the 
probabilities of societal sanctions are not minimised through “soft and passive” options, 
the state has “hard and active” ones. So, the state is described as acting diversely in 
confrontational Type I scenarios. Moreover, unlike Type II where to translate state
149 Note that while Nordlinger claims the state’s third Type I strategy aims to “dissuade”, p .l32, the options 
are emphatically less conciliatory than what the term suggests, bolstering the need for the strategy labels 
attributed here
150 ibid, see option 15
151 Nordlinger, p.133
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preferences into action the importance of convergence is more striking, in Type I the use 
o f formal authority is distinctly more prominent.
VII. Nordlinger’s State
Thus Nordlinger identifies and compares three considerably different scenarios in which 
the state translates its preferences into action, as a single autonomous actor facing society. 
Through this analysis, he argues that the state’s decision-making is not determined by 
society’s preferences and that it can take action to overcome them in case of divergence. 
Accordingly, Nordlinger does not examine the state in its disaggregated form, hence, the 
autonomy of specific state actors, such as regulatory agencies.
In fact, while depicting the state as a whole, unified actor for the purposes of his argument, 
Nordlinger acknowledges the possibility that two (or more) coalitions, each composed of 
public and private actors, might confront one another. Indeed, he provides examples o f 
factors constituting possible sources o f intrastate conflict; changes in state units’ formal 
powers relative to one another or in policy implementation responsibilities, which impinge 
differentially on private interests152. Accordingly, he claims, in such instances state 
autonomy is assessed independently of the private actors who support public officials153, 
based on the balance o f intrastate resources.
Thus, besides indicating an uneven distribution o f resources among diverse state actors as 
well as between state and non-state actors, Nordlinger subtly raises the key possibility that 
distinct state actors may have divergent preferences. Both elements are otherwise neglected 
in his dichotomous state-society analysis. Yet, these two issues crucially portray one part of 
the state ‘winning’ over others, thus deserve special attention when examining rival 
regulatory institutions pursuing their preferences, as is the case in sub-cases presented 
further below and as the studies on agency independence from Government discussed 
above suggest.
152 Nordlinger, p.78. Also, distinct state actors may have overlapping functions or competencies o f interest to 
unrelated actors and, given divergent preferences, could be part o f opposed coalitions; say, government
ministers in disagreement with each other, with a bureaucracy, or Parliament, over a given issue. For example, 
Ministers handling budgetary concerns may not welcome a Bank o f England decision to raise interest rates; a 
decision likely to be favoured by savers and strongly opposed by borrowers and a split among financial 
institutions too
153 ibid. p.20
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VIII. Conclusion
This chapter has provided an account o f key literature on the independence of regulatory 
agencies so far. It has explained that despite the spread of regulatory agencies across 
Europe since the mid-1980s, analytically, their ‘independence’ remains closely associated 
with formal institutional arrangements. The degree of formal controls that Governments 
relinquish and the powers they delegate to sectoral regulators remain a widespread way of 
assessing agency independence.
Yet, by simply comparing different ‘independence indices’ comprising the same agencies, 
the chapter has exposed significant weaknesses in the formal institutionalist approach to 
‘measuring’ agency independence. There is inconsistency in the selection of useful formal 
indicators. The latter are equally weighted despite separate research indicating that specific 
formal controls are more important than others. Tellingly, formal independence indices 
generate contradictory results. Moreover, degrees of formal independence neither specify 
whether Governments exercise the formal controls they retain nor if agencies actually apply 
powers delegated to them, treating independence as a static endowment. Most significantly, 
formal independence neglects research suggesting that other non-statutory factors and 
actors, namely regulatees, can influence regulatory activity.
To develop a different conceptualisation o f independence, the chapter has set out 
Nordlinger’s approach to ‘state autonomy’. By identifying preferences and strategies as key 
analytical features, Nordlinger provides a basis to challenge formal institutionalists whose 
approach to analyse independence assumes away dynamic aspects that statutory 
arrangements cannot incorporate. His approach makes it possible to depict what occurs 
after delegation. Nordlinger indicates that policy preferences are focal factors and that the 
‘state’ applies diverse strategies to achieve their implementation. He proposes three 
possible types o f autonomy, which rather than providing a single measure of independence 
simply showing variation across countries, based on formal institutional arrangements, 
indicate variation within a state too.
The chapter thus explains the usefulness of Nordlinger’s approach to autonomy, which is 
not reliant on formal arrangements alone. Equally, however, it briefly raises the substantive 
issue that differentiates his unified state-society analysis from an assessment o f the 
independence in practice of regulators, which is that the latter are part o f the state, not all 
o f it. The analytical implications of the differences between Nordlinger’s state and the
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central actors in this thesis, independent regulatory agencies, are addressed in chapter 2, 
when a more complete set of indicators is identified to operationalise the types of 
autonomy that regulators show, before undertaking empirical analysis.
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Chapter 2: Creating a N ew  Framework for Analyses on Independence - 
Indicators and Autonomy Scenarios
I. Introduction
The previous chapter illustrated how the debate on regulatory independence is relatively 
circumscribed. The focus on formal institutional arrangements remains intact despite the 
considerable conceptual and empirical inconsistencies made evident by reviewing it. The 
implication is that ‘measurement’ techniques applied to assess regulatory independence in 
practice need to be developed. Nordlinger’s framework on state autonomy provides a 
valuable starting point, and constitutes an important first level of analysis to examine 
independence in practice, because of its integration of key variables; preferences and a 
range o f strategies that do not focus solely on formal provisions.
Given the inadequacies of the formal institutionalist literature, developing a framework that 
incorporates rather than eschews a comprehensive range o f formal and informal factors 
that determine regulatory independence in practice means filling a real scholarly gap. This 
chapter reviews the usefulness of Nordlinger’s approach with regard to assessing regulatory 
independence, then explains its limitations and, accordingly, develops a new analytical 
framework composed of the five indicators put forward below to examine agency 
independence in practice.
II. Distinguishing Between ‘State Autonomy* and Regulatory Independence
As explained in chapter 1, Nordlinger’s framework on state autonomy indicates that the 
state has preferences that it translates into action, whether in the presence of divergence or 
non-divergence with societal actors, by deploying a significant range of autonomy- 
enhancing strategies and options comprising formal and non-formal elements (see Diagram 
1 below). In Type III autonomy cases, the state works to maintain a situation of preference 
non-divergence with societal actors. In Type II cases, the state works to ‘shift’ the 
divergent preferences of key actors before acting on its own preferences. In Type I cases, 
the state acts on its preferences regardless of key actors’ preference divergence. Thus 
preference patterns and the strategies undertaken indicate the type o f autonomy.
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Nordlinger’s conceptualisation of autonomy is valuable for the research question posed 
because it allows examining the actual impact of either formal or non-formal resources, or 
both, on the translation o f preferences into action. His strategies and options depict the 
state’s deployment of formal authority and non-formal resources to fulfill preferences. 
Thus, he has expanded the possible factors explaining autonomy, allowing case evidence 
to illustrate their respective influence over policy. Applying Nordlinger allows the tracing of 
distinct paths on how state autonomy can be achieved by identifying three typologies. The 
latter are useful to order the empirical information investigated, making it possible to 
describe, classify and compare what type o f autonomy is achieved.
By identifying three types of autonomy for his (‘state’) unit o f analysis, Nordlinger suggests 
more than one benchmark for evaluating and comparing autonomy, unlike formal 
institutionalists. The three typologies indicate that there are different ways of accounting 
for autonomy, and hence there is variation in autonomy. Indeed, “a single-explanation 
theory o f regulatory politics is about as helpful as a single explanation of politics 
generally.. .Distinctions must be made, differences examined”154.
Having recognised the value of preferences and strategies in order to define different types 
of autonomy, of course, some substantive differences remain between Nordlinger’s study 
and the research question examined here. To proceed with the analysis it is imperative to 
present the issues that need to be developed distinctly from his work on state autonomy, to 
set out indicators that help to explore the independence of regulators in practice.
154 WilsonJQ 1980 “The Politics o f Regulation”, p.393
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Diagram 1: State preferences translated into action vis-a-vis society
Divergence
StateSociety Strategies
Non-divergence
A defining difference between the autonomy of Nordlinger’s state and o f regulators is that 
he largely refers to a two-dimensional dynamic, in which the reference point is the state 
identified as a single all-encompassing actor facing another whole labelled ‘societal actors’. 
This thesis is, instead, about a ‘second level’ of analysis referring to regulatory agencies. The 
latter are part o f the state, but the specific independence of regulators within it is what 
matters at the sectoral level, quite separately from that of other state actors. Indeed, as 
illustrated above, formal institutionalists examine the independence of regulators by 
measuring what statutory powers senior government officials in key positions have to 
constrain the agencies, thus basing their approach on a statutory division between different 
state actors.
Ellis, in his critique of work presented by state-centred proponents, righdy observes that 
the grounds for referring to the state as “a unitary actor is a separate question from 
whether or to what extent those in the state are autonomous from those in society”155. 
Clarifying the latter is crucial since Nordlinger claims “state autonomy refers solely to 
legislatures, legislative committees, cabinets, presidents, bureaucratic agencies...and so 
forth”156. Thus, despite creating a highly valuable framework regarding the autonomy of the
155 Ellis,RJ Summer 1992, “Pluralist Political Science & The State: Distinguishing between Autonomy and 
Coherence”, Polity - Northeastern Political Science Association, Vol. XXTV(4), p.571
156 Nordlinger, p.20 (emphases added)
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state as a whole vis-a-vis society, Nordlinger shows limited precision and depth in 
identifying which part or parts o f the state can be autonomous.
Scholars praising Nordlinger raise the limits o f his monolithic conceptualisation of the state 
too. Smiley’s state-centred paper on federalism in Canada reflects on the differences in the 
centralist tendencies o f the French and English provinces among other things, thus 
presenting the Canadian state as a divided entity, composed of different actors battling for 
distinct priorities. In the process, he points to Nordlinger’s reflection on the US that, while 
being autonomous, any display of weakness by the American state occurs because of 
fragmentation within it157, which severely conflicts with Nordlinger’s presentation of the 
autonomous state as a single actor.
In its simplest form, the point is made effectively by Riddell-Dixon. While endorsing 
Nordlinger’s statist approach, she points out that “it does not take account of the fact that 
the state is more complex (in a federal system)” and, perhaps more relevantly here, that “he 
fails to distinguish between politicians and government bureaucrats”158. Different authors 
therefore suggest that Nordlinger underplays divisions within the state, hence relative 
autonomies between state actors, such as those of regulatory agencies with respect to 
elected officials or other civil service officials. Ambler criticises Nordlinger, specifying that 
he “seeks to factor out such untidy phenomena as intrastate conflict and public-private 
coalitions, when in fact the essential character o f the policy process would seem to be the 
interaction among elected officials, government agencies, political parties and private interest 
groups”159. In other words, understanding how regulatory agencies deal with complex intra­
state divisions is as important as evaluating how they deal with non-state actors. Studies 
have been dedicated to the complexity o f inter-agency collaboration160.
Thus, transposing Nordlinger at the regulatory level entails the creation of a meso-level 
analysis, which applies the key features of his framework in a rigorous and clear way, while 
taking into due consideration the differences between his ‘state’ analysis and regulators 
focussed upon here. Nordlinger’s framework needs to be refined to be applicable at the 
regulatory level by extending the key indicators arising from his approach, making
157 Smiley p.452 and Nordlinger pp.l82-92
158 Riddell-Dixon,E 06/1988, “State Autonomy and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case o f Deep Seabed 
Mining”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.21(2), pp.297-317, p.299
159 Ambler JS September 1988, “French Education and the Limits o f State Autonomy”, The Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol.41(3), pp.469-488, p.470
160 Bardach,E 1998, “Getting Agencies to Work Together - the practice and theory of managerial 
craftsmanship”, Brookings Institution Press
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allowances for intra-state fragmentation161 and the conflicts that an agency’s policy may 
engender among various state actors, as well as public-private ones.
One way of presenting the distinction between ‘state’ actors to analyse agency 
independence is that o f the United Kingdom’s House of Lords Select Committee on 
Constitution which, in a 2004 report on regulatory roles and activities, stated: “The 
consequence of this unbundling o f the regulatory state has been to sharpen the 
accountabilities of specific regulators, Ministers and Parliament in relation to their 
respective roles and responsibilities, emphasising the interconnectedness of the various 
parties within the regulatory framework as a whole. If  regulators are independent for a 
particular purpose...It is independence within Government, rather than independence of 
Government per j?”162.
The distinction between regulators and ‘other state’ actors critically underlies the question 
o f whether regulatory agencies are more or less independent from political principals 
according to the extent o f formal powers and instruments delegated to them, as formal 
institutionalists indicated above argue and as examined here in practice. Compounding the 
limits of a framework inhabited by two unitary participants alone - state and society - is 
Nordlinger’s vagueness in repeatedly referring to the ‘weightiest’ actors. He never specifies 
how they are ‘weighty’ or influential, thus what key resources they possess and exploit, 
which is o f prime interest here and is investigated through the sub-cases below.
One can, nonetheless, infer that identifying participants is highly important for an analysis 
of regulatory independence. By turning the regulatory agency, and its specific policy 
preferences, into the point o f reference - removing the ambiguity o f what the dominant 
state preferences are and to which part of the state they belong -, one can establish which 
type of autonomy it achieves vis-a-vis a range of influential policy actors and how.
Yet, an implication ensuing the assessment o f regulatory independence through the lens o f 
Nordlinger’s framework on autonomy is that, precisely because o f intra-state 
fragmentation, the likelihood that an agency faces preference divergence vis-a-vis other 
actors is higher than what may be the case for Nordlinger’s state, and the single ‘societal’
161 For examples of intra-state fragmentation causing conflict, Riddell-Dixon 1988 and Ambler 1988
162 HL68, 31 /3 /04  “Sixth Report - The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability”, see ch.2 “The roles of 
Parliament, Ministers and independent regulators”, para.40
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dimension it confronts (shown in diagram 2). The larger the number of policy participants, 
the less likely preferences will be similar overall, hence, divergence.
Accordingly, Type III state autonomy strategies of ‘preservation’, ‘entrusting’ and ‘apathy’ 
discussed in chapter 1 are developed at the regulatory level below consistent with 
Nordlinger’s valuable exposition of Type III autonomy. The selected indicators proposed 
below are applied to illustrate a scenario o f regulatory independence consistent with this 
typology, which does not feature the active use of formal instruments to achieve policies. 
For instance, key industry actors may converge with the regulator’s policy proposal or be 
indifferent because of its formulation. Meanwhile there may be intra-state indifference 
because of technical complexity or because the issue is not covered saliendy by the media, 
causing MPs and, hence legislative committees, not to be interested, and other civil 
servants to avoid getting involved since it does not affect them direcdy.
Nevertheless, the exercise of refining Nordlinger’s valuable framework at the regulatory 
level, carried out through this chapter, requires due awareness that with a non-dyadic set of 
participants, reflecting the fragmentation among state and non-state actors over a given 
policy, it would appear rather exceptional that all preferences are similar. In fact, 
Nordlinger concedes that convergence does “not regularly include entirely identical, 
precisely shared preferences”163. Given the meso-level explored, which widens 
participation, and the preference-based conceptualisation, it is intuitively suggested that the 
likelihood that regulatory agencies encounter Type III autonomy is not as high as for the 
other two types involving divergence.
163 ibid.p.78
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Diagram 2: Regulatory preferences translated into action vis-a-vis ‘n’ actors
Divergence
Non-State State
Consumers
Divergence
Divergence
Strategies Other State Actors
o o
Regulator ^Strategies/Regulatees
Non-divergence
Non-divergence
I
______________J J
Non-divergence i  -  "
Central to Type III autonomy is not just whether a regulator has, and applies, formal or 
informal resources as might be argued for Type II or I cases. Type III strategies are not 
questioned per se since maintaining non-divergence does not involve formal action, or at 
most infrequently, thus challenging formal institutionalist scholars o f independence. 
Rather, given the additional set o f actors a regulator has to ‘guard itself from’ to translate its 
preferences into actions - most notably in the regulatory independence literature, senior 
elected officials, not part o f Nordlinger’s work - an agency is likely to face more ‘sources o f 
divergence’ than the ‘state’ both conceptually and empirically. More actors entail more 
preferences, making a non-divergence scenario less likely. Type III strategies suggest that 
the state is uniquely blessed with privileged information, with a quasi-monopoly vis-a-vis 
societal actors, and is especially capable o f exploiting it to maintain overall preference non­
divergence. However, at the sectoral regulatory level there are diverse, competing industry
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actors that pool and exploit information at the expense o f different parties164, furthering the 
possibility o f divergent preferences.
Even if there is overall agreement regarding a ‘grand-issue’ its implementation is likely to 
raise some divergence. Otherwise, the existence o f any polarising issue, whether between 
industry actors, or between industry and senior elected officials, implies that some policy 
actor is divergent with the regulator whatever its preferences. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
all sectoral actors will avoid being vocal about a policy, since it might prevent them from 
fulfilling their preferences. Similarly, with many industry actors possessing technical 
knowledge, policy complexity cannot be assumed to secure non-divergence in all cases.
To reduce the likelihood that including more actors in the analysis leads to preference 
divergence, the autonomy of regulators from regulatees and from other state actors could 
be examined separately, as has happened so far. Formal institutionalists analyse the 
independence o f regulators from senior elected officials retaining statutory controls. 
Capture theorists examine (lack of) agency independence from influential regulatees. Yet, 
this would alter the scope of this thesis, which aims to examine regulatory independence in 
practice. This deserves to be done by considering elected officials and regulatees jointly, 
particularly since past literature on this subject has largely avoided doing so.
Identifying two separate autonomies for a given policy would, paradoxically, weaken the 
analytical utility of Type III autonomy. If  a policy scenario must be broken down and re­
interpreted, the implication is that, in practice, Type III autonomy’s central feature - non­
divergence among all actors involved in a policy - is less likely than suggested here. This 
would undermine plausible Type III autonomy scenarios, implying it is not a significant 
conceptual contribution to the debate on autonomy; something not intended here.
What is suggested upfront instead is that, given wider policy participation presupposing 
more individual preferences, overall non-divergence at the regulatory level is not as likely as 
for the unified state described by Nordlinger. More importantly for the scope of this thesis, 
analysing types of agency autonomy from elected officials and from regulatees separately 
would also prevent a scenario in which they share preferences contrary to the regulator’s165. 
This would not make it possible to verify whether regulators can overcome both other
164 See Baldwin and Cave 1999; for industry examples (eds.) Helm,T and JenkinsonJD 1999, “Competition in 
Regulated Industries”, OUP; (eds.) Mayer,C. Bishop,M and KayJ 1995, “The Regulatory Challenge”, Oxford 
University Press
165 see the chapter 7 sub-case
influential state and non-state actors when they share preferences and jointly deploy 
respective resources. Instead, the independence of regulators should be ‘measured’ by 
examining whether agencies achieve their policy preferences on the whole, regardless of the 
influential actors they face and that may be thought to constrain them, as this thesis sets 
out to do.
Thus, assessing the verifiability of Type III in practice, as done here, should not be 
interpreted to undermine the value and applicability o f Nordlinger’s overall approach to 
operationalise regulatory independence. It is instead part of an attempt to stress its 
strengths and recognise minor weaknesses which arise by applying as fruitfully as possible 
the framework at the, more complex, agency level. Most crucially, by relying on policy 
preferences and processes that are not rigidly defined in statutes, Nordlinger avoids 
identifying autonomy solely with a limited set o f explanatory variables directly relating to 
formal institutional arrangements. Thus the question that arises is how best to develop 
Nordlinger’s autonomy types at the sectoral level?
III. Indicators Operationalising the Assessment of Regulatory Independence
Clear indicators are crucial to conduct assessments o f agency independence in practice that 
apply to different countries, to different sectors and, particularly herein, to specific 
regulatory issues. Having set out the differences between Nordlinger’s state-society analysis 
and regulatory agencies operating as part of the state, five generalisable indicators are 
developed analytically and set out below. They help develop a refined version of 
Nordlinger’s state autonomy framework for the regulatory level (see Tables 2-4 below, 
summarising the three types o f regulatory autonomy).
Identifying ‘participants’, ‘preferences’, ‘process’, ‘time-length o f decision-making’ and 
‘outcomes’ permits systematic research on how any regulatory agency conducts its pursuit 
of policy preferences, so whether showing Type III, Type II or Type I autonomy, 
ultimately revealing what resources really matter within the ‘regulatory space’166.
166 First coined by Hancher,L and Moran,M. 1989 “Organising Regulatory Space”, in Hancher^L and 
Moran,M (eds.) “Capitalism, Culture and Regulation”, OUP, later developed by Scott,C. Summer 2001 
“Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design”, Public Law, pp.329-53
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The selected indicators provide a sequential guide to assess whose preferences a regulator 
has to overcome - responding to the ‘independence from whom’ question -, how the 
agency attempts this in the presence o f given influential actors, and whether its preference 
is achieved. O f these, ‘preferences’ and ‘outcomes’ are directly drawn from Nordlinger. The 
‘process’ indicator tries to narrow down the scope of the varied, loosely articulated and 
occasionally overlapping strategies and options he presents for each type of autonomy167 
(abbreviated, at the state level, with the labels in Chapter 1 /Table 1), and hence make them 
both relevant and easier to identify at the regulatory level.
Furthermore, the process indicator is critical to establish the importance regulators allocate 
to available formal instruments. A careful analysis o f processes will help reveal which 
resources are deployed by, and vital to, the regulator to achieve its preferences. It will 
constitute an important contribution to understanding whether formal powers delegated to 
regulatory agencies are necessary, necessary but not sufficient, or unimportant for 
independence in practice.
To transpose the framework appropriately at the regulatory level, the dimensions of 
‘participants’ and the ‘time-length of decision-making’ are added here. Following on from 
the earlier discussion about Nordlinger’s simplified state-society dichotomy, identifying 
policy participants indicates actors’ significant resources that are useful to pursue respective 
policy preferences. Preferences indicate what actors want from a regulatory policy. But, in 
addition, the policy involvement of fellow state actors with defined roles, such as 
government ministers with specific statutory controls, and/or regulatees with specific 
attributes, helps to understand the type of obstacles that an agency must surmount. The 
time dimension is a subtle but important additional factor to understand the ‘process’ 
undertaken. It shows the extent an agency decides and manages to act upon its preferences 
with immediacy, taking into account formal powers available. The combined indicators 
respond to independence indices that restrain the analysis to formal institutional 
arrangements, contributing to what could be labelled a ‘policy independence index’.
167 For example, option 5 o f Type I ll’s preservation strategy for convergent actors is “relating authoritative 
actions to widely shared, largely unquestioned values and symbols”, with option 1 o f Type II’s inducement 
strategy for divergent actors being “playing up and playing upon shared interests and values”; respectively, 
pp.93,111
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III.l Participants and resources
The composition o f policy participants with their respective levels of influence, referred to 
by Nordlinger as “relative weights of the political resources”168, is a determining factor o f 
issue-specific ‘regulatory space’. Policy participants have different attributes. Setting out 
who the participants are and what attributes characterise them, as proposed here for each 
type of autonomy, subsequently allows a much clearer identification of what particular 
resources, which may or may not be statutory powers, matter in order for certain actors to 
fulfill their preferences. The three scenarios of participants for each type of regulatory 
autonomy follow, adapting Nordlinger’s analysis on the three types o f state autonomy.
In Type II autonomy scenarios, Nordlinger indicates a wider range o f participants - he talks 
about divergent, indifferent and convergent actors169 - and, accordingly, a more varied set 
o f strategies than for Type I. The implication at the Type II regulatory level, therefore, 
seems to be a larger ‘space’. Thus, for Type II regulatory autonomy, at the start o f a policy, 
we would expect to see significant resources spread among distinct actors. In Type II cases, 
different participants have valuable resources to exert influence, whether statutory in nature 
or not, otherwise their involvement would not be worthy of mention.
Instead, the fact that, for Type I autonomy cases, Nordlinger refers to ‘best endowed’ and 
‘predominant’ actors170 suggests that key resources to exert influence are held by relatively 
few participants at the start o f policy. Regarding Type III scenarios, since Nordlinger refers 
to ‘best endowed’ and ‘significant’ non-divergent actors separately, it is suggested here that 
at the regulatory level the actual number of participants can vary; there may only be a few 
actors with key resources, or several o f them.
Policy participants possessing significant resources will deploy them according to their 
preferences. The latter signal whether such resources will be used to support or oppose the 
regulator. Nonetheless, the importance of participants and their resources should not be
168 Nordlinger, p.108
169 It is worth clarifying that dividing participants in the three groupings ‘divergent, indifferent and 
convergent’ is not done simply to echo Nordlinger’s preference-based approach. It avoids identifying 
concrete examples, thus, anticipating empirical evidence, which make the case more clearly. However, 
labelling participants indicates that they have limited common ground. While regulatory preference formation 
is not the subject o f the thesis, setting out participants and resources separately from preferences from the 
outset, ultimately, helps understand why some actors might be prone to have certain preferences and interact 
accordingly, for example, when resources are shared among several actors. Indeed, although preferences are 
not mentioned explicitly, in her paper assessing financial regulation, Black 2003 not only agrees that the 
systematic identification o f actors matters, but also “how they might (or might not) be interconnected”, p.70
170 All divergent
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based purely on actor preferences as is clear from Fesler’s question, independence ‘from 
whom’171. The resources that participants can deploy in the ‘regulatory space’ are important 
in addition to their preferences. Nordlinger implies this continuously without ever saying it 
when referring to the state’s strategies to minimise, neutralise or dissuade divergent actors 
from using their resources, mobilising indifferent actors, or turning to convergent actors 
for more support.
To fulfill policy preferences, certain participants’ resources, which this thesis argues do not 
have to be statutory, must be more effective than others. Using ‘participants’ and 
‘preferences’ as distinct indicators is, therefore, sequentially valuable to understand how 
complex policies develop and who achieves their goals. Having preferences does not entail 
having the ability to pursue them. So participants must be assessed in terms o f their 
significant resources. By identifying respective resources used to achieve expressed 
preferences, ultimately, their value is revealed. This points to a further shortcoming of 
Nordlinger’s analysis that is crucial for regulatory independence analysis; he avoids 
specifying which resources are critical for his ‘state’ to achieve its preferences even when 
they underlie his strategies and options.
Coen, for example, has examined comprehensively the importance of relationships, and 
developing ‘clear lines of access’172, focussing on the modus operandi of regulatory 
agencies. While Coen’s research has predominantly looked at relations between regulators 
and business173 unlike the analysis herein, the issue about the underlying importance of 
relations remains important, as evoked by Bernstein long before. The nature o f relations 
varies significantly, potentially creating policy insiders and outsiders174.
Nordlinger also suggests the importance o f relations since, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, several state autonomy strategies portray some interaction between the state and 
certain societal actors, whatever the nature and development o f these relations. For 
instance, for Type III he suggests “discouraging” and “encouraging”, for Type II he 
explicitly mentions “private discussions” and the need to establish “issue coalitions”. 
Relational elements appear prominent in confrontational Type I strategies too, when
171 Fesler 1946,1959
172 CoenJD and Willman,P 1998, “The Evolution o f the Firm’s Regulatory Affairs Office”, Business Strategy 
Review, Vol. 9(4), pp.31-6, p.32
173 Consideration o f intra-state regulatory relationships is relatively more present in Coen et al 2002, 
compared to the bulk of his work
174 CoenJD 2005, “Business—Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in European Utility 
Markets”, Governance, Vol.l8(3), pp.375-398.
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referring to “cutting back on the regularity or openness of...consultations”175. So, the state 
exploits a multiplicity of relationships to pursue policy, irrespective of their nature. Given 
its significant policy interaction, it has even been argued that state “autonomy develops 
through relationships”176, though this seems no less o f a hazardous exaggeration than 
attributing sole explanatory power to formal institutional arrangements.
So while network analyses do not offer substantive explanations on initial distribution of 
resources177, the key implication is that relational ties are a resource exploited to fulfill 
respective preferences. In fact, Coen’s research has also drawn attention to the fact that 
informal relationships, and the effect o f insiders/outsiders, particularly over time, can 
affect degrees o f expertise among actors involved in the regulatory process178. He also 
reveals how the regulatory focus on certain relationships may be a consequence o f the 
expertise possessed by one or more counterparts179.
In a wider non-regulatory setting, the importance o f weak ties with regard to the diffusion 
o f influence and information was previously stressed by Granovetter, who indicated that 
their removal may be more damaging to transmission probabilities than would that of 
average strong ones180. He refers to research suggesting that behaviour may be shaped and 
constrained by one’s network, but also to ways in which individuals can manipulate these 
networks to achieve specific goals181. Transposing the claims at the regulatory level may 
explain why, rather than being static, “organisational alliances are constantly forming and 
reforming” with no “reference to a conventional public-private divide”182. A study on 
‘bureaucracy’ has indeed argued that “multiple networks (have given) agency officials an 
independence from politicians, allowing them to build manifold coalitions around their 
favoured programmes”183.
175 Nordlinger, pp.111-2 and p.132
176 See ch.3, Smith,M 1993 “State autonomy and policy networks” in “Pressure, power and policy”, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, p. 5 5
177 Thatcher,M 1998, “The Development o f Policy Network Analyses - from modest origins to overarching 
frameworks”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10(4), pp.389-416, pp.410-411
178 In particular, CoenJD, Willman,P, CurrieJD and Siner,M 2003, “The Evolution o f Regulatory 
Relationships: Regulatory Institutions and Firm Behaviour in Privatised Industries”, Industrial and Corporate 
Change”, Vol.l2(l), pp.69-89
179 Coen et al 2002, pp.21,29, and Coen 2005 especially p.390 when stating “In terms of access to the 
regulatory process being a function of expertise...incumbents had the most favoured position in the early 
rounds”
180 Granovetter,MS 05/1973, “The Strength o f Weak Ties”, American Journal o f Sociology, Vol.78(6), 
pp.1360-80, p.l 366
181 ibid.pp.1369-70
182 Hancher and Moran 1989, p.276
183 CarpenterJDP 2001, “The Forging o f Bureaucratic Autonomy - reputations, networks and policy 
innovation in executive agencies, 1862-1928”, p.5, Princeton University Press
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O f course, non-statutory resources may be exploited at the expense of regulators’ 
preferences, by actors with divergent preferences. Nordlinger eschews the possibility that 
ultimately the state does not fulfill its preferences but, while not elaborating on their 
implications, repeatedly mentions potential threats to preferences in the guise of “societal 
sanctions”. In this study, such “sanctions” are not eschewed, or mentioned in abstract 
terms. They are presented as part of the influential resources that different policy 
participants can deploy (and which feed into processes and outcomes). Hence, they are 
revealed and integrated in the case analysis.
III.2 Preferences
When transposing Nordlinger’s framework at the regulatory level, agency preferences and 
those o f other influential policy participants represent the guiding indicator to examine 
independence. Their importance is manifold. Regulatory agencies have formal objectives 
providing generic policy direction for which they are accountable. However, statutory 
vagueness is unavoidable, allowing for the agencies’ policy formulation to ensue184. Indeed, 
while the specification o f multiple statutory objectives may constrain regulatory discretion 
since a failure to meet them could open decisions to litigation185, their competing nature 
could also be used by the agency to justify its actions. In case o f no formal prioritisation of 
the statutory objectives, preferences reflect the policy initiatives of agencies not directly 
readable off statutes.
The main reason for focussing on initial policy preferences here is, clearly, that they are 
Nordlinger’s key element of analysis. Preferences help to assess whether regulators act on 
theirs regardless of the preferences of influential senior elected officials and regulatees. 
Attributing prime importance to preferences for analyses of agency independence can, also, 
allow scenarios where regulators and senior elected officials have divergent preferences, 
thus undermining models claiming that “the actual choice o f policy is traceable not to 
bureaucratic preferences but to the preferences o f legislative and executive politicians”186. It
184 For a discussion on how “agency independence and public accountability can be complementary and 
mutually reinforcing rather than antithetical values”: Majone,G. 1994 “Independence vs. Accountability? 
Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe”, p.2, EUI Working Papers No 94/3 ; 
also Majone 1997, p .l52
185 Spiller,PT and Vogelsang,I 1996, “The United Kingdom: A pacesetter in regulatory initiatives”, in eds. 
Levy,B and Spiller,PT, p. 100
186 McCubbins, Calvert, Weingast 1989, p.589
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follows that where the appointment and dismissal of regulatory chairmen or the 
management board is decided by senior political officials, or that the latter have a formal 
say on funding, this has no automatic impact on the agency’s policy direction. Similarly, 
cases in which the preferences of agencies and powerful industry actors are divergent 
conflict with capture claims.
Agency preferences may contrast with those o f any single ‘regulatory space’ participant or a 
combination o f them, which, moreover, undermines claims of ‘hard’ or ‘soft-wiring’187. 
Indeed, unless preference convergence is consistently witnessed between a regulator and a 
specific set of actors, whether political principals possessing formal powers or influential 
interest groups that participated in defining the statutory framework enacted, one cannot 
assume that the agency’s behaviour is pre-determined. The critical implication o f some 
preference divergence with different political and business actors is that there are limits to 
the extent that any set o f actors delineates the agency’s decision-making lastingly188.
More importantly, preferences constitute powerful explanatory factors because they guide 
the use that individual participants make o f any available influential resources, formal or 
non-formal. Once key participants are identified and preferences are established, the 
question o f who the regulator needs to overcome is revealed.
Thus, having explained the centrality of preferences, to continue refining Nordlinger at the 
regulatory level, it is imperative to set out what preferences influential participants are 
expected to hold in each autonomy scenario. In Nordlinger’s Type III state autonomy 
scenarios, actors hold convergent preferences, want the state to act on their behalf, and/or 
there are indifferent actors (see section VI. 1), in other words they are non-divergent. 
Accordingly, while key resources at the Type III regulatory level may be spread among 
distinct actors or held by few as suggested in the ‘Participants’ section above, the derivable 
scenario is that preferences o f influential participants do not differ from those proposed by 
the agency. Non-divergence, comprising preference convergence and indifference, implies 
that, on balance, the regulator benefits from influential support at the start o f the policy.
In Type II state autonomy scenarios, there is neither full preference convergence, nor does 
the state intend to impose its preferences on the divergent from the start. Moreover, in the 
‘Participants’ section, it has been established that at the Type II regulatory level key
187 Wilks and Battle 2002, p.165
188 Carpenter 2001, pp.11,14
74
resources are spread among distinct actors. Combining the three conditions suggests that at 
the regulatory level preferences of influential participants over agency proposals differ at 
the policy-start189. The regulator faces both actors with divergent and non-divergent 
preferences with influential resources. Among these are convergent actors that will deploy 
their valuable resources in line with regulatory decision-making. Thus, Type II preferences 
at the regulatory level entail that the agency can rely on a degree of support, hence, on key 
instruments it does not control directly, to try to shift actors with divergent preferences 
from the outset.
Instead, Type I state autonomy cases indicate the prominent divergent preferences of the 
‘best endowed private actors’, which the state does not intend to shift. Since Type I 
regulatory level influential resources are held by few participants, at the start of a policy, 
preferences o f influential actors are expected to differ from those of regulators. Due to 
insufficient influential support, regulators may not be able to shift preferences even if they 
wish to.
III.3 Process
The next key step in examining independence in practice is to apply Nordlinger’s approach 
to analyse how agencies translate their preferences into action in the presence o f different 
preference patterns held by well-resourced policy participants. This means examining 
whether agencies regulate by way of formal authority, or through alternative mechanisms 
and ‘processes’ for regulatory preference fulfillment.
To clarify and distinguish the distinct ‘processes’ undertaken by regulators for the three 
differing autonomy scenarios, Nordlinger’s strategies and numerous options must be 
refined. While drawing from them to retain key relevant concepts, the aim is to translate 
them into a simple but also more precise form so that they can be directly understood as 
one of the three processes consistent with the three types o f autonomies applicable to 
agencies.
189 Some might argue that even though there are a number o f actors and resources are spread, the latter might 
be possessed by divergent actors only. However, this would simply be inconsistent with the greater 
prominence Nordlinger attributes strategy-wise to convergent actors in Type II than for Type I. If 
participants who are preference convergent from the outset do not have valuable resources, why generate an 
entirely separate strategy relying on their support?
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Instead of making vague references to the use o f formal authority, the degree to which 
formal provisions are exploited in practice at the regulatory level is indicated more clearly. 
This more specific analysis leads to some changes in terminology between the shorthand 
labels given earlier and illustrated in Table 1, en lieu of Nordlinger’s wordy first level o f 
analysis, and the ‘second level’ that follows below referring to the regulatory level.
As stated in chapter 1, given the central feature o f non-divergence, for Type III autonomy 
to occur, state preferences are achieved when preservation, entrusting, and apathy strategies 
are applied successfully. Since influential actors only hold non-divergent preferences, at the 
regulatory level, agencies will aim to avoid any divergence in preferences emerging. Thus, 
instead of openly exercising formal authority to pursue the policy of interest, regulatory 
efforts are directed towards prolonging and sustaining this non-divergence from the start. 
Accordingly, as part of the overall regulatory level Type III process (see Table 2 below), it 
is expected that agencies will try controlling the presentation and communication flow o f 
their actions.
To avoid divergence at the state level, Nordlinger has drawn significant attention to the 
importance o f how state preferences are perceived. Yet, perpetuating Type III preference 
non-divergence at the regulatory level requires greater containment, since there are more 
policy participants than in the dyadic state-society scenario. Thus, discouraging serious 
consideration of divergent preferences is a real test for agencies. To allow for the policy to 
develop in the preferred way, it is therefore expected that a regulator’s Type III process will 
entail being selective about the information they divulge.
Similarly, just as the state exploits the ‘entrusting’ strategy, the projection of competent 
engagement and policy-making at the regulatory level is a further Type III factor that could 
explain deference by convergent actors to agencies and their policy preferences. 
“Recruiting well-known experts” and “makingit known that (public officials) are...actively 
looking for remedies”190 can be reassuring for participants favouring the policy.
Furthermore, whether there is indifference among political principals or influential 
regulated firms about agency preferences, regulatory officials will be keen to give “the 
impression that they evaluate policy alternatives in a highly rational, apolitical
190 ibid
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manner...highlighting adherence...to formal-legal procedures”191. Thus, rather than as a 
recurring tool to formally direct other participants towards the preferred outcome, the use 
o f authority constitutes a circumscribed procedure bolstering credibility192. To limit 
controversy about policy choices, the aim seems to be not to politicise, or even de- 
politicise, an issue. ‘Apathy’ is, therefore, retained at the regulatory level by transmitting, 
apparent, agency neutrality.
Type II autonomy involves shifting preferences o f divergent actors. As discussed in chapter 
1, Nordlinger tells us that at the state level this is done by: persuading or instilling enough 
uncertainty about the desirability of divergent preferences - ‘inducement’; minimising the 
extent actors who are divergent deploy their resources - ‘appeasement-conciliation’; 
mobilising indifferent actors - ‘enfranchisement’; and, increasing the weight of resources 
held by convergent actors - ‘empowerment-reinforcement’193. Accordingly, given the 
existence of influential divergence and non-divergence from the start o f policy, it is 
expected that, as part o f the overall Type II regulatory process, an agency will try altering 
actors’ divergent preferences and restrain their use o f key resources by prioritising 
negotiation over imposition.
Nordlinger’s Type II scenarios envisage avoiding running “counter to societal 
preferences”194. To alter preferences implies portraying policy in more acceptable terms to 
divergent actors, “making the case that...goals are the same”195, besides “offering them 
every opportunity to alter public officials’ preferences”196. By applying the same principles, 
the regulator takes a conciliatory stance and, without sacrificing its key preferences, works 
towards a solution that it finds reasonably suitable as do the divergent actors. So, 
divergence is not exacerbated by undertaking prescriptive, command-and-control, “going 
by the book” regulation197, but rather “solving the problem”198 by searching for 
‘responsiveness’. Rather than instructing or even threatening divergent actors, which may
191 ibid. p.94
192 While Deputy Governor o f the Bank o f England, now Governor Mervyn King coined the phrase “boring 
is best... A reputation for being boring is an advantage - credibility o f the policy framework helps to dampen 
the movement o f the (economic) see-saw”, in “To the Plymouth Chamber o f Commerce and Industry's 
187th Anniversary Banquet, 14 April 2000”. Also, “Reform of the International Monetary Fund At the Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) in New Delhi, India - Monday, 20 
February 2006”
193 s.VI.2 above
194 Nordlinger, p.l 15
195 Nordlinger, p.l 11
196 ibid
197 Bardach,E and Kagan,RA 2002, “Going by the Book-The Problem o f Regulatory Unreasonableness”, 
Transaction Publishers
198 ibid.p.xxi
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or may not be statutorily possible, Type II regulatory preferences are achieved informally, 
by making compromise proposals that through persuasion and repeated bargaining can 
appease divergent actors.
Since Nordlinger claims “sometimes it is possible simultaneously to talk and to oppose, to 
negotiate and to fight, with mutually reinforcing effects”199 while qualifying that constantly 
relying on these conflicting approaches might not be effective, an alternative way for 
regulators to translate their preferences into action is to exploit influential actors with 
convergent preferences. With the latter actively opposing divergent participants, agencies 
avoid confrontation and make progress.
For example, when regulators and regulatees have convergent preferences opposed by 
senior government officials, agencies can outline policy proposals and explain their validity 
with the support of industry actors campaigning against the position o f senior political 
officials even though the latter may hold powerful formal instruments to overturn agency 
decision-making. Agencies could also increase pressure on divergent senior elected officials 
by interesting actors that are unaware or not directly involved but have opinion-shaping 
capabilities. Or, regulators may launch a policy that key industry actors vigorously oppose, 
but encourage discussions projecting reciprocity distinctly from any convergence. By 
containing the exposure to conflictual situations, regulators act consistent with their wish to 
try shifting preferences. Type II autonomy reflects processes in which, where possible, 
agencies choose to deploy an informal approach over formal authority, ones in which 
statutory arrangements have limited impact on regulatory activity.
Type I processes suggest a radically different approach to preference divergence. The fact 
that key resources are in the hands of few actors who can, therefore, exert significant 
influence in the ‘regulatory space’ on a given policy constitutes a threat to agency 
preferences. Nordlinger’s strategies are unequivocal in the tougher approach Type I 
reflects, whether it is by neutralising or diminishing the effects of societal actors’ resources 
- ‘counterbalancing-offsetting’ , mitigating the extent with which they are able to deploy 
their resources - ‘obstruction’, or dissuading them from deploying most resources and 
exerting implacable pressure - ‘confrontation-disincentive’.
199 Nordlinger, p.l 15
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Particularly for the second strategy, Nordlinger notes that “there is no hiding the actions of 
public officials in mitigating the extent and effectiveness with which societal actors holding 
divergent preferences are able to deploy their resources” before claiming that “private 
actors are strongly disposed to inflict sanctions upon public officials”200. Accordingly, as 
part of the overall Type I process to diminish the constraining effects o f preference 
divergent influential actors, regulators are expected to react by alternating and coalescing 
formal and informal approaches, switching them to enact preferences.
Regulators facing Type I preference divergence are expected to display a firmer approach 
than in Type II, where working with divergent actors is portrayed as being important and 
taking formal action is avoided. Whether to “fracture the unity” and “endanger the 
cohesiveness” o f actors with divergent preferences or to “jeopardise their position vis-a-vis 
rivals”201, the fact that regulators would proceed with the preferred policy irrespectively 
suggests that under Type I they identify and widely expose the obstacles representing the 
divergence to be overcome.
Nordlinger points to a state undeterred by conflict since, with rare exceptions, its options 
“all involve visible, direct, oppositional efforts to free the state from the constraints of the 
potentially weightiest actors”202. Thus, to translate preferences into action in the midst of 
strong divergence, agencies act intransigently and may need to exploit available ties to 
construct specific policy frameworks, possibly by “selecting decision sites whose occupants 
are relatively insulated from .. .pressures”203.
Ultimately, regulators could undertake deterrent measures to address confrontation, for 
example, by “threatening the realization o f their other policy preferences, being less 
forthcoming in providing services (and) putting their advantageous relations...at risk”204, 
which may cause further conflict. Thus, Type I processes depict scenarios in which 
agencies carry on with their preferences without cooperation from divergent actors, and 
suggest that the Type I likelihood o f using statutory instruments to pursue policies is 
greater than for Type II cases.
200 ibid. p.135
201 ibid.pp.131-2
202 Nordlinger, p. 134
203 ibid. p.131
204 ibid.p.132
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III.4 Time-length of decision-making
The temporal dimension of a policy is frequently omitted or overlooked. Regulators may 
have several means to overcome the preference divergence of participants with influential 
resources. The distinct features of the processes associated with different types of 
autonomy can be expected to require different and dynamic timeframes to translate 
preferences into action.
Using time as an indicator at the regulatory level is not a straightforward exercise. Statutory 
frameworks may not define minimum or maximum decision-making timeframe powers for 
agencies to impose, irrespective of whether other actors have the authority to formally 
shorten or extend them. Thus, setting arbitrary time-periods within which agencies are 
expected to translate their preferences into action according to autonomy types may be 
relevant to one regulator but not to another. Moreover, applying such formal criterion 
without analysing its scope undermines the research question presented here. Instead, it is 
important to understand whether regulators apply relevant formal instruments available to 
fulfill their preferences and, if yes, in what circumstances.
Nordlinger explicitly recognises that Type II autonomy includes a time dimension205. The 
reasoning is straightforward since the state can be thought of taking longer to shift those 
with divergent preferences, than carrying out its preferences without hesitation as Type I 
autonomy suggests. Making the Type II case - “unless and until”206 divergent actors are 
persuaded -, entails that resources have to be deployed to discuss how to make progress in 
line with the state’s policy preferences. The implication that seems to need testing at the 
regulatory level is whether agencies largely use or neglect available timescale powers, and 
apply policy forbearance to translate preferences into action.
Under conditions o f non-divergence - Type III scenarios -, the state will be in a position to 
fulfill its preferences as long as societal preferences do not change. The implication at the 
regulatory level seems that agency officials will seize available timescale powers to expedite 
the preferred policy outcome unless they fear that this will raise questions and, potentially, 
engender divergence.
205 ibid.p.29
206 Nordlinger, p.99
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Under Type I, the state shows ‘leadership’ by undertaking its preferences while accepting 
the existence of societal divergence, hence, the possibility of sanctions that may come with 
it. Transposing this non-conciliatory approach at the regulatory level suggests a scenario in 
which preference divergent participants will react by opposing agency policy through their 
most effective resources. Contrasting the immediacy o f the regulatory approach with the 
divergence of certain actors suggests that agencies are likely to apply timescale powers, 
where available. Accordingly, delays in preference fulfillment are expected to be forced.
III.5 Outcomes
The indicator measures the success of regulators in translating their preferences into action, 
after the different factors affecting the course of policy as mentioned above are accounted 
for. Type III autonomy portrays preference fulfilment because non-divergence is secured. 
It is thus expected that a regulator’s preferences are implemented because of acquiescence 
too; see Table 2 below exhibiting a summary of the Type III autonomy scenario at both the 
state (Level 1) and the regulatory level (Level 2). Type II autonomy says state preferences 
are translated into public policy after those of divergent actors are shifted to make them 
“congruent or consonant”. Yet, regulator’s preferences should be implemented after actors 
with divergent ones are persuaded to shift theirs, allowing for some concessions (Table 3). 
Instead, since under Type I state preferences are translated into public policy without 
shifting those of divergent actors, at the regulatory level agency preferences are expected to 
be fulfilled without the intention to compromise, despite the conflictual nature o f Type I 
autonomy suggesting that ‘sanctions’ are sought by actors with divergent preferences 
(Table 4).
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Table 2: Type III Autonomy: State and Regulatory scenarios (Levels 1 and 21
Empirical
Indicators
Level 1 -  Nordlinger’s  Type III Level 2 - Regulatory level Type III
Participants 
and resources
Best endowed actors hold preferences 
convergent with those of state, or 
significant actors indifferent to them
At start of policy, key resources spread 
among distinct actors or held by few
Preferences Absence of divergent state-society 
preferences
Preferences of influential participants do 
not differ from regulator’s proposals. 
Influential support because of preference 
convergence, and/or no opposition from 
indifferent actors
Process State translates preferences into 
authoritative action when state-society 
are non-divergent by: (i) preservation 
(ii) entrusting; (iii) apathy
To sustain non-divergence, regulator 
controls presentation and 
communication flow of its actions. 
Preferences furthered by: (i) selective 
divulging of information; (ii) projection of 
competent engagement and policy­
making; (iii) transmitting apparent 
neutrality
Time-length of 
decision­
making
Public policy undertaken as non­
divergence holds
Timescale powers applied unless 
expediting policy raises questions and 
divergence
Outcomes State preferences translated into action 
by securing non-divergence
Regulator’s  preferences implemented 
given acquiescence
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Table 3: Type II Autonomy: State and Regulatory scenarios (Levels 1 and 2 )
Empirical
Indicators
Level 1 -  Nordlinger’s  Type II Level 2 - Regulatory level Type II
Participants 
and resources
Range of societal actors: those divergent 
from the state seek to obstruct its 
preferences; also actors with similar 
preferences to the state supporting it 
(convergent), and those without strong 
expressed preferences
At start of regulatory policy, key 
resources spread among distinct actors;
with preferences similar to regulator and with 
divergent ones. Different participants have 
valuable resources to exert influence
Preferences Combination of divergence, 
indifference, convergence
Preferences of influential participants 
differ over regulator's proposals. But not 
only influential divergent preferences; 
some influential support from outset for 
agency to shift preferences
Process State shifts preferences of societal 
actors over time, by: (i) inducement; (ii) 
appeasement - conciliation; (iii) 
enfranchisement; (iv) empowerment - 
reinforcement
To alter preferences of opponents or restrain 
their use of key resources, regulator 
prioritises negotiation over imposition. 
Preferences shifted by: (i) making 
compromise proposals; (ii) repeated 
bargaining; (iii) exploiting influential 
actors with convergent preferences to 
avoid confrontation
Time-length of 
decision­
making
Public policy not undertaken ‘unless and 
until’ actors with divergent preferences 
are persuaded
Timescale powers largely neglected; 
policy forbearance
Outcomes State preferences translated into public 
policy after those of divergent actors are 
shifted to make them ‘congruent or 
consonant’
Regulator’s preferences implemented
after actors with divergent ones had been 
persuaded to shift theirs, with some 
concessions
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Table 4: Type I Autonomy: State and Regulatory scenarios (Levels 1 and 2)
Empirical
indicators
Level 1 -  Nordlinger’s  Type I Level 2 - Regulatory level Type I
Participants 
and resources
Range of actors but predominant societal 
actors hold preferences divergent from the 
state and obstruct its preferences
At start of regulatory policy, key 
resources to exert influence held by few 
actors with divergent preferences 
(dissimilar from regulator)
Preferences Predominantly divergence, similar 
preferences in the background
Preferences of influential participants 
differ from agency proposals. At start only 
influential divergent preferences;
insufficient influential support to shift 
preferences
Process State translates preferences into 
authoritative action when state-society are 
divergent by: (i) counterbalancing - 
offsetting; (ii) obstruction; (iii) 
confrontation - disincentive
To diminish the constraining effects of 
influential actors with divergent preferences: 
agency alternates informal with formal 
approach, deploying either to enact its 
preferences. Acting on preferences by: (i) 
identifying and widely exposing obstacles 
to direct policy as preferred; (ii) 
exploiting ties to construct a framework, 
against divergent preferences, (iii) 
deterrence to address non-compliance
Time-length of 
decision­
making
Public policy undertaken accepting that 
state and societal preferences are 
divergent
Available timescale powers applied; 
delays forced
Outcomes State preferences translated into public 
policy without a shift in those of divergent 
actors
Preference fulfilled without intention to 
compromise
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Thus, the past section has accounted for the five indicators selected to examine the 
independence of regulatory agencies in practice. The indicators have been largely developed 
from Nordlinger’s preference-based state autonomy framework, making it possible to 
transpose his three autonomy type scenarios at the regulatory level through a careful 
elaboration o f their key identifiable features. The latter are contained in the three tables 
above. Accordingly, in chapters 4 to 7, the indicators are applied to policies conducted by 
Oftel and the ART to establish policy-specific types of autonomies and evaluate the extent 
that independence in practice reflects formal independence, hence, verify whether any 
other resources matter for the agencies to implement their preferences successfully. 
Chapter 3 examines respective formal institutional arrangements. First, however, the next 
section discusses the methodology o f this thesis, including why the sub-cases examine the 
telecoms sector in France and in the UK.
IV. Research Design and Methodology
Given the doubts expressed about the merits of past quantitative analyses to examine 
regulatory independence and the framework detailed above, the research design centres on 
qualitative tools. The joint techniques of ‘process tracing’, within four single sub-case 
studies, and of comparison are used to produce an empirical appreciation o f agency 
independence in practice, in order to develop a more elaborate conceptualisation allowing 
for more sophisticated research in this field in the future.
The regulation of the telecommunications sector in France and Britain is the case selected 
for the depth of research required207 to examine the independence o f regulatory agencies in 
practice. Although the two countries are comparable because o f non-institutional structural 
similarities208, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP)209, population, geographic 
position, and membership of the European Union (EU), past studies have raised 
differences between respective industrial policies and government-industry relations210. The
207 Dogan,M and Pelassy,P 1990, “How to Compare Nations — Strategies in Comparative Politics”, Chatham 
House Publishers, observe that a case study “may bring to light significant factors and variables neglected in 
many comparisons” p. 123
208 Thatcher 1999, p.22
209 International Monetary Fund (IMF) March 2007, Annual International Financial Statistics (IFS) Series
210 Shonfield,A 1965, “Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance o f Public and Private Power”, OUP; ch.7 
in ZysmanJ 1977 “Political Strategies for Industrial Order - State, Market and Industry in France”, University 
o f California Press; Hall,PA 1986 “Governing the Economy - The Politics of State Intervention in Britain 
and France”, Polity Press; Cawson,A, Morgan,K, Webber,D, Holmes,P and Stevens,A 1990, “Hostile 
Brothers”, Clarendon Press, especially ch.3
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choice of countries seems balanced since, a “’regional’ strategy is tied up with the risks of 
confinement it conceals...(but) a comparison between contrasting countries often tends to 
concentrate on extreme almost ‘abnormal’ types...(which) become a means of distorting 
the reality instead o f representing it”211.
The telecoms sector is highly relevant, especially since the 1998-2002 period focussed upon 
spans the ‘telecoms boom and bust’ period. In his sectoral study covering Britain and 
France as well as the Netherlands, Hulsink claims that the “telecommunications sector has 
traditionally been characterised by a high degree of government intervention”212, 
strengthening the case for analysing regulatory independence from elected officials in the 
two countries. Thatcher has referred to the sector’s ‘strategic’ attributes, especially given its 
direct impact on a range of other industries213. The effects o f developing regulated 
communication networks have stretched further than domestic telecoms and internet 
domains, into those o f international political economy. With the advent o f globalisation, 
the development o f advanced communication networks and services impacted directly on 
financial services growth’214. In 1999 the telecoms sector constituted a notable portion of 
GDP for both countries215, suggesting that policy implications extend beyond sectoral 
interests.
Instead sectoral institutional dissimilarities have persisted between Britain and France, even 
though institutional divergence between them ended in 1990, followed by progressive 
convergence216. Since “variations are the most powerful engines of causal analysis. Without 
variations we cannot establish associations between variables, and without associations the 
causes, processes, and outcomes...remain obscure”217. Since the scope of the thesis 
encompasses establishing whether formal institutional arrangements lead to differences in
211 Dogan and Pelassy 1990, pp.134,146
212 Hulsink 1999, p.5. Also Cawson et al’s.ch.4
213 Thatcher 1999, pp.22-3,66-7
214 Marsden,CT Summer 2001, “Cyberlaw and International Political Economy: Towards Regulation o f the 
Global Information Society”, p.356, Law Review of Michigan State University Detroit College o f  Law, 
pp.355-421
215 The similar national economic significance of the sector strengthens the case for labelling it ‘strategic’ and 
using it for a cross-country comparison. Sectoral contribution to UK GDP in 1999 was about 2.25-2.5% 
according to an Office o f Communications Telecoms Review chart (AnnexF: The Role of Telecoms in the 
Economy, 18/3/2005). The French telecoms sector equated to 1.9% ca. o f GDP in 1999. The figure was 
calculated by dividing the sector’s 1999 worth in million euros in the “Observatoire des marches - Les 
services de telecommunication en France au ler trimestre 2000” (Tablel) by IMF GDP data in billion euros; 
Annual IFS on France - 3/2007
216 Thatcher 1999, p.310; Hulsink 1999; also Gilardi 2002,2005, Edwards and Waverman 2006
217 Levi-FaurJD 7/2003 “Comparative Research Designs in the Study o f Regulation: How to Increase the 
Number O f Cases Without Compromising the Strengths o f Case-Oriented Analysis”, Centre on Regulation 
and Competition, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University o f Manchester
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independence in practice, institutional dissimilarity is particularly valuable to examine the 
independence in practice of respective national regulators on similar policies. Thus far the 
premise among scholars of formal independence has been that differences in formal 
frameworks within which national regulators operate determine the extent of regulatory 
independence. That is precisely what is tested here, while also ‘controlling’ for the sector.
Two salient and distinct policy issues are examined. Hence, four sub-cases provide 
empirical data for a ‘third level’ o f analysis, following the ‘second level’ o f analysis shaped 
by Nordlinger’s theory and constituted by the five selected indicators developed from it. 
This reduces the scope for ‘selection bias’ as well as for suggestions that different outcomes 
may be based on national differences only and, hence, widens the meaningfulness of 
findings. So, this research reaches beyond the common one country-one sector studies on 
regulation, since a cross-country and a cross-policy comparison is undertaken. Through a 
Medium-N (more than two and less than circa fifty (subleases218), the thesis works to 
achieve the balance between “depth and breadth”219. One policy is the licensing o f Third 
Generation (3G) mobile services220, the other is local loop unbundling (LLU)221.
Both are linked to the national spread of high-speed internet. Nevertheless, the selection of 
distinct policies is especially relevant in the telecoms sector, where the different types o f . 
industry actors (fixed and mobile) may generate different findings on regulatory 
independence. Dogan and Pelassy claim that “binary comparison can be used not only for 
increasing, through contrast, our knowledge o f two different systems...it can also 
contribute to an understanding o f general phenomena”222. At the simplest level, one benefit 
o f the joint cross-national and cross-policy comparison will be to avoid relying on a unique 
set of events, hence, assume that evidence on one regulator on a given issue constitutes a 
benchmark for independence.
Thus, the ‘comparative method’, which is associated with a systematic and careful analysis 
o f a small-N with many variables223, is adopted to assess in detail both the similar and
218 Levi-Faur 2003, p.3 (brackets added)
219 Levi-Faur quotes Ragin,CC 2000, “Fuzzy-Set Social Science”, p.22, Chicago University Press
220 Broadly, voice, internet-related services, images, data transmitted via a broadband digital network.
221 National incumbent operators making available the pairs o f copper-wires, or lines, they own to other 
network operators, so the latter can incorporate them in their networks to provide broadband (i.e. high-speed 
internet) to end-users
222 Dogan and Pelassy 1990, p .l27
223 Colli erJD 1993, “The Comparative Method”,ch.5, in eds. Finifter,AW, “Political Science: The State o f the 
Discipline II”, American Political Science Association; Lijphart,A 1971 “Comparative Politics and the
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different factors that affect whether the two regulators translate their preferences into 
action and how, in different countries and on different issues. Lijphart claims: “the 
intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more 
superficial statistical analysis of many cases”224. Comparing findings from selected cases 
avoids that “those less sensitive to the limitations of aggregate data would make 
unwarranted claims about these countries (or policies) being alike or different”225, as 
similarities or differences based on studies assessing formal institutional arrangements have 
induced.
The four sub-case studies also help portray changes in the policy stance o f specific actors 
over time, adding an inter-temporal element to the analysis. This reflects process tracing, 
which reveals ‘causal mechanisms’, or “the causal processes and intervening variables 
through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects”226. The technique 
“directs one to trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way. Between the 
beginning (independent variable[s]) and end (outcome of dependent variable), the 
researcher looks for a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps”227. This is clearly 
set and carried out through the framework and selected indicators, developed from 
Nordlinger’s autonomy-types, which guide the research in a sequential manner to draw 
attention on the specific combination o f factors and mechanisms that determine regulatory 
independence228, and possibly help to establish their magnitude. A benefit o f the technique 
is that process tracing allows for ‘equifinality’, “or similar outcomes occurring through 
different causal processes (hence) the possibility o f mapping out one or more potential 
causal paths that are consistent with the outcome and the...evidence in a single case”229. 
Thus, the combination o f methods is useful in terms o f providing explanations for specific 
cases and to refine available theories, to produce generic knowledge on regulatory 
independence in practice.
Comparative Method”, American Political Science Review Vol.65(3), pp.682-693, for the strengths and 
weaknesses o f the comparative method versus alternative techniques.
224 ibid.p.685
225 Ashford,DE 1992, “Introduction: O f Cases and Contexts”, p.14, Ashford,DE. (eds.) “History and 
Context in Comparative Public Policy”, pp.3-26, University of Pittsburgh Press, (brackets added)
226 George,ALG and BennettA 17-19/10/97, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research”,p.2, Paper presented 
at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University
227 CheckelJT 2005 “It’s the Process ‘Stupid’! Process Tracing in the Study o f European and International 
Politics”,p.5, prepared for Audie Klotz (ed.), Qualitative Methods in International Relations, Arena
228 Roberts,C 1996, “The Logic o f Historical Explanation”, Pennsylvania State University Press, refers to the 
“tracing o f the sequence o f events that brought (complex events) about” in terms of historical studies, with 
George and Bennett, p.l 3, claiming: “A causal path may include many necessary steps, and they may have to 
occur in a particular order”. Both substantiate the sequential use o f selected indicators to establish causal 
paths generating autonomy types
229 George and Bennett, p.7
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V. Sources
The argument developed in the thesis is based on documentary sources in the form of 
consultations, market data, statements and decisions published by the two regulators, 
government documents, national and supranational legislation, transcripts of parliamentary 
debates and committee hearings, non-confidential industry views and responses, press 
releases and press sources. The documents were obtained from several sources, both in 
paper form and electronically. Five UK semi-structured interviews were carried out:
•  three anonymous senior and middle-management UK regulatory officials 
(Oftel/Ofcom);
• the Radiocommunications Agency’s former Chief Executive, David Hendon;
•  National Audit Office 3G report Study Manager, Neil Carey.
Exchanges with French officials:
• telephone interview with then French regulator’s (ART) Chairman Jean-Michel 
Hubert;
• electronically with a France Telecom senior management official (regulation).
Some exchanges were also undertaken with middle-management and secretarial staff at the 
regulators.
Several documents were procured from the British Library for Political and Economic 
Science (BLPES), others were obtained via direct communication. French-language press 
cuttings, including from Le Monde, Les Echos, Le Figaro (Figaro-Economie), were mostly 
sourced from archives at the Sciences-Po library in Paris. The other French press cuttings, 
like UK press material, largely from the Financial Times, The Times, The Independent and 
the Guardian, were retrieved from electronic databases (namely Nexis) accessible through 
BLPES.
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VI. Limits of the study
The study aims to widen the analysis, hence the understanding, on whether regulators are 
independent in practice. It avoids quantitative analyses of ‘independence’. Part of the 
exercise of the thesis is to stress that independence is relative, not absolute. A regulator is 
not, and can rarely be defined as, dichotomously independent or not. Thus the thesis 
proposes a set o f different explanations on how regulators may be able to conduct policy as 
they intend, beyond what can be drawn from their formal institutional design. While the 
framework presented in this thesis focuses on uncovering more than a single explanatory 
factor influencing agency independence, and does so systematically for a ‘strategic’ sector in 
two countries and by examining two separate policy issues, it does not establish whether 
the identified factors apply to all cases and sectors, hence whether they are exhaustive; In 
future studies, larger and more diverse (subleases could be researched.
The thesis does not examine how participant preferences, at the centre of the framework, 
are formed. The analysis is developed on the basis of preferences stated in, or reasonably 
inferred from, the cited documentary sources, assumed to be representative. So, where 
regulatory preferences are similar to those o f senior elected officials or regulatees from the 
start of a policy, questions about the ‘independence’ o f preference formation may arise. 
However, deriving conclusions suggesting that the regulator is acting in line with the 
preferences o f political principals or has been captured in such cases is a questionable 
assumption. Nordlinger stresses that it is unrealistic to expect any entity to come even close 
to being fully autonomous in the self-generation o f preferences. Analysing different cases 
can nonetheless provide evidence regarding a greater similarity between the preferences of 
regulators and certain types of actors, compared to other types.
VII. Conclusion
The preference-based framework developed in this chapter proposes to broaden the 
analytical assessment of regulatory independence in practice. The five selected indicators 
help examine the actual impact of respective formal institutional arrangements on the two 
agencies, particularly regarding their translation of preferences into action, and whether 
specific dynamic non-statutory factors and mechanisms are significant in explanatory 
terms. Thus the proposed framework forms a basis for a review of the importance of 
formal institutions and, particularly what they represent with respect to the governance of
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markets. The study of two salient policies, carried out in the following chapters and 
concerning a key sector in two distinct countries, provides a more comprehensive basis to 
evaluate regulatory independence in practice, and is intended to make a sufficient 
contribution to the literature in order to generate further research. First, in chapter 3, the 
formal institutional arrangements of Oftel and the ART are set out. A clear picture of the 
powers delegated to the two telecoms regulators, as opposed to those possessed by other 
statutory actors, is necessary to illustrate in depth the factors that formal institutionalists 
consider important to measure ‘regulatory independence’. Once formal frameworks are 
delineated, the analysis shifts to sub-case chapters four to seven showing the extent to 
which regulators depend on those formal frameworks to fulfill policy preferences.
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Chapter 3: Formal Institutional Actors within 
National Regulatory Frameworks
I. Introduction
This chapter examines the formal institutional arrangements relating to the selected 
telecoms regulatory agencies in the UK and France. The account of regulators’ formal role 
is complemented with the relevant formal authority o f other actors, whether because of 
veto or shared powers, and duties. It precedes the case studies, in which the regulatory 
autonomy framework presented in chapter 2 is applied. The chapter sets out the key 
elements of the formal institutional design of the two agencies to provide a comparative 
insight on the statutory attributes of sectoral regulation in the two countries. They are taken 
into account where relevant in the case analysis of the agencies’ independence in practice. 
Accordingly, the explanatory power o f statutory arrangements in practice is studied in 
subsequent chapters, rather than assumed as formal institutionalist literature does.
The chapter is divided into sections addressing sequentially the formal authority of 
regulators, ministerial and government powers, the role of other public ‘state’ bodies 
including those with concurrent powers, and finally the scope o f judicial bodies. In each 
section, formal arrangements relating to the senior management of the regulators is 
identified first, followed by any licensing authority of the actors discussed, their 
enforcement powers and advisory role. Selected ancillary powers, providing a fuller picture 
of the formally relevant actors, are indicated. British regulatory actors are discussed first, 
followed by French ones, to allow for comparisons to be as consistent as possible, hence, 
show institutional similarities and dissimilarities. Table 5 at the end summarises 
Governments’ and ‘other state’ bodies’ formal controls over the two regulators230.
II. The UK’s Office of Telecommunications (Oftel)
As the United Kingdom’s telecoms sector was liberalised under the Telecommunications 
Act 1984, by the Thatcher Government, the Director General of Telecommunications
230 Citing statutes as published in 2003 and subsequently
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(DGT) was vested with powers to perform assigned regulatory functions231 for a maximum 
five-year term, but with the possibility o f re-appointment232. He could resign in writing to 
the Government’s Secretary o f State (SoS) at any time233. The DGT’s management powers 
during his tenure included appointing staff as he saw fit234, for the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) agency he headed; a non-ministerial Government department 
replaced at the end of 2003 by the Office o f Communications (Ofcom)235. He had to 
exercise functions and fulfill ‘general duties’, shared with the SoS. Nonetheless, anything 
the D G T was authorised or required to do under the Act, other than making statutory 
instruments, could be done by any other member o f staff the DGT authorised236.
The D G T’s two primary duties “in the manner which he considers is best calculated” were:
(i) to ensure that all reasonable demands for telecoms services were satisfied throughout 
the UK; and, (ii) to ensure that suppliers could finance the provision o f the services237. 
Subject to these two primary duties, the DGT, and the SoS, had to:
(i) promote interests of consumers, purchasers and other UK users (especially those 
disabled and o f pensionable age) regarding prices, quality and variety o f telecoms 
services and apparatus supplied;
(ii) maintain and promote effective competition between persons engaged in UK
commercial telecoms activities;
(iii) promote efficiency and economy;
(iv) promote research, development and use o f new techniques;
(v) encourage major telecoms service users abroad to establish business in the UK;
(vi) promote the provision o f international transit services;
(vii) enable UK telecoms services providers to compete effectively abroad;
231 Telecommunications Act 1984, Part I, Section 1(1), Halsbury's statutes of England and Wales, Vol.45, 
Butterworths 1985, henceforth the ‘Telecoms Act’ or ‘Act’. The abbreviations DGT and Oftel are used. The 
DGT’s powers were extended with the “Competition Act 1998”, Crown Copyright 1998, effective from 1 
March 2000. They are outlined in the ‘Other Public Bodies and Concurrent Powers’ section below. Nowhere 
in the Telecoms Act was there a reference to the DGT’s or of Oftel’s ‘independence’
232 s.l(2),p.l25
233 s.1(3). The SoS referred to is that formerly responsible for Trade and Industry’
234 s.l(5)
235 Oftel was merged into Ofcom with the Independent Television Commission, the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission, the Radio Authority, and the Radiocommunications Agency discussed in chapter 4, following 
Her Majesty’s Government Communications Bill, drafted in June 2001, given progressive telecoms and media 
industry convergence. Ofcom has operated since end-2003
236 Schedulel,para.8
237 s.3(l)
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(viii) and, to enable apparatus suppliers to compete effectively both in and outside the 
UK238.
The DGT and Oftel carried out duties by enforcing licences containing operators’ 
obligations, mirroring the regulator’s considerable powers. The DGT shared with the SoS 
the authority to institute proceedings vis-a-vis persons committing the offence o f running 
unlicensed telecoms systems in England and Wales or Northern Ireland239.
The DGT had to be consulted before the SoS granted a licence, but he could only grant 
licences upon the SoS’s authorisation240. Licences contained requisite conditions according 
to the SoS or the DGT, allowing connection to specified telecoms systems241. After 
establishing procedural details concerning granting the licences, they notified interested 
persons, and could refuse licences to applicants omitting required information. A notice 
was published as either o f the two considered appropriate, bringing decisions to applicants’ 
attention242.
Before granting applicants public telecommunications operators (PTOs) licences subject to 
special conditions243, the SoS or the DGT gave notice setting out effects, reasons and the 
time (not less than 28 days from the notice publication) within which representations, to be 
duly considered, could be made244.
238 s.3(2)
239 s.5(7). Long,C 1995 “Telecommunications Law and Practice”, p.39, Sweet and Maxwell, refers to s5 as the 
general prohibition constituting the foundation o f UK telecoms regulation; anyone running a telecoms system 
was guilty o f an offence unless authorised by licence under s7
240 s.7(l)(a) There were three types o f licences; general (to all persons), class or individual. Running a system 
compliant with ‘class’ licence terms entailed automatic validation without further formality; without 
notification procedures. However, upon breaches o f conditions, the DGT could revoke by notice its 
application; Long pp.41,103. s7(3A) specified that the SoS and the DGT had to ensure compliance with EC 
Licensing Directive requirements. The DGT’s April 1999 statement, “Rights and obligations to interconnect 
under the EC Interconnection Directive”, indicated that “Throughout the EU, licensing policy is now 
governed by the.. .EC Licensing Directive. Thus member state rules on who gets interconnection rights must 
comply with the provisions o f the Licensing Directive as well as the Interconnection Directive. The Licensing 
Directive requires Member State rules on licensing to be proportionate, non-discriminatory, objective and 
transparent”, paras.1.6-7
™ s.7(5)(a)(c)
242 s.7A(l)(3)(4); s.7A inserted by the Telecommunications (Licensing) Regulations 1997
243 s.9(3); Running a licensed public telecoms system to which section 8 applied, entailed more obligations 
such as: providing specified telecoms services; connecting to any telecoms system to which the licence 
related, or permitting connection to such systems; not showing undue preference to, or to exercise undue 
discrimination against, particular persons; publishing notices on methods adopted for determining charges
244 s.8(5)
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Once licences were granted, the DGT’s formal authority was significant:
•  his directions had to be complied with245;
• he could add to licensees’ formal obligations with or without consent.
Licences modification by consent followed notifying affected persons, stating the proposed 
changes, the reasons and the timescale for representations (28 days minimum)246.
Alternatively, the DGT could overcome regulatees’ dissent by referring a matter to the 
Competition Commission247, which investigated and reported, within six months, on 
whether the matter operated or could operate against the public interest and, if so, whether 
licence modification constituted a remedy. He could vary references to the Commission at 
any time, besides publishing details bringing references or variations to affected persons’ 
attention, sending a copy to the particular licensee248. The DGT then received a 
Competition Commission report249, which took into account the DGT’s and SoS’s duties 
to determine whether the matter operated against the public interest250. A Competition 
Commission report favourable to a D G T reference allowed him to impose a licence 
change251.
The DGT could issue final or provisional orders for licence contraventions; he kept a 
public register, comprising licences granted, modifications and revocations252. Provisional 
orders depended on the extent someone was likely to suffer a loss or damage. Where 
necessary, the DGT confirmed provisional orders with or without modifications to ensure 
compliance. When general duties precluded making orders, or contraventions were trivial, 
he informed affected persons, and sent the operator a copy253.
Orders could be revoked at any time. Otherwise, complying was compulsory. Breaches 
causing loss or damage were “actionable at suit or instance of that person”. The DGT 
could ensure compliance with orders by civil proceedings for an injunction or interdict or 
other relief for affected persons254. Also, if final, or confirmed provisional, orders were not
245 s.7(6)
246 s.12
247 Replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission created through the Fair Trading Act 1973
248 s.13
249 s. 14(4)
250 s .13(8)
251 s.15
252 s .19(1)(2)
253 s. 16(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (a) (c)
254 s.!8(5)(6)(a)(8)
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complied with within three months of the SoS giving notice in writing accordingly, the 
licence was revocable255.
Procedurally, the DGT informed affected actors before making orders. He either obtained 
operators’ consent or complied with requirements, allowing representations within 
minimum 28 days, to be duly considered. Final orders were made within two months of 
notices. Revoking final, or confirming provisional, orders entailed the same procedure256.
To carry out his duties, the DGT had significant powers to obtain information. Besides 
reviewing and collecting information on commercial UK telecoms activities257, the DGT 
could require persons to produce, by notice, any specified documents or information, 
except what could not be compelled in civil proceedings before a court258. Such 
information could only be disclosed without consent of those carrying out the business if it 
facilitated the SoS’s, the DGT’s or the Competition Commission’s functions.
The D G T’s ancillary Telecoms Act powers, amongst others, comprised259:
• making regulations prescribing performance standards designated operators should 
achieve (unmet standards entailed compensation), resolving disputes by orders260;
• investigating complaints if required to or if he thought fit261;
• establishing advisory bodies and appointing members, subject to the SoS not doing
_ 2 6 2  
SO .
Thus, the Telecoms Act formalised sectoral regulation by the DGT, but his role stretched 
further. To co-ordinate Telecoms Act functions and the SoS’s licensing powers under the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act (1949/1998), allowing spectrum allocation to mobile operators, 
the D G T gave the SoS advice on the exercise of such powers where he felt necessary or as 
the SoS requested. Advice related to granting, varying or revoking licences authorising the 
establishment, installation or use of wireless telegraphy stations or apparatus and the 
running o f telecoms systems263.
255 Long,p.57 (ss.7,16,18)
256 s. 17(1) (2)(3A)(4)
257 s.47(l)(2)
258 s.53(l)
259 see Telecoms Act 1984 for all the powers
260 ss.27A(l) (4) (6),27B (1) (2) (a)
261 s.49(l)(3)
262 s.54(l)(3)
263 s.51(l)(3)
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As explained below, even though the Director General o f Fair Trading (DGFT) shared the 
additional authority, the March 2000 enactment o f the Competition Act 1998 extended the 
DGT’s powers.
III. The Formal Weight of Ministerial and Government Powers
Notwithstanding the powers delegated to the DGT, the Telecoms Act 1984 left successive 
Conservative and Labour Governments with significant regulatory controls. HM Treasury’s 
approval was required for numbers, and terms and conditions o f service, of staff the DGT 
sought to appoint264. Otherwise, the SoS for Trade and Industry, who appointed the DGT 
and could reappoint or remove him on unspecified grounds o f incapacity or 
misbehaviour265, was the elected official with most sectoral authority266.
National security or relations with Governments or territories outside the UK enabled the 
SoS to supersede anything done consistent with statutory duties267. The SoS could give the 
DGT general directions on the order o f priority for telecoms matters to be reviewed. The 
DGT had to, voluntarily or when asked, give the SoS or the DGFT information, advice 
and assistance268.
Crucially, the SoS had the sole power to grant telecoms licences, after consulting the DGT, 
unless she authorised the DGT to grant them. Granted in writing, licences lasted for the 
specified period unless the SoS revoked them according to terms therein, and authorised 
connection to specified telecoms systems and apparatus, and the provision of specified 
telecoms services269.
The SoS designated ‘public telecommunication operators’, by order270. She established 
conditions regarding licensee rights exercisable by virtue o f the Telecommunications
264 s. 1(5)
265 s.l(3)
266 see Telecoms Act 1984 for ancillary powers
267 s.3(3)(a). Having consulted specific persons in question including the DGT, the SoS could give directions 
as appeared requisite in the interests o f national security or relations with foreign governments or territories. 
The particular thing required in any SoS direction had to be carried out notwithstanding other duties the Act 
imposed; s94
268 s.47(3)(4)
269 ss.7(1) (2) (3) (4)
270 s.9(l)(2)
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Code271, conferring operators powers to install and maintain apparatus to run their systems 
on third-parties’ land272, and could make a public telecoms system cease to be a PTO 
temporarily273.
The SoS could veto licence modifications the DGT sought274. She had to be sent copies of 
proposed modifications sought through operators’ consent. However, within the time 
allowed for representations, the SoS could direct the DGT not to make modifications, only 
if: (i) it appeared that they had to be based on a Competition Commission report, or (ii) 
national security interests or relations with foreign governments could have been 
jeopardised275.
Similarly the DGT informed the SoS o f references to the Competition Commission. The 
SoS could direct the Commission not to proceed with references or give effect to variations 
within 14 days o f receiving them, but only based on national security interests or relations 
with foreign Governments. The SoS appointed no fewer than three Commission members 
for the purpose of licence modification references276.
Otherwise, the DGT sent the SoS a copy o f the Commission’s reference report containing 
conclusions. I f  the SoS considered that publishing certain matters was against the public 
interest, or the commercial interests o f any person, and directed the regulator to exclude 
any matter from the report before the end of the 14 day period since receiving it, the DGT 
had to do so277. Furthermore, if, within the time specified, the SoS directed the DGT not to 
apply modifications upon receiving a Commission’s report copy specifying requisite 
modifications, he had to comply278. The DGT submitted annual reports to the SoS, 
comprising his and the Competition Commission’s activities regarding references, which 
she laid before each House of Parliament and could publish279.
271 s. 10(1) (2) (3). The code applied to persons to whom the special s8 conditions applied, or when the SoS 
considered that that person running a system would benefit the public, and that it was not practicable for the 
system to be run without the application o f the code
272 s.l0,sub-sl Notes, but also Schedule 2; the code defined. Regarding exercisable rights, para.2, for example, 
required that operators seeking to execute works, like apparatus installation or maintenance, on land owned 
or occupied by others required a written agreement conferring on the operator a right for statutory purpose
273 s.9(4)
274 s. 12(5)
275 s .12(6)
276 s s .13(5)(6)(10); Schedule 7, paras.l&2 Competition Act 1998
277 s .14(5)(6)
278 s .15(5)
^  s.55(l)(2)(3)
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In exercising his Telecoms Act functions, to co-ordinate respective functions, the D GT 
had to consider the principles the SoS applied regarding her Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 
licensing powers280. The Competition Act 1998’s introduction allowed the SoS to make 
rules concerning appeals and appeal tribunals, conferring functions on the Competition 
Commission’s Appeal Tribunals President after consulting the President among others281. 
The Minister could make regulations to co-ordinate functions exercisable concurrently by 
the DGT and the DGFT under the Competition Act282.
IV. Other Public Bodies and Concurrent Powers
The role of statutorily significant sectoral actors other than Government Ministers also 
defined regulatory agencies’ degree o f formal authority. The British Parliament had selected 
but important powers. Oftel was funded by money voted by Parliament for the 
remuneration and other expenses of the DGT and his staff283. Moreover, powers to make 
regulations regarding telecoms service provision were exercisable by statutory instrument. 
Parliament could annul statutory instruments containing regulations the SoS made, through 
a resolution of either House284.
The Parliamentary Trade and Industry Select Committee (TISC) could not insist that 
Members o f Parliament (MPs) or civil servants, such as Oftel staff, attended its hearings for 
public questioning, unlike for other persons. However, it had the power, unspecified in the 
Telecoms Act, to secure the production of written evidence on any topic of enquiry285.
280 s.51 (2)
281 C A 1998 -  s.48(2)(3)
282 CA 1998 -  s.54(4); Schedule 10, Parts II,IV
283 s.l(6). Yet, “Oftel's management plan 2002/3”, 18 /4 /02  ch.4 states: “most...costs o f the office are 
recovered through fees charged to holders of licences”. “Under the EC Authorisation and Licensing of 
Telecommunications Directive (97/13/EC), the cost o f certain areas o f Oftel’s activities cannot be recovered 
from licence fees. Based on Oftel’s approved expenditure plans for 2002/3, some £0.8 million will be 
provided from Government sources to meet such costs”; para.4.19. For a breakdown o f  1995 fees for 
different licence categories, Long p.54
284 ss.46A(l),46A(2) Thatcher 1999 draws on s9 to indicate this; p.151. The SoS designated a public telecoms 
system by order to be presented to both Houses of Parliament and only in force after 28 days. Thus, though 
unable to modify licences, either House could block a PTO licence being issued by voting a resolution 
revoking the order
285 House o f Commons 5/03, “The Committee System of the House o f Commons” pp.20-1. Whether a 
committee could formally demand civil servants to attend remained “something o f a grey area” after Oftel 
ceased to exist; “Handbook of House o f Commons Procedure”, 2007, Select Committees and Joint 
Committees para.l7.2.7, p.223
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Instead, as explained above, the general competition authority, the Competition 
Commission investigated and reported on whether matters the DGT referred to it operated 
against the public interest, and whether licence modifications were remedies. Following a 
reference, the DGT had to satisfy any Commission request for information and other 
assistance in his power. The Commission issued a report within six months, having regard 
to the SoS’ and D G T’s duties. The D G T had to have regard to the Commission’s report 
before making licence modifications286.
The Competition Act 1998, based on Articles 81 and 82 (formerly 85 and 86) o f the EC 
Treaty and which established the Competition Commission287, assigned to the D G T wider 
competition functions and, especially information-gathering and enforcement, powers than 
the Telecoms Act from March 2000. Formally, the DG T’s Telecoms Act ‘general duties’ 
did not apply when asked by the Director General of Fair Trading288 to exercise functions 
relating to conduct detrimental to consumers of telecoms services and apparatus289. When 
exercising Competition Act functions, the DGT could have regard to Telecoms Act 
‘general duties’ if the DGFT would have when exercising the same functions290.
Thus, the Competition Act assigned function ‘concurrency’, comprising significant 
enforcement powers (explained below) to the ^Directors General’ but, formally, the DGFT 
represented a veto player. Provisions addressed agreements, decisions or concerted 
practices preventing, restricting or distorting competition (Chapter I Prohibition) and 
conduct amounting to abuses of a dominant position in a market (Chapter II 
Prohibition)291, regarding telecoms activities292. The preparation and publication of guidance 
on penalties293 and making procedural rules294 were the only functions exclusive to the 
DGFT, though he still had to consult the DGT among others on both295.
Concurrency meant that only the Act’s non-binding guidelines, “not a substitute for the 
Competition Act 1998”, specified that “agreements or conduct that relate to the
286 ss.l3(1)(7)(8)(9)(9A)(10),15(2)
287 Replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on 1/4/1999
288 Head of the Office o f Fair Trading (OFT). The OFT, created under the Fair Trading Act 1973, aims to 
protect both consumers and businesses from unfair competition and unlawful activity
289 ss.3(3b),50(l)
290 s.3(3C)
291 Telecoms Act s.50(3), as amended by the Competition Act. The latter fully defines the prohibitions ss.2,18
292 s.50(2)(3)
293 CA 1998, s.38(l-6)
294 s.51(3)(4). Also OFT417, “Competition Act 1998 - The application in the telecommunications sector”, 
pp2,4. Accordingly, while having regard for the DGFT’s exclusive powers, to simplify and use references 
from the Competition Act 1998 consistently, the term Director is used here as in the Act
295 CA 1998, ss.38(7),51(4) respectively
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telecommunications sector will normally be dealt with by the DGT. However, the DGT 
and the DGFT will always consult with each other before a decision is made as to who will 
deal with a case in respect of which there is concurrent jurisdiction”296.
Formally, either Director could publish general advice for telecoms operators about the 
application and enforcement of the prohibitions. He could publish revised advice or 
information, including how he would exercise conferred powers. In preparing advice or 
information, the DGT had to consult the DGFT, fellow regulators and others he 
considered appropriate297.
An important element o f the Act was ‘self-regulatory’ notification298 by operators, asking 
the Director whether a relevant prohibition was being infringed. He could grant individual 
exemptions regarding the Chapter I prohibition and immunity from penalties regarding the 
Chapter II prohibition. Besides varying, removing or adding obligations or conditions 
subject to conditions, he could cancel the Chapter I prohibition exemption, and could 
remove the Chapter II prohibition immunity299.
The Director could conduct investigations regardless o f notifications if he suspected that 
either prohibition had been infringed. Any person could be required to produce requested 
documents or relevant information and give explanations. If  not produced, he could 
require persons to state where documents were300.
Competition Act information-gathering powers were far wider than Telecoms Act ones. 
The Director could authorise his officers to enter any premises without a warrant and 
without notice if he considered that the occupier was either a party to the agreement 
investigated, or an undertaking the conduct of which he was investigating301. Officers could 
require the production o f any relevant document. The Director could authorise officers to 
enter premises under a warrant issued by a court, to search premises and take copies of 
documents302.
296 OFT417,p.5 (underlined here, indicating discretion and suggesting private discussions between the two 
DGs)
297 CA 1998, s.52
298 N o requirement existed; OFT417,p.5
299 CA 1998, ss.4,5,16,23,24 including the conditions that applied regarding ‘exemptions’ and ‘immunity*
300 ss.25-26
301 s.27(l)(2)(3)
302 s.28(l)(2)
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In enforcement terms, the DGT could give directions to end infringements o f either 
prohibition and failure to comply authorised him to apply for a court order303. 
Furthermore, unlike the Telecoms Act setting Oftel’s powers since its inception, under the 
Competition Act, if an infringement was committed intentionally or negligently the 
Director could impose a penalty of up to 10% of turnover304.
Under the Competition Act 1998, any party facing a decision by the Director, could appeal 
to the Competition Commission. Except in the case of an appeal against the imposition, or 
the amount, o f a penalty, appealing did not suspend the decision’s effect305. Any appeal 
against the DGT’s decisions made to the Commission was to be determined by a 
Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal306.
V. The Scope for Judicial Bodies
The role of courts largely related to challenges that operators could bring against Oftel by 
virtue o f final or provisional orders under the Telecoms Act, o f which they questioned the 
validity either on the ground that the DGT had not exercised his authority in a reasonable 
manner, or because of procedural impropriety. Operators could make an application to the 
High Court within 42 days of an order. If  satisfied that the making or confirmation of the 
order was not within the DGT’s powers or that he had failed to comply with requirements, 
it could quash the order or provisions therein307. Otherwise, courts could be involved by 
way of judicial review308.
VI. France’s Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART)
In France the setting up of an ‘autorite administrative independante’ for telecoms 
regulation occurred following a law passed in 1996, under Alain Juppe’s Government, 
created the ART309, which started operating from 1997, hence, almost thirteen years after
303 ss.32(l),33(1),34(1)
304 s.36 (1) (2) (3) (8)
305 s.46(l) (2) (4)
306 s.48(l), schedules 7(27),8
307 s .18(1)(2)
308 Thatcher 1999, p.150
309 Autorite de regulation des communications electroniques et des postes (ARCEP) since 20th May 2005
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Oftel310. In management terms, rather than a single head, the ART had a board o f five 
members, appointed because o f their legal, technical and economic skills311. Decisions were 
to be taken collectively, by a minimum of three board members and by the majority of 
those present.
Once appointed, board members could not be dismissed. Thus, Governments could not 
threaten to remove senior ART officials. Furthermore, unless they had held office for a 
term not exceeding two years, board members posts were non-renewable312, reducing 
incentives to act according to Government policy. Board members appointed to replace 
members unable to complete their term, held office for the remainder of the term o f the 
person replaced. Terms lasted six years, with one o f three members appointed by decree 
leaving, hence replaced, every two years.
Holding the post of ART board member, remunerated according to the two highest senior 
civil servant administration grades, was incompatible with any professional activity, national 
elected office, and, direct or indirect interest in a company in the telecoms, broadcasting 
and information technology sectors. Board members could not:
•  be part of the posts and telecoms public service commission (Commission
superieure du service public des postes et telecommunications, CSSPPT);
•  disclose any information acquired during the post313.
Similarly to Oftel, wider staff management was an internal matter for the ART Chairman 
{'president)314. The 1996 law established that relevant departmental staff would transfer from 
the Ministry responsible for telecoms to the regulatory agency according to functions 
conferred upon the latter315. Otherwise, the regulator could employ ‘fonctionnaires publics’
3,0 Loi de reglementation des telecommunications n°96-659 du 26 juillet 1996. Some viewed it as a 
consequence o f pressures stemming from earlier European directives fighting national monopolistic network 
industries; for example, ChevallierJ 1996, “La Nouvelle Reforme des telecommunications: ruptures et 
continuites”, p.910, Revue Francaise de Droit Administratif, 12(5) pp.909-951. Maisl,H. 20/3/1997: “Droit 
des Telecommunications: Entre Dereglementation et Regulation - Les Transformations Recentes”, p.215, in 
“L’Actualite Juridique - Droit Administratif’, n.3 stressed this choice was focal to develop domestic 
competition
311 Art.8, LOI 96-659, 26 /7/96, also Art.L.36.1 o f former “Code des Postes et Telecommunications” 
(now “Code des Postes et des Communications electroniques”). Henceforth, unless indicated otherwise, 
footnote references to articles will refer to the Code, instead o f to articles in the aforementioned Loi for the 
reader’s convenience. The law which established the ART, duly cited in the Code articles, has been amended. 
The laws amending it can be found when reading individual Code articles; www.legifrance.gouv.fr
312 The regulator’s website indicates that government appointee Dominique Roux, given a first term of two 
years, obtained a six-year reappointment, totalling eight years
313 Art.L.36-2
314 Art.L.36-3
315 Art.22.V of the 1996 law
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(civil servants), at the same conditions as those offered by the Telecoms Ministry, and 
external candidates316. All were bound by obligations of confidentiality.
ART funding came from charges levied for its services, licence fees and from public 
monies317. The ART proposed the funds estimated as necessary to the Minister in charge of 
telecommunications, who would include them in the annual budget. As for staffing, the 
ART’s Chairman had discretion over spending. Accounts had to be submitted to the 
national auditing authority; the Cour des comptes.
Similarly to Oftel, the ART shared regulatory objectives with the Government Minister in 
charge of telecommunications318:
i) the provision and financing o f ‘service public’319;
ii) fair and effective competition in the interest o f users;
iii) developing sectoral employment, innovation and competitiveness;
iv) establishing equitable terms o f network access and interconnection;
v) ensuring telecoms operators respected confidentiality of communications 
transmitted;
vi) ensuring operators and service providers complied with defence and public 
security obligations;
vii) due consideration of all geographical areas and users regarding access to 
services.
Also like Oftel, the ART carried out regulatory duties by enforcing telecoms licences, 
‘autorisations’ specifying operators’ obligations, and sanctioning breaches if necessary.
The ART’s licensing authority was limited to independent, closed-user, networks. Refusals 
could only occur because of non-compliance with terms set by decree or those the ART 
established as part o f its wider regulatory functions. No response within two months of 
applications meant the licence could be considered granted320.
316 ArtL.36-3
317 Art.L.36-4
318 Art.L.32-1.11
319 Obligations imposed on operators, based on principles relating to the public interest - equality, continuity 
and adaptability - to be protected domestically
320 Art.L.33-2
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The regulator evaluated public telecoms network operators, including experimental ones, 
and public telephony services licence applications on the Minister’s behalf. When licensing 
required a call for applicants, it published a report explaining the outcome of the selection 
procedure321.
The ART lacked Oftel’s licences modification powers but comparably, after hearing the 
Conseil de la concurrence’s (the competition authority) views:
•  could request operators to modify interconnection conventions, which they 
agreed, but the regulator had to be notified of, to guarantee equality of terms for 
competition and service interoperability322;
•  annually established which operators had significant market power (SMP)323, that is 
market share o f over 25%. These operators were to be governed by special 
provisions.
The regulator:
• decided whether to approve technical and pricing terms of interconnection offers 
meant to be cost-oriented and reflect network usage, that SMP operators planned 
to publish324;
•  could resolve disputes if asked (explained below)325.
To carry out his duties, besides commissioning expert evaluations and conducting 
studies326, the ART Chairman had the powers, as did the Telecoms Minister, to:
• collect any information from licensed operators to ensure compliance with 
principles and obligations pertaining to legislative or regulatory provisions, or 
those in their licences327;
• conduct relevant investigations, while ensuring non-disclosure of confidential 
information328.
Significant enforcement powers were combined with those to collect information. The
321 Art.L.36-7.1
322 Art.L.34-8.1
323 Art.L.36-7.7 based on turnover compared to market size, means o f access to end users, operators’ access 
to financial resources and their experience in the supply o f market products
324 ArtL.34-8.II
325 Art.L.36-8/L.36-9
326 Art.L.36-14. Operators had to provide annual statistical information on the use, coverage and means o f  
access o f their service
327 Art.L.32-4
328 Art.L.36-13
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ART Chairman could institute proceedings to accomplish formal objectives329. Following a 
request from the Minister, business users’ organisations, user associations, by individuals, 
or upon deciding so, the ART could sanction network operators and service providers 
breaching regulatory provisions relating to their activities330. If, for instance, an operator did 
not pay required ‘universal service’ fund contributions331, the regulator served a formal 
notice first, ordering remedial action within a set period, and could make the procedure 
public.
When no remedy was sought before the deadline, depending on the seriousness of 
breaches, the ART’s sanction could entail:
• suspending completely or partially the licence, for up to one month;
• reducing its duration by maximum one year;
• revoking the licence, which was possible without notice if foreign composition of
shareholders or o f voting rights exceeded 20%, except European Union/European 
Economic Area actors332.
When breaches were not criminal offences, the ART could impose fines:
• o f up to 3% of the previous year’s turnover; or
• 5% on operators repeating the same offence.
If  activity was insufficient to determine this threshold, the fine could not exceed one 
million French francs, or two million if the same breach was repeated. The fines were 
issued after the operator received notification of the order and had the possibility of 
examining the case and making representations.
So, the French agency, created long after the British regulator, was granted the formal 
power to fine first. The regulator could not be requested to look into three-year old matters 
not previously investigated333.
Besides sanctioning non-compliance following orders to remedy regulatory provision 
breaches, the ART applied sanctions for non-compliance with decisions regarding serious 
breaches o f sectoral rules or dispute resolution having been called upon by aggrieved
329 ArtL.36-12
330 Art.L.36-11
331 Art.L.35-3.II.2
332 Art.L.36-11.2
333 Art.L.36-11.3
106
parties334. Dispute resolution causes comprised: interconnection refusals; failed commercial 
negotiations; interconnection or network access disagreements; conditions of shared 
facilities on public and private land335.
First, however, to resolve disputes, the ART:
• issued determinations after inviting parties’ observations, specifying ‘fair’ technical
and financial conditions.
For serious breaches of sectoral rules, it could:
• order ‘protective’ measures336 to ensure continuity of network operations.
The regulator published decisions subject to confidentiality, notifying concerned parties337.
For different types of disputes between operators, upon requests of persons, professional 
organisations, user associations or the Telecoms Minister, the ART sought conciliation, 
prioritising it338. When conciliation failed, the Chairman referred the matter to the Conseil 
de la concurrence if relating to its competencies339. He referred matters regarding abuses of 
dominant positions or anti-competitive practices directly to the Conseil, which had to 
provide an opinion within 30 days when sought for emergency procedures340. He could 
seek the competition authority’s advice on all other matters within its jurisdiction.
ART ancillary powers included341:
• allocating frequency and numbering resources to operators, and users, in objective 
and non-discriminatory terms for a fee covering related management costs, the 
Conseil d’Etat set by decree (more below)342;
•  issuing, or designating which bodies could issue certificates o f conformity to 
terminal equipment suppliers according to conditions the Conseil d’Etat set by 
decree343.
334 Art.L.36-11.2
335 Art.L.36-8.I/.II-2. See Art.L.47-48 on terms of use o f public and private land by operators
336 In French, ‘mesures conservatoires’
337 Art.L.36-8.I
338 Art.L.36-9
339 Art.L.36-9
340 Art.L.36-10. The ART Chairman informed the ‘procureur de la Republique’ o f matters constituting 
criminal offences
341 See LOI n°96-659 26 /7 /96  for ancillary powers
342 See jointly Art.L.34-10 and Art.L.36-7.6
343 Art.L.34-9/L.36-7.2
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Otherwise, the ART was given significant advisory functions, including being consulted by 
the Government on bills, decrees and regulations, which it would enforce344.
Separately, the law established that the number of licences issued could be limited given 
technical constraints relating to scarcity o f frequencies. The ART proposed terms and 
conditions governing licence procedures to the Telecoms Minister in charge of publishing 
them345. The terms defining frequency allocation were to ensure effective competition.
Similarly, prior to ministerial approval, the regulator publicly issued advice on:
•  universal service prices and related long-term pricing objectives,
•  charges for non-competitive services346.
It advised the Government, with the CSSPPT which it could consult, on a report 
concerning the implementation of public service duties that the Government submitted to 
Parliament minimum once every four years347. Proposals concerned changes in technology, 
services and user needs, suggesting new services, hence, revising universal service 
obligations.
ART advice to the Telecoms Minister included appointees for two consultative 
commissions:
• radio networks and services Commission Consultative des Radiocommunications, 
CCR;
• networks and services Commission consultative des reseaux et services de 
telecommunications, CCRST,
which it could consult, and whose meetings the Chairman could attend, or send one 
representative, without deliberating348.
The ART issued an annual report to the Government, Parliament and the CSSPPT ahead 
of 30 June, advising regulatory or legislative changes it felt were needed in relation to 
sectoral, and competition, developments349.
^ A r t l ^ S
345 ArtL.33-l.V
346 Art.L.36-7.5
347 Art.L.35-7
348 Art.D97-3 (Art.D99-4 o f the new Code)
349 Art.L.36-14
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VII. The Formal Weight of Ministerial and Government Powers
This section shows that despite the powers delegated to the ART, the sectoral authority o f 
successive centre-right and centre-left Governments remained considerable. The law 
specified that regulation would be undertaken ‘independently’ of the exploitation of 
networks and the supply of services, on behalf of the ‘state’, by the Government’s Minister 
in charge of telecommunications and the ART350.
Meanwhile, however, the ‘independent’ regulation the law required was challenged from 
the outset by other institutional arrangements not impinging on the ART’s powers. 
Another law passed at the time laid out that the ‘state’ remained majority shareholder of 
former state-monopoly France Telecom (F-T)351, and none of the civil servants working for 
the majority state-owned incumbent operator could be made redundant352.
The Government retained a significant say in the ART’s:
•  management, as it appointed three board members by decree including the 
Chairman;
•  participation in the preparation o f French positions for international sectoral 
negotiations, and representation o f France at international or European-level 
sectoral fora — both were dependent on the Telecoms Minister’s request353.
The Telecoms Minister’s formal authority, like the UK’s SoS, comprised licensing, 
following ART evaluations:
•  public telecoms network operators and those intending to provide public voice 
telephony services354;
350 Art.L.32-l.I-3
351 Art.l “LOI no.96-660 du 26 juillet 1996 relative a l'entteprise nationale France Telecom”, Journal Officiel 
n°174, 27/7/1996, was passed simultaneously to the law instituting the ART as an ‘independent’ regulatory 
authority, creating a conflict o f interest that successive governments did not alter long after the ART’s 
creation
352 Changing a law effectively permitting tens of thousands of jobless reduced ministerial incentives to 
regulate France Telecom and open up near-monopoly market segments. Changes took place over seven years 
later; through “LOI n°2003-1365 du 31 decembre 2003 relative aux obligations de service public des 
telecommunications et a France Telecom” defining F-T’s organisational changes, and the “Decret n°2004-387 
du 3 mai 2004 relatif au transfert du secteur public au secteur prive de la societe France Telecom en 
application de la loi n°2003-1365 du 31 decembre 2003” authorising F-T to become majority private-owned 
and, formally, reducing the French state’s control
353 Arts.L.36-1 ,L.36-5
354 Arts. L.33-1,34-1,34-6
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• service providers using spectrum not allocated by a telecoms authority, issued after 
the authority responsible for assigning spectrum approved the use o f the 
frequencies355.
His only grounds to refuse licences were:
•  national defence and public security concerns;
• technical constraints pertaining to limited availability of frequencies — in which case 
the Minister was responsible for publishing terms and conditions governing licence 
procedures356;
• applicants lacking the necessary financial or technical requisites for the provision of 
services; or,
•  applicants had faced some form of sanction357.
Licences lasted fifteen years and set out obligations in the ‘cahier des charges’358 for 
operators to comply with and the ART to implement. The Minister notified renewal 
conditions or reasons for refusing renewal at least two years before their expiry. Otherwise, 
he set the turnover threshold forcing large operators to provide accounting details o f their 
single business activities with the Finance Minister359.
In fact, the ART collected sectoral information, applied regulatory provisions and enforced 
licences. However, the Telecoms Minister had to approve the sectoral rules the regulator 
established before they were entered into the Journal officiel, part of his extensive veto 
powers.
The rules that the ART could establish but required ministerial approval included:
(i) rights and duties of all categories o f network operators and service providers;
(ii) prescriptions on technical and financial terms o f interconnection;
(iii) technical prescriptions for network and terminal interoperability, and good use 
of frequencies;
355 ArtL.34-3.2
356 ArtL.33-l.V
357 Arts. L.33-1,34-1,34-6
358 The cahier des charges imposed wide-ranging obligations comprising: coverage; fair competition; national 
and security issues; licence fee payment; interconnection and interoperability conditions; the environment; 
universal service, such as regional cost differences to be spread in a non-discriminatory way. Also Chevallier 
1996 p.930
359 Art.L.33-l.I
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(iv) conditions for establishing and operating independent networks. A decree 
determined general terms, especially concerning essential requirements360.
The Telecoms Minister also authorised the contribution/s the ART proposed:
• to be added to the interconnection charge operators paid F-T, to finance the 
‘universal service’ provided361;
• regarding a fund covering the costs o f universal service obligations undertaken by 
various operators providing affordable services to unprofitable areas and 
customers, replacing the regime granting F-T the additional contribution.
Both Telecoms and Finance Ministers approved universal service prices, related long-term 
pricing objectives and prices charged by operators for services lacking competition, on 
which the ART issued its advice beforehand362.
The Government could therefore veto the ART on several issues, but lacked the ART’s 
enforcement powers.
The Minister’s ancillary powers included appointing, following the ART’s advice, the 21 
members of each o f two advisory consultative commissions for:
• radio networks and services (CCR);
•  networks and services (CCRST).
For each one, he appointed in equal numbers representatives of: network operators and 
service providers; business and home users; ‘qualified persons’363. He could attend their 
meetings, or send one representative, without deliberating364.
The Minister or the ART consulted the commissions on all proposals concerning licensing 
procedures, on the setting out or modification o f technical and operational terms, on 
technical specifications and provisions related to their specialised knowledge, as well as on 
interconnection and numbering issues. Accordingly, the commissions issued 
recommendations to them.
360 Arts.L.36-6^.33-2
361 Art.L.35-3.n
362 Art.L.36-7.5
363 Art.L.34-5
364 Art.D97-3
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VIII. Other Public Bodies and Concurrent Powers
Formal arrangements allowed for actors other than the Government and the ART to be 
involved in sectoral regulation, with different degrees of formal authority. The key role for 
parliamentary figures was appointing the two ART board members not appointed by 
Government decree, selected respectively by the Presidents of the lower and upper Houses. 
Moreover, unlike the UK, parliamentary standing committees overseeing the sector could 
formally hear the ART and consult it on all regulatory issues365.
Otherwise, unless it passed new legislation, the French Parliament’s regulatory role was 
relatively limited. Like the Government, Parliament and the CSSPPT commission it created 
received the ART’s annual report recommending sector-specific legislative and regulatory 
changes.
The largely parliamentarian-run CSSPPT posts and telecoms public service commission366 
provided advice to the Minister regarding obligations in the ‘cahier des charges’ of universal 
service operator F-T367. It could call on the ART to monitor, and where appropriate 
sanction, operators required to respect to ‘service public’ and universal service 
obligations368.
Instead, the ‘Conseil de la concurrence’ upheld competition principles, collaborating with 
the ART according to respective jurisdictions and competencies. When the ART undertook 
conciliation procedures it would inform the Conseil which, if called upon the same matter 
separately, could decide to defer its ruling. Similarly, the Conseil informed the ART o f any 
telecoms issues referred to it within the regulator’s jurisdiction, seeking its advice on the 
practices referred369. If  advised by the Conseil de la concurrence, operators with a non­
telecoms infrastructure monopoly or dominant position were required to separate, if 
possible, the relevant infrastructure’s activities at a legal level for competition purposes370.
The Conseil d’Etat, the legal advisor to the executive and supreme court for administrative 
justice, was the body that operators appealed to against ART decisions and sanctions for
365 Art.L.36-14
366 O f its seventeen members, fourteen were members o f  the two houses, the remaining three were ‘experts’
367 Arts. L.32-2,L.35-2.I
368 Art.L.32-2.1
369 Arts. L.36-9,L.36-10
370 Art.L.33-l.II
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breaches of regulatory provisions. Regarding fines, pending appeals led to their 
suspension371. Otherwise, the Conseil d’Etat set out by decree:
• licence applications’ content, specifying expected technical requirements to 
conform with essential obligations372;
• the timeframe within which the ART took dispute resolute decisions regarding 
parties unable to settle interconnection terms373.
The Conseil d’Etat also set out the decree establishing universal service financing 
mechanisms terms after hearing CSSPPT views374.
The Government spectrum agency, Agence nationale des frequences (ANFR) tasks 
comprised:
•  planning, managing and monitoring spectrum usage consistent with the
jurisdictions o f authorities to which radio frequencies had been allocated;
• coordinating installations of national radio stations to ensure the optimum use of 
available sites;
• preparing France’s position and coordinating representation in international 
negotiations on spectrum issues.
The Executive Board included ART officials. Chairmanship o f the ANFR and of the ART 
could not be held joindy375.
The CCR (radio) and the CCRST (network and services) were consultative commissions 
the Minister or the ART consulted given their respective specialised knowledge (see 
s.VII)376. Their remit included:
• deciding to investigate matters within their competencies if their Chairmen agreed 
with the majority of members, then informing the Minister and ART;
• creating/appointing specialised technical working groups for specific issues. 
Recommendations would be transmitted to the Minister and the ART Chairman. Each 
commission had one secretariat assured by the ART and another by the Minister377.
Otherwise, operators required permission from the relevant authority defining installation
371 Art.L.36-11.4
372 ArtL.34-2
373 Art.L.36-8.I
374 Art.L.35-3.-IV
375 ArtX.97-l.I-II
376 Art.L.34-5
377 Arts.D97-l,D97-2
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and operating specifications to occupy public carriageways378.
IX. The Scope for Judicial Bodies
ART dispute resolution decisions on interconnection refusals, failure to reach commercial 
agreements on interconnection or network access or similar issues, could lead to an appeal 
or judicial review within one month o f notification. Appeals did not suspend the decisions, 
but their implementation could be deferred if consequences could prove excessive or if 
new circumstances o f exceptional gravity had arisen since. Protective measures the agency 
applied for serious breaches o f sectoral rules could be subject to appeals or judicial reviews 
within ten days of notification. The ‘cour d’appel de Paris’ judged appeals, against these 
dispute resolute decisions or protective measures, within one month o f notification379.
Otherwise, a court’s authorisation, by order of the ‘president du tribunal de grande 
instance’ or a judge delegated by him, could allow ART officials to visit premises and 
obtain material accordingly. Either judge could stop the search at any time380.
X. Conclusions
This chapter has set out in considerable detail the formal institutional arrangements 
comprising the different state actors involved in telecoms regulation in France and the UK 
following liberalisation, ranging from the selected regulators to formally relevant elected 
officials, competition authorities, sectoral agencies and judicial bodies. Drawing upon 
statutes less comprehensively has shiaped the analysis of regulatory independence associated 
with indices in some of the literature explored in chapter 1.
Thus, as a first step, the chapter has crucially established the significant number of actors 
within respective national regulatory frameworks and the different ways for their formal 
role to be exercised, characterising a notable degree of formal intra-state fragmentation in 
both countries. Clearly, in formal terms, more actors than just Governments and their 
Ministers could play a sectoral role vis-a-vis the selected regulators and their different
378 Art.L.47
379 Art.L.36-8.IV
380 Art.L.40
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statutory duties. As discussed in chapter 2, Nordlinger ignores intra-state fragmentation to 
examine state autonomy, but when assessing a regulator’s independence it is critical to 
ascertain all the actors that, even without actual powers, can be involved in the agency’s 
activity.
Secondly, this chapter has drawn out that a significant part of the formal role Governments 
continued playing post-delegation went beyond static ex ante powers and controls, such as 
appointing agency heads and board members - by a specific Minister in the UK or 
Government and Parliament in France, and ex post dismissal powers - possible in the UK 
but not in France.
In France, the ART formally shared its regulatory policy-making role with the Minister, 
resonating with Gilardi’s independence index - constructed with similar but less ‘subjective’ 
equally-weighted formal independence indicators than Edwards and Waverman381 - 
awarding Oftel 0.74 and the ART 0.65. Indeed, the chapter has identified the French 
regulator’s considerable formal advisory functions, but also that Ministers retained 
extensive powers to determine policy. The chapter therefore depicts how analyses largely 
centring on Government controls over senior agency management (one or many board 
members, their terms, who appoints, renewal/dismissal) omit potentially critical formal 
indicators relating to actual policy-making.
In both countries, key powers determining sectoral market entry through licensing 
remained the prerogative of specific Ministers. At the same time, both regulators could 
exploit significant information-gathering and enforcement powers to carry out their duties.
Instead, notwithstanding the SoS’s and the Competition Commission’s respective veto 
roles382, Oftel’s authority to modify licences, hence formally modify sectoral regulation and 
widen its powers, was markedly wider than the ART’s, which for significant regulatory and 
legislative changes depended on Government and Parliament heeding its proposals. French 
Ministers retained many veto powers over ART policy-making.
Nonetheless, the ART possessed from its inception and before Oftel an array of 
sanctioning measures to enforce compliance, comprising significant fines, which the 
Government could not veto. To an extent, this resonates with Edwards and Waverman
381 ch.l, s.IV herein
382 With vaguely qualified vetoing remits
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giving the ART a higher formal independence score o f 0.54 than Oftel’s 0.48, taking 
Gilardi’s scale383. Yet, Edwards and Waverman’s 1998 and 2003 independence scores of 
Oftel did not change despite it acquiring key powers to fine up to 10% of operators’ UK 
turnover under the Competition Act 1998, hence more than the ART’s 3%-5%. 
Enforcement indicators were thus undermined.
More importantly, closely examining similarities and dissimilarities o f statutes, the 
fragmentation they indicate and incomplete indices derived from them, does not provide a 
clear picture of the impact of formal arrangements on the independence in practice of 
regulators developing complex policies. At the very least, besides omitting preferences, 
formal arrangements underplay the role o f industry actors. Thus, in the following four sub­
case chapters, regulatory activity is analysed by applying the framework developed earlier in 
this thesis to selected telecoms issues, starting from Oftel and 3G policy in the UK, to 
uncover whether formal independence is the determinant factor for regulatory agencies to 
fulfill their policy preferences.
383 ch.l,s.IV
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Table 5: Summary of Formal Regulatory Arrangements: the ART and Oftel
Regulators Formal Agency Resources/Powers Government/Ministerial Controls Other ‘State* Bodies’ Role
Appointment of 
Board Members
ART 1. Five not dismissible -  deliberations with 3, 
based on majority votes
1. Chairman and 2 other appointed by Government 
decree
1. Upper and Lower Houses Presidents 
appoint one each
Oftel 1. Powers vested in Director General of 
Telecommunications (DGT). Could resign writing to 
Secretary of State (SoS)
1. SoS appointed DGT, could revoke mandate for
incapacity or misbehaviour
Terms of Board 
Members
ART 1. 6-year non-renewable terms, except for 
members in office 2 years or less
2. Members unable to complete term replaced for 
remaining time
1. When ART first created, Chairman tenure 6 years. 
Other two for 2 and 4 years by random draw
1. When ART first created, 2 members’ terms 
were of 4 and 6 years by random draw
Oftel 1. DGT 5-year term maximum. Re-appointment
possible
Staffing
Autonomy
ART 1. Chairman discretion
2. Board could not hold other offices
Oftel 1. DGT could appoint staff as saw fit 1. Treasury approved numbers and terms
Funding
Autonomy
ART 1. Partly service fees, partly taxes and other public 
money (e.g. licence fees)
1. ART submitted funding estimate to Telecoms 
Minister; in Budget d’Etat (Government proposed to 
Parliament)
1. Conseil d’Etat fixed funding terms in finance 
laws or via decree
2. Cour des comptes audited accounts
Oftel 1. Parliament funded expenses
Licensing,
Rule-making,
Enforcement
ART ART: 1. Evaluated for Minister all public 
operators/service provider applications; if 
technical spectrum constraints proposed 
licensing terms
2. Established Significant Market Power operators; 
approved their interconnection offers; could ask to 
change interconnection agreements
3. Dispute resolution; via conciliation or 
sanctions
4. Called on Conseil de la concurrence for anti­
competitive practices/abuses of dominant position
5. Sanctioned breaches. If order ignored: 
suspended, reduced duration or revoked licence. Or 
could fine up to 3% turnover, 5% where breach 
repeated
Telecoms Minister: 10. Licensed public network 
operators, telecoms service providers, spectrum usage
11. Approved ART rules including: (i) rights/duties of 
operators and SPs (ii) interconnection terms
12. Decided if ART represented France in international 
negotiations
13. Telecoms and Finance Ministers approved ART 
pricing advice on ‘universal’ and non-competitive 
services
14. Telecoms and Finance Ministers set turnover 
threshold for operators to itemise accounting details
15. Appointed members and could consult specialised 
commissions (see 20)
16. Appeals against ART access and 
interconnection-related disputes’ decisions and 
protective measures, to cour d’appel de Paris
17. When trying reconciliation, ART informed 
Conseil de la concurrence which, if already called 
upon, could defer its ruling. If  failed to reconcile 
called upon Conseil if its competency
18. Conseil d’Etat judged appeals against ART 
sanctions for breaches and disputes not in 14
19. CSSPPT advised on ‘service public’. 
Consulted and was consulted by ART also on 
universal service
20. Specialised consultative commissions 
(CCR/CCRST) could investigate relevant matters 
and give advice
Table 5 (continued^
Regulators Formal Agency Resources/Powers Government/Ministerial Controls Other ‘State’ Bodies’ Role
6. Power to collect information and investigate 
shared with Minister
7. Consulted on bills, decrees or regulations by
Government
8. Annual report advising regulatory changes to 
Government, Parliament
9. Could consult specialised commissions (see 
20)
Licensing,
Rule-making,
Enforcement
Oftel DGT: 1. Under Telecoms Act, power to institute 
proceedings viz. running unlicensed telecoms 
system (SoS too)
2. As SoS, power to refuse licences for insufficient 
information
3. Consent due for SoS to authorise compulsory 
PTO land purchase
4. Modified licences with consent
5. Upon dissent, could refer matter to 
Competition Commission
6. Directed on licence matters to be complied 
with unless he consented
7. Issued provisional or final orders to stop 
contraventions and secure compliance; could 
revoke either
8. Could require documents unless unobtainable in 
civil proceedings
9. Could assist any party in proceedings except 
operators
10. Resolved performance standards and billing 
disputes
11. Reviewed and collected telecoms information 
could arrange for publication for consumers
12. Co-ordinated Telecoms and Wireless 
Telegraphy Acts advising SoS on licensing
13. If SoS did not, DGT set-up advisory bodies as 
saw fit
SoS: 14. Could supersede anything DGT did viz. duties, 
for national security or relations with foreign 
governments
15. Granted licences, after consulting DGT, designating 
public telecoms system. Could adopt scheme making 
system transitionally cease to be PTO
16. Established licensee land usage rights relating to 
Telecommunications Code
17. Could direct DGT not to modify licence upon 
receiving copy of proposal if (i) it appeared it had to be 
based on Competition Commission report or (ii) national 
security interests or relations with foreign governments
18. Owed copy of DGT reference to Commission. Could 
direct it not to proceed for reasons in 17(ii)
19. DGT published Commission report unless SoS 
considered it against public interest, directing DGT to 
omit matters
20. If directed DGT not to apply modification, DGT 
would comply
21. Could give DGT directions on priority matters to be 
reviewed
22. Could make regulations co-ordinating DGT/DGFT 
concurrent functions
23. Made rules on appeals and tribunals; functions on 
Competition Commission Appeal Tribunals President
24. Licensed under Wireless Telegraphy Act
25. Competition Commission investigated if  
matter in DGT reference against public 
interest, and modification prevented it. DGT to 
mind report
26. Either House could annul SoS regulations by 
resolution. SoS laid before Houses annual DGT 
report
27. High Court could quash final/ provisional 
orders upon application
28. DGT exercised CA functions with regard to 
whether matter for Director General of Fair 
Trading (DGFT) too
29. DGT/DGFT concurrency on most CA 
functions re: anti-competitive practices (Chapter 
I prohibition)/abuses of dominant position 
(Chapter II)
30. Shared power to grant and cancel respectively 
exemption and immunity
31. Could investigate infringements, authorising 
officers to enter premises without notice too, if 
suspected occupier was part of investigation
32. Directions, or court orders for failure to 
comply
33. Could impose 10% turnover fine
34. Appeals to Competition Commission 
against DGT decisions determined by Appeals 
Tribunal
35. Trade and Industry Select Committee 
could ask papers/records
Chapter 4: Oftel and 3G Policy in the UK
I. Introduction
This chapter applies the regulatory autonomy framework developed earlier in this thesis to 
examine the introduction of 3G or Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS)384 licences in the United Kingdom. 3G licensing in the UK provides a valuable 
first case to assess the regulatory independence in practice of the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel). The salience o f 3G mirrors the progressive growth o f the 
EU-wide mobile telephony market, with the UK acting as an innovator on policy and in 
service provision385. Given its role as sectoral agency, Oftel was in charge of regulating the 
licensed mobile telecoms operators intending to spread new, advanced technology in a 
segment o f the telecoms market that had expanded enormously since its inception and 
continued to do so386. Other prominent actors played part in developing the policy 
nonetheless.
Notwithstanding the considerable uncertainty regarding both the economic value of the 
technology and customer demand for UMTS products387, the prospect of entering the new 
and advanced 3G market raised significant ‘non-state’ industry interest given the huge 
success of 2G (second generation) mobile telephony, also known as GSM388. Similarly, the 
Government’s control o f the radio spectrum, hence o f the prospective sale of a scarce 
product in high demand, drove ministerial activity. The policy saw the active involvement
384 Third-generation (3G)/UMTS services are associated with voice, internet-related services, images, data 
transmission. The terms will be used interchangeably out o f convenience. UMTS is one 3G technology, 
designed to succeed 2G GSM (Global System for Mobile Telecommunications) systems allowing for voice 
and basic data services like SMS (Short Message Service). For more on 3G technology, see International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) (http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/3G), an organisation within the United 
Nation’s system where Governments and industry coordinate global telecoms networks and services. This 
UN agency’s mandate comprises allocating spectrum and registering frequency assignments
385 Regarding early introduction o f UK mobile services, Thatcher 1999, especially pp.294-296 and Tables 39- 
40 therein on rapid uptake; Hulsink 1999. On 3G, Thatcher,M 2005 “Sale o f the Century: 3G mobile 
licensing in Europe” ch.5 in (eds.) BlackJ, Lodge,M and ThatcherJVI “Regulatory Innovation”, Edward Elgar
386 Over the period in which 3G licensing was being finalised (Q2 1999/00-2000/01; so, between July- 
September 1999 and 2000) mobile subscriber volumes rose 76%, to about 34 million units; charts 1-2, Table2. 
Moreover, comparing the same quarters, total mobile operator revenues rose over 25%, with total Q2 
2000/01 consumer mobile services expenditure above an estimated £1.85bn (Tablel). Oftel’s “Market 
Information Mobile Update” 1/2001
387 Borgers,T and Dustmann,R 2005 “Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom’s Third 
Generation Spectrum Auction”, p.14, first appeared as mimeo, University College London, 2001, then 
printed in The Economic Journal, pp.551-578. Vol.115 (July). Also Schmidt,KM 2002, “Efficiency o f the 
British UMTS Auction - A Comment on Borgers and Dustmann”, Ifo Studien, Vol.48(l),pp.lll-14, p. 112. 
Borgers indicates his role as economic advisor to the Radiocommunications Agency for the UK’s 3G licence 
auction
388 GSM is the more popular o f four main 2G standards in terms o f million users, largely because of higher 
2G mobile telephony adoption in Europe than elsewhere. Figures 1.1-1.2 and table 1.1, Selian^A 16/1/02  
“3G Mobile Licensing Policy: From GSM to IMT-2000 A Comparative Analysis”, ITU- GSM Case Study
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of the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) executive agency responsible for 
planning and managing efficiendy spectrum use, the Radiocommunications Agency (the 
RA).
By examining participants and the resources available to them, preferences, processes, 
decision-making time-lengths and outcomes, Oftel’s pursuit of its competition preference, 
through additional market entry, vis-a-vis different influential industry actors is analysed. 
Drawing on the five selected indicators illustrates clearly that Oftel showed Type II 
autonomy. The chapter shows the limited extent to which the regulator’s formal authority 
mattered. Aided by preference convergent influential ‘state’ actors with and without formal 
powers, respectively the Government and the RA, which mobilised their policy resources, 
in practice, Oftel pursued its preference by prioritising negotiation over imposition, dealing 
persuasively with influential divergent industry actors. In the process, the regulator 
eschewed formal powers it had at disposal. The regulator exploited decisively informal ties, 
exchanges and policy expertise, allowing it to understand and exploit key information, 
instead.
Outline o f  Events
The British Labour Government launched a consultation on 3G spectrum licensing in mid- 
1997 indicating its intention to use auctions. Responses were overwhelmingly positive. 
Although licensing powers were held by the Secretary o f State, between March 1998 and 
May 1999, the RA, the Government’s spectrum agency, conducted working group 
meetings, comprising Oftel and industry members, to develop policy. Until February 1999, 
there were two key working premises. One was the licensing of four 3G operators. The 
second was the use of existing service provision obligations on the two largest 2G 
incumbent operators, Vodafone and BTCellnet, to provide possible 3G new entrants 
without a 2G network access to theirs.
In February 1999, Oftel reviewed mobile market competition and identified 3G licensing as 
an opportunity for new entry. The Government heeded the advice, allowing the auctioning 
of five licences and reserving one for a new entrant. Having reserved a licence for a new 
entrant, existing service provision obligations were now deemed not to provide sufficient 
guarantees for possible new entrants without 2G networks, potentially discouraging them 
from bidding. Accordingly, all four 2G incumbent operators were required to accept a
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licence modification imposing ‘roaming’, allowing 3G new entrants to exploit incumbents’ 
2G networks for a long-enough period (end-2009) to build sufficient network capacity.
In-between informal discussions, Oftel formally consulted on roaming between May and 
June 1999. Meanwhile, one of the four incumbents, 0ne20ne, took legal action against the 
Government’s decision that roaming should be a pre-condition to bid for 3G auctions. In 
October 1999, Oftel announced that Vodafone and BTCellnet had accepted the roaming 
condition, leading the Government to avoid imposing roaming through auction rules. In 
April 2000, the UK Government auctioned five licences, including one reserved for an 
entrant, raising £22.5bn.
II. Participants and Resources
Despite its prominent formal role as the UK’s telecoms regulator with significant statutory 
instruments deployable under the Telecommunications Act 1984, Oftel’s 3G policy 
involvement in the early stages appeared circumscribed by several other key actors whose 
impact on policy depended on a range of factors that were not limited to those of a 
statutory nature.
At the ‘state’ level, the SoS retained significant statutory authority, particularly with its key 
Wireless Telegraphy Act (1949/1998) spectrum licensing powers. The SoS formally 
controlled the ‘supply’ o f the ‘physical’ resource defining the whole policy. In practice, 
while 3G licensing meant that relevant licence modifications would ensue as Oftel required 
under the Telecoms Act, it was the DTI’s RA, with no formal authority over Oftel, that 
developed policy under the infrequent and irregular public monitoring of Ministers.
The successful implementation of any regulatory policy meant market practicalities were 
important too. Among numerous participants discussing policy development, the 
structural/network, informational and financial positions o f the four ‘non-state’ 2G 
incumbent mobile operators meant they were particularly well-placed to enter the 3G 
market compared to other interested actors. Regulatory and established industry players 
had been interacting for many years too, thus, unlike potential new entrants, knew the 
regulatory process well, if not each other, to help shape policy adoption discussions. This 
section shows that key resources, statutory and non-statutory, were spread among distinct 
actors that helped develop 3G policy, consistent with Type II autonomy.
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A combination of regulatory actors, elected officials, mobile operators, equipment 
manufacturers and others proved eager to develop 3G technology and thus cohabited the 
policy’s ‘regulatory space’ with Oftel. UK industry proponents promoted 3G emphatically 
from 1997 onwards. They argued its impact went from domestic service advancement to a 
global ‘vision’ anticipating an impact beyond the sector; “technologies and standards will be 
in demand in developing countries to provide extensive low cost access to modern 
telecommunications services”389.
Under the Telecoms Act, Oftel formally regulated telecoms systems as a whole by 
modifying and enforcing telecoms licences. However, the agency shared its regulatory role. 
This was particularly so for 3G, with competencies and authority fragmented among 
several ‘state’ actors. In statutory terms alone, apart from key powers to veto telecoms 
licence modifications390, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (the ‘SOS’) had 
licensing powers under the Telecoms Act and under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 
(WTA 1949), superseded, following a 1997 consultation, by the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
1998 (WTA 1998)391. Mobile operators required both licences, but with 3G dependent on 
the radio spectrum for the exploitation of bandwidth allocated to transmit voice, data and 
images wirelessly, the WTA was of primary importance for licensing requirements.
Thus, formally, the SoS commanded extensive authority since licensing powers related to 
the key ‘physical’ asset, 3G spectrum, over which it had exclusive control. The position of 
the SoS was especially noteworthy when considering that the business use of radio 
constituted a £13 billion contribution to British GDP in 1995/96 growing at an annual rate 
of 11 %392, and supporting over 400,000 jobs. Accordingly, 3G licensing was 
complementary to other significant issues.
389 DTI 2/97, “Developing Third Generation Mobile and Personal Communications into the 21st Century - 
An Industry Advisory Document Prepared by the UK 3rd Generation Mobile Group”, Executive Summary
390 ch.3 above
391 The WTA 1998 repealed the WTA 1949 licensing arrangements. Its introduction reads: “to make 
provision about the grant of, and sums payable in respect of, licences under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 
other than television licences, and about the promotion of the efficient use and management o f the electro­
magnetic spectrum for wireless telegraphy; and for connected purposes”. The WTA 1949 did not allow 
licence auctioning
392 RA 5/97, “Implementing Spectrum Pricing”
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The SoS was the Government Minister heading the DTI393 and its affiliated Ministers, 
steering departmental policy according to the political agendas of the day. The DTI was the 
‘umbrella’ Government department encompassing and sponsoring the telecoms sector, 
with a strategic political interest in its performance since liberalisation394. So, successive 
Ministers holding telecoms as part of their portfolio could issue public statements on 
UMTS, and hence, draw attention over policy and shape its direction.
The DTI showed commitment to 3G as early as February 1997395, by publishing the 
industry advisory document prepared by the TJK 3rd Generation Mobile Group396’ entitled 
^Developing Third Generation Mobile and Personal Communications into the 21st 
Century’. The DTI published the industry document despite the Science and Technology 
Minister’s explicit claim that proposals and recommendations did “not necessarily reflect 
the views of Government”397.
The endorsement of a 3G policy by the D TI’s Small Firms, Trade and Industry Minister, 
Barbara Roche, followed five months and eighteen comments later through a consultation 
in which the Government said it was “determined that the UK should play a leading 
role...both within Europe and internationally”398, with successive DTI Ministers getting 
involved at later stages. Indeed, the ‘chain of command’ at the DTI, with the SoS heading 
junior Ministers, meant the relevance and involvement o f the department (not just the SoS) 
in developing 3G policy was wide-ranging - going beyond what was formally delineated in 
the Telecoms Act.
The operational body managing non-military radio spectrum on the DTI’s behalf was its 
‘executive agency’, the RA, directly reporting to the lead DTI Ministers399 and, though the 
DGT sat on its informal administrative Steering Board400, with no powers over Oftel. The 
RA’s role involved representation at the international level, commissioning research,
393 The three SoS during the earlier policy stages: Margaret Beckett (2/5/1997 — 27/7/1998), Peter 
Mandelson (27/7/1998 - 23/12/1998) (Resigned), Stephen Byers (23/12/ 1998 - 8/6/2001)
394 Thatcher 1999; Hulsink 1999; Hood et al 2000
395 Broadly when UK mobile subscriber uptake started incurring very strong growth, turning into the late- 
1990s ‘telecoms and internet boom (and bust)’, see Fig.7, Oftel’s “The UK Telecommunications Industry 
Market Information 2001/02” 3/03
396 Industry body comprising the four mobile network operators, other operators, several manufacturers and 
other interested parties, to stimulate the development o f third generation mobile personal communication 
systems in the UK
397 DTI 2/97, ‘Foreword by the Minister for Science and Technology’
398 DTI 7/97, Foreword, “Multimedia Communications on the Move”
399 Under the SoS, Under-Secretaries: Barbara Roche (May 1997-January 1999), Michael Wills (January-July 
1999) and Patricia Hewitt (July 1999-June 2001) before becoming SoS
400 Interview: David Hendon, RA Chief Executive, 1 /4 /09
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allocating spectrum and licensing its use as well as avoiding technical radio interference. 
Thus, when consultative meetings starting from March 1998 were convened for all parties 
interested in 3G to participate, DTI Communications and Information Industries (CII) 
Directorate officials401 attended in addition to RA officials chairing the sessions and 
conducting policy development. Creating and defining the agenda, and hence the issues to 
be discussed so as to allocate 3G licences, was therefore largely undertaken by the RA.
Domestically, RA activity with direct 3G licensing implications had taken the form of 
technically ‘expert’ discussions over spectrum pricing well before the D TI’s July 1997 
official consultation402. The agency had sought industry views on how to change pricing 
away from licence fees based on its fully allocated costs, via consultations, at least since 
1994403, in order to improve efficient spectrum management.
Accordingly, the RA, with its strong engineering skill-set - o f almost half o f headquarters- 
based officials, including Chief Executive David Hendon404 - relative to a small competition 
function405, was involved in policy development early on. Once the Government 
introduced draft legislation in Parliament (the Wireless Telegraphy Bill) to reform how fees 
were set for licences to install or use radio transmitting equipment, the RA launched 
another spectrum pricing consultation in May 1997406.
While focussing on administrative pricing407, the RA anticipated discussions on spectrum 
auctions, invoked in the DTI July 1997 consultation as the likely 3G licensing procedure 
subject to the Wireless Telegraphy Bill being passed. Its key regulatory role was heightened 
by its regular representation o f the DTI in international fora408, such as those on technical 
standards in which it frequently took the lead409. Oftel attended as a distinct entity410, 
operating and airing its views separately.
401 RA “Minutes o f first UMTS Action consultative group (UACG) meeting on 20 March 1998 at 1 Victoria 
Street, London” and all ‘Meeting minutes’ published thereafter on the old RA site, now: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/spectrumaucrions/3gindex.htm
402 DTI 1996 White Paper “Competitiveness - Forging Ahead” s.14.8
403 Radiocommunications Agency 3 /94  “The Future Management of the Radio Spectrum”
404 Interview: Hendon
405 Interviews A,B,C
406 RA 5/97
407 Fees determined by regulation
408 Interview: Hendon
409 ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), CEPT (the Conference o f European Post and 
Telecommunications Administrations), UMTS Forum and the European Commission undertook the 
international promotion of UMTS standards - DTI 7/97 p.5
410 RA 5/97, DTI 7/97
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Given its spectrum management role, the RA co-ordinated and conducted DTI 3G policy 
development from the start without statutory powers. At consultative meetings between 
March 1998 and May 1999, Oftel officials were repeatedly outnumbered by RA, and CII, 
officials. The RA’s ‘hands-on’ management of 3G was demonstrated months before the 
first UMTS Action consultative group (UACG) meeting in which the Government’s 
proposals for the auction of UMTS licences would be discussed by industry.
In October 1997, the RA sought tenders for financial consulting services for the then 
unconfirmed auctions, while forming an in-house team to oversee the 3G licensing 
process411. Three months later, before the first UACG meeting, the RA announced the 
appointment of NM Rothschild as the financial advisor that would handle the still 
unconfirmed auctions412. It selected consultants that would advise on technical aspects of 
spectrum requirements, assisting with commercial facets of technical decision, thus adding 
credibility413. The RA subsequently appointed University College London for auction 
design advice, thus pre-empting the passing of the Wireless Telegraphy Bill 1997 into law. 
Academic experts appointed were headed by economist Professor Kenneth Binmore, of 
the ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, who would participate in 
and make presentations at relevant UACG meetings414.
Meetings were chaired by the RA’s Jeremy Clayton, with Oftel always present. Clayton 
stated from the start that the “Group’s input would help the Government reach 
appropriate and workable decisions on the various aspects of UMTS licensing. While there 
was as yet no final decision that UMTS licences would be the subject o f an auction, this 
was currently the clear working assumption...UACG would avoid duplicating the 
valuable...more technical...work undertaken by the UK Third Generation Advisory 
Group UKTAG (e.g. on spectrum packaging)”415. Clayton chaired the Auction Steering 
Board comprising Oftel, DTI and Treasury officials416.
Telecoms operators and manufacturers expressed their views regarding creating a 3G 
market throughout the period following the D TI’s consultation and beyond. Industry, 
hence ‘non-state’, actors constituted the vast majority o f the 35 respondents to the DTI
411 “Radiocommunications Agency searches for consultant to assist with UMTS Licensing Process”, 1/10/97
412 “Radiocommunications Agency appoints financial adviser for Third Generation Telecoms Licensing 
Process”, 28 /1 /98
4,3 Interview: Hendon
414 RA 28/1 /98
415 “Minutes o f the UACG meeting on 20 March 1998 at New King's Beam House”, London. Brackets added
416 Interview: Hendon
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July 1997 document417, bringing sectoral knowledge to the fore. The breadth of high-profile 
respondents included: the four existing 2G mobile network operators; big domestic 
operators, like Cable&Wireless and Nd; US-based giant AT&T; manufacturers like Nokia, 
Eriksson and Lucent; satellite organisations like Inmarsat; telecoms associations. The 
significant participation and interest in UACG sessions by major domestic and global 
companies was reflected by the fact that the minimum attendance during the eight policy 
development meetings between March 1998 and May 1999 was thirty-three, with frequent 
peaks of forty participants and above418.
Clayton pointed to an excess of participation early on. He set ‘regulatory space’ boundaries, 
helping to cement cohesion among state and non-state players able to make a difference to 
policy development. In July 1998, at the third meeting, he asserted that membership was 
originally offered to organisations that responded to the July 1997 consultation, with 
subsequent additions limited to firms which strongly influenced the development of 
UMTS, such as manufacturers, limiting UACG size for “practical” reasons419. Restricting 
participation entailed furthering closer relations between regulators and regulatees420.
Although most participants represented well-known firms and had some UK operations, 
operators attending UACG meetings were characterised by significant disparity. Indeed, 
not all telecoms firms present at meetings were ‘formally regulated’ by Oftel. France 
Telecom UK had no licensed telecoms operations in the UK421. Participating in UACG 
meetings, and voicing views at them, was therefore an exceptional opportunity for some 
actors to try having some policy-shaping impact they would have otherwise lacked. 
Potential new entrants could try informing policy development by raising issues concerning 
them.
However, select industry actors were especially significant to develop policy given the key 
non-statutory resources each one possessed. The four incumbent mobile network 
operators were highly influential in many different ways. Vodafone, BT-owned Cellnet, 
0 n e2 0 n e  and Orange constituted the whole 2G market, giving them decisive first-mover 
advantage. Hence, they were best placed to develop 3G through existing networks and
417 DTI 18/11/97 “Next Generation o f Mobile Communications Moves a Step Closer”
418 see all UACG Minutes referenced
419 “Minutes o f the UACG meeting on 10 July 1998 at New King's Beam House”
420 Originally, UACG members listed in early 1998 were 83; RA’s former website, now on Ofcom’s site
421 Oftel’s “The Public Register of Telecommunications Licences”. Subsequently, the French incumbent 
company France Telecom controlled operating interests in the UK under its name (France Telecom Network 
Services), besides acquiring control o f other licensed operators, notably Orange
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acquired expertise. They had undertaken the ‘sunk costs’ o f establishing 2G networks, 
considered the main obstacle to entering the telecoms sector. The incumbents’ 2G 
businesses were complementary to 3G. Their roll-out costs for necessary 3G infrastructure 
(radio masts and the like) were substantially less than those o f a new entrant, since they 
could ‘piggyback’ their 2G infrastructure.
Critically, incumbents had established customer bases, and hence existing relationships with 
them, and brand-name recognition. They were financially powerful too. Entrance into the 
2G telecoms market had come at almost no licence cost, “in the region o f just £40,000”422, 
followed by high returns423. These and network considerations loomed even larger in the 
early policy planning stages424. Several respondents to the D TI’s consultation expected the 
four 2G operators to be the critical basis for 3G in the UK425. Otherwise, incumbents had 
been the sole focus o f Oftel’s mobile market regulation, giving agency officials the 
opportunity of learning in-depth about the operators’ activities, and giving both sides the 
scope for direct contact and exchanges.
Notwithstanding similar resources, there were important resource differences between the 
four mobile operators too. Although their market operations came into effect in 1985, 
Vodafone and Cellnet were licensed prior to BT’s privatisation, in May 1983426. A duopoly 
until 1991, they went unchallenged for about six years to recover initial investments, 
establishing their status as mobile operators ahead of subsequent entrants. Accordingly, 
Vodafone and Cellnet had been subject to Oftel’s regulatory scrutiny for a longer time 
period and, for their more influential market position reflecting considerably larger 
networks, had to comply with more stringent licence obligations.
Vodafone and BTCellnet continued to possess ‘Market Power’ while 3G policy was 
developed427, which entailed the ability to charge higher prices despite increasing 2G 
competition428. Thus, they were already subject to licence conditions requiring them to 
provide wholesale airtime to independent service providers that did not have their own
422 Binmore and Klemperer 3/02, C90 in “The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale o f the British 3G Telecom 
Licences”, C74-C96, The Economic Journal 112 (Royal Economic Society),p.C76
423 Thatcher 2005
424 Binmore and Klemperer, 3/02, p.C80
425 Beddoes,T 4 /6 /9 8  T)olphin Response to "Multimedia Communications on the Move”, Ionica’s 27/10/97  
response; ‘Norweb Communications’ Response to DTI Consultation Third Generation Mobile Licences’ 
(undated); The Telecommunications Managers’ Association, 16/10/97 “Multimedia Communications on the 
Move - Response to the Advisory Document by TMA”
426 Hulsink 1999, p.149
427 Oftel 2/99, “Competition in the mobile market”
428 Intensification occurred because o f Orange and O ne20ne’s entry
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networks but wanted to compete through service provision; a formal, Telecoms Act, 
licence condition that Oftel had exempted Orange and 0 n e2 0 n e  from since 1997429.
Similarly, given the new licence templates to be issued consistent with the EC Licensing 
Directive to take effect in June 1999430, during 3G policy development Oftel proposed to 
determine that Vodafone and BTCellnet would be subjected to a ‘Market Influence’ (MI) 
condition431. If triggered, they had to provide airtime to service providers if asked to do so, 
avoid undue discrimination or preference favouring their own providers, and publish prices 
and service terms432. Service providers (SPs) could agree commercial terms for new services 
if these were published by operators, but had no right to demand that either network 
operator provide services not already available.
Instead, 0n e2 0 n e  and Orange, respectively licensed in 1993 and 1994433, started 
competing with the ex-duopolists after 1991, when three personal communications 
networks (PCNs) licences were issued434. While the 3G policy was being discussed, 
1998/99 total subscriber market shares still showed a clear divide. Vodafone controlled 
37.5%, Cellnet 30.4%, Orange 17% and 0 n e20ne  15.1%435. Estimated retail revenue 
figures indicated that Vodafone’s mobile telephony operations were generating over £1.1 bn 
more than Orange and 0ne20ne436.
Vodafone’s DTI consultation response illustrated broadly the non-formal influence o f 2G 
incumbents in the 3G market. Vodafone stressed it had “made a major contribution to the 
development of the UK cellular market and, by building the UK’s second largest 
telecommunications network, created jobs for over 6000 staff. A larger number o f jobs 
have been created in other sectors of the industry...to support Vodafone, such as service 
providers, dealers and manufacturers”437. So, its influence was especially pronounced, 
although the other three incumbents had considerable headway over potential 3G market 
new entrants too.
429 Oftel 4 /97 “Fair Trading in the Mobile Telephony Market - Conclusions on future competition policy”
430 Directive 9 7 /13/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 10 April 1997 on a common 
framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field o f telecommunications services
431 Oftel 2/99
432 RA/UACG 98(18), 26/10/98, “Access to Second Generation Networks”
433 DTI 7/97, p.l
434 Hulsink 1999, p.149
435 Oftel 3/03 “The UK Telecommunications Industry Market Information 2001/02”, Table30, p.53, which 
presents Cellnet with its current name 0 2  (no longer BT-controlled) and, One20ne as T-Mobile
436 ibid, Table31, p.54
437 “Response to “Multimedia Communications On The Move” by Vodafone Ltd’ 17/10/97, p.3
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Thus, consistent with Type II autonomy, this section has shown that different actors had 
valuable resources to exert influence from the start o f policy. Building on the success of 2G 
mobile telephony, the United Kingdom’s discussions on the introduction of UMTS, 
projecting innovative high-speed and high-quality mobile multimedia services, saw 
participation from ‘state’ and industry actors possessing key resources. These resources 
were dispersed, with no single influential group of participants.
III. Preferences
Interest in 3G spectrum led a diverse range of state and non-state actors to participate in 
policy development, many of whom were influential because o f key contributions they 
could, but also wanted to, make. The 3G policy preference scenario was a fairly divided 
one. Oftel, the Government possessing licensing authority, and the RA responsible for 
spectrum management, converged on promoting 3G competition with due attention to 
market entry. New entrants central to the regulator’s policy preference, but with limited 
influence, supported them.
Instead, the incumbent 2G operators, which were best-placed to create a 3G market given 
their existing networks even according to other industry actors, displayed divergence. They 
wanted to exploit their advantageous position. Thus, this section shows that as Oftel 
pursued competition in the nascent 3G market, the preferences of influential actors 
differed. The regulator faced preference divergent actors but also had, from the outset, the 
support of key convergent ‘state’ actors, consistent with Type II autonomy.
Although the telecoms industry took the initiative to discuss what policy issues needed 
developing and Government Ministers expressed support early in 1997, by March 1998, 
when the Wireless Telegraphy Act received Royal Assent438, there was widespread 
consensus that a concerted effort was desirable to introduce 3G in the UK. Despite the 
reticence of most439, industry players had also broadly accepted that the Government’s 
licence allocating mechanism would be auctions440. Within two months from the new Act’s
438 DTI 18/3/98, “New Legislation on the Right Wavelength for Business, Consumers, Jobs”, P /98/216
439 “Inmarsat comments on Multimedia Communications on the Move” for strong opposition to auctions, 
but also “Response from the GSM MoU Association to the Consultation Document from the United 
Kingdom Department o f Trade and Industry” 13/11/97
440 “BT Response to Government Consultative Document: Multimedia On The Move” 17/10/97, p.2. 
0 n e2 0 n e 10/97, p.19, offered to provide the auction design expertise o f parent companies USWest and 
Cable&Wireless. In its separate response Cable&Wireless Communications expressed strong opposition to
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introduction, on which the auctions depended441, DTI Minister Barbara Roche declared the 
firm intention to hold spectrum licence auctions in summer 1999 “subject to market and 
other developments and to final decisions nearer the time”442. So, auctioning 3G licences 
seemed to constitute a relatively uncontested platform to launch a new mobile market.
The Labour Government’s full announcement actually outlined three policy objectives: “(i) 
utilise the available UMTS spectrum with optimum efficiency; (ii) promote effective and 
sustainable competition for the provision of UMTS services; and (iii) subject to the above 
objectives, design an auction which is best judged to realise the full economic value to 
consumers, industry and the taxpayer o f the spectrum”443. O f these, Binmore and 
Klemperer, the UACG’s primary auction designers, suggested and worked on the 
assumption that the first and third objectives were closely tied and that both were 
effectively covered with the decision to undertake an auction on efficiency grounds444, 
contrary to scepticism about the unambiguous efficiency of auctions among other 
scholars445.
In contrast to the RA conducting policy development on the Government’s behalf, Oftel 
was not driven by exacdy the same policy objectives. The regulator never expressed a clear 
public preference, or concern, on the issue of spectrum efficiency. Similarly, it did not 
articulate its viewpoint on holding 3G licence spectrum auctions during the policy 
development stages. Yet, if formal provisions dictated the agency’s actions, the statute 
governing its regulation o f the telecoms sector did not suggest that Oftel should have been 
passive about both issues.
The SoS had formal spectrum management duties specified in the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 
and hence of spectrum efficiency. Oftel’s Telecoms Act objectives did not precisely 
correspond to the Government’s spectrum efficiency policy objective. Oftel had no formal 
role set out in the WTA, hence, no duty in relation to UK spectrum and its efficient use. 
However, the Telecoms Act did say that the DGT had the duty to “promote efficiency and
auctions “Multimedia Communications on the Move - submission by Cable&Wireless Communications”, 
10/97. Also ‘Ntl response to the DTI Consultation "Multimedia Communications on the Move”. Vodafone 
did not express opposition to auctions
441 DTI 7/97, p. 5
442 DTI “Mobile Multimedia Communications” 18/5/98, P/98/393
443 ibid
444 For discussions on the efficiency o f allocating property rights via auctions for radio spectrum, ss.2-3, 
Binmore and Klemperer 2002
445 Van Damme,E 2002, ss.2-4 “The European UMTS-auctions”, European Economic Review 46(4/5), 
pp.846-858; Borgers,T and Dustmann,C 2002, “Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: The Case o f the UK  
Auction”, ifo Studien 48(1), pp.77-109
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economy” among those engaged in the provision o f telecoms services446, which had 
implications for network operators’ spectrum usage.
Perhaps more noticeably, the Government’s intention to design an auction that ‘would 
realise the full economic value to industry’ should have been of some concern to Oftel. 
One of two primary duties the DGT shared with the SoS was to “ensure that suppliers 
could finance the provision of the services”447. Yet, throughout policy discussions reported 
in minutes of UACG meetings and other documents, the regulator was unclear about 
whether it favoured auctions or opposed them. Therefore, formal provisions did not 
appear to impact on Oftel’s preferences vis-a-vis these two issues, nor did the fact that they 
were held by the Government.
Instead, Oftel had a preference for competition in the mobile market to get the best deals 
for consumers448, which, albeit not as specific as the terms it went on to define, did reflect 
one of its secondary statutory objectives. Although they were not necessarily in tension, the 
regulator thus put the competition preference explicitly ahead of efficiency (of spectrum), 
and of ensuring that suppliers could finance provision o f service, which were also statutory 
duties, the latter actually being a ‘primary’ one. This occurred notwithstanding that section 
3 of the Telecoms Act, mandating the promotion of competition as one of Oftel’s eight 
‘non-primary’ duties, offered no “guidance to the relative weight to be attached to each” 
one of them, as acknowledged by a former DGT449.
Although Oftel’s February 1999 pronouncement came relatively late compared to the 
public positions of the RA/DTI and industry actors with whom it participated at UACG, 
the preference was unsurprising. The regulator acted consistently with a longstanding 
priority, shown by its quarterly publication of ‘Competition Bulletins’450, and upheld in 
different telecoms markets including mobile services451. Indeed, Oftel continued pursuing 
competition unaffected by the March 1998 appointment of David Edmonds, who replaced 
Don Cruickshank as DGT at a time when the WTA 1998 received Royal Assent and the 
first UACG meeting took place. In promoting its competition preference by undertaking a
446 see ch.3 above. For simplicity, hereafter, rather than referring to specifics o f national statutes, “see ch.3” 
refers to ch.3 herein
447 see ch.3
448 Oftel 2/99
449 Cruickshank,D 11/95 “Oftel’s Plan for 1995/96 and Beyond”
450 Don Cruickshank’s Introduction, June 1996 bulletin
451 Preface, Director General Don Cruickshank 5 /96 “Fair Trading in Mobile Service Provision”. For historic 
accounts; Thatcher 1999, Hulsink 1999, Hood et al. 2000
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consultative review of the whole mobile market, Oftel spanned different segments 
including issues relating to 3G policy452.
Oftel stated that 3G licensing provided “an opportunity for new entry by mobile network 
operators”453. The DGT only publicly acknowledged that he strongly supported the 
Government’s intention to offer five 3G licences subsequendy454. Yet, the influence o f the 
regulator’s preference for competition via new entry behind closed-doors was emphasised 
in the National Audit Office (NAO) report on 3G, among others455.
Oftel wanted new entry, but without excluding 2G incumbents either, thus avoiding 
recreating a market of four players456. Whilst not in disagreement, given less spectrum per 
operator, the RA was unsure about the technical feasibility of five licences for service 
practicality and prioritised building UK economic growth on spectrum usage to gain an 
advantageous understanding over other countries and exploit its 3G experience and 
networks457. Maximising auction proceeds was not a RA priority458.
While limiting references to 3G developments, in the February mobile review, Oftel was 
clear about its broader competition preference. Notwithstanding increasing competition, it 
warned that a market of four 2G operators could cause ‘collusive’ behaviour. Furthermore, 
Oftel referred to the operational gap in network terms between 2G incumbents and 
potential new entrants, and how 2G network coverage could curtail 3G competition. 
Customers were likely to wish to purchase advanced mobile services provided by 3G 
operators with voice services459. Entrants without 2G facilities would need to access some 
o f incumbents’ existing infrastructure to provide services over comparable geographic 
areas. Without agreements with incumbent network operators, already benefiting from 
large customer bases, new entrants could struggle to obtain the necessary sites.
452 Oftel 2 /99
453 ibid. para J\33
454 “Statement from David Edmonds (Director General o f OFTEL) on the Secretary o f State’s 
announcement to auction five third generation licences”, 8 /6 /99 , p .l l ,  RA, “The Next Generation o f Mobile 
Communications” and; “Oftel’s review of the mobile market”, 7/99
455 The NAO indicates Oftel strongly advocated the auctioning o f  five licences unlike the initial working 
UACG assumption, though this was not explicitly stated in early documentary evidence the regulator 
published. NAO “The Auction of Radio Spectrum for the Third Generation of Mobile Telephones” HC233 
Session 2001-2002:19/10/2001, para.4.4, p.37. Also Binmore and Klemperer 2002, fn.29
456 Interview: Hendon
457 ibid
458 Interview: Neil Carey, National Audit Office 3G Report Study Manager 2000-01,15/4/2009
459 Oftel 2 /99
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So, though not emphasised in earlier publications referring to 3G, Oftel acknowledged that 
one option, which had been indicated in the DTI consultation and discussed by the UACG 
as a pro-competitive measure, was adopting roaming460. This would avoid sole reliance on 
commercial agreements between operators, since 2G operators were unlikely to allow 
entrants to access their 2G networks, reducing their market shares.
Potential new entrants voiced respective preferences through the DTI consultation, 
indicating their convergence with Oftel. However, obtaining a 3G licence would be 
insufficient for new entrants to compete on a par with incumbents, and new entrants 
needed the regulator to act. Responding in 1997, even major US telecoms operator AT&T 
had warned that entry barriers could serve to enhance the market power of existing players. 
It thus encouraged regulatory oversight and measures to ensure access for competing
461operators .
Given its 0 n e20ne  affiliation and competition in the fixed market, Cable&Wireless 
Communications (CWC) unsurprisingly envisaged the application o f market power licence 
conditions especially for BT, which had an interest in rival mobile operator Cellnet. CWC’s 
proposal implied mandatory wholesale airtime provision to SPs. Yet, to establish a 
competitive environment, CWC also favoured roaming agreements between 2G and 3G 
operators462, which its group’s mobile operator 0 n e2 0 n e  would fight fiercely subsequently.
Less prominent telecoms players needing support to avoid market exclusion converged 
with Oftel. Given its preference that SPs supply 3G services, internationally operative 
independent service provider (ISP)463 Cellcom commended existing licence conditions 
forcing operators to sell services to ISPs but argued that 3G-related regulatory obligations 
on network operators should be stringent too. For SPs belonging to network operators not 
to be excluded from the new market required that they be legally separated and that the 
operators not be allowed to show preference464, to prevent potential new entrants from 
being dissuaded for fear of incumbents’ anti-competitive behaviour.
460 The use by a customer o f one mobile operator o f another mobile operator’s network to make or receive 
calls, usually because the customer is out o f range of his own operator’s base stations
461 AT&T's Comments on The Department of Trade and Industry Consultation 17/10/97
462 CWC 10/97
463 N ot tied to mobile network operators
464 Response by Cellcom Ltd to ‘Multimedia Communications on the Move’, 10/97; paras.7,10 and 11
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The now defunct Dolphin Telecom, which before going into administration in mid-2001 
was part o f the Canadian TTW group465 that ultimately won the fifth 3G licence, favoured 
redressing the significant disadvantages o f new entrants to encourage them to bid. It 
advocated reserving at least one licence for new entrants, and roaming on 2G operators’ 
networks466. Ionica, which had operated in the UK since liberalisation467, also welcomed 
prescriptive licence conditions for dominant players, but refuted the usefulness o f resale 
over other networks including roaming, believing infrastructure competition would be 
weakened468.
Naturally, instead, the biggest threat to Oftel’s preference were the 2G incumbent mobile 
operators critical for 3G development, which, notwithstanding minor specific differences, 
opposed new entry. 0ne20ne  shareholder Cable&Wireless pic469 wanted its large 
infrastructure investment protected, arguing that regulation should not devalue 2G 
business thus affecting returns. Indeed, notwithstanding being a relatively new incumbent 
operator like Orange470, 0n e2 0 n e’s opposition to Oftel’s preference was radical. 0n e2 0 n e  
neither welcomed new entry nor wanted to be equated to more established incumbents 
Vodafone and Cellnet.
0 n e2 0 n e  contested the idea that DTI proposals could equalise operators that had already 
committed billions of pounds and new players. The operator opposed any additional, 
inhibiting, obligations on incumbents. It wanted regulatory measures to allow its continued 
exploitation o f its advantageous 2G status at the expense of new entrants. Referring to the 
German Administration’s belief that extending the licences of existing 2G operators was 
acceptable and adding that there was an economic limit to the number o f players, 
0 n e2 0 n e  refuted the DTI’s interpretation of the EC Licensing Directive giving further 
network operators the opportunity to gain licences. It was “essential that sufficient UMTS 
licences (were) available so as not to force the exclusion o f any existing operator from third 
generation”471.
Similarly, 0 n e2 0 n e  opposed roaming between 2G and 3G networks as ‘biased too much 
towards the new operator’, ‘understanding’ instead the motives for mandating roaming
465 Electronics Times 6 /8 /01 , “News Digest”
466 Beddoes,T “Dolphin Telecom Response to ‘Multimedia Communications on the Move’” 04/06/98
467 Hulsink 1999,p.298
468 Ionica, 23 /10/97
469 A distinct response from CWC’s
470 Orange’s views were not made publicly available on the RA site
471 0n e20n e, p.3
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between 3G operators; it would benefit from larger incumbents’ 3G investments. Yet, 
0 n e2 0 n e  also warned that assuming all 2G operators ought to be considered equal was an 
error since, like Orange but unlike Vodafone and Cellnet, it did not possess market power 
in 2G.
BT clearly opposed competition via new entry too. The incumbent, who owned a large 
share of Cellnet, argued for the auctioning of three licences472, thus recommending a 
reduction in the number of 3G players compared to those in the 2G market. While 
recognising that “some potential bidders...might feel they are at a competitive 
disadvantage against incumbent(s),” it asked that the “need for regulatory intervention to 
control the joint activities of BT and Cellnet, or... o f other affiliated fixed/mobile players, 
should not be pre-judged at this stage”473.
Despite opposing the immediate introduction of national roaming, since “all customers 
(would) only (have) access to one network.. .(and) the effect would be a monopoly network 
built by several players”, BT oddly supported roaming between 2G and 3G operators. This 
would have made sense had existing 2G operators alone acquired the hypothetical three 
licences and BT’s opposition to national roaming between 3G operators been endorsed.
Without encouraging entry, Cellnet’s considerations regarding competition issues did not 
exacdy match BT’s. Cellnet claimed that introducing either type of roaming obligation 
could distort 3G market development. It argued that roaming between 2G and 3G systems 
be permitted, but had to remain a commercial matter474, not made compulsory. It did not 
specify how many licences should be auctioned, but associated new entrants with “Value 
Added, Service Provider and Content fields”475. Pushing for consortia bids based on a 
multi-tiered market structure implied incumbent operators would retain their advantageous 
positions. Otherwise, BT was not to be precluded from bidding, “with or without Cellnet 
involvement”.
Having advocated innovative spectrum usage to grant maximum four licences, Vodafone 
opposed new entry unambiguously. It did “not support the need to reduce entry 
barriers”476, arguing that making ‘as many licences as possible’ available to incumbents was
472 Based on its considerations o f spectrum requirement per 3G operator
473 BT paras.4.1&4.4 (brackets added)
474 “Cellnet response” 17/10/97, pp.26-7
475 ibid.p.8
476 Vodafone, p. 10
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in the customers’ interest. UMTS infrastructure could be deployed most cost effectively 
alongside existing GSM networks. It reiterated the view differently stating that the 
competition focus should switch from furthering network operator competition to 
promoting increased use and deployment of new services, reducing regulatory attention on 
the company. Vodafone opposed compulsory roaming. Roaming agreements were to be 
free commercial decisions, only subject to consideration of anti-competitive or unlawful 
behaviour.
Some important actors other than the incumbents did not object to an incumbent-driven 
market either. Cable-operator N d reasoned that “it is likely that the present four UK 
cellular radio incumbents can place a higher value on the spectrum than a new 5th operator 
(with) no...support infrastructure in place”477. Mobile manufacturer Ericsson agreed: “To 
allow existing GSM operators to apply for a UMTS licence is not only fair, it is also a 
necessity to make UMTS viable in the short term. If UMTS should lose the support o f 
existing operators, it will be very hard for that standard to establish itself on the market”478. 
Nevertheless, it observed that some regulatory intervention could be justified to secure 
roaming between present GSM operators and UMTS operators.
Preferences thus revealed a division between influential participants, with the regulator not 
isolated. While the Government, the RA and new entrants dependent on regulatory 
authorities for competitive terms were convergent, Oftel faced opposition from the four 
powerful 2G incumbents wanting to protect their significant market positions.
IV. Process
This section shows Oftel’s Type II autonomy approach throughout 3G policy 
development. Oftel avoided confrontation by exploiting preference convergent state actors 
from the outset, collaborating at length with the RA, which had no formal authority over 
the regulator, nor licensing powers479. Oftel provided its policy-making input to the
477 Ntl para.3; also TMA 16/10/97, s.6.3;“AirTouch Response to DTI Consultative Document on 3rd 
Generation: "Multimedia Communications On The Move"” 17/10/97, p.2. AirTouch Communications 
merged with Vodafone in 1999;
http://www. vodafone.com/start/investor_relations/shareholder_services/faq/airtouch.html
478 Hellstr6m,K and Grimsmo,N 1/10/97, Ericsson consultation response, T)TI Consultation: Multimedia 
Communications on the Move’
479 In addition to Wireless Telegraphy Act licences, 3G licensees would have been eventually issued or 
reissued a Telecoms Act licence regulated by Oftel - RA “UMTS Licensing: Setting the Scene - UACG(98)1”; 
timetable
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Government agency privately, which the latter presented at UACG meetings comprising 
officials of divergent incumbent operators.
Through its private exchanges with the RA and its competition expertise, the regulator 
influenced the Government’s licensing o f five operators. Subsequendy, while the 
convergent Government exercised its formal authority to ensure that incumbents would 
allow 3G new entrants to access their 2G networks through roaming, which they opposed, 
Oftel avoided applying existing relevant powers, hence, imposition. Instead, it gradually 
tried persuading incumbents to accept licence modification, exhaustively negotiating 
proposals without compromising on its preference.
Oftel’s wish to ensure 3G competition was buttressed from the outset by the convergence 
with the powerful Government which controlled the critical spectrum, and whose DTI 
Ministers the D G T could access if he felt necessary480. This convergence extended to RA 
officials who chaired the UACG working group. Preference convergence and collaborative 
ties with the RA helped Oftel advance its preference without expending formally-allocated 
resources or imposing measures from the start.
The convergent DTI agency mobilised more resources than its role dictated481, as it spread 
and bolstered Oftel’s policy analyses by circulating Oftel’s consultation documents and the 
D G T’s statements and views at UACG meetings, publicising them as an important part of 
policy development. All RA steps involving Oftel at meetings took place in the presence of 
the regulator’s officials who, having previously discussed issues behind closed-doors, 
consented that the RA speak on Oftel’s behalf482.
Thus, early in the policy, before being at the forefront o f decision-making, Oftel attended 
UACG meetings and provided input selectively, exploiting the activity of influential state 
actors with similar preferences and avoiding confrontation with preference divergent 
industry ones, consistent with Type II regulatory autonomy. During the informal 
discussions at the first UACG meeting in March 1998, the Chair, the RA’s Jeremy Clayton, 
stressed that “the Government was keen to have new entrants in the mobile market”483.
480 Interviews Hendon and B
481 see ch.l above on Nordlinger’s Type II ‘strategy’ options. For simplicity, hereafter, rather than referring to 
Nordlinger’s book pages, paraphrasing his ‘options’ will be referenced as: “see ch.l; Nordlinger”
482 Interviews Hendon and C
483 Minutes of first UACG meeting, 20/3/98
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In practice, it was the RA, which lacked powers over Oftel and, like the regulator, lacked 
powers over the SoS, that channelled discussions towards competitive outcomes on issues 
complementary to licensing, on the Government’s behalf. The RA updated sectoral 
Ministers through the civil service practice of three-page ‘submissions’, and its Chief 
Executive met them regularly; some, such as eventual SoS Patricia Hewitt, on a first-name 
basis484. Stephen Byers, who replaced Peter Mandelson as SoS and head o f DTI at end- 
1998 while the RA chaired UACG, had to become familiar with 3G to understand the 
different complex issues485.
For instance, regarding packaging available spectrum for auctioning, consultation responses 
had indicated the relative inferiority and undesirability o f unpaired spectrum bands 
compared to paired spectrum bands. Yet, less spectrum would reduce the amount available 
to allocate to different operators, hence new entry prospects. The RA orientated spectrum 
advisory working group UKTAG and commissioned consultants Ovum and Quotient to 
consider several technical options illustrating how 3, 4 or 5 operators could be 
accommodated486.
Thus, having previously indicated that “consequences for the ability to offer services if four 
or five licences are made available are being investigated”487, the RA disregarded industry’s 
technical indications. Several months and UACG meetings later, technical experts were 
assessing the maximum number o f licences that could be auctioned488. So, even where the 
RA’s expertise or dedicated staff was insufficient489, it could direct policy to further its 3G 
new entry preference and that o f Oftel, which made its views public selectively.
The RA, without powers over Oftel, acted as agenda-setter shaping policy according to its 
role and areas of expertise. Policy inputs were largely non-statutory. The introductory 
document published before the first UACG meeting set out that inputs would take two 
forms; written material produced ahead o f meetings and oral contributions at meetings. 
Written material was to be produced and circulated, in light o f any concerns raised by 
members, as would minutes of meetings490.
484 Interview: Hendon
485 McIntosh,B 18/6/99 “0 n e20n e launches legal challenge to mobile auction”, The Independent
486 RA/UACG (98)2, especially the attachment
487 RA/UACG (98)1
488 RA/UACG (98)7, 18/6/98, UMTS Spectrum Options for 3, 4 or 5 Operators and Their Implications 
Issue 1
489 Interview: Hendon
498 RA/UACG (98)l,para.3
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Nevertheless, as the convergent RA chaired discussions, it raised and drew attention to 
issues consistent with Oftel’s preferences, including those for the regulator to address. The 
division of WTA and Telecoms Act licence powers meant issues could not be determined 
by one actor. Yet, the fact that the RA conducted 3G policy did not affect the consensus 
with Oftel over competition, nor the latter’s role based on its sectoral knowledge.
On the contrary, the shared understanding of central issues seemed to cement their 
working relationship. For example, regarding network roll-out, coverage, obligations on 3G 
licensees, the RA anticipated that, while obligations would be contained in the WTA 
licences, they would be “linked to condition 1 of the Telecoms Act so that the DG  o f Oftel 
could enforce them if necessary”491. Besides acknowledging Oftel’s formal authority, the 
RA warned operators not to assume how the regulator would exercise its discretion, 
suggesting decisions would be taken by weighing information.
Thus, Oftel appeared not to be at the forefront of policy-making. However, the D G T was 
given prime coverage and support by the convergent RA. For instance, the DGT’s Market 
Influence Condition trigger in the draft Telecoms Act licence discussed in November 1998 
was deemed “somewhat vague”492 by a UACG member.
3G entrants without 2G networks would be able to ask that incumbents with Market 
Influence provide network services already available, not new ones, and was the working 
hypothesis regarding the key competition issue o f 2G network access for 3G entrants 
before roaming. Applying the condition was Oftel’s formal responsibility493.
Clayton, a member of the RA and chair of the working group, responded instead, arguing 
the “statement provided a good level of comfort given that the DGT could not formally 
fetter his discretion”494. Thus Oftel shaped future 3G competition policy-making, ‘shielded’ 
vis-a-vis divergent incumbents, through exchanges and collaboration with the RA 
presenting issues at UACG.
The most significant intervention furthering Oftel’s preference without the regulator 
imposing it on divergent incumbents was, nonetheless, by the Government’s Telecoms
491 RA/UACG (98)1, 3/98,para.l4
492 UACG(98)18 Minutes, 13/11/98
493 see Tartkipants’ section
494 ibid
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Minister, who was not involved at UACG level, but received RA ‘submissions’. In February 
1999, a week after Oftel published its mobile market competition review indicating 3G as 
‘an opportunity for new entry’, DTI Minister Michael Wills told Parliament that the 
Government felt further consideration regarding issuing five licences and roaming was 
necessary495. If technical assessments enabled the auctioning o f five licences, the largest one 
would have been reserved for a new entrant496.
Yet, the technical advisers Quotient had already established that a “smaller allocation (than 
initially considered) would make it technically feasible to fit 5 licences into the available 
spectrum”497. Wills confirmed the policy three months later498. He had mentioned ‘a further 
brief consultation’ on offering five licences, but the revised spectrum packaging proposals 
published within three days outlined two options, both with five licences499. A few months 
earlier the Government had advocated four licences; five “could also compromise the 
ability of all licensees to run effective UMTS networks”500.
Thus, Oftel’s lack o f licensing authority did not thwart its influence and ability to pursue its 
preference. The Telecoms Act ‘only’ granted the regulator advisory functions when the SoS 
licensed under the Wireless Telegraphy Act501. Yet, Oftel was central in shaping the 
Government’s decision to introduce a 3G new entrant502, as licensing five operators was 
deemed technically possible. Accordingly, in the earlier stages, Oftel deployed informal 
resources as the convergent RA championed its preference. Subsequently, the Government 
acted with its statutory powers on the preferences jointly held with Oftel, hence on the 
latter’s behalf.
Oftel’s persuasive competition analysis and expertise, shaping Government choices 
opposed by incumbents, seemingly led the Minister to mobilise a level of political resources
495 RA/UACG(99)5, 9 /2 /99 , “Announcement by Michael Wills, Telecommunications Minister, On Third 
Generation Mobile”
496 DTI 9/2/1999 “Mobile Telecommunications - The Next Generation Government Sets Out Progress 
Towards 3G Auction”, Press Release
497 RA/UACG(98)17 13/11/98 “UMTS Spectrum Packaging; Taking forward the Working Hypothesis”, 
(brackets added here); also UACG minutes
498 RA/UACG(99)11, 6 /5 /99 , “Announcement By Michael Wills, Telecommunications Minister, On Third 
Generation Mobile”
499 RA/UACG(99)3,9 /2 /99
500 Borgers and Dustmann 4/03, “Awarding telecom licences: the recent European experience” p.230, 
Economic Policy, pp.215—268, claim the statement was made in November; it was in September, 
UACG(98)10
501 see ch.3
502 NAO 2001; Interviews Hendon and C
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greater than initially intended503. While the Government previously harboured doubts about 
roaming too504, in February 1999, Wills was “minded to ensure that new entrants’ 
customers can roam onto existing second generation networks until their own networks are 
established”505. Oftel and the RA had agreed it was necessary506. Clayton stressed that 
consultation proposals had been drawn up with advice from legal advisers507. The 
Government intended to proceed firmly, despite the use of licence modification powers 
being Oftel’s.
So, besides discussing five licences, the RA presented the new hypothesis that all 2G 
incumbents should accept licence modification mandating roaming, albeit until end-2009, 
as a condition to bid for a 3G licence. Existing Telecoms Act licences regulated by Oftel 
did not include provisions forcing 2G licensees to enter into roaming negotiations when 
asked by new entrants. The condition was to give potential 3G new entrants sufficient 
confidence about accessing, hence offering their customers, basic competitive 2G services 
across the UK.
Oftel already had powers through ‘market power’ licence conditions to require Vodafone 
and BTCellnet to provide airtime to SPs, such as new entrants in the 3G market, and it 
proposed to introduce the Market Influence condition to the same effect. So, although the 
UACG roaming consultation was characterised by resoluteness and urgency, Oftel avoided 
highlighting its applicable statutory authority to require the two largest incumbents to 
provide new entrants with greater certainty.
The regulator’s overall approach contrasted with the convergent Government’s, which was 
ready to use its formal authority notwithstanding ongoing private exchanges with divergent 
incumbents508. Indeed, in a court case brought against it by 0n e2 0 n e  regarding the 
roaming pre-condition to bid for 3G licences, the High Court judge ruled that the 
Government applied undue pressure on operators to consent to changes of existing 
licences, which was beyond its power509.
503 see ch.l; Nordlinger
504 UACG (98)18,para.6
505 DTI 2/99
506 Interview: Hendon
507 UACG (99)2,para.4
508 Interview: Hendon
509 RA 26 /8 /99  “Government Appeals Mobile Phone ‘Right To Roam’ Decision”, UACG(99)29
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0n e2 0 n e  had argued its legal challenge was not against allowing rivals to ‘roam’ but 
centred on the principle of altering its licence without a chance to fight it since the auction 
forced licence modification without recourse to the Competition Commission. 0 n e20ne  
opposed the formal imposition sought by the Government, but for Oftel to implement. 
Section 3 of the WTA 1998, granting the SoS discretion to introduce regulations to 
promote the optimal use of spectrum, did not take away existing licence modification rights 
under the Telecoms Act510. Orange supported 0 n e2 0 n e511. Despite no formal action, 
media reports claimed that privately BTCellnet did too512. Thus key industry actors usually 
competing against each other acted joindy.
Minister Wills reacted by claiming that concerns were unwarranted and: “if they don’t want 
to bid for a third generation licence then they will not be forced to accept roaming”513. The 
Government appealed against 0 n e2 0 n e’s successful judicial review514, subsequently 
overturned by a Court o f Appeal in October 1999. The Court of Appeal ruled that the SoS 
was to determine how best to promote the optimal use o f spectrum in the public interest. 
Nothing in 2G licences assured that incumbents could bid for new licences without 
accepting restrictions upon existing rights515, thus allowing the Government to impose 
roaming.
Instead, although first the RA, then Wills’ firm intervention advanced Oftel’s preference, 
the regulator’s policy-making was more subtle, centring on persuasion and negotiation 
notwithstanding its licence modification powers to implement roaming516. The DGT’s non- 
formal guidelines, part of the mid-February UACG document, illustrated a milder 
approach vis-a-vis incumbent operators.
The consultation guidelines indicated that the D G T did not intend to negate incumbents’ 
interests517, setting out the approach he was “likely to take in applying the Condition so that
510 THE QUEEN - v -THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY EX PARTE (1) 
MERCURY PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (2) MERCURY PERSONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS (A FIRM TRADING AS "0N E20NE") Applicants, 6 /8 /99 , CO/2162/99; p.15
511 ibid
512 The Independent, 18/6/99
5,3 Teather,D 19/6/99 “0n e20n e holds up mobile auction; smallest network complains about licence sell- 
o ff ’ The Guardian
514 RA 26/8 /99
515 Mercury Personal Communications v Secretary o f  State for the Department o f Trade and Industry, 
14/10/99, QBCOF 1999/0934/4
516 Unless licensees disagreed, which required the formal intervention and recommendations o f the 
Competition Commission (see ch.3). Opposition from the SoS, who had overruling powers, was unlikely 
given the Government’s convergence
517 see ch.l; Nordlinger
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interested parties are better able to assess for themselves (its) effect”518. Each case would be 
viewed on its merits and, significandy, the guidelines could be amended in light of 
experience, after consultation with interested parties. Oftel sought to enter into dialogue 
with incumbents resisting opening up their 2G networks to a licence-winning bidder on 
what executives defined as ‘non-commercial terms’519.
Oftel encouraged 3G new entry520 shortly before the RA raised the Government’s roaming 
intentions that led to 0 n e2 0 n e’s court case, but avoided imposition. While finding that 
Vodafone and Cellnet continued possessing ‘market power’ and proposing to determine 
their Market Influence, Oftel referred to “strong indications” that competition had 
increased significantly and removed regulatory price controls for calls from mobile phones.
Thus Oftel did not just eschew formal powers but renounced them without compromising 
on its preference with the incumbents, offering a costless mutually advantageous 
exchange521. The regulator stated that effective competition was a prospect, and proposed a 
review more than a year-and-a-half later, refraining from putting further pressure on 
incumbents.
Oftel exchanged views with incumbents on roaming informally at length, offering them 
every opportunity to alter its preferences522. An Oftel Regulatory Policy Directorate official 
explicitly referred to the ‘informal consultation’ period preceding the launch of a formal 
consultation in early May 1999, clearly stating that comments had been ‘taken on board’523. 
The explanatory letter circulated at UACG indicated that comments had led to an 
amendment to condition 8 on undue discrimination.
Thus, following its earlier informal efforts to shape entry largely through the RA, the 
formal consultation text showed how much the regulator sought incumbents’ consensus on 
licence modification. All comments following the informal consultations and received “in 
an earlier round o f discussions with the 2G operators in Autumn 1998 and meetings in
518 RA/UACG(99)2 “Draft guidelines National roaming licence condition” in Access To Second Generation 
Networks; italics added
519 The Independent, 18/6/99
520 Oftel 2/99. In parallel it issued “Customer choice: Oftel’s review o f  indirect access for mobile networks”, 
examining whether indirect access to mobile networks for indirect access operators and SPs would expand 
service choice, widen competition and lead to price reductions
521 see ch.l; Nordlinger
522 ibid
523 Dhillon,D 7 /5 /9 9  “Oftel Consultative Document: Access to 2nd Generation mobile networks for new 
entrant 3rd Generation Mobile Operators - RA/UACG(99)12”
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February and March 1999” had been considered. The condition had been redrafted in light 
o f these discussions524.
The regulator did not need agreement to modify licences525, but raised issues aimed at 
persuading incumbents to accept roaming throughout the document. After spending 
months interacting with incumbents informally within UACG, Oftel used its only formal 
consultation to agree 3G entry terms to be adopted, which incumbents opposed. Making 
roaming a condition for 3G licence bidding was indicated as a consequence o f the 
Minister’s February 1999 statement.
Portraying roaming as a useful measure, the regulator’s consultation eloquently indicated: 
“It is important...to be clear that Oftel would hope to see a roaming agreement reached 
commercially. The proposed licence condition is intended... as a backstop in the event of a 
failure to reach an agreement with.. .incumbent operators. It is also important...that it is 
not the intention that roaming would place an unfair burden on an incumbent operator or 
give the new entrant an unfair advantage”526.
Oftel argued roaming should commence once an entrant’s network covered 20% of the 
population, not 40%-50% as incumbents wanted. The entrant should launch a competitive 
service earlier than was possible without roaming. However, it understood incumbents’ 
“concerns” that entrants had to be required to build a substantial amount o f their networks 
prior to roaming eligibility.
The regulator even tried to heighten the policy’s advantages527. From Vodafone and 
BTCellnet’s perspective, Oftel’s reasoning on the “overriding need for entrants to have 
certainty”528 meant Orange and 0n e2 0 n e  would not be treated more favourably on 
roaming despite protestations. The condition would apply to all 2G operators winning a 
3G licence.
Furthermore, Oftel highlighted the formal powers eschewed. More burdensome terms 
could have been inserted than those proposed. It avoided specifying charging structures to
524 Oftel, 14/5/99 “Access to second generation mobile networks for new entrant third generation mobile 
operators”, para.1.11. The consultation actually started a week after Oftel’s explanatory note was circulated at 
UACG with the formal consultation text
525 see ch.3
526 Oftel, 7 /5 /99 , para.1.9
527 see ch.l; Nordlinger
528 Oftel, 7 /5 /99 , para.2.17
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arise from commercial arrangements529, and fixed timescales within which negotiations on 
roaming agreements were to be completed530. Technical reasons preventing roaming from 
being provided would exempt operators from the condition’s obligations.
Most significantly, Oftel made a compromise proposal, negotiating consent with 
incumbents. Its carrot-like inducement531 was to remove three formal provisions from the 
previous draft condition - to prevent unfair discrimination, cross-subsidies and also a 
requirement to provide accounting separation information, ‘in light o f responses’532. Subject 
to a minor wording modification of the undue discrimination condition, Oftel decided to 
deal with anti-competitive behaviour using existing conditions.
Oftel’s July 1999 statement established that no changes were necessary to the proposed 
condition. I t indicated important modifications to the guidelines instead533, highlighting the 
non-statutory instrument’s significance. Oftel explained why incumbents should not 
oppose the condition, emphasising in bold print that it was intended to act as a backstop 
should parties not reach commercial agreements. The DGT would seek clear indications 
that parties had attempted genuine negotiations before accepting to resolve disputes. 
Moreover, despite licence modification and enforcement powers, Oftel did not intend to 
construct the main body of a roaming agreement.
Meanwhile, the Government exploited its formal authority. Having decided that 
incumbents wishing to enter 3G auctions had to accept roaming, hence, licence 
modification534, led its adoption to be decided in court, following 0 n e2 0 n e’s legal 
challenge regarding “the validity of the Government’s decision to require such a 
precondition”535.
This section has thus shown that, to fulfill its competition preference, Oftel repeatedly 
underplayed and eschewed statutory resources, including available licence enforcement 
powers. Instead, it prioritised persuasive exchanges and negotiation. In fact, the regulator 
lacked the formal authority of the SoS to license 3G spectrum, hence shape market entry.
529 ibid, especially paras.2.8-2.10
530 ibid.para.2.14
531 Nordlinger, p.116
532 Oftel 7 /5 /99 , para.3.4
533 Oftel 29 /7/99, “Statement on National Roaming”, RA/UACG(99)23
534 ClaytonJ 9 /6 /99 , “Clarification o f Meeting Minutes o f 14 MAY 1999 on Roaming Policy - 
RA/UACG(99)20”
535 DTI Press Release P /99/549, referring to Minister Wills’ vision for 3G “Mobile Phones - the Next 
Generation”, 23 /6 /99
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Moreover, in the early stages, policy development firmly appeared in the RA’s domain, in 
conjunction with ministerial approval. The regulator pursued its preference nonetheless.
To shape new entry, Oftel exploited key ‘state’ actors with convergent preferences by 
influencing their decision-making on competition in private, while persistendy avoiding 
confrontation with 2G incumbents with divergent preferences. Oftel did not apply the 
forceful approach deployed by the Government notwithstanding their convergence. 
Formal powers did not constitute Oftel’s key resource. Besides exploiting convergent 
influential actors possessing statutory powers, to achieve its preferences Oftel prioritised 
dialogue and put forth persuasive ‘compromise’ proposals to the incumbents, 
demonstrating Type II autonomy.
V. Time-length of decision-making
This section reveals that, consistent with Type II autonomy scenarios, the UK’s telecoms 
regulator neglected available timescale powers and exercised policy forbearance to pursue 
its preference. Oftel’s approach towards the execution o f its preference was distinct from 
that of the formally powerful Government which, since disregarding industry reluctance 
from the early proposals to auction licences536, displayed firmness whenever opposed 
between July 1997 and April 2000.
Oftel did not appear to lead policy development when UACG was formed and members 
started meeting in 1998 to discuss 3G issues, hence, it did not publicly frame timescales. 
However, once it became formally entitled to introduce measures that could directly 
contribute to competition, the regulator acted without haste, notwithstanding convergence 
with the eager Government.
Oftel’s statutory role required it to allow a minimum of 28 days to seek views o f affected 
parties, for example, on policy issues entailing licence modifications and enforcement537; 
there was no maximum period of consultation. Consistent with its negotiating approach 
vis-a-vis 2G operators, it avoided asserting its formal authority based on the significant 
market power (SMP) condition in Vodafone and BTCellnet licences that could have
536 For example, BT’s response 10/97
537 see ch.3
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significantly shortened the process for auctioning licences and consistent with its 
preference.
Instead, Oftel exchanged views with divergent 2G mobile operators at length, pursuing 
competition by addressing issues analogous to 3G but not explicidy targeting them. So, in 
February 1999, it launched the mobile market competition review, in parallel with the 
consultation on indirect access to mobile network operators. To the extent that it proposed 
inserting the Market Influence condition in Vodafone and Cellnet’s licences, effectively 
extending the SMP condition according to the new EC Licensing Directive, the review was 
relevant to access to 2G networks, and hence to potential 3G new entrants.
Oftel issued an ‘informal’ document notwithstanding that UACG discussions on access to 
2G networks had taken place since October 1998, and days before Michael Wills, the 
relevant Minister, expressly stated that he favoured roaming as a competitive measure. 
Indeed, while working towards gradual progress on licence modification regarding MI, 
Oftel acknowledged that “such a determination (on M3) would also need to be the subject 
of a subsequent formal statutory consultation”538. This implied a minimum of twenty-eight 
more days for views to be submitted as statutorily required to modify licences. Therefore, 
Oftel was raising the prospect of prolonging decision-making further.
The ‘informal’ review alone gave interested parties, including the two affected incumbent 
operators, over a month to comment. Moreover, Oftel went further than upholding its 
fairly standard, informal, procedure of allocating fourteen days for ‘comments-on- 
comments’, by allowing a few more days; eighteen in total. Thus, regardless of the urgency 
created by the Government’s announcement that on top o f mandating roaming it was 
“initiating a further brief consultation on...five licences”539 to encourage entry in the 3G 
market, the regulator did not rush respondents formally or informally, including the key 2G 
operators, on issues that were at the very least complementary. Oftel took this stance while 
the Government was, on the one hand, delaying the auction to introduce the two entry 
measures but, on the other, granting incumbents only a few weeks o f response-time540.
538 Oftel, 2 /99 para. 1.4
539 Wills 9 /2 /99
540 ibid and; RA/UACG(99)2
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That the regulator was offering incumbents ‘every opportunity to alter the public officials’ 
preferences’541 in line with Type II autonomy is indicated by the fact that the May 1999 
statutory consultation announcement on roaming542 - for which it was formally responsible 
given licence modification powers - did not coincide with its launch. The publication 
containing the redrafted licence condition text was circulated to UACG members one week 
before the consultation officially began, thus giving incumbents more time to develop and 
formulate any ongoing differences with the regulator over the insertion. More significantly, 
by the time Oftel made public any announcements or documents, three months had passed 
since the Government’s statement favouring roaming.
So, Oftel did not act any more expeditiously once UACG proposals to auction five licences 
and roaming had been hastily put forward by the Minister, as late as February 1999. By 
then it was already too late to comply with the initial timetable, which assumed pre­
qualified auction candidates would be decided by early 1999. Instead, the regulator’s 
consultative work accommodated the revised timetable requested by UACG members 
following Wills’ February statement543. It did not seek to undertake the policy ‘unless and 
until’544 preference divergent actors were going to give their consent, largely ignoring 
available timescale powers.
In setting out the roaming consultation, reflecting the persuasive approach examined in the 
previous section, Oftel decided to retain the informal practice of fourteen days for 
comments on responses, on top of the statutory twenty-eight consultative days, with the 
deadline set to 25th June. Another month passed before Oftel determined that the roaming 
licence condition would be left unaltered, but that guidelines had been modified. 
Meanwhile, in the preliminary Information Memorandum for potential 3G licence 
applicants, Minister Wills had reiterated that the Government was determined to keep the 
UK at the forefront of the global telecommunications. It was committed to increasing 
sustainable competition in the mobile telecommunications market to help spur a faster 
rollout of innovative services and development of the technology545, hence, soliciting 
decision-making.
541 see ch.l; Nordlinger
542 Oftel 5/99 as presented in RA/UACG(99)12
543 Illustrative auction timetable RA/UACG(99)7,02/99
544 see ch.l; Nordlinger
545 RA, 6/99, p.2
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Similarly, in the July 1999 final roaming statement, the regulator indicated that it had 
written to the incumbents asking them to consent to licence modification, but claimed it 
did not “expect a response from the operators before the outcome is known of the judicial 
review on the legality of requiring consent as a condition o f bidding in the 3G auction”546. 
Whereas Oftel extended policy discussions to persuade 2G operators, the Government 
involuntarily prolonged the process by exercising its formal powers since the High Court 
upheld 0 n e2 0 n e’s legal challenge to the Government’s decision547.
Prior to the court’s ruling, reports claimed that 0 n e2 0 n e’s legal move reflected frustration 
among mobile phone company executives who believed Britain was losing a valuable first- 
mover advantage by delaying the introduction of 3G network frequencies548. The Minister 
recognised the uncertainty caused by litigation and that the chance of a delay was not in 
anyone’s interest in June 1999549. However, a few days later the Government announced 
that it would seek an early ruling by the courts to avoid delaying the auction if 0 n e20ne  
continued with its action550. Ultimately, the Government appealed at the end o f August 
1999 against the ruling that 2G operators should not have to let new companies use their 
networks as a pre-condition to gain a 3G licence551.
Several months later the Government was successful in the Court of Appeal552. Yet, this 
came after Oftel’s success in getting the two largest mobile incumbents’ consent to modify 
their licences553. Indeed, upon winning the appeal, the Government seemed to reconsider 
its more forceful approach towards incumbents given Oftel’s achievement. The 
Government welcomed the fact that: “As long as either BTCellnet or Vodafone (or a 
member of either o f their groups) wins a 3G licence, the availability of roaming to new 
entrants on fair terms will be guaranteed”554. Accordingly, given the need to minimise 
uncertainty as the possibility of a 0n e2 0 n e  appeal to the House o f Lords remained, the 
Government chose to avoid using the powers to impose the roaming condition through 
the auction rules.
546 Oftel, 7/99, para. 1.3
547 ClaytonJ. 6 /8 /9 9  “Judicial Review of Roaming Decision”, (99)27
548 The Independent, 18/6/99
549 The Guardian, 19/6/99
550 Note 6 in Wills 23 /6 /99
551 RA/UACG(99)29,26/8/99
552 RA/UACG(99)33, 14/10/99 “0n e20n e Judicial Review o f Roaming Licence Condition: Appeal Court 
Judgement”
553 RA/UACG(99)32, 8/10/99 “Licence Modification On Roaming: Operator Agreements”
534 RA/UACG(99)33,14/10/99
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In fact, Oftel further integrated minor industry comments, thus newly revising the 
condition before Vodafone and BTCellnet consented to roaming, which was well received 
both by DTI Minister, and future SoS, Patricia Hewitt555, as well as by the RA Chief 
Executive556. Oftel decided that no statutory consultation was necessary since it had already 
given operators additional time and changes were ‘not substantive’. Oftel granted the 
operators four more days nonetheless, thus giving them a final chance to agree and 
avoiding to proceed with a formal referral to the Competition Commission557.
VI. Outcomes
The United Kingdom’s five 3G licences were finally auctioned by the Government 
between start-March and end-April 2000, and generated the striking sum of £22.5bn558. 
The measures put in place by Oftel, the Labour Government and the RA to encourage 
applications from new entrants saw as many as thirteen operators bidding for the five 
licences; all qualified to bid559. Previously, the November 1999 Information Memorandum 
setting out the terms of the 3G auction indicated that there were no technical or financial 
pre-qualification requirements for entering the auction other than the provision of a 
deposit. In fact, details of ownership structures, the 3G technology to be used and 
confirmation of compliance with the rules of the auction were required, but bidders did not 
have to be telecoms operators560.
The auction saw the four 2G incumbents - Vodafone, BT Cellnet, Orange and 0 n e2 0 n e  - 
win 3G licences561. However, the Canadian operator TIW562 obtained the largest licence, 
which had been reserved for new entrants, and could exploit roaming as a ‘safety-net’
555 RA/UACG(99)32, 8 /10/99
556 Hendon JD 21/10/99 “Next generation o f mobile telecoms offers exciting opportunities in e-commerce — 
letters to the Editor”, FT
557 RA/UACG(99)31, 4 /10 /99  “Access to 2nd Generation mobile networks: Revised Roaming Licence 
Condition and Guidelines”
558 Binmore and Klemperer 2002
559 Hewitt,P 14/2 /00  “Hewitt Confirms Qualified Bidders For 3G Mobile Licence Auction”, P /2000/99
560 RA and NM Rothschild, 1 /11/99 “United Kingdom Spectrum Auction - Third Generation, The Next 
Generation o f Mobile Phones”, p.2
561 The precise sums were: TIW £4.3847bn (Licence A); Vodafone £5.964bn (Licence B, which was the 
largest licence incumbents could bid for); BT3G £4.0301 bn (Licence Q; One20ne £4.0036bn (Licence D); 
Orange £4.095bn (Licence E), Borgers,T and Dustmann,C 2002, “Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: 
The Case o f the UK Auction” p.84, Ifo Studien, pp.77-109
562 Soon afterwards, TIW sold the subsidiary that owned the licence to Hong Kong-based Hutchinson 
Whampoa - Borgers and Dustmann 2003, p.254; Thatcher 2005, p.!13,note 2
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measure where it needed to. Thus Oftel’s efforts to introduce competition in the new 
mobile market proved successful.
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Table 6: Oftel’s 3G Type II autonomy
Empirical
Indicators
Level 1 - Nordiinger’s state level Level 2 - Regulatory level Level 3 - Case Study - UMTS UK: Type II
Participants 
and resources
R ange of societal actors: those  
divergent from the  sta te , seeking to 
obstruct its preferences; also actors 
with similar preferences to the s ta te  
supporting it (convergent), and those  
without strong ex p ressed  p references
At start of regulatory policy, key resources 
spread among distinct actors; with preferences 
similar to regulator and with divergent ones. Different 
participants have valuable resources to exert 
influence
Dispersed resources and no single influential group:
- industry incum bents had 2G networks and finances
- Secretary  of S ta te  formal licensing pow ers under W ireless Telegraphy 
Acts 1949/98, over spectrum , and T elecom s Act 1984
- G overnm ent agency (DTI’s RA), under S oS  and Ministers, led policy 
with Oftel, which had formal licence modification pow ers
- 'new  en tran ts’ key for competition but low influence
Preferences Combination of divergence, 
indifference, convergence
Preferences of influential participants differ over
regulator’s proposals. But not only influential 
divergent preferences; some influential support
from outset for agency  to shift preferences
Agency not isolated, with support of influential actors from start:
Oftel w anted g reater competition like new en tran ts and crucially as 
Government agency (RA) and Ministers, since G overnm ent controlled 
key a sse t. Incumbents opposed entry
Process State  shifts preferences of societal 
actors over time, by: (i) inducement; 
(ii) appeasement-conciliation; (iii) 
enfranchisement; (iv) 
empowerment-reinforcement
To alter preferences of opponents or restrain their 
u se  of key resources, regulator prioritises 
negotiation over imposition. Preferences shifted 
by: (i) making compromise proposals; (ii) using 
persuasion, repeated  bargaining; (iii) exploiting 
influential actors with convergent preferences to 
avoid confrontation
Agency avoids imposition and through dialogue gradually shifts 
preferences of opponents:
Through private exchanges with G overnm ent’s  RA, Oftel influenced 
number of 3G licences allocated without licensing powers. Avoided 
providing 2G network a cc ess  to 3G en tran ts under existing provisions. 
While benefiting from Ministerial support, informal exch an g es with 2G 
incum bents. Obtained licence modification enabling roaming non- 
hierarchically: redrafted condition before formal consultation, taking 2G 
com m ents into account; three formal provisions removed
Time-length of 
decision­
making
Public policy not undertaken 'un less 
and until’ actors with divergent 
p references a re  p e rsuaded
Timescale powers largely neglected; policy 
forbearance
Lengthy regulatory process du e  to consultations and informal 
discussions, despite  Ministerial pressures for urgency and the 
opposition of incumbents
Outcomes State  p references translated  into 
public policy after those  of divergent 
actors a re  shifted to m ake them  
‘congruent or consonan t’
Regulator’s preferences implemented after actors 
with divergent o nes had been  persuaded  to shift 
theirs, with some concessions
Oftel fulfilled its preferences after shifting those of incumbents, also 
by removing specific provisions
VII. Conclusions
The case o f 3G policy in the UK has shown that Oftel displayed Type II autonomy as, with 
the support of a Government persuaded to sell five licences, it avoided using existing 
formal provisions to achieve its preference, applying its sectoral knowledge instead. 
Throughout policy development, the regulator’s decision-making and preference fulfillment 
were not characterised by the extensive deployment o f formal authority, but by dialogue 
and persuasion, including compromise proposals, consistent with Type II autonomy (see 
level 3, Table 6 above).
The SoS was in charge o f licensing the key ‘physical’ 3G spectrum asset, and thus formally 
in control o f policy. Spectrum’s scarcity made it the very rare commodity and resource that 
all industry, and particulady divergent incumbents aiming to expand their market 
capabilities, wanted. The incumbents’ desire for spectrum and the formal framework meant 
that they were supposed to be interested in, or rather concerned about and dependent on 
the decision-making o f the SoS. In fact, Oftel’s formal powers to fulfill its 3G preference 
were significant compared to those held by other prominent and publicly active ‘state’ 
actors, such as the RA which did not have the regulator’s licence modification and 
enforcement powers.
Nonetheless, in practice policy progress was largely conducted by the DTI’s spectrum 
agency, which had no formal powers over Oftel, the SoS or over operators. Crucially, while 
the RA chaired UACG meetings with its understanding o f how specific issues needed 
addressing, Oftel was always present and influenced policy by intervening and providing 
inputs on selected issues according to its own policy analysis and expertise. The regulator 
prioritised competition with little concern for the other statutory objectives contained in 
the Telecoms Act, regardless o f the fact that secondary formal duties were not ranked.
Preferences guided the scope and application of formal arrangements, having shaped the 
direction o f discussions and policy development. Preferences led to the application of 
statutory provisions available to the regulator when it decided so. Oftel’s preference was 
bolstered by convergence with Government Ministers, but particularly by the public and 
private collaboration with the RA, which overshadowed the fact that the SoS had licensing 
powers the regulator did not.
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The shared preference with the Government, as well as with the RA, meant that, in 
practice, the formally most powerful actor, the SoS, deployed his decision-making authority 
in line with the regulator’s policy objective. Furthermore, preference convergence meant 
that, ultimately, the licence modification sought by Oftel was not blocked by the SoS. 
Similarly, statements and interventions by DTI Ministers were all aimed at enhancing 
competition in some way. Oftel’s analysis and advice was heeded as 3G spectrum was 
allotted in order to license a new entrant.
Subsequently, however, Oftel did not simply exploit the SoS’ convergence to exercise its 
formal authority and introduce the roaming measure that would reassure new entrants and 
aid competition. The regulator granted divergent incumbents different opportunities, and 
considerable time, to voice their views on what issues needed to be developed.
Oftel’s grasp of the coverage, pricing and technical details addressed to advance 
competition in the face of expressed preference divergence, illustrates the importance of its 
regulatory expertise. The regulator was able to bargain over individual licence terms 
without compromising on its wider preference. Rather than forcing preference divergent 
operators to endure a set o f intricate measures they opposed, Oftel accomplished its 
preference by making allowances, including granting significant formal concessions, 
intended to make licence modification seem acceptable to incumbents. The invaluable 
resource of policy expertise that shaped 3G development had not been dictated statutorily, 
had been accumulated over time and did not require lump-sum expenditures from the 
formally allocated budget.
In addition to its in-house expertise and the collaboration of influential preference 
convergent actors, Oftel built on and exploited the informal ties developed over time with 
the established operators. The regulator identified and formulated competition-related 
issues without ever undermining the importance o f the four 2G operators. Indeed, Oftel 
never made suggestions that the four incumbents were to be excluded from the 3G market, 
for example, by proposing that new entrants be allocated two of five 3G licences, or that 
one new entrant be allocated one of only four auctioned. In fact, despite having to concede 
entry to a new operator at the expense of their advantageous status quo, the four 
incumbents obtained a licence each and protracted their mobile market activity.
Unlike the Government, whose use of formal authority even led to a judicial review, Oftel 
showed the distinct willingness to take into account the positions o f 2G operators, even
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after extensive discussions had taken place. Oftel avoided using existing statutory powers 
vis-a-vis Vodafone and BTCellnet, as sole bearers o f the market power/influence 
obligations, to grant prospective 3G entrants access to their 2G networks.
Similarly, at a time when the Government acted firmly, Oftel did not push to impose 
roaming on existing 2G operators as was formally possible. When the Telecoms Minister 
announced favouring roaming, the regulator did not launch an immediate statutory 
consultation either. Both moves were conciliatory. Oftel went as far as making some 
notable concessions, limiting and, perhaps even decisively, renouncing additional statutory 
provisions that it had initially planned to introduce.
Thus, Oftel’s decision-making over 3G was dominated by the main features o f Type II 
autonomy. The regulator persistently sought some consensus from divergent incumbents 
through several consultations. In delaying implementation to persuade the adversely 
affected operators, most eloquently by revising roaming details without losing sight of the 
key objective, it managed to ‘shift the preferences’ o f Vodafone and BTCellnet as it 
removed specific provisions. The two larger 2G operators, which had indicated their 
opposition to more entry and to allowing roaming on their networks at the outset, 
ultimately, consented to licence modification, making superfluous the provision that 
allowed Oftel to refer the matter to the Competition Commission.
The case of 3G policy in the UK has thus shown that eschewing the deployment of formal 
provisions in favour of Type II autonomy processes of persuasion and negotiation, 
especially when offering reassurances and concessions can lead preference divergent actors 
to accept and agree to preferences pursued by regulators rather than opposing them. 
Factors not set out in formal arrangements, such as preference convergence with formally 
powerful state actors or with actors controlling ‘physical’ policy-defining assets, informal 
ties and policy expertise to shift divergent preferences, can be equally, if not more, decisive 
for independence in practice.
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Chapter 5: The ART and 3G Policy in France
I. Introduction
This chapter examines how the Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART) 
pursued its preferences regarding 3G spectrum licensing in France. The chapter argues that 
the regulator successfully showed Type II autonomy by deploying persuasion and 
negotiation. It was able to do so because o f its policy expertise and ties with industry 
incumbent mobile operators that in turn used their influence to pressure other state actors 
with formal powers to determine policy.
France was one of the last European Union (EU) countries to sell 3G licences563. Policy 
implementation was nonetheless pursued following the enormous domestic success o f 
GSM, or second-generation (2G) telephony. The ART was the domestic regulator that 
actively promoted progress within the scope o f the wider UMTS framework created at the 
European level. The chapter shows that, notwithstanding its largely advisory role and 
limited ex ante formal powers, the regulatory agency created the conditions to further its 
policy preferences vis-a-vis diverse influential actors interested in 3G.
With both state and industry actors participating in the process, the ART conducted the 
policy on technical and non-technical merits. It ensured that four licences were allocated 
through the ‘beauty contest’ method, as it desired, despite facing potentially determinant 
divergence. The ART’s preferences were challenged by particular elected officials, including 
a Minister possessing overriding statutory authority. The preference divergent Minister in 
charge o f telecoms - who had licensing and rule-setting powers over the selection process - 
advocated auctions; a preference shared by the Finance Minister. The French Government 
also controlled the frequency spectrum on which the policy centred and could seek to 
introduce specific legislation. The regulator’s preferences were thus achieved with respect 
to a different set o f divergent (state) actors and resources than those Oftel faced in the UK 
(non-state). Yet, it did so through a similar process.
563 Thatcher 2005, p. 105
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Outline o f  Events
In February 1999, the ART launched a consultation in which it advocated the licensing of 
3G spectrum via a ‘beauty contest’ to a maximum of four operators. This followed earlier 
work by an advisory spectrum body working group comprising industry actors and the 
ART. In October 1999, the ART published a summary o f responses reflecting 
overwhelming support for its preferences. However, the French Telecoms Minister and 
subsequently the Finance Minister advocated auctions instead, because they expected 
higher licensing revenues compared to a fixed-fee beauty contest and desired to improve 
state finances.
To pursue its preferences, before April 2000, the ART deployed persuasion through 
accumulated policy expertise and exploited the influential preference convergent industry 
actors to put pressure on the Government. By applying these resources after April 2000 
and indicating the possibility of an increase in the fixed fee initially proposed, the ART’s 
preferences were adopted in June 2000. However, in terms o f outcomes, due to sectoral 
actors affected by worsening financial conditions withdrawing from the process, only two 
of the four licences were sold in January 2001. They were obtained by the two largest 2G 
incumbents, with the remaining incumbent acquiring a third at the end of 2002.
II. Participants and Resources
The section shows that different actors participating in 3G policy development in France 
possessed valuable resources; clearly, not all were of a statutory nature. At the start of 
policy, key resources were spread among distinct state and non-state actors, consistent with 
Type II autonomy. The ART exercised its role of policy advisor to the Government, which 
held key statutory authority to determine policy. The three incumbent mobile operators 
possessed 2G networks as well as important ties to elected officials and to the media. As 
policy was developed, resources besides spectrum ownership, licensing, rule-setting powers, 
and network incumbency emerged, such as policy expertise, other informal ties and 
influence over public opinion, were spread among several, mainly domestic, participants.
Policy discussions regarding the development o f UMTS in France started in 1998, a few 
months after the UK. In a year in which French mobile market users doubled,
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demonstrating “exceptional” growth564, the development of a national 3G policy attracted 
strong participation. A range of regulatory actors, elected officials, mobile operators and 
equipment-makers were progressively involved. Among the diverse actors, domestic ones 
proved particularly influential.
Under the 1996 law determining France’s regulatory framework565, the ART regulated 
telecoms operators and service providers primarily by enforcing licences. However, the 
ART shared its regulatory functions. The Telecoms Minister held the authority to issue 
licenses to public network operators566 and to providers o f public telecoms services 
exploiting radio spectrum via a new network or due to changes to an existing one, much 
like the UK’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The ART had to evaluate licence 
applications relating to public telecoms operators on behalf of the Minister and, when their 
allocation followed a call for applicants, it published a report explaining the outcome o f the 
selection procedure.
Regarding spectrum licensing, the law specified that the number of licences issued could be 
limited based on technical constraints pertaining to the scarcity o f frequencies. In such 
instances, the ART was to propose terms and conditions governing licensing procedures 
that had to ensure effective competition, but which the Minister was in charge o f 
publishing. Accordingly, with regard to 3G policy, in addition to controlling the spectrum 
and having relevant licensing powers, the Minister also possessed rule-setting powers over 
the licensing process. Thus, while the ART was to undertake frequency allocation to 
operators and users in objective, transparent and non-discriminatory terms, the Minister 
had the formal authority to determine the manner o f the sale o f spectrum, the key asset the 
policy centred on.
In practice, the policy initially followed a rather similar path to the British experience, as 
other state actors appeared at the forefront. Unlike other telecoms policies conducted by 
the ART by way o f its regulatory role, early discussions addressing 3G in France in 1998 
were undertaken by an advisory body specialised in radio network and services issues, the 
Commission consultative des radiocommunications (CCR). Thus, like Oftel in the UK, the 
French regulator seemed somewhat overshadowed by another state body with relevant 
expertise, over which a Government Minister held some authority.
564 ART, 1 3 /l/9 9 ,“Les consommateurs et la telephonie mobile — compte rendu”
565 LOI n°96-659,26/7/1996
566 ibid. see ch.3 for formal institutional arrangements
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The 21 CCR members, including seven ‘qualified’ individuals, were to be appointed by the 
Telecoms Minister upon ART advice567. So, the Minister’s appointment powers over the 
CCR complemented his key formal policy role of licensing and rule-setting regarding the 
3G licensing process. The CCR could be consulted by the Minister or the ART on all radio 
network and services issues concerning licensing procedures, the setting out or 
modification of technical and operational terms, technical specifications and provisions 
pertaining to its specialised knowledge, among other things. If  the CCR Chairman agreed 
with the majority of members, the body could decide nonetheless to investigate matters 
relating to its competencies568.
Initially, the CCR seemed to determine the French 3G agenda. Without formal powers 
over the ART, in January 1998569 it created a working group (CCR/UMTS)570 aimed at 
providing recommendations on key implementation questions including the licensing 
method, a feasible timetable, frequency allocation and technical interface standards571.
So, an understanding o f technical spectrum issues was important for policy progress 
regardless of who nominated CCR members. The CCR/UMTS working group was indeed 
headed by the former President of European Telecommunications Standards Institute’s 
(ETSI) Special Mobile Group (SMG), Philippe Dupuis, whose technical knowledge 
reflected the extensive work carried out on 2G GSM technology572.
Twenty-five organisations joined with Dupuis in CCR/UMTS573, none of whom had 
formal authority over the ART. The work included, nonetheless, contributions from state
567 see ch.3 on CCR composition. In the CSSPPT postal and telecoms commission, qualified individuals 
included engineers from the French ‘Ecoles’ specialised in sectoral issues, at the time of writing; 
http://www.telecom.gouv.fr/rubriques-menu/acteurs/acteurs-francais-reglementation-regulation-365.html
568 ArtD97-l o f the former Code des postes et des telecommunications, now Code des postes et des 
communications electroniques (Art. D99-4)
569 Commission Consultative des Radiocommunications (CCR), 22 /9/98, Groupe de Travail CCR/UMTS, 
“L'introduction de l'UMTS en France”, Rapport n .l. Also ART, 16/12/98, “L'Autorite de regulation des 
telecommunications rend public le rapport de la Commission consultative des radiocommunications sur 
l'introduction de l'UMTS en France”, Communique de presse
570 Allowed under the afore-mentioned Code; Art.D97-3
571 Setting frequency bands for data-rate services consistent with the modest expectations o f the time 
occurred at the ITU’s 1992 World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC), an international forum where 
Member States revise an international treaty. Its Radio Regulations provide technical, operational and 
regulatory conditions for the use o f the radio frequency spectrum held every two to three years for changes in 
the Regulations. (http://www.itu.int/ITU-R; WRC section). Yet, the CCR claimed that the ITU did not 
possess ETSI’s expertise to develop common and detailed technical specifications
572 Dupuis edited with Hilderbrand,P 2002, “GSM and UMTS - The Creation o f Global Mobile 
Communication”, John Wiley and Sons, comprising the technical history o f GSM and the early evolution of 
UMTS
573 CCR 22/9/98, A3. Tiste des Participants du Groupe’,p.65
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actors other than ART officials. Some represented the Agence nationale des frequences 
(ANFR) whose board was actually formed by ART officials according to law too574. Others 
were from the Direction des postes et telecommunications (DPT)575; a regulatory policy 
unit internal to the Ministry for Industry576, whose portfolio included telecoms. DPT 
officials reporting to the Ministry were the closest to direct Government representation 
within CCR/UMTS; formally, though without right of deliberation, the Telecoms Minister 
could send a representative to CCR meetings on his behalf577. In the report’s joint opening 
note, the three state agencies specified that their participation was to provide useful 
information to the working group, not influence its conclusions. Recommendations were 
not to be mistaken for their respective views.
In fact, o f the seventy-two representatives participating in CCR/UMTS, state actors other 
than the ART were a small minority. The ANFR had four officials attending, the DPT 
three. With twelve officials representing it in these early policy discussions, one o f whom 
acted as the working group’s point o f contact, the ART’s involvement was the largest from 
a single organisation, without a statutory justification.
Similarly, Dupuis presided the seven plenary sessions attended by around thirty participants 
each, with four sub-groups addressing different 3G issues. In addition to the ART, industry 
actors played an active and important role, especially the established network operators. 
Their voluntary participation was critical to understand what issues potential 3G spectrum 
candidates considered needed addressing to develop policy.
Thus industry actors had a key non-statutory resource, which was the expertise to identify 
and resolve broad and specific operational issues on which 3G policy implementation 
depended in practice, pre- and post-licensing. Indeed, three of the four expert sub-groups 
were chaired by the two oldest and largest, domestic 2G mobile operators, France Telecom 
Mobiles and Cegetel578. Vodafone, the multinational mobile operator active in UK 3G 
policy too, chaired the fourth. The spectrum sub-group was conducted by the largest - 
state-controlled and ex-monopoly - domestic operator. The standards and licences sub­
574 see ch.3
575 The DPT did not have statutory ties with the regulator
576 The ‘Ministry’ for Industry and its Secretary were, then, part o f the broader Ministere de l’economie, des 
finances et de l’industrie’ the Finance Minister headed
577 see ch.3
578 In 1999, Cegetel’s turnover would total just under 4.1 bn euros, o f which 3.7bn generated by mobile 
operations, with a 366mln euros profit. Escande,P 16 /3 /00  “Cegetel affirme que son accord avec 
Vodafone est compatible avec le pacte d’actionnariat”, Les Echos
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groups were headed by the second largest fixed-line operator owner of the SFR mobile 
brand - a part o f the global media conglomerate Vivendi Universal/Cegetel group. 
Vodafone chaired the services sub-group.
Crucially, the three French mobile incumbents had national 2G networks to build 3G 
facilities and services from, helped by their commercial experience too. Indeed, while not 
chairing a sub-group, the family-run, smallest, French 2G operator, Bouygues Telecom, 
which “owned politically important newspaper and media companies”579, and controlled 
the TF1 national television channel had more CCR/UMTS representatives than France 
Telecom (F-T) and Cegetel. The three mobile incumbents had nine, eight and seven 
representatives respectively.
Therefore, from the early policy stages, when the CCR ‘led’ initial 3G discussions, officials 
from ART and the three incumbents were more involved than other state actors and 
potential new entrants attending meetings. ART and incumbents’ officials alone constituted 
half o f all CCR/UMTS participants. For the ART, this meant developing issues with 
operators it had regulated since becoming operational in 1997.
An important implication of 2G operators’ participation for the regulator was the acquired 
knowledge of their existing and prospective operations. The ART had also had more time 
to create closer working relations, and hence access to company officials and information, 
with the incumbents, as indicated below, than with potential new entrants. Thus, besides 
the formal relationship between regulator and regulatees, there had been informal 
interaction.
Non-incumbent participants also included large international business groups, such as 
operators Hutchinson and Lyonnaise Communication, and manufacturers Motorola, 
Nortel, Philips and Siemens. These companies operated worldwide, and in relevant 
technical fields, thus possessing considerable sectoral expertise. Yet, having borne huge 
costs, the three established 2G operators could build on the critical advantage o f network 
incumbency in France, a highly influential asset, at least with regard to transitional technical 
and market arrangements from 2G to 3G580. 2G networks gave incumbents first-mover
579 Thatcher, 2005, p.105
580 Renault,E and Jakubyszyn,C 10/6/99, “Les operateurs de telephonie mobile avancent prudemment sur 
internet”, Le Monde
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advantages at a structural, technical and operational level581, given a direct understanding of 
French mobile service demand trends582.
F-T and Cegetel’s mobile arm SFR had established their market presence since being 
licensed in July and December 1992 respectively. By the time the CCR issued its 3G 
recommendations, Bouygues had been operational for over two years too583. So, the 
participation of industry incumbents was partly explicable by FFlOObn of ‘sunk costs’ spent 
to build their networks584, despite uncertainty about the success of the prospective market 
and the exact nature of services585. The two oldest operators generated returns o f around 
FF1.9bn each in 1998586. Having entered later, thus bearing the more recent investment 
burden and smaller operations, Bouygues projected a FF3bn loss in 1999 instead587.
Other domestic factors made the incumbents influential. Besides the affiliation to 
important media and newspaper companies that could draw public attention to issues of 
interest, the two privately-owned operators, Cegetel/SFR and Bouygues, had high-level 
links to policy-makers and influential politicians, with one o f Bouygues’ major 
shareholders, Francois Pinault, reported to be a close friend of then French President 
Jacques Chirac588. Curien claims that ties between senior elected officials and French 
telecoms operators led the Government to strongly arbitrate in Bouygues’ favour in 1996, 
regarding its GSM licence589. Being majority state-owned and given its previous status as a 
national monopoly, F-T had significant political connections too590. Within two weeks of 
being appointed as Finance Minister in spring 2000, Finance Minister Laurent Fabius met 
F-T Chairman Michel Bon591.
581 BarrouxJD 23/2/99, “La France attribuera de nouvelles licences d'operateurs mobiles en 2000”, Les 
Echos; 13/10/99, “L'ART prepare l'arrivee du telephone mobile du futur et de la boucle locale radio”
582 La Tribune 17/3/99, “L'Europe de l'Ouest comble son retard sur les Etats-Unis en matiere de telephonie 
mobile”
583 ART 4/98, “Perspectives d'evolution a moyen-terme du marche franfais du radiotelephone - Etude menee 
par 1'IDATE pour le compte de 1'Autorite de regulation des telecommunications”, p.5
584 Renault,E 30/6/99, “L’ART reclame une baisse des prix des appels vers les telephones mobiles”, Le 
Monde
585 CCR report, p. 8-9, para.2.3
586 Renault 30/6/99; BarrouxJD 30/6/99, “Appeler un client Itineris coutera 2,38 francs des demain”, Les 
Echos
587 Renault 30/6/99
588 Maussion,C, Pons,F and Raulin,N 5 /6 /00 , “Le tresor des mobiles”, Liberation
589 Curien,N 2002, “UMTS en France et en Europe: Quelles procedures pour l’attribution des licences?” 
p.176, Annals o f Public and Cooperative Economics 73(2), pp.149-79
590 see Thum,M p.265 in Borgers and Dustmann 2003
591 Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 14/4/00, “Agenda previsionnel de Laurent 
Fabius”, Communiques de presse (all Ministry references are press notices; henceforth, left unspecified)
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Indeed, the CCR ultimately proved to be an advisory body with limited scope, given its 
short-lived consultative role. The report arising from the CCR’s work was submitted in 
September 1998 to both the Telecoms Minister and the ART Chairman592. It contained 
preliminary conclusions on distinct issues based on state and non-state input. Stated aims 
included providing interested French actors with a shared understanding of the impact o f 
introducing UMTS, whether specific points had been raised by the CCR, the Telecoms 
Minister or the ART Chairman593. Thus the CCR acted as a conduit that produced a first 
important step towards a national policy through participant discussions and 
recommendations. Policy was not being imposed formally.
In fact, the CCR ‘expert’ report acted as the foundation for, and enhanced the scope of, the 
ART’s subsequent course of action, which was calling for the launch of a public 
consultation to define regulatory policy. Accordingly, in February 1999, the ART provided 
an opportunity for ‘all actors’ to comment on policy developments. Thirty-two 
organisations responded594, up from the CCR’s twenty-five. Several telecoms operators had 
not voiced their views previously. New respondents included significant operators Japan’s 
mobile operator NTT DoCoMo, and Orange (not owned by F-T at the time), Belgacom, as 
well as now defunct Dolphin Telecom, which participated in the UK’s policy discussions. 
The participation o f industry actors entailed a spontaneous exchange o f additional, not 
formally elicited, information useful for the ART to shape 3G policy.
Without powers to determine policy, the regulator remained nonetheless aware that 
selected Government officials, notably the Telecoms Minister, could formally challenge its 
policy orientations. The regulator acknowledged the Minister’s statutorily influential role 
when it launched its consultation595. Shortly before the launch, Telecoms Minister Pierret 
had stressed publicly that the regulator’s role was one o f highly valuable ‘technical’ work. 
However, he also specified that the agency had been created to produce advice and 
‘regulate’, not to determine policy596.
The Minister did not respond to the regulator’s proposals, just as he had not participated in 
CCR/UMTS discussions, thus appearing uninvolved in the policy largely conducted by the
592 ART 19/2/1999, “Consultation publique sur l’introduction de l’UMTS en France”
593 CCR 22/9/98, p.5
594 “Liste des Contributeurs”, ART 9/99, “Introduction de l’UMTS en France: synthese des contributions a 
la consultation publique”
595 ART 2/99, p.3
596 Renault,M-C and LeGales,Y. 8 /1 /99 , “Christian Pierret: 'Favoriser les prix les plus bas possibles'” Le 
Figaro
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ART. Yet, at the European Council of Telecoms Ministers meeting in April 1999, Secretary 
o f State for Industry Pierret did officiate and discuss the prospects o f introducing 3G as a 
matter of industrial policy597.
Indeed, state and non-state actors that shaped policy development in practice became 
clearer as the ART consultation’s initial momentum subsided. The progressive narrowing 
down coincided with the French Government’s increased interest and participation in the 
spring o f 2000, when the British Government auctioned 3G licences in the UK. The final 
phases o f the British auctions roughly coincided with the appointment of a new Finance 
Minister, Laurent Fabius, who headed the then Ministry for economy, finance and industry.
Fabius displayed greater involvement in the public debate on 3G, especially, compared to 
his short-lived predecessor598. While lacking powers to dismiss junior Ministers to change 
the course of sectoral policy599, Fabius, a former Socialist Prime Minister, was in charge of 
the Industry Ministry600, headed by the Minister overseeing the telecoms sector, Secretary 
Pierret, with whom he had longstanding close ties aiding a collaborative relationship601.
Fabius became publicly involved with Pierret in how the Government developed 3G policy 
in the run-up to determining the licensing method, given the Telecoms Minister’s formal 
powers. The two Ministers privately discussed policy terms directly with then Socialist 
Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, involving him in 3G decision-making behind-closed-doors, 
particularly after the ART formulated its proposal602. Similady, according to a report, then 
centre-right President Jacques Chirac agreed to meet Francois Pinault, personal friend and 
major shareholder o f Bouygues, over 3G603.
597 “Intervention de Christian Pierret sur l'UMTS lors du Conseil europeen des ministres des 
telecommunications de Luxembourg”, 22/4/99, Industry Ministry Press notice,
598 Christian Sautter, November 1999-March 2000. Raulin,N 28/3 /00 , “Desavoues, mortifies, fatigues, ils 
quittent le gouvemement”, Liberation; Bonavita,M-L 5 /4 /00 , “ Une equipe longue a consumer ”, Le Figaro
599 The dismissal o f French Government Ministers is a power held by the President o f the Republic, upon the 
Prime Minister’s proposal, Art.8, French Constitution: Conseil Constitutionnel, “Constitution du 4 octobre 
1958”.
600 La Tribune, 28 /3 /00 , “Fabius charge 'd'incamer la reforme' a la tete de Bercy”
601 Malingre,V 27/5/00, “Les elements du dispositif de controle etabli a partir de Bercy”, Le Monde
602 FabiusL- “Assemblee nationale 2e SEANCE DU MARDI 6 JUIN 2000”; Jakubyszyn,C and Renault,E 
15/4/00, “Le gouvemement veut se consumer une cagnotte grace au telephone mobile”, Le Monde; 
Maussion et al 5/6/00; Jakubyszyn,C and Renault,E 6 /6 /00 , “La ‘cagnotte’ du telephone pourrait attendre 
100 a 150 milliards de francs”, Le Monde; Lamm,P 7 /6 /00 , “Habile compromis”, Les Echos; Penicaut,N and 
Riche,P 7 /6 /00 , “Un 'ni-ni' qui ne contente personne”, Liberation
603 Maussion et al 5 /6 /0 0
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Fabius officially announced the Government’s decision over the 3G selection process to 
Parliament in June 2000604. Indeed, as the policy gained visibility and media coverage, the 
Government’s progressive involvement in 3G also brought to the fore the preferences of 
other French Members of Parliament (MPs). They were not granted powers direcdy 
relevant to 3G in the 1996 law but, depending on their policy support, could publicly 
influence ministerial decision-making, ultimately voting on new legislation. Though late in 
the process, MPs scrutinised the Government’s policy-making during several sessions, and 
by default that of the regulator605. MPs debated and put pressure to revise decisions on 3G 
regulatory issues by publicly questioning and exposing the judgment o f cabinet Ministers606.
Around the time when political involvement into 3G spectrum allocation increased, ART 
Chairman Jean-Michel Hubert announced the domestic and foreign mobile operators that 
had expressed interest in 3G licences. Seven to ten did, thus comparatively fewer than the 
thirteen UK bidders607. Besides the three existing French 2G operators, French 
conglomerate Suez Lyonnaise (des Eaux) in a consortium with Telefonica, Deutsche 
Telekom, Telecom Italia and the Canadian TTW were likely candidates608. Apart from one 
Lyonnaise Communication official, none of these large non-incumbent operators had had 
representatives involved in the CCR’s work shaping recommendations in its report. Hubert 
called on other operators to join the process, particularly the Japanese incumbent NTT 
Docomo which had responded to the ART’s consultation.
Two potential new entrants (Deutsche Telekom and TTW) had participated successfully in 
the British auctions. Moreover, Deutsche Telekom and Telecom Italia, respectively 
German and Italian national incumbents, were bidding for domestic UMTS licences. Thus, 
some of the world’s largest operators were looking to expand their 3G presence across 
Europe609. Entry into France too would help create pan-European 3G networks610. Foreign 
operators could apply their mobile sector expertise and financial muscle like the domestic 
operators. None, however, possessed network operations in France apart from Telefonica,
604 Fabius 6 /6 /0 0
605 The ART’s policy-making was criticised for its lack o f democratic legitimacy by MPs frustrated with their 
lack of policy involvement after the licensing method had been decided. Carrez,G and Auberger,P 
“Assemblee nationale 3eme SEANCE DU VENDREDI 20 OCTOBRE 2000”
606 Before licences were allocated, RossiJ and SoissonJP “Assemblee nationale 1“ SEANCE DU 3 MAI 
2000” questioned the doubts over which licensing method to apply, as did subsequendy, Goulard,F 
“Assemblee nationale 2e SEANCE DU 30 MAI 2000”, who questioned why the selection process was not 
being debated and decided in Parliament
607 Binmore and Klemperer 2002, fn.49, p.C90
608 ART 7/00, ‘Interview de Jean-Michel Hubert a Radiocom & Telecoms Magazine”
609 HenniJ and Mabille,P 30/5/2000, “France Telecom finalise sa plus importante acquisition avec le 
britannique Orange”, Les Echos
610 HenniJ 7 /6 /00 , “Quatre favoris pour quatre licences”, Les Echos
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and, excluding Vodafone’s participation through Vivendi/SFR611, none had the high-level 
political links of the three French incumbents.
The introduction o f 3G in France thus saw a range of diverse actors interact with the ART 
from the start. Key resources were dispersed among several, mainly domestic, participants, 
hence, not part o f a single influential group.
III. Preferences
The section shows that, although key elected actors had divergent preferences from the 
regulator’s on 3G licensing, the ART had some influential support from the outset, 
consistent with Type II autonomy. Following the ART’s February 1999 consultation, the 
different 3G preferences of resourceful actors emerged. 2G network incumbents indicated 
their convergence over the regulator’s preferred selection process of a modest fixed-fee 
‘beauty contest* for four licences. After realising that auctions could determine higher 
licensing revenues than a beauty contest, senior Government officials, including the 
Telecoms Minister with the powers to determine policy, focussed on the Finance Ministry’s 
priority o f improving state finances.
ART preferences emerged through its consultation. It asked policy participants to identify 
solutions for key issues drawn from the CCR’s work. Several complex spectrum-related 
considerations were raised, such as the allotment o f frequency bands, causing the initial 
debate to be deemed ‘highly technical*612. Yet, the ART took a rather open stance on the 
more technical and commercial aspects, effectively delegating work to respondents. It was 
much more definite on licensing issues instead, leading to divergence with key elected 
officials.
So, to help spread 3G, the ART asked how operators would address the limited 3G 
network coverage in the short-term vis-a-vis 2G networks’ extensiveness, enquiring about 
likely service provision, 2G and 3G network complementarity, and the scope for adopting
611 Thum 2003, p.265
612 Thatcher 2005, p.106
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roaming conditions613. French operators risked particularly expensive coverage 
requirements given a more dispersed population than other EU countries614.
Operators’ likely reluctance to provide extensive coverage across France, especially to 
unprofitable areas, could hardly be ignored, given the ART statutory objective o f providing 
access to services regardless o f geography or users. Similarly, the regulator enquired about 
the different types of participants expected to enter the market (network operators, service 
providers, content providers) and what relationships they were likely to build; relevant to 
the formal objective of promoting ‘competition in users’ interest’.
However, the ART revealed its actual preferences clearly, stating the number o f operators it 
was ‘suitable’ to let into the market, and ‘proposing’ a licensing procedure which would 
allow it to select the 3G operators among licence applicants615. The two objectives implied 
gaining control over market entry and structure, determining competition levels and who 
the ART would regulate. So, although the authority to license 3G spectrum, the key 
‘physical’ asset, was the Telecoms Minister’s, by achieving its preferences, the regulator 
would effectively determine how the Minister exercised his formal powers.
The preferences were not wholly consistent with the ART’s formal duties. Licensing four 
3G operators maximum meant limiting entry to one more operator than the 2G market. 
Thus, the regulator precluded the possibility o f issuing five or more licences, unlike some 
other EU countries616. Besides promoting more new entry, and hence greater competition, 
licensing a fifth operator might have helped fulfill the ART’s geographical statutory 
objective and that of developing employment, innovation and competitiveness too617.
The CCR had recommended the frequency blocks for the aggregate terrestrial supply o f 3G 
services in France - the same as those adopted in the UK618, and suggested the amount of 
frequencies to be allocated per operator619. The 1996 French telecoms law set out that the 
number o f licences issued could be limited based on technical constraints deriving from the 
scarcity o f frequencies620. Yet, while four licences was an implicit choice given the
613 ART 2/99, ss.I.2-3 and II.3.2-3.3
614 Curien 2002, p.175
615 ART 2/99, points 19,29 respectively
616 Tables 3-4, Borgers and Dustmann 2003
617 see ch.3
618 2*15MHz symmetrically coupled in the 1920-1980MHz/2110-2170MHz paired frequency bands and 
5MHz in either the 1900-1920MHz or the 2010-2025MHz unpaired frequency bands. ART 2/99, Point 22
619 2x15MHz of paired spectrum plus 5MHz o f unpaired spectrum
620 see ch.3
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recommended frequencies per operator, the CCR had not explicitly stated the number of 
operators it felt should be licensed.
The ART did not raise questions about recommended bands potentially leaving 15MHz of 
spare frequencies unused621, nor did it question whether frequency blocks could be split 
differently. Thus the regulator did not verify whether 3G operators would have been 
constrained had less spectrum been allocated per licence, to allow for an additional 
operator. It did not consider that larger spectrum licences be reserved for new entrants, 
with smaller licences for established operators, as had been decided in the UK.
Licensing four 3G operators entailed new entry. However, competition was not the ART’s 
priority. The law allowing the number o f licences to be limited for technical constraints 
also stated that frequency allocation had to ensure effective competition622 - other EU 
countries allotting the same frequency bands issued more 3G licences. Limiting the number 
o f licences was prioritised over the formal competition objective, aiding ART discretion to 
protect domestic operators from foreign entry through the licensing method623. Thus the 
regulator interpreted its vague formal objectives selectively to pursue its preference o f 
determining the entry of maximum four 3G operators.
The ART’s central and most debated preference related, nonetheless, to its favoured 3G 
licensing selection process. The article in the law stating that the number of licences issued 
could be limited given technical constraints due to spectrum scarcity also indicated that, in 
such instances, the ART proposed terms and conditions governing licensing procedures to 
the Telecoms Minister. The ART ‘envisaged to propose’ a ‘beauty contest’, also 
recommended by the CCR instead of an auction624, as the method to allocate 3G spectrum 
licences625. The ART was therefore proposing to extend its discretionary power beyond the 
formal provision allowing it to evaluate licence applicants on the Minister’s behalf626.
The ART had the statutory duty to publish its reasons for the selection procedure 
undertaken and for applicants licensed627. Yet, adopting a beauty contest meant that the
621 ART 2/99, Points 18-19
622 see ch.3
623 Thatcher 2005, p. 106; Renault,M-C and Visseyrias,M 19/5/00, “'Que la France n'ait pas de reflexe 
nationaliste”” Le Figaro
624 CCR 9/98, para.7.2
625 Barroux 23/2 /99
626 see ch.3
627 ibid
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agency was assuming the power to vet licensees, by applying ‘objective’ selection criteria 
which it decided628, however vague629, after operators ‘qualified’ according to other criteria 
it identified630. Therefore the regulator would select operators among those that had not 
been excluded because of its qualifying criteria. The ART suggested several selection 
criteria including time-limited coverage requirements, minimum service quality levels, and 
the financial outlay for the access and use of 3G frequencies.
So, the regulator’s proposal comprised its preferred licensing method which, if formally 
adopted, would allow it to evaluate applications on the Minister’s behalf and establish 
licensees according to its published criteria but with enormous control over the choice631. If  
the Government agreed, the ART would control the whole chain of 3G entry. Indeed, with 
applicants paying the same fixed ‘administrative’ entry fee, if more operators applied than 
licences were available, by evaluating applicants on the Minister’s behalf, the agency’s 
authority would include deciding between domestic and foreign operators632. The method 
was unlike the UK’s policy to auction licences, which made the economic evaluation of 
licences by individual applicants the only criterion for entering the market633.
Initially, the ART’s key preferences were largely unopposed. Most respondents agreed on 
allocating maximum four licences. Two specified that, initially, three licences were 
preferable634. One was former monopoly, France Telecom635. Only two respondents felt a 
smaller spectrum band was sufficient, allowing more for new entrants. Indeed, only about a 
year after responses had been submitted, did the chief o f the multinational conglomerate
528 ART 2/99 point 29. Operators would have to comply with the 1996 law duties, distinctly from 3G 
selection criteria. LOI n°96-659, Art.L.33-1.—I for the eighteen dudes that applied to all licensed PTOs
629 Borgers and Dustmann 2003, p.247, indicate how one criterion would be “the contribution which the 
project makes to the multimedia mobile telephony market and...to the development o f the information 
society in France”. ART 2000, Decision 00-835, p.26
630 The regulator first raised two ‘qualifying’ criteria: i) applicants with 2G licences should be allowed to apply 
for 3G licences - ultimately omitted, thus allowing 2G operators to apply, ii) cross-shareholdings of separate 
applicants was not permissible - retained. It was agreed 3G competitors should be separate entities. 3G 
licences had to be allocated to “real competitors”. Several argued that those owning over 25% of a 3G 
operator should not own a competitor’s shares, which applied to 2G operators. ART 2/99, 9/99; points 26- 
27
631 It is worth reminding that the Government licensed 2G public telecoms operators in France before the 
ART was created
632 Le Monde 15/4/00
633 For discussions on auctions versus beauty contests: Curien 2002; Cartelier,L 3/2003 “Auctions Versus 
Beauty Contests: The Allocation o f UMTS Licences in Europe”, Annals o f Public and Cooperative 
Economics, Vol.74, pp.63-85; Cohen,E 2004, “Regulation et procedures d’encheres: les discussions sur les 
choix d’attribution” pp.87-93 in (ed.) Frison Roche,M-A, “Regies et pouvoirs dans les systemes de 
regulation”, Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz
634 ART 9/99, p.26
635 HenniJ and Mabille,P 26/5/00, “Feux croises contre Fattribution d’une cinquieme licence”, Les Echos
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Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux publicly propose five licences636, which Cegetel and Bouygues 
publicly opposed637.
Given the high costs of creating 3G networks, operators were concerned that five licences 
would be sold, yielding lower economic rents than with four. Secondly, they argued that 
fewer frequencies per operator would make delivering high-speed innovative services 
technically harder638. So, the regulator received significant support over the amount of 
frequencies it proposed for each eventual 3G operator, directly influencing the number of 
licences639.
Even more crucially for the ART, which would select the 3G entrants, an overwhelming 
majority agreed with the beauty contest proposal640. All respondents thought that auctions 
would raise the price of licences, hence o f entry, enormously. In support of Curien’s claim 
that the expected value, or price, of a licence constituted the main issue in France’s 3G 
policy rather than the selection procedure641, the “negative experiences” of auctions abroad 
were raised. The maximisation of Government revenues was surmised as the only basis for
642auctions .
Since industry actors wanted to minimise costs, they supported the ART’s preferred 
allocation process too to avoid making the financial evaluation o f spectrum the only 
determinant. Spectrum rarity meant bidding for 3G spectrum against powerful competitors 
could prove very expensive. The unpredictability o f auctions for a highly valued, rare 
resource was undesirable compared to a fixed fee established by public authorities.
Only one consultation contributor had reservations about a beauty contest643. Fearful of 
protectionism and national bias, only months later did the Chief Executive of Germany’s 
incumbent operator Deutsche Telekom raise doubts about the likelihood that French 
regulatory authorities would award foreign candidates a licence; an auction was the most
636 ibid; Pons,F. 26 /5 /00 , “Mobiles: l'inconnu du cinquieme element. Christian Pierret hesite a attribuer une 
cinquieme licence UMTS”, Liberation
637 Henni and Mabille 26/5/00; Barjonet,C. 26 /5/00, “Licences UMTS: Martin Bouygues met la pression 
maximale”, Les Echos; HenniJ 30/5/00, “UMTS: les operateurs mobiles opposes a l’attribution d’une licence 
supplementaire”, Les Echos
638 ibid
639 ART 9/99, points 17-18. It also incurred consensus over the early release of blocked frequencies, and 
allocating the spectrum primarily to PTOs; point 23
640 ibid. p.30
641 Curien 2002, p.151
642 ART 9/99 p.31
643 ibid, p.30
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“fair and transparent system”644. Instead senior executives o f the three French mobile 
incumbents F-T, SFR and Bouygues, indicated their convergence on a beauty contest right 
after the consultation’s publication645, strengthening the consensus surrounding the ART.
Thus the ART received exceptional industry support, particularly from the players best- 
placed to deliver 3G in France fast, given established 2G network operations and market 
knowledge. Given the overwhelming support for a beauty contest fixing entry costs, only 
the possible selection criterion of a financial outlay for access and use of frequencies 
proved highly unpopular. Referring to the drawbacks of auctions, respondents objected to 
candidates evaluating financial contributions to be made. Fees should be fixed at 
“acceptable” levels to avoid hindering the development of 3G. Most preferred to make 
annual licence payments as for 2G646. Opposing auctions and attempting to minimise 
licence fees shows how candidates wanted to acquire 3G spectrum as cheaply as possible.
The regulator appeared on track to fulfill its preferences nonetheless, seemingly incurring 
Type III autonomy647. The overall agreement over a beauty contest and allocating four 
licences suggested that preference fulfillment depended on the regulator preserving 
consensus. A variety of industry players possessing 2G networks, financial muscle, political. 
and media connections, international experience and technical expertise, supported the 
ART’s priorities.
However, the considerably different implications for state finances, o f licensing based on 
the process and conditions promoted by the regulator vis-a-vis auctions, caused divergence 
with the formally powerful Government, creating a Type II preference scenario. The 
preference triggered the possibility that the ART would be obstructed by existing formal 
constraints, unlike Oftel in the UK.
Industry Secretary Pierret, the Minister in charge of telecoms who possessed licensing 
powers, indicated auctions were not to be excluded one day after the ART had published 
consultation findings648. While auctions were not “a French tradition”, Pierret claimed that
644 RenaultJVIC and Visseyrias,M. 19/5/00, “'Que la France n'aitpas de reflexe nationaliste1”, Le Figaro
645 Musi,G. 19/11/99, “Les operateurs redoutent les couts de la 3e generation de mobiles”, La Tribune
646 ART 9/99, point 30. In January 2001, the ART’s Chairman reiterated this issue’s importance given the 
downturn o f the telecoms/internet market and the Government’s decision on licence prices, “Interview de 
Jean-Michel Hubert publiee dans Les Echos le 18 janvier 2001”
647 see ch.l; Nordlinger
648 Le Figaro 12/10/99 “Mobiles: futures licences aux encheres en France”; Les Echos, 13/10/99, “L'ART 
prepare l'arrivee du telephone mobile du futur et de la boucle locale radio”
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a “reflexion” was taking place. The implication was improving the state’s finances through 
the one-off ‘sale’ o f the unique and highly valuable spectrum ‘asset’ for 3G service 
provision. Different reports indicated that while maximising revenue was desirable, a 
compromise method was being considered instead of pure auctions, given the doubts 
about the ability of French 2G incumbents entering the market on a solely financial 
criterion, unlike powerful foreign rivals649.
Pierret nonetheless reiterated in a television interview the next day that his “preference was 
for auctions, although it had not been laid down”, the issue had to be considered in-depth, 
and was “an open debate”650. He reiterated the possibility of auctions one-month-and-a- 
half later, advocating their “advantageous transparency and best evaluation method for the 
rare spectrum”651, despite recognising the concern that 2G incumbents might have been 
excluded. Long after the licensing method was decided, Pierret stated again, in Parliament, 
that he had been a, “partisan”, proponent of auctions652.
Thus, a Government Minister with rule-setting powers653 o f a different political orientation 
from that who had appointed ART Chairman Hubert654, formerly Secretary-General and 
Finance Director during Jacques Chirac’s mayor-ship of Paris and his close ally655, did not 
share the regulator’s and key industry actors’ preferred licensing method. The French 
Government’s reaction to the British auctions and the prospects of German auctions 
marked the distance with the regulator, causing the ART’s formal 7th March 2000 proposal 
to be reviewed, as later revealed by Hubert656.
For newly appointed Finance Minister Laurent Fabius, the prospect o f raising finance 
became more important than the licensing procedure given the opportunity to address 
macroeconomic concerns, particularly increasing France’s pension funds reserves657 and 
reducing public debt658. Pierret had disclosed to a newspaper before then that a new
649 Les Echos 12/10/99, “Le gouvemement veut mettre aux encheres les licences de 3e generation”
650 Les Echos 14/10/99, “Christian Pierret reaffirme sa preference pour un systeme d’encheres”
651 Les Echos 30/11/99, Christian Pierret: 'Le degroupage sera introduit d'ici a 2001'”
652 Pierret,C “Assemblee nationale 1« SEANCE DU 20 OCTOBRE 2000”, p.7262
653 ART 18-19/11/99, “Intervention de Jean-Michel Hubert, President de 1'Autorite de regulation des 
telecommunications, aux Journees intemationales de l’ldate”
654 The ART started operating start-1997, during Alain Juppe’s centre-right Government
655 La Tribune 6 /1 /97 , “Le gouvemement designe les membres de 1'Autorite de regulation”; Le Point 
1/2 /97 , “Etat-major”
656 ART 11/5/00
657 Fabius,L. 16/5/00 “DECLARATION DU GOUVERNEMENT sur le debat d’orientation budgetaire”
658 Maussion et al 5 /6 /0 0
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scheme imposing both an entry fee and an annual licence charge was being considered659. 
There was, nevertheless, the awareness that the sum collected by the British Government 
was heavily influenced by the auctioning process.
Fabius first mentioned the possibility o f auctioning French licences in early May 2000660; a 
week after the British auctions had ended. With the apparent support of most Government 
members661, Fabius informed the Assemblee nationale that the Government would decide 
the selection procedure within six weeks. This immediately led certain centre-right MPs to 
question Fabius, and a week later Pierret, over the decision-making slowness662; particularly 
the hesitation over auctions to the detriment o f public finances.
One MP who challenged the centre-left Government’s hesitancy over auctions, asking if 
they would take a decision based on ideology, was former Telecoms Minister, Francois 
Fillon663, who had belonged to the centre-right Government that had appointed Hubert. 
Without referring to the ART, in Parliament, Fillon, stressed the important financial impact 
that selling 3G licences would have on state revenues, but questioned how a left-wing 
Government that opposed liberalisation would consider auctions664. One report claimed 
that he welcomed a beauty contest the following month665, after the left-wing Government 
took the decision.
Based on then state-controlled F-T’s acquisition of Orange, comprising its UK 3G licence, 
another centre-right MP challenged Fabius over not opting for auctions assertively around 
one month later. The MP asked why, if the Minister “authorised” that F-T purchase the 
UK mobile operator which had spent FF40bn (£4.095bn666) on a 3G licence, the price o f a 
3G licence in France should be any lower, benefiting operators’ shareholders667. Thus, 
some centre-right MPs put pressure on the divergent centre-left Government to act against 
the key ART preference too.
659 Jakubyszyn and Enguerand 15/4/00
660 Fabius,L“Assemblee nationale l e SEANCE D U  3 MAI 2000”, p.3669
661 Jakubyszyn,C and Malingre,V 13/5/00 “La France se divise sur rattribution de licences de telephone par 
encheres”, Le Monde
662 RossiJ (former Industry Minister, Thatcher 1999, p.215, fn.58), SoissonJP. ibid; also Fillon,F. “Assemblee 
nationale l e SEANCE DU 10 MAI 2000”
663 Thatcher 1999, p.158, fn.67. Fillon is French Prime Minister under President Nicolas Sarkozy at the time 
of writing
664 Fillon 10/5/00
665 BezatJ-M 8 /6 /0 0  “Les parlementaires se familiarisent avec le dossier de la telephonie”, Le Monde
666 Borgers and Dustmann 2002, p.84
667 Goulard 30/5/00
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Preferences thus revealed a division between influential participants but, from the start, the 
regulator was not isolated. While facing opposition from key elected officials, industry 
actors, especially influential 2G incumbents, were convergent.
IV. Process
This section examines how the ART risked forgoing its preferences, particularly the beauty 
contest, once divergence with the Government controlling key powers to license and to 
finalise the allocation process emerged. Rather than acting upon its preferences directly, 
which it could not do, the regulator shifted the Government’s position, consistent with 
Type II autonomy668. It is shown that, despite the formal constraint of being a primarily 
advisory body, the ART exploited other resources, namely a clear understanding of policy 
choices, convergent preferences with influential domestic industry actors and informal ties 
and exchanges, to present key Government Ministers with a convincing case. Besides 
exploiting convergent influential actors, the regulator used persuasion, so that the 
Government accepted a compromise, and fulfilled its preferences.
The ART laid the ground to fulfill its preferences between February 1999 and June 2000, 
when Finance Minister Fabius announced the Government’s decision on the terms o f 3G 
licensing; a decision that was not conflictual, but consensual669. By the time Industry 
Secretary Pierret stated that the Government was considering 3G spectrum auctions 
towards end-1999, the regulator had ascertained the arguments for a beauty contest and 
commanded decisive support from influential established industry actors. Without the 
necessary formal authority, such key resources would be exploited thereafter to ‘induce’ a 
beauty contest.
Persuading the Government to adopt preferred policy terms began soon after the 
consultation ended and Pierret made his preference for an auction known. The regulator 
held several private discussions with the Minister670, to find a compromise671. To overcome 
statutory constraints, the ART pursued its preferences by exploiting information at its
668 Consistently with Type II autonomy, Rourke 1965 describes how in the 1950s in the US, where formally 
independent regulatory agencies were first established, “it was believed these agencies should emphasise 
persuasion rather than coercion in the exercise of their authority”, p. 189 “Bureaucracy and public opinion”, 
in “Bureaucratic power in national politics”, Eds. Rourke,FE., Litde, Brown and Company
669 Telephone interview: Jean-Michel Hubert, ART Chairman 1997-2003, 7/5/2009
670 ibid
671 Les Echos 13/10/99 “L'ART prepare l'arrivee du telephone mobile du futur et de la boude locale radio”
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disposal and its better understanding of issues than the Government, selecting supportive 
sectoral analyses. The UMTS Forum’s report number 5 mentioned in the ART’s 
consultation had recommended the minimum spectrum requirement upheld by the CCR, 
and equated to a maximum of four licences672.
ART Chairman Hubert publicly explained the case that he wanted the Minister to heed a 
month after publishing consultation findings, at a conference on the growth o f French and 
European mobile markets673. Hubert provided a rationale for a beauty contest largely based 
on the CCR report and the ART consultation. Similarly to when the ART consultation was 
launched, Hubert publicly recognised the “determinant” effect that Secretary Pierret’s 
decision on the licence allocation process would bear on the market’s likely structure. 
Unable to determine policy terms, Hubert openly called on the Minister to assess 
advantages and disadvantages of the two methods carefully. Yet, the regulator markedly 
promoted the beauty contest preference.
To persuade Government Ministers that auctions were against their interests, Hubert 
started by offering his own interpretation o f key issues674. According to him, traditional 
justifications supporting auctions could be summarised in two points: their “reputed” 
transparency, “supposedly avoiding multiple appeals over candidate selection” and; that 
“they should lead to a better valuation of spectrum”675.
Hubert thus worked to instil uncertainty676 about the merits o f auctions among Ministers, 
unlike in the ART’s initial consultation when it had avoided mentioning auctions. While 
echoing publicly available CCR recommendations677 for a beauty contest in both of its 
documents, the regulator first presented the consensus over the shortcomings of auctions 
in its summary of responses678 and, as the Minister’s preference emerged, compared them 
unfavourably. So, the ART exploited selectively inter-agency collaboration679, to portray
672 “Minimum spectrum demand per public terrestrial UMTS operator in the initial phase”, 1998. UMTS 
Forum is an international telecoms association promoting 3G mobile systems and services comprising 
telecoms operators, manufacturers and regulators
673 ART 18-19/11/99
674 see ch.l; Nordlinger
675 ART 18-19/11/99
676 see ch.l; Nordlinger
677 ART 16/12/98, “L'Autorite de regulation des telecommunications rend public le rapport de la 
Commission consultative des radiocommunications sur l'introduction de l'UMTS en France ”
678 Without identifying contributors
679 Bardach 1998 states: “not all forms...threaten autonomy equally.. .Agencies will therefore attempt not just 
to eschew autonomy-threatening relationships but to recast necessary relationships in their least threatening 
form”, pp. 180-1
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auctions as an imperfect licensing method and make a beauty contest sound more suitable 
and appealing680.
The case for a beauty contest was, nonetheless, developed non-confrontationally. Hubert 
highlighted the convergent consultation responses during his November speech, indicating 
the overall consensus with sectoral actors. Consistent with Type II autonomy, Hubert 
exploited convergent actors from the start, pointing out how, despite shared optimism over 
3G, contributors had strongly warned about the economic and market-related risks o f 
auctions681.
The possibility that escalating bids could exclude French 2G operators was raised, subtly 
‘reinforcing’682 the relationship with key convergent industry actors but also appealing to 
shared national loyalties with the Government683. Indeed, while expressing the auction 
preference subsequently, Pierret also indicated that the decision should not lead to 2G 
incumbents being excluded from the 3G market684.
Arguing that the ART could not ignore the consensus on the licensing method best 
adapted to France685, Hubert publicly suggested the Government should not do so either, 
months before submitting the proposal the regulator was formally entitled to frame. Yet, 
clearer evidence that, while making a case for a beauty contest, confrontation was being 
avoided is that he referred to the preferred licensing method “if  it is retained”686. Hubert 
similarly underplayed divergence with the Government, indicating that a beauty contest 
meant ‘state authorities’ had a better chance to define licensing requirements and manage 
the spectrum, hence that goals were the same but that the agency’s preferences were more 
effective687.
Thus the regulator gained a position o f influence through a resource, the consultation, 
which was not laid down in the 1996 law but was created by the agency, and through the 
CCR’s ‘expert’ report preceding it688. Handling responses, following its interaction and
680 The ART focussed selectively on thirty-seven points compared to about sixty CCR recommendations; 
CCR 9/98, pp.50-60
681 ART 11/10/99,18-19/11/99
682 see ch.l; Nordlinger
683 ibid
684 Les Echos 30/11/99
685 ART 18-19/11/99
686 ibid (italics added)
687 see ch.l; Nordlinger
688 This included the input o f many ART officials part o f CCR/UMTS
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exchanges within CCR/UMTS, meant that the ART consolidated its 3G policy 
development role with both state and non-state actors. In addition to acquiring useful 
knowledge to make its case, the regulator also knew how much support it had and from 
whom, publicly and privately.
Besides planning to take into account keenly engaged actors’ preferences689, the ART had 
stated that lessons would be leamt from consultation responses in order to submit 
proposals to the Minister, echoing claims that: “procedural rules can cause agencies to 
generate the outcomes desired by the principals”690. Yet, while acting as though there were 
shared objectives, the regulator opposed rather than generating the principal Minister’s 
desired 3G outcome.
In practice, the ART took control o f the policy, overshadowing formally relevant bodies 
such as the Agence nationale des frequences, and shaped the debate’s direction, creating an 
“issue coalition”691. Indeed, when announcing his interest in auctions, after the ART had 
advocated a beauty contest sustained by industry, Pierret expressed caution over the 
contentious decision despite his formal authority692.
The proposal was presented as an analysis of domestic factors and international 
experiences reflecting “dialogue with other actors” and the “quality o f the debate”693, thus 
conveying the level of consensus that the Minister had to overcome to ignore the ART 
proposal. So, unlike for other agencies, the ART’s “information dependence and 
professional bias” was not “under the control of political overseers”694. Similarly, its budget 
did not determine the extent it could assure itself o f multiple information sources. The 
regulator’s efforts, comprising private discussions with Pierret, had almost ensured that a 
beauty contest would be retained in early 2000695.
Yet, the importance of the ART’s arguments and the highly influential support secured 
showed particularly after Laurent Fabius’ appointment. He seemed intent on exploiting the 
Government’s formal authority to overturn the regulator’s proposal. Following the ART’s
689 ART 2/99, Introduction
690 McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987, pp.244-246; 1989
691 see ch.l; Nordlinger
692 Le Figaro 12/10/99; Les Echos 14/10/99; Les Echos, 30 /11/99
693 “Intervention de Jean-Michel HUBERT, President de 1'Autorite de regulation des Telecommunications a 
la "Semaine des Telecoms" 1/12/1999
694 Noll 1989, p.1279
695 Interview: Hubert; La Tribune 12 /1 /00  “L'Internet rapide, dossier test pour la credibilite de l'ART”; 
Renault^M-C 14/1/00, “Licences: la France repousse les encheres” Les Figaro
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March 2000 submission, the Government asked the ART to “look again” at the number of 
licences to be issued, the licensing procedure, and the contributions expected from 
operators given “the thoroughly unexpected results of the UK auctions”696.
Prime Minister Jospin, previously expecting the adoption of a beauty contest697, was closely 
consulted698. While having to undertake a debate with its majority699, the Government could 
ultimately choose to legislate. Making Ministers comprehend the rationale for a beauty 
contest jointly with 2G incumbents became even more important for the ART.
The regulator continued holding discussions and exploited convergent influential actors 
that started exercising significant public pressure on Government. Ministers’ intention to 
raise considerable sums of money700, altering ART plans, fuelled a concerted campaign 
against auctions by operators. They acted largely through newspapers - in particular, 
Bouygues’ Chairman opposed auctions outspokenly in an interview701 - but also through 
occasional private meetings. The ART kept interacting with all the policy actors702, while 
incumbents’ executives met privately and lobbied the Government703. State-owned F-T’s 
Chairman Michel Bon met Finance Minister Fabius privately in mid-April 2000, when the 
Government was evaluating the ART proposal, including the licensing method to adopt704.
By placing an issue o f mutual concern on the formal agenda705, the ART had ‘empowered’ 
industry actors to assert their views as Fabius and Pierret did not commit to either 
procedure706. Fabius first mentioned auctions in Parliament at start-May, indicating he and 
Pierret would take a decision within six weeks707. Formal arrangements meant that other 
than not publishing the proposal and deciding to legislate separately, it was the 
Government that needed to apply effective persuasion vis-a-vis the regulator. As the 
British and German Finance Ministers pointed out to him, Minister Fabius privately
696 HubertJ-M 29/11/00, “Analysys Conference/Mobility Futures: Competing visions of a 3G 
World/London”
697 Jakubyszyn and Renault 15/4/00
698 see Fabius 6 /6 /0 0  presentation o f the final proposal to Parliament
699 Jakubyszyn and Renault 6 /6 /0 0
700 Maussion,C & Penicon,N 5/5/2000 “'L'Etat ne bradera pas le domaine public'”, Liberation; Fabius 
6/ 6/00
701 Le Monde 10/5/00, “Mortelles encheres dans le telephone”; HenniJ 5 /5 /0 0  “Tolle des professionels des 
telecoms”, Les Echos; Del Jesus,T 3 /3 /00 , “L'UMTS, le tres cher enjeu des futurs telephones mobiles”, La 
Tribune. Also Dague,T 18/5/00, “Un renoncement du gouvernement”, Le Parisien
702 ART 11/5 /00  “L’intervention de Jean-Michel Hubert sur les encheres UMTS”
703 Maussion et al 5/6 /2000
704 Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 14/4/00
705 see ch.l; Nordlinger
706 Fabius 3/5 /00; Pierret,C. “Assemblee nationale 1“ SEANCE DU 10 MAI 2000”
707 Fabius 3 /5 /0 0
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emphasised to Jean-Michel Hubert the exceptional opportunity that 3G spectrum auctions 
represented for potential gains, and hence the difficulty to renounce them708.
Accordingly, the support the ART harnessed from industrially and politically influential 
convergent actors, possibly mobilising more resources than they would have otherwise 
done709, was very important. Their pressure on the Government persisted. The well- 
connected Martin Bouygues, Chairman of the smallest and financially weaker 2G operator, 
publicly argued that auctions would have risked translating into higher consumer prices and 
“killed the market”710, evoking consultation concerns shared by Cegetel and user 
associations711.
Apart from the licence cost, Bouygues estimated 3G network costs between FF20bn and 
FF40bn712. State-owned F-T emphasised a cost per operator around FF30-40bn without 
undergoing an auction713, which, moreover, entailed spending public money. One report 
claimed then F-T Chairman Michel Bon had expressed his reservations to the Prime 
Minister’s office714.
So, despite not having formal powers, the regulator capitalised on a strong policy alliance 
with industry. Being supported by the influential incumbents, whose use of informal 
resources sustained the regulator’s activity, did not stop the ART from pursuing its 
preferences through three weeks of intense private discussions with Fabius715. While 
incumbents campaigned for their industrial interests, the regulator also made occasional 
public statements, raising ‘national interests’ to present a beauty contest as less harmful 
than auctions716. F-T actually prepared for the possibility717. Yet, Jean-Michel Hubert 
considered that French operators lacked the resources to undergo auctions718.
Following a parliamentary statement in mid-May by Minister Pierret that the Government 
was caught between raising finance and assisting French operators to enter the 3G
708 Interview: Hubert
709 see ch.l; Nordlinger
710 Le Monde 10/5/00
711 Henni 5 /5 /00
712 Del Jesus 3/3/00; Dague,T 18 /5 /00  “Telephone mobile: une polemique a 150 milliards”, Le Parisien
713 Dague 18/5/00
7,4 Maussion et al 5/6/2000
715 Interview: Hubert
716 ART 11/5/00; 31/5/01 “UMTS: Le point de vue de l'Autorite”
717 Cherki,M 9 /5 /00  “France Telecom se lancera dans les encheres”, Le Figaro
7,8 Interview: Hubert
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market719, Hubert stated that a financial competition would force incumbents to win a bid 
to survive or become extinct through the expiry o f their licences720. This resonated with 
Bouygues’ argument that, if auctions were adopted, his company would either incur a 
“sudden death” by way o f not winning a licence bid, or a “slow death” due to the difficulty 
of paying the high licence cost expected of auctions721. While wanting to get fair value for 
the rare spectrum, Prime Minister Jospin did not want large firms to be “handicapped” 
either722.
The regulator portrayed auctions as undesirable for a Government aiming to protect 
‘national champions’723, arguing that only the financially most powerful operators would 
obtain licences in several countries if the trend to exploit financially the sale o f 3G 
frequencies via auctions spread across Europe724. Fewer operators competing within 
Europe would entail fewer opportunities for French operators to participate in the 
market725. Suggesting the latter views were taken into account, the previous day, Pierret had 
indicated that the licensing method had to take into account how “French operators in 
particular had to be in a position to present a good offer”, and the final decision would be 
taken in the “national interest”726.
Hubert also capitalised upon the way his preference promoted Pierret’s wish that all 
national users should benefit from 3G727, relating the appeal of collecting potentially 
significant sums to the economic consequences borne by taxpayers, consumers and 
shareholders728. Public discussions of auctions’ economic risks, such as doubling network 
costs and consumers bearing the repercussions, saw the regulator’s ‘enfranchisement’ of 
otherwise indifferent actors, but politically relevant to the Socialist Government. Trade
719 Pierret 10/5/00
720 ART 11/5/00
721 Le Monde 10/5/00
722 Jakubyszyn and Renault 6 /6 /00
723 For more on France’s national champions policy in telecoms, Thatcher 1999; more broadly Zysman 1977 
pp.62-3,89, California University Press
724 See Benzoni,L on the greater concentration in the EU 3G market than in 2G, which much higher fees for 
3G licences - sold at once unlike 2G licences - contributed to, notwithstanding that more 3G licences were 
sold per country. The chances o f failure o f 3G new entrants without 2G networks, or o f the smaller 2G  
operators entering the 3G market, increased. “Concentration, segmentation et fragmentation dans l’lnternet 
mobile”, pp.267-280 in Didier,M and LavezziJ-H’s 2002 report “Enjeux economiques de l’UMTS”, Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique, La Documentation Francaise. In the same report, see Geoffron,P and Pogorel,G 
“Consolidation de l’oligopole europeen des telecommunications”, pp.281-292, for an analysis o f the 
oligopolistic effects o f 3G spectrum licensing across the EU
725 ART 11/5/00
726 Pierret 10/5/00
727 see ch.l; Nordlinger
728 ART 11/5/00
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unions echoed the concerns diffused by the regulator on auctions729. Fearing high 
consumer prices and poor coverage for profitability purposes, trade union officials 
expressed dissent over the state’s ‘abdication’ of “service public” goals730.
Thus, the regulator accumulated support from multiple sources. Influential state and non­
state actors exerted pressure on Socialist Government officials. As the decision 
approached, the Government continued hesitating. Where possible, Hubert intensified his 
persuasive and negotiating efforts, capitalising on the collaboration over the Information 
Society objective the Government committed to as part of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda731. He 
claimed the ART fully adhered to the objective and that the 3G proposal had been 
formulated taking it into account732.
However, given the “value o f the spectrum and the State’s interest”733 noted by Pierret and 
Fabius’ priority of raising substantial sums from 3G licensing734, the regulator suggested 
that a “reasonable solution” was to re-examine the fixed entry fees to be charged and an 
appropriate payment timeframe735, reflecting anticipated revenues.
The regulator’s indication of an upwards review of fees acted as an effective ‘carrot-like 
inducement’ for Ministers, who had no formal obligation to accept it and could have 
introduced new legislation. The regulator indicated that the case for a beauty contest was 
made and that the Government’s preference had been taken into account, consistent with 
Type II autonomy persuasion and negotiation.
Hubert claimed that the ART acted according to its mission to favour market development, 
and that he was willing to clarify anything for the Government, explaining that formal 
duties had been fulfilled but that evaluating the arguments and deciding was for Ministers. 
In practice, agreeing to the enticement meant endorsing the ART’s key preference - the 
beauty contest736.
729 ART 9/99 p.31; Jakubyszyn,C and Malingre,V 13/5/00, “La France se divise sur l'attribution de licences 
de telephone par encheres”, Le Monde
730 Khalfa 18/5/00
731 In March 2000, when the ART submitted its 3G proposal
732 ART 11/5/00
733 Pierret 10/5/00
734 Jakubyszyn and Renault 6 /6 /00 , suggest Fabius strongly favoured auctions; Mabille,P. 5 /5 /00 , 
“Telephone mobile: Bercy ne privilegie pas les encheres mais veut une redevance elevee”, Les Echos; 
Interview: Hubert
735 ART 11/5/00
736 Industry actors opposed high entry fee; not o f direct interest to the regulator
181
Thereafter, while Ministers analysed the regulator’s proposal, convergent 2G incumbents 
put more public and private pressure regarding the negative impact of auctions. Besides 
rejecting the possible allocation of five licences on technical grounds737, which the 
Government considered738 following Suez Lyonnaise’s suggestion739, senior Bouygues and 
Cegetel executives gave interviews strongly contesting the Government’s auction 
preference.
Bouygues’ Chairman threatened legal action, and claimed auctions or high fees were 
incompatible with European legislation; his firm was talking to the European Commission. 
If auctions were adopted, he would “ask the Government what to do”, implying the firm’s 
likely exclusion from the process740. Cegetel’s deputy Director-General, who also headed 
the French Association of private telecoms operators (AFOPT), questioned whether the 
Government’s interest lay in long-term sectoral development or short-term fiscal respite741.
The ART’s argument about the unfavourable financial implications of auctions on national 
operators was especially resonant among elected officials concerned by possible effects on 
state-owned F-T and its strategic management decisions742. The ‘tie’ between MPs and the 
state-controlled former monopoly was subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate, not 
strictly related to 3G policy-making. When a Socialist MP objected to auctions in 
Parliament, a close ally of the Finance Minister in the process of considering the option 
responded that the Government’s role was not to defend the interests of Vivendi 
(Cegetel/SFR) or Bouygues743, without mentioning F-T.
A week before the final decision was taken, Communist MP Claude Billard, part of the 
Socialist Government’s coalition, drew Fabius’ attention to the high cost state-owned F-T 
had undertaken to acquire the whole of UK-based mobile operator Orange744. The former 
monopoly was financially weakened by acquiring Orange for FF283bn (about 41 bn euro) 
in cash and shares, including Orange’s 6.56bn euros outlay for its 3G UK licence745. Billard 
stressed critically that the financial operation led F-T to obtain a 3G UK licence that it had
737 Henni and Mabille 26/5/00; Barjonet 26/5/00; Henni 30/5/00
738 Del Jesus,T 25/5 /00  “Bercy etudie la creation d'une cinquieme licence UMTS”, La Tribune
739 Henni and Mabille 26/5/00; Pons 26 /5 /00
740 Barjonet 26/5/00
741 Henni 30/5/00
742 Jaskubyszyn and Renault, 6 /6 /00
743 Maussion et al 5 /6 /00
744 Billard,C “ASSEMBLEE NAUO NALE - 2e SEANCE DU 30 MAI 2000”
745 Henni and Mabille 30 /5 /00
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been unable to win via auctions, and caused the French State’s shareholding in F-T to fall. 
He thus opposed their adoption in France.
Fabius acknowledged the ambitiousness o f the acquisition746, but justified the move to
make F-T a strategically placed operator long-term, substantiated by the Government’s 
decision to retain about 55% control, “allowing some margin to manoeuvre”747. Still, over 
two-and-a-half months after the ART submitted its proposal, the Minister avoided 
commenting on the selected licensing method.
Thus, the arguments delineated and diffused by the ART through the consultation led to 
the participation of several state and non-state actors with different preferences vis-a-vis 
the regulator’s 3G licensing proposal. Despite lacking powers to determine policy, having 
fully exploited the force o f its arguments, the pressure of preference convergent industry 
actors on the Government and by, ultimately, indicating that fees could be reviewed, the 
ART made it very difficult for Ministers to reject its proposal. Accordingly, this section has 
shown how the regulator pursued its preference by creatine a persuasive case non-
divergent Government’s preference without sacrificing its own, consistent with Type II 
autonomy.
V. Time-length of decision-making
The ART conducted France’s 3G policy from its inception to the licensing of operators. 
The responsibility for framing the proposal for the Telecoms Minister to publish saw the 
agency involved in the period leading to the Government’s decision over licensing terms in 
June 2000. Notwithstanding its involvement since CCR/UMTS discussions, the ART’s 
primary role of licence enforcer and Government advisor meant that, unlike Oftel, it lacked 
powers to set timescales or deadlines other than those regarding compliance obligations748.
The lack of formal instruments to set the decision-making pace, and expedite it when 
necessary, did not stop the agency. Consistent with Type II autonomy, the ART undertook 
a relatively lengthy process, notwithstanding timeframes set by other authorities, which
746 ibid
747 Fabius,L “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - 2e SEANCE DU 30 MAI 2000”
748 see ch.3
confrontationally, exploiting influential convergent actors
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helped it achieve its initial preferences after Government divergence emerged. Despite 
preference divergence and lacking powers to instruct the Government, it showed litde 
haste in line with Nordlinger’s Type II proposition that policy is not undertaken “unless 
and until” divergent actors are persuaded.
By the time the ART launched its February 1999 consultation, the European Union had 
adopted a Decision that Member States: “take all necessary actions in order to allow... 
(the) progressive introduction of the UMTS services...by 1 January 2002 at the latest and 
in particular shall establish an authorisation system...no later than 1 January 2000”749. The 
ART underlined the impact of the decision in its consultation; 1999 would have been used 
to define the terms introducing 3G.
Yet the regulator’s intended timetable indicated that consultation respondents had until 
end-May 1999 to submit documents, a summary o f responses would be published by July 
1999, followed by the submission of its proposal to the Minister in September 1999 and the 
launch of the licensing procedure at an unspecified date during 2000750. Therefore, the ART 
planned from the outset for licensing to occur at a slower pace than decided at the EU 
level, notwithstanding that delivering licences following a calendar similar to EU 
neighbours garnered respondent consensus751. Its slower timetable did not correspond to 
the EU licensing calendar, which was not enacted in practice.
In practice, without formal powers to impose its decision upon interested actors, nor any 
public notice or reason, the ART granted itself a significant extension to examine and 
present the policy expertise collected from thirty-three organisations752. Although the 
licensing timeframe proposed was supported by most respondents753, the summary of 
responses was published in October 1999. So, after granting respondents over three 
months to comment, the ART took three more months than anticipated to assemble and 
disseminate the policy views reinforcing the arguments for its preferences. Furthermore,
749 Decision N o.l28/1999/E C  o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 14 December 1998 on the 
coordinated introduction o f a third-generation mobile and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the 
Community. Art. 3 states: “Member States shall be granted on request an additional implementation period of 
up to 12 months...justifiable by exceptional technical difficulties in achieving the necessary adjustments in 
their frequency plan...filed before 1 January 2000. The Commission shall assess such requests and take a 
reasoned decision within.. .three months”
750 ART 2/99, p .ll
751 ART 11/10/99 “L’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications publie la synthese de la consultation 
publique sur l’introduction de 1TJMTS en France”
752 ibid
753 ART 10/99 p.20, Implementation estimates differed considerably
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after originally stating that it would have been hard to “anticipate long before start-2002”754 
the commercial launch of 3G services, the regulator stated that it was not required “before 
2002 at the earliest”755.
Thus, about six months before the UK auctioned 3G licences, the ART prolonged the 
domestic timetable beyond the Decision o f the European Parliament and the Council, 
which its own Government was bound by too. The agency was already behind its own 
original schedule.
As divergence emerged, it created further delays, seemingly to persuade the Government. 
After outlining the support received over adopting a beauty contest and issuing four 
licences, the regulator claimed it would “formalise” the content o f its proposal to the 
Telecoms Minister756. The statement came one month after the ART had planned to 
submit the proposal to the Minister. Instead the proposal was submitted to the 
Government on 7 March 2000. So, five months after consultation responses were 
published757.
Between the time when consultation responses were published and the proposal’s 
submission, Pierret had revealed his preference for an auction, possibly mixed with 
elements of a beauty contest as in Italy. He raised his divergence with the ART over the 
licensing method and stated that the EU timetable had to be respected758.
However, given the 7 March submission, the ART did not expedite its referral according to 
the EU timetable requiring an authorisation system by 1 January 2000759. By delaying 
submission, the ART did not put pressure on the Government to respect the supranational 
timeframe and hastily endorse its 3G proposal by the start o f 2000 either. Hubert specified 
that the proposal was to be published by the Government, and that the 3G auctions had 
led the latter to re-examine the implications o f the proposed licensing method760. Yet, the 
regulator did not change its preference for a beauty contest or four licences before or after 
its 7 March submission. Thus, submission was not delayed beyond the EU timetable to 
heed the Minister’s 3G preference.
754 ART 2/99, p .ll
755 ART 11/10/99
756 ibid
757 ART 11/5/00
758 Les Echos 30/11/99
759 La Tribune 13 /6 /00  “Licences UMTS, la France se demarque en Europe”
760 ART 11/5/00; 31/5/01
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The Government lacked powers to expedite the policy process prior to the proposal’s 
submission. However, following submission, the Government could reject the licensing 
terms compiled by the regulator, hence the beauty contest, and, potentially, legislate 
specifically, overriding the ART. It did not do so. Ministers did not exercise significant 
public pressure on the regulator to shorten timescales either, despite delays infringing the 
original EU timetable.
Thus, after over a year o f consultations, Ministers evaluated ART arguments. Rather than 
reject the regulator’s position shortly after the conclusion of the British auctions, Fabius 
announced that he and Secretary Pierret would finalise licensing terms within six weeks. 
Moreover, Fabius expressed uncertainty regarding the licence allocation process761 until one 
week before the final statement762, when Pierret conceded auctions were unlikely763 despite 
the opportunity he saw in them.
In the three months after the proposal was submitted, 2G incumbents campaigned publicly 
and privately against auctions. Instead, the ART Chairman met Ministers privately764, and 
made only one public statement reiterating the arguments depicting auctions unfavourably 
compared to beauty contests. So the regulator used the additional time to make its case.
Furthermore, when indicating that licence fees could be revised to assuage the Government 
and shift the latter’s preferences towards a beauty contest, as it eventually did, the regulator 
stated that the payment timeframe required some elaboration765. Thus the agency avoided 
hastening Government Ministers again.
After hearing separate views, including o f a private consultancy firm, Fabius himself 
shortened the six-week period he had announced to decide 3G licensing terms. So, albeit 
with higher entry fees than originally planned by the ART, which expressed “appreciation 
over constructive dialogue”766, the Government adopted the beauty contest and four 
licences the ART wanted.
761 Fabius 16 /5 /00
762 Fabius 30 /5 /00
763 Penicaut^N 1/6 /00 , “Nouveaux mobiles: les encheres s'eloignent” Liberation; Le Monde 6 /6 /0 0
764 ART 31/5/01
765 ibid
766 ART 6 /6 /00 , “L1 Autorite se felicite de l'ouverture prochaine du marche de telephonie mobile de troisieme 
generation”
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The Minister indicated the significance of the time-dimension as he stated that after a 
“careful examination, the ART’s proposal appears to (the Government) as the most 
judicious...based on the arguments and in-depth analysis we wish to retain the...method 
recommended by the ART”767. After informing Parliament, Fabius substantiated the ART’s 
persuasiveness by presenting precisely the arguments raised repeatedly by the agency and 
preference convergent actors. Aside from the Government’s powers to set licence fees, 
Fabius stressed the hard choice between protecting the state’s property rights, not selling 
them off, and penalising consumers and operators768.
To shift the Government’s preference and accommodate higher fees while retaining a 
beauty contest meant that the ART had to modify licensing terms. Thus to achieve its 
preferences without having decisive formal powers, the regulator applied forbearance and 
prolonged the process. It integrated higher beauty contest fees in its proposal, instead of 
forcing the Government to legislate specifically769. The new ‘proposed’ terms, including 
fees and licensee requirements770, were formally published over two months later771.
Having secured the adoption o f its two priorities and despite being almost eight months 
behind the original EU requirement of having a licensing procedure in place by 1 January 
2000, the regulator was still not rushing changes. It felt that candidates needed six months 
to submit applications772. In practice, extending the decision-making timeframe negatively 
affected the Government’s preference, without preventing the regulator from fulfilling its 
preferences.
767 ibid
768 Mabille,P and Madelaine,N 7 /6 /00 , “UMTS: Un compromis qui devrait favoriser les operateurs 
nationaux”, Les Echos, reported that this did not appeal to elected officials who viewed the procedure as an 
unsatisfactory compromise compared to auctions. Pogorel,G 2003, “Regulation and Competition - radio 
spectrum policy and management, a turning point?” Communications and Strategies 49, pp.109-117, indicates 
that the debate on whether spectrum should be considered and managed as part o f the public domain, or 
whether private ‘property rights’ should be increasingly allocated, is ongoing
769 ART “Decision n°00-835 de 1’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 28 juillet 2000 
proposant au ministre charge des telecommunications les modalites et les conditions d’attribution des 
autorisations pour l’introduction en France metropolitaine des systemes mobiles de troisieme generation”; 
ART 24/7 /00  “Interview de Jean-Michel Hubert a Radiocom & Telecoms Magaaine”
770 Comprising coverage, quality of service, competition. Requirements included that 3G licensees with 2G 
networks could not discriminate against operators without 2G infrastructures. The ART established a 
candidate points-allocation system reflecting three criteria groupings (technical, commercial and financial)
771 For selection procedure details, ART 18/8 /00  “Annexe a la decision n°00-835 de 1’Autorite de regulation 
des telecommunications proposant au ministre charge des telecommunications les modalites et les conditions 
d’attribution des autorisations pour l’introduction en France metropolitaine des systemes mobiles de 
troisieme generation”. The Government expected the call for applicants by end-June and the deadline for 
applications by end-2000 (Fabius 6/6 /00; Tiche 8, Chronologie et calendrier’). The ART finalised revised 
terms in end-July, published them and the call for applicants mid-August, ‘proposing’ the submission o f  
applications by 31 January 2001. Both indicated 30 June 2001 as the latest the Minister would issue licences. 
Ministers did not block the ART’s terms
772 HenniJ 7 /6 /00  “La nouvelle generation de mobiles en cinq questions”, Les Echos
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VI. Outcomes
When the French Government finalised the terms allocating four 3G licences by beauty 
contest, thus adopting the ART’s key policy preferences, it priced each licence at FF32.5bn 
(4.95bn euros773), for a total o f FF130bn (19.8bn euros). This was almost nine times the 
ART’s March 2000 proposed licence fees of FF15bn for the four operators774. The 
Government established that candidates would pay half the fees, in equally split amounts, 
during the first two years of their fifteen-year long licences, with the outstanding amounts 
equally spread over the remaining thirteen years. Having indicated to the Government the 
possibility o f higher fees, a concession not affecting the ART’s preference consistent with 
Type II autonomy, Hubert avoided commenting on the sums until after the January 2001 
beauty contest, finding them “high but reasonable”775.
Yet, delays coinciding with the Government’s wish to revise licence fees upwards saw 
French and international consortia expected to compete776 gradually withdraw. By mid- 
January 2001, less than two weeks before the applications deadline, Hubert claimed that the 
candidates would have been, at least, as many as the licences to compete for777. Instead, 
worsening market conditions, reflecting the rapid ‘burst o f the internet bubble*, made the 
revised licence fees unattractive.
The financial strain led French candidates and likely licensees, the Suez-Telefonica pairing 
and 2G incumbent Bouygues778, to pull out respectively on 24 and 31 January. Only two 
applicants remained, incumbents F-T and SFR, which contrasted with twelve other EU 
countries that, by end-January 2001, had allocated 3G licences. Excluding Poland’s three, 
France was the only country that had not allocated four licences779. At first, the ART 
argued that the duopoly situation, arisen before applications had been examined, had no 
impact on the procedure from a legal viewpoint780. Then, after beauty contest bids by F-T 
and SFR were accepted at end-May 2001781, the ART proposed that the Government
773 Cartelier 2003, p.79, claims the fee was based on British licence prices
774 ART 31/5/01
775 ART 24/7/00; 31/5/01
776 HenniJ 7 /6 /0 0  “Quatre favoris pour quatre licences”, Les Echos
777 ART 18/01/01 in Les Echos
778 Curien 2002, Cartelier 2003
779 ART 31/1/01, “Conference de presse UMTS le 31 janvier 2001”
780 ART 31/1/01, “Cloture de l’appel a candidatures pour Fattribution des licences de troisieme generation 
mobile Commentaires de 1’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications”
781 ART 31/5/01, “UMTS: Results o f the allocation procedure for 3rd generation mobile metropolitan 
licences in France - ART’s point o f view”. The two licences were valid for 15 years from the ministerial 
decree issued on 18 July 2001
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launch a second round of bids by the first half of 2002 at the latest to favour 
competition782.
The regulator recommended that Ministers dramatically review the timetable for fee 
instalments for existing and potential 3G licensees too783. Subsequendy, the management of 
Vivendi, SFR’s holding company, threatened not to pay the first required FF4bn (619mln 
euros) instalment of the licence fee on 30 September, bolstering the regulator’s view and 
‘blackmailing’ the Government784. Similarly, Didier Quillot, Orange France (F-T) Director- 
General, requested the suspension of fee instalments for 2002 until licence terms for future 
3G candidates were drawn. Ultimately, Ministers Fabius and Pierret compromised their 
original preference much further by reducing the 3G licence fee from 4.95bn to 619mln 
euros785. The measures the ART advocated, a second round of bids by start-2002 and 
attributing the remaining two licences through a beauty contest786, saw only Bouygues 
submit an application, for which it was allocated a 3G licence one year later787, thus 
replicating the operators competing in the 2G market. The allocation of a fourth 3G 
licence was still being discussed late in 2008, with the regulator advocating that it be 
attributed to a new entrant788. In January 2009, Prime Minister Francois Fillon announced 
that the French Government considered it urgent to allocate a fourth 3G licence, reserved 
for a new entrant, through a further beauty contest789.
782 This was earlier than what Hubert originally suggested to the parliamentary Finance commission. 
“Assemblee natdonale - Commission des finances, de l’economie generale et du plan Compte rendu n°48 - 
Audition de M. Jean-Michel Hubert, President de 1'Autorite de regulation des telecommunications (ART), sur 
l'attribution des licences de telephonie mobile (UMTS)” 2/5/2001
783 ART 31/5/01 The ART advised that the Government maintain the first annuity corresponding to one- 
quarter o f the licence fee (FF8.125 billion) but lower the second year's payment and those o f the following 
four years to a level similar to that operators paid for 2G frequencies usage. The remaining dues would, 
hence, be spread over the rest o f the licence duration
784 HenniJ and Mabille,P 2 /10/01 “UMTS: le conflit financier tourne a l’impasse politique”, Les Echos; 
Girard,L 2/10/01 “SFR, filiale de Vivendi Universal, refuse de payer sa licence UMTS”, Le Monde
785 Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 16/10/2001, “Le gouvemement annonce une 
revision des modalites d'attribution des licences UMTS”. In November, the Finance Ministry launched a 
second round for UMTS applications, informing that besides the 619 million euros, licensees would pay a 
proportional charge equivalent to 1% of turnover; MINEFI 30/11/01 “Appel a candidatures UMTS”. 
Licence duration was extended to 20 years
786 ART “Decision n°01-1202 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 14 decembre 
2001 proposant au ministre charge des telecommunications les modalites et les conditions d’attribution 
d’autorisations pour l’introduction en France metropolitaine des systemes mobiles de troisieme generation”
787 Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran^aise 12/12/02, which also saw SFR and F-T’s licences modified
788 ARCEP website cites the then Chairman Paul Champsaur’s interview to Les Echos on 24/12/08
789 Hotel de Matignon (PM’s residence) 12/1/09, “Communique de presse”, Premier Ministre - Service de 
presse. Fillon was formerly Telecoms Minister
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Table 7: The ART’s 3G Type II autonomy
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e m p o w erm en t-re in fo rc em en t
To a lte r p re fe re n c e s  of o p p o n e n ts  o r restra in  their 
u s e  of key re so u rc e s , reg u la to r p rio ritise s  
n e g o tia tio n  o v e r im position . P re fe re n c e s  sh ifted  
by: (i) m aking co m p ro m ise  p ro p o sa ls ; (ii) u sin g  
p e rsu a s io n , re p e a te d  b argain ing ; (iii) explo iting  
influential a c to rs  w ith c o n v e rg e n t p re fe re n c e s  to  
avo id  co n fro n ta tio n
A gen cy  a v o id s  im p o sitio n  a n d  th ro u g h  d ia lo g u e  g rad u a lly  sh if ts  
p re fe re n c e s  of o p p o n e n ts :
'e x p e r t ' (CCR) v iew s a n d  inform al co n su lta tio n s  su s ta in e d  ART 
position . ART C h a irm an  h ad  p riv ate  e x c h a n g e s  d isc u ss in g  w ith 
M inisters. A uction open ly  o p p o se d  by in cu m b en ts; n e g a tiv e s  of 
G o v ern m en t po licy  pub lic ly  s t r e s s e d .  For M inisters with form al 
a u th o rity  h ard  to  red efin e  ART p ro p o sa ls . H ierarch ical s c o p e  
re d u c e d  given inform ally  a g re e d  po licy  with 2 G  industry  a c to rs
T im e-leng th  of 
d e c is io n ­
m aking
Public policy no t u n d e rtak en  'u n le s s  
a n d  until’ a c to rs  with d iv erg en t 
p re fe re n c e s  a r e  p e rsu a d e d
T im esca le  p o w e rs  largely  n eg le c te d ; policy 
fo rb e a ra n c e
L en g th y  reg u la to ry  p ro c e s s .  W ith no  re lev an t pow er, long inform al 
c o n su lta tio n  p e r io d s  sa w  re g u la to r  c o n so lid a te  su p p o r t  b e fo re  
su b m ittin g  p ro p o sa ls  to M inisters (03/00). G o v ern m en t took  3 m ore  
m o n th s to d ec id e , but tim e ART s p e n t  to  g a rn e r  su p p o r t  h e lp ed  
p e rsu a d e  M inister
O u tc o m e s S ta te  p re fe re n c e s  tra n s la te d  into 
public policy a fte r th o se  of d iv erg en t 
a c to rs  a re  sh ifted  to  m a k e  th em  
‘c o n g ru e n t or c o n so n a n t '
R e g u la to r’s  p re fe re n c e s  im p lem en ted  after ac to rs  
with d iv e rg en t o n e s  h ad  b e e n  p e rsu a d e d  to shift 
the irs, w ith so m e  c o n c e s s io n s
D esp ite  m in iste ria l a u th o rity  a n d  political d iv e rg e n ce , cau s in g  h igher 
fe e s  a n d  d e la y e d  licen ce  allocation , M in isters e n d o rs e d  key re g u la to ry  
re co m m e n d a tio n s
VII. Conclusions
The chapter has examined 3G licensing policy in France, which provides a strong case of 
Type II regulatory autonomy. Without powers to determine the allocation of four 3G 
licences and particularly to adopt a beauty contest, the regulatory authority ART fulfilled its 
preferences despite divergence with the formally powerful Government. Conversely, the 
Government did not fulfill its preference despite having the formal authority to require the 
auctioning of 3G spectrum and increase the number of licences allocated, which Ministers 
hoped would maximise licence revenue put towards national fiscal goals. Notwithstanding 
the authority to finalise licensing terms and the possibility of seeking further legislation in 
Parliament, the Government did not alter the ART’s proposal over the key issue of the 
licensing method constituting the fundamental source o f divergence (see Table 7 above).
The case thus seriously challenges approaches suggesting the importance o f formal 
institutional arrangements in assessing regulatory independence in practice. It substantiates, 
instead, the primacy of actor preferences and their ability to pursue preferences through 
non-statutory resources. The ART’s two preferences were not inferred directly from formal 
objectives laid out in the 1996 telecoms law. The law did not specify in any way the type o f 
licensing process the regulator was allowed to propose, giving it enormous discretion. 
However, the ART decided early in the process to opt for the allocation of maximum four 
licences and did not examine the possibility of using spare spectrum to allocate five or six, 
as happened elsewhere in the EU, despite a broad competition objective and one 
specifically set out for cases of spectrum allocation constraints. The regulator did not 
consider reserving a larger spectrum licence for a new entrant either, to help it vis-a-vis 
established operators.
Regarding the beauty contest preference, former Telecoms Minister Francois Fillon, under 
whom the ART was created and Chairman Hubert appointed, was critical about the 
Government’s hesitant stance over auctions, thus implying some divergence with the 
regulator. Thus, whilst evidence is contradictory, the case does not wholly support claims 
attributing significant importance to ‘hardwiring’ and ‘pre-programming’ mechanisms. The 
sub-case evidence does not confirm claims that formal appointment of a regulator’s head 
constitutes a critical factor to influence agency decisions.
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In terms of process, the ART displayed features consistent with Type II autonomy because, 
notwithstanding the lack of decisive formal powers to achieve its preferences on 3G policy, 
it worked to shift the position of Government Ministers to achieve its preferences. The 
regulator used selected arguments repeatedly to persuade divergent Ministers, and exploited 
the support of convergent influential actors who were publicly and privately active. The 
inducement approach was largely possible because of technical expertise obtained through 
key information provided voluntarily, hence without expending limited regulatory budgets, 
by respondents to the ART’s consultation; a useful instrument not set out by law.
By collecting information and ascertaining views, the ART drew support from convergent 
influential actors interested in 3G, notably established French 2G operators possessing 
‘physical’ network assets, whose resources helped develop policy according to the 
regulator’s preferences. The regulator’s ties with senior elected officials, additional pressure 
from ‘enfranchised’ actors and raising the Government’s right to review licence fees led 
Ministers to compromise and renounce auctions. The Government’s decision to revise fees 
significantly upwards compared to those proposed by the ART caused a delayed selection 
o f potential licensees. This coincided with a change in market conditions, which did not 
thwart the regulator’s preferences but further reduced the Government’s 3G licence 
revenues.
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Chapter 6: Oftel and LLU Policy in the UK
I. Introduction
This chapter analyses how Oftel pursued its policy preference for local loop unbundling 
(LLU) to introduce broadband competition in the UK. It argues that the regulator 
demonstrated Type II autonomy by showing restraint in using its formal powers. Instead, it 
deployed persuasion and negotiation, exploiting its policy expertise and informal ties with 
preference divergent BT and with influential convergent actors, primarily state ones, who 
in turn put pressure on the incumbent operator privately.
In the late 1990s-start-2000 period, at the height o f the ‘internet boom’, the UK’s 
narrowband consumer market was growing rapidly790 and proving highly competitive 
compared to those o f other European Union Member States791. The spread of high-speed 
broadband internet access was the next internet benchmark, which Oftel decided to pursue 
by developing LLU792.
LLU entailed making it possible for new entrants, or other licensed operators (OLOs), to 
access the existing network facilities of former state monopoly BT and, accordingly, 
provide broadband services available to domestic consumers nation-wide in similar 
competitive conditions with the incumbent operator. It meant providing OLOs with 
access to BT’s ubiquitous national telecoms network, particularly its paired copper-wires, in 
other words BT’s telephone lines directly reaching most UK end-users. Such access would 
allow OLOs to incorporate BT lines into their networks. By attaching broadband 
equipment both to lines taken over from BT and at customer premises, entrants would be 
able to provide broadband in competition with the incumbent over the exclusive ‘last mile’ 
reaching end-users.
790 Oftel 12/01, “The UK Telecommunications Industry: Market Information 2000/01”, Fig.5.1
791 ibid. Fig.5.2; European Commission 28/11/01, “7th Report on the Implementation o f the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package”, p.18 depicts Oftel’s May 2000 initiative requiring BT to offer 
competitors’ wholesale unmetered internet access ahead of other EU countries. For comparative October 
2000-June 2001 EU internet access penetration, Annexl, p.63
792 Cane,A 2 /12 /98  “Oftel to tackle telephone 'loop'”, Financial Times (FT); 11/12/98, “Watchdog moves to 
unravel web of the 'local loop'”; 7 /7 /99  “Telecoms watchdog opens BT networks to competitors”; 1/12/99, 
“BT given deadline to open network to rivals”; Taylor,P 9 /6 /99 , “BT slow to offer fast internet service”
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Thus Oftel’s policy addressed the entry barrier of BT’s unique control over end-user access 
nationally, which the former monopoly could exploit to become dominant in a new and 
innovative key market. Similarly to the UK’s 3G policy, the regulator’s preference was 
achieved with respect to a non-state actor whose key resources excluded formal powers. It 
did so through a similar process, consistent with Type autonomy II.
Outline o f  Events
In December 1998, Oftel launched a consultation comprising five options regarding the 
supply of broadband services across the UK, including LLU. Based on overwhelming 
industry support, excluding that of BT, in July 1999, the regulator published a new 
document focussing on two options, including LLU, in which it consulted on their 
development for an implementation deadline of July 2001. Notwithstanding existing 
powers to impose its implementation and even though OLOs considered the deadline too 
long, in November 1999, Oftel announced that LLU would be adopted by introducing a 
new condition into BT’s licence.
As operational and technical issues were discussed, the new condition was inserted into 
BT’s licence in April 2000, applicable from August 2000. Meanwhile, the European 
Commission developed a EU-wide framework that would bind Member States to a 
deadline of end 2000. As BT developed its own broadband services but withheld key 
information from competitors and obstructed policy development, thus delaying market 
entry, Oftel came under pressure from OLOs and a parliamentary select committee for not 
intervening sufficiendy to address key issues.
After consulting with Oftel’s Director General among others and endorsing his position, 
DTI Minister Patricia Hewitt became progressively involved in late 2000, met BT’s senior 
management and put pressure on them to collaborate with Oftel and industry to comply 
with the EU deadline. In practice, Oftel largely continued developing LLU issues thereafter 
by seeking consent, consistent with its original July 2001 deadline.
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II. Participants and Resources
This section shows that key resources relevant to the UK’s LLU policy development were 
spread among distinct actors from the start, consistent with Type II autonomy. Different 
participants had valuable resources to influence policy, several o f a non-statutory nature. 
Oftel possessed licence modification and enforcement powers but also sectoral knowledge 
and ties. Industry actors with telecoms operations and expertise were fundamental to LLU 
policy. The parliamentary trade and industry select committee (TTSC) publicly questioned 
actors about policy development, including Oftel. Junior Labour Minister Patricia Hewitt, 
rather than the SoS with key powers, became involved late in the process, using private 
access to key actors. The European Commission formulated supranational LLU policy.
Oftel initiated public discussions regarding developing LLU to spread broadband in 
December 1998, showing a clear understanding of technical and policy choices. The UK’s 
2 million narrowband internet subscribers market was growing 100% annually793. Thus, 
besides querying broadband demand794, the regulator asked whether barriers to supply new 
broadband ‘Information Society’ services for residential and small business users existed. It 
raised five options for “possible regulatory action”, including ‘unbundling’ and variations 
of it, welcoming comments.
Over sixty diverse, almost all non-state, actors with different resources responded, placing 
Oftel at the centre of subsequent progress through further information-gathering that 
helped refine LLU policy-making and define the necessary regulation of BT’s key ‘physical’ 
asset795. Largely sectoral actors commented on the scope o f unbundling, or its variations, to 
create a consumer broadband market. Network operators included BT, Cable&Wireless 
(C&W), Energis, MCI Worldcom, and cable operators ntl and Telewest. Mobile firms, 
internet service providers (ISPs) and manufacturers also replied. Less obvious actors 
included Barclays and the Civil Aviation Authority796.
793 Oftel 12/98, “Access to bandwidth: Bringing higher bandwidth services to the consumer”
794 Oftel indicated large companies’ £ lb n  annual demand, and identified the US as an indicator for potentially 
successful UK products. Some US companies had started offering high-speed Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
internet through LLU. DSL, or xDSL, technology transforms ordinary phone lines into high-speed digital 
lines supporting advanced services like fast Internet access, ‘x’ stands for variant DSL types. For example, 
ADSL (Asymmetric DSL) is more common than HDSL (High data-rate DSL)
795 Oftel 7/99, “Access to bandwidth: Proposals for action”
796 Full list obtained from Ofcom, 9/04: “Responses to: Access to bandwidth 12/1998”
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Certain participants stood out nonetheless. ‘Non-state’ industry actors besides BT had 
‘physical’ network assets, hence, possessed significant expertise to address policy issues 
given extensive national and international operations. For example, UK operator Energis, 
in which the National Grid utility company had a major stake797, was expanding its network 
capacity in Brazil at the time with operators Sprint and France Telecom798.
Similarly, C&W and MCI Worldcom were investing in pan-European networks799. Some 
possessed operations for consumer broadband provision already. Energis owned a 3500 
route miles high-technology network; reportedly the UK’s largest national fibre-optic 
operator800. Operators with network assets were accustomed to the UK telecoms market, 
its regulation and its key state and non-state actors.
In fact, C&W was a formerly government-owned telecoms utility801, not subjected to the 
same public scrutiny and political intervention as BT802. C&W owned the operations of 
BT’s only competitor before and during the UK’s early liberalisation duopoly-period (1984- 
1991)803, Mercury Communications, created in 1981 as a fixed line UK subsidiary804 and 
licensed in 1982805. It also partly controlled the original joint-venture partner o f 0 n e2 0 n e ’s 
mobile operations (MercuryOne20ne)806.
To enter the broadband market by exploiting ties, network and financial resources, many of 
these prominent non-state actors were among the sixty respondents outlining a more 
definite path following Oftel’s July 1999 consultation807. Actors lacking such resources 
withdrew early on, once policy exchanges became more specific and technical. Certain 
consumer groups struggled with the first consultation’s technical content, mistaking two of
797 The Independent, 20/1/99, “Oudook: NatGrid/Energis”; Cane 7 /7 /99
798 BarhamJ 6 /1 /99 , “Brazil eliminates telecoms rival to Bell Canada grouping”, FT; PRNewswire, 
15/1/99, “National Grid, Sprint, and France Telecom win long distance "mirror license" in Brazil”
799 Thai Larsen,P 4 /2 /99 , “BT to invest pounds 5bn on making network faster for millions” The 
Independent
8°° PRNewswire 15/1/99; Taylor A  20/1/99, “National Grid plans Energis sale”, FT
801 Hulsink 1999, p.126; Hood et al 2000, p.18
802 Hulsink 1999, p. 126
803 The Duopoly Review ended exclusive competition between BT and Mercury; DTI 1991 White Paper, 
“Competition and Choice: Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s”, Cmnd. 1461
804 Hulsink 1999, p.126, Thatcher 1999 p.176-8. C&W and BP owned 40% each, Barclays Bank controlled the 
remaining 20%. C&W acquired full control in 1984
805 Hulsink 1999, p.133; Thatcher 1999, p.176; Turner A  23/11/99, “First, but not equal”, The Times
806 Hulsink 1999, pp.149,162
807 Ofcom’s 2004 correspondence “Responses to: Access to bandwidth: Proposals for Action, July 1999”
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the hardest options as the easiest to implement808, indicating how valuable sectoral 
expertise was for Oftel and industry to pursue their preferences809.
In practice, the national network inherited from the UK’s pre-liberalisation period made 
BT the central non-state actor. BT influenced and, simultaneously, was most exposed to 
the policy aiming to spread high-speed internet usage. Developing broadband through LLU 
or the other listed options entailed third-party access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
BT’s participation was essential and inevitable as policy centred on its key ‘physical’ asset.
In 1998, about 50% of UK households were reached by cable networks; only 16% were 
actually served by them810. In contrast, BT controlled over 85% of access lines to residential 
and Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) customers, through which wholesale broadband 
was deliverable by applying DSL technology and enhancing the bandwidth o f BT’s loop 
network811. BT’s very strong position in the supply of access lines had key implications for 
eventual broadband supply.
‘Physical’ incumbency gave BT decisive first-mover advantage. It could test and provide 
commercial broadband services before competitors reliant on accessing its loops. Besides 
market dominance, by owning the exchanges extending loops to end-users, BT possessed 
unique information to restrict or at least delay competitors from accessing facilities. 
Controlling detailed information about its quasi-ubiquitous network was influential far 
beyond that purchasable through Oftel’s formal budget and those of other actors812.
Furthermore, unlike new entrants, BT could count on dedicated specialist regulatory 
groups o f sixty individuals or more813, to face regulatory demands. Its regulatory team 
complemented the ‘exclusive’ and long-standing “menage-a-trois” ties with the Department 
o f Trade and Industry814, headed by the SoS with licensing powers, and with Oftel since the
808 Response, Consumer Communications for England 24/3 /99 , regarding LLU options 1 and 2, explained 
below
809 Hood et al 2000, p.92 indicate that industry viewed consumer groups “over-influential...considering how  
poorly they argue”
810 Oftel 12/98; 38% households reached had subscribed
811 DSL allows data to travel over the same voice line by using different frequencies, with speeds affected by 
customer distance from the incumbent’s local exchange and traffic flow symmetry. Firth,L & Kelly,T 2001 
“The Economic and Regulatory Implications o f Broadband”, ITU, p.9
812 Interviews B,C
813 Coen et al 2002, p.20
814 The DTI and BT negotiated BT’s licence terms at the time of privatisation. Thatcher 1999, p. 177
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inception of the UK’s post-privatisation regulatory framework815, mirroring the regulator’s 
‘informal’ ties with ‘other state’ and industry actors shown further below. During LLU 
policy development, BT’s Chief Executive, Sir Peter Bonfield, claimed Oftel’s regulatory 
duties centred on BT’s prime market position; “most of the regulation is really aimed at a 
very tight control on BT”816.
Under the Telecoms Act 1984, Oftel formally regulated telecoms systems by modifying and 
enforcing telecoms licences including BT’s; the incumbent was not a specific regulatory 
target. Nonetheless, the DGT had key formal powers regarding LLU adoption, including 
modifying licences with consent, having duly notified licensees o f intended changes817.
Alternatively, the DGT could modify licences without consent via a reference to the 
Competition Commission, if the latter agreed that the matter operated against the public 
interest818. Otherwise the DGT had comprehensive licence enforcement powers. He could 
also require licensees to produce almost any specified documents in their custody. Thus 
Oftel held significant authority to determine policy, as did the SoS who, besides having 
licensing powers, could veto licence modifications the DGT sought.
In practice, SoS’s Peter Mandelson and Stephen Byers819 were not among the active ‘state’ 
actors. Neither SoS publicly responded to Oftel’s unbundling consultations, nor did they 
visibly engage in policy formulation. O f the formally relevant Ministers, only the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, head o f the Treasury, which could veto 
staffing numbers the DGT appointed at Oftel and their terms of service820, briefly 
intervened on LLU.
Brown met and consulted the DGT at the start o f 2000, publicly affirming the need for 
infrastructure roll-out and low cost internet for business and consumers821, although this 
was not part o f the Treasury’s Telecoms Act remit. Brown claimed that BT “foot- 
dragging” would not be allowed and that internet access costs should be reduced to US
815 Hood et al 2000 describe how this ‘relationship’ evolved
816 “Minutes of Evidence taken before the Trade and Industry Committee, 19/12/00, integrated in the TISC’s 
HC90 20/3 /01 , “Sixth report - Local Loop Unbundling”, para.310
817 Telecoms Act sl2(l)(2)
818 see ch.3
819 see ch.4 regarding their terms. Patricia Hewitt replaced Byers
820 Telecoms Act si (5)
821 Brown,G 16/2/00, “Britain and the knowledge economy: speech given by the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown to the Smith Institute in London”, HMTreasury
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levels by the end of 2002 but his intervention had a more immediate impact on BT’s share 
price than on implementation as the incumbent temporarily turned into a takeover target822.
The DTI did not publicly comment on the regulator’s document823 despite claiming 
primacy over regulatory policy in the period after the Conservative Government had 
liberalised the telecoms sector824, including on broadband825. DTI (Labour) Minister of 
State for Small Business and e-commerce, Patricia Hewitt acknowledged the initiative at the 
end o f 1999826. She became the highest ranking elected official under the SoS to be actively 
involved in LLU but, as explained below, only so in the second-half of 2000 and first 
privately, then publicly.
Instead, the ‘state’ parliamentary Trade and Industry Select Committee (T1SC) became 
considerably involved early on. The Committee System o f the House o f Commons 
specified select committees could not “order” MPs and civil servants to attend hearings827. 
Yet, as Oftel developed LLU policy, its senior management was publicly scrutinised 
recurrently given an ‘informal’ understanding that government departments’ senior officials 
would attend when requested828. In March 1999, shortly after Oftel raised LLU, its Director 
o f Technology, Peter Walker, attended a hearing on the only partially related topic of e- 
commerce. Oftel responded in writing to TISC observations too829. In December 1999830, a 
year after the first consultation, TISC members asked Edmonds whether he was happy 
with Oftel’s progress on LLU. In November 2000831, the DGT was questioned based on 
written evidence from several OLOs, acting as a ‘fire alarm’832 mechanism for the TISC.
Thus, the TISC judged the regulator by collecting documentation and arranging ‘informal’ 
but public hearings. The TISC could pressure the regulator given its stated intentions on
822 Cane,A 16/2/00, “BT limbers up for battle on local network access” FT; 17/2/00, “BT chief warns 
government not to meddle”; “LEX COLUMN: BT bypass”, 17/2/00; Cane,A & Groom,B 18/2/00, “Brown 
accused o f making BT a target”
823 Although the SoS headed the DTI, he/she was singularly vested with Telecoms Act powers. It had no 
formal authority over Oftel
824 Oftel did not always inform the DTI o f publication contents in advance; Hood et al 2000, p.91
825 DTI 1994 “Creating the Superhighways of the Future: Developing Broadband Communications in the 
UK”, Cm.2734
826 Hammersley,B 6 /12/99, “Ringing changes”, The Times
827 see ch.3
828 Oftel was a non-ministerial government department
829 HC835 26/10/99, “Twelfth special report”, Appendix 2, Recommendation (M)
830 HC93-i 25 /1 /00 , “The Work of Oftel”, Hearing: 7 /12 /99
831 HC90 20/3/01. Hearmg:l4 /11 /00
832 see ch.l
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the record, also informing public opinion through the media833. Persuading TISC members 
that regulatory policies satisfied the wider public interest mattered particularly when Oftel 
wanted to avoid questioning that would expose it to oversight from elected officials with 
formal powers such as the SoS.
In practice, in December 2000, the TISC held hearings with junior Minister Patricia Hewitt 
rather than with the SoS who licensed operators, formally appointed the DGT and headed 
the DTI834. Hewitt lacked Oftel’s and operators’ technical depth, but used her ministerial 
access to key actors to exert influence, since “local loop unbundling on the ground will 
really only work effectively if you have sensible working relationships”835.
A few months before the TISC hearing, she talked privately to senior Oftel officials, to 
major OLOs and BT836. Working in a ‘regulatory space’ beyond the traditional ‘menage-a- 
trois’, she gathered respective policy views and conveyed the Government’s position on 
policy progress made until then, as Oftel worked towards finalising LLU terms complying 
with the EU unbundling Regulation.
In July 2000, the European Commission published a draft Regulation837, applicable in all 
Member States from 2001 onwards838, explaining the increased immediacy o f Government 
and ‘other state’ officials. EU institutions had supranational powers, hence, influenced the 
policy framework by formulating the Regulation, but were otherwise uninvolved in national 
decision-making.
Thus, LLU policy attracted many actors, with different resources dispersed among them, 
not controlled by a single influential group.
833 WardA 15/11/00, “BT 'held up' introduction of competition”; 6 /12/00, “BT accuses regulator of 
'posturing' over access”, FT
834 HC66-i 15/12/00 “Minutes o f Evidence”, “Annual Report from the e-Minister and the e-Envoy” 
paras.15, 28. Hearing: 13/12/00
835 ibid, para. 19
836 Interview: B
837 Oftel Press Release (hereafter, shortened to OPR) 12/7/00, “Oftel Statement on European Commission's 
proposed Regulation on Local Loop Unbundling”
838 "Regulation (EC) N o 2887/2000 o f the European Parliament and the Council o f 18 December 2000 on 
unbundled access to the local loop”, Official Journal of the European Communities 30/12/00
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III. Preferences
As Oftel pursued LLU following the December 1998 consultation, the preferences of well- 
resourced state and non-state participants emerged rapidly. BT, owner of the key ‘physical’ 
asset which the policy centred on, indicated its preference divergence vis-a-vis Oftel 
immediately since it opposed rivals taking-over its lines and providing broadband and 
telephony directly to end-users. Conversely, new entrants with distinct network capabilities 
wanted to access BT’s local loop network to provide broadband. The TISC, which was able 
to raise the public profile of issues, favoured competitive broadband provision, as did 
Oftel. Initially, other key actors that subsequently supported the regulator, such as Minister 
Patricia Hewitt and the European Commission, were not actively involved, but were not 
divergent. The section thus shows that, although the central industry actor’s preference 
differed from the regulator’s, the agency had some influential support from the outset, 
consistent with Type II autonomy.
Oftel’s December 1998 consultation listed five non-mutually exclusive options to spread 
broadband competitively over BT’s local loop if industry agreed there was consumer 
demand and regulatory intervention was required to supply it. Options 1 and 2 constituted 
unbundling, options 3, 4 and 5 did not. Thus, the regulator presented two distinct sets of 
preferences, entailing different policy choices (in summary, Table 8 below).
Broadly put, options 3-5 were wholesale broadband products which BT would supply to 
competing operators or ISPs at a regulated price, for resale to consumers839. Thus options 
3-5 did not require entrants to invest in their networks to provide broadband, avoiding 
deploying costly equipment and facilities. BT would make necessary network upgrades, 
bearing the costs. However, BT would accordingly determine product features. Moreover, 
options 3-5 did not grant OLOs direct access to the ‘last-mile’ o f BT’s phone lines, and 
hence, access to end-users’ homes to provide diverse broadband services.
839 O ftel 7/99, para. 1.4
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Table 8: Summary Features of 5 Oftel Options Proposed
Options
Advantages 
(for entrants)
Disadvantages
1 - Access to/direct commercial 
relationship with end-users
- Minimised dependence on 
incumbent for: deployment; 
innovation/service differentiation; 
service provision
- Slow & very costly implementation
- Selected coverage
- Dependence on co-location offer 
(delays)
- Shared spectrum / interference 
management significant problem
2 - As option 1, but differed 
contractually, giving Oftel more 
control as a regulated ‘telecoms 
service’
- As option 1
3 - Limited new entrant investments - Incumbent determined product features
- No entrant access to end-user loops to 
provide services
- DSLAM equipment did not provide 
clean ‘bitstream’ data output
4 - As option 3; but, critically, fast 
commercial presence possible
- Similar to option 3; critically 
incumbent decided roll-out speed
5 - Meant to operate national 
broadband network as conventional 
telephony
- Similar to options 3-4; but, critically, no 
general broadband public switched 
network available
LLU options 1 and 2 meant removing the key entry barrier that was BT’s direct end-user 
access, as entrants took-over BT’s lines. Entrants would face significant costs to develop 
broadband-enabled networks but could choose where to invest and would, crucially, have a 
direct relationship with their customers to tailor services, hence, be on a more equal footing 
and better placed to compete with BT.
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Specifically, option 1, the unbundled local loop, meant making BT’s lines available to 
OLOs to incorporate into their networks. After taking over BT lines, OLOs would co­
locate, or place and attach their broadband equipment, like a DSL modem, to the local 
loop in or near BT’s local exchange buildings840. OLOs would similarly provide end-users 
with matching equipment to supply broadband841 and voice telephony services, instead of 
BT842. BT would only remain responsible for the circuit’s physical integrity843. Option 2844 
resembled option 1, but differed contractually. Instead of providing a copper loop to the 
entrant, BT provided a ‘telecoms service’ with defined characteristics to the other 
operator845 (implications below) - effectively a leased line between the customer and the 
local exchange.
Instead, under wholesale option 3, ‘bitstream’ access846, BT owned and operated equipment 
on each line. So, OLOs would not install their equipment at either end o f loops, but 
connected to the broadband bitstream at BT exchanges, co-locating equipment to take data 
onto their networks. However, BT would retain a contractual relationship with customers 
for network access, and for telephony if users chose to retain BT. So OLOs provided 
broadband but lacked an exclusive relationship with end-users. Option 4847 entailed BT 
providing OLOs with wholesale broadband access to end-users via DSL on the copper 
loop. This would be a data service between customer lines and the SP’s or operator’s own 
site at a different part o f the network from a BT exchange, thus relying considerably on 
BT’s network. Option 5, or Indirect Access to a broadband public switched network, 
would have mirrored the operation o f conventional telephony and the dialling of customer 
numbers.
Thus, Oftel’s five options to spread broadband across the country entailed some 
dependency on access to BT’s local loop. The critical issue was what level of local access
840 The telephone exchange consumers are connected to
841 DSL modems attached to end-user computers/devices turn the digital signal from the computer/device 
into an analogue signal transmittable over an analogue medium like phone-lines. OLOs’ modems at BT 
exchanges convert the incoming analogue signal back to digital format. Oftel 12/98 Annexl
842 Oftel 12/98, paras.5.2-5.4
843 ibid. Annex3
844 Partial Baseband Leased Circuit (PBLC), hereafter referred to as ‘unbundling’ or LLU’, since Oftel 
excluded option 1
845 Oftel 12/98 para.5.5
846 Sequence o f bits, or data-stream, transmitted continuously over a path one at-a-time
847 Permanent Virtual Circuit access: Termanent’ meant no call-by-call selection; customers connect to the 
same provider. Virtual’ meant no physical circuit per customer, with data from many customers joined 
together and SPs recognising a connection between customers and data packets flowing on the circuit. Oftel 
12/98 paras.5.11-5.12
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Oftel wanted BT to accept, thus the extent to which it removed determinant entry barriers 
for OLOs. The decision affected whether, when OLOs provided services, BT retained any 
contractual relationship with end-users (options 3-5) or only with competitors (1-2).
By July 1999, Oftel discarded option 1 following indications o f significant spectrum 
problems regarding managing interference between services over a loop controlled by an 
entrant and services provided over other loops by BT or other OLOs within the same 
cable. Two wholesale broadband products were also excluded. Oftel hardly mentioned 
‘bitstream’ option 3 past December 1998 since relevant broadband equipment did not 
ensure a clean data output848. Option 5 was impractical in the short-term as there was no 
general broadband public switched network.
For relatively fast residential broadband provision, Oftel retained wholesale product 
proposal option 4 instead. Implementation complexities meant that unbundling (options 1 
and 2) would take time849, whereas Option 4 involved BT upgrading its network voluntarily, 
enabling its loops to be used to deliver broadband.
BT had already developed significant ADSL roll-out plans since December 1998, and 
planned to announce broadband provision details shortly850. Under its licence, BT had to 
provide a wholesale interconnect product to OLOs and a wholesale access product to SPs 
on fair and non-discriminatory terms851. Option 4 was especially attractive to ISPs, 
stimulating service competition and innovation. New entrants could offer services with 
significant customer reach and limited infrastructure investment. Technical issues such as 
spectrum management would be avoided, facilitating mass market access. Oftel held 
powers to address anti-competitive behaviour852.
However, option 4 alone did not meet Oftel’s goal of securing consumer choice through 
competition. Demand could remain unmet. BT controlled the pace and extent of network 
roll-out, adjusting it to match its own service development at competitors’ expense. OLOs 
would be unable to deploy broadband services to areas that BT considered uneconomic.
848 DSL access multiplexers (DSLAMs)Oftel 7 /99 para.6.1
849 Oftel 7/99, paras.4.4,4.8
850 Taylor 9/6/99; Oftel 7/99 para.1.6; Cane 7 /7 /9 9
851 Oftel 7/99 para.4.5
852 Oftel 7/99, para.5.3
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The option left BT the entire choice of technology. Relying on option 4 risked exacerbating 
the impact of BT’s network dominance on innovative broadband supply.
Diagram 3: Wholesale Option 4 - BT provides OLO or SP with higher bandwidth 
access to the end-user fNTP85*! via a point-to-point data service
NTP
ATM Switch 
or IP Routes 
Piovnlmg Permanent
Ylltliill
Cwosjt 
Connection 
T o  O L O  m  S P
Source: Oftel 7/99. Annex B
Accordingly, Oftel pushed for option 2. Unlike option 1, the circuit remained part of BT’s 
‘licensed system’, which entailed continued regulatory oversight for loop provision. Option 
2 constituted a ‘telecoms service’ for which, besides remaining in charge o f the nature and 
quality of the communication service provided over its network, BT was formally regulated 
through its licence.
Thus, Oftel concluded early on that option 2 gave it greater legal clarity, hence control over 
the incumbent, than option 1, particularly as it was unclear whether option 1 could be 
required under the Telecoms Act854. Service provision conditions were similar, including 
the need for ‘spectrum management’ avoiding service interference. Owning the lines, BT 
would want to ensure that OLOs used approved equipment855.
As explained above, through unbundling OLOs would upgrade the loop by installing their 
equipment at BT’s local exchange and at customer premises as they saw fit (see diagram 4).
853 Network Termination Point
854 Interviews B,C
855 Oftel 12/98 paras.5.5-5.7
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OLOs would build networks, deciding which exchanges they provided services from. Thus 
while bearing investment risks, OLOs would not be subject to BT’s commercial decision­
making. Oftel argued that by promoting competition in the technological upgrade of BT’s 
local loop, consumers would get the best service deal.
Diagram 4: Option 2 LLU - BT PBLC between OLO equipment at customer 
premises and at BT exchange leased by new entrant
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Source: Oftel 7/99. Annex B
Oftel’s preference for introducing competition to BT’s ‘local access network’ was clear. 
Unbundling was unlikely to deliver short-term ‘mass-market’ roll-out; technical and 
practical issues needed resolving. Operational details for co-locating OLO equipment at BT 
exchanges needed to be determined. Nonetheless, Oftel indicated its significance to ensure 
that the necessary bandwidth was delivered as soon as possible. I f  progress developed as 
proposed, a trial was expected no later than the end o f 2000 and LLU services no later than 
July 2001. Oftel advocated access to all BT’s loops, unless there were “insuperable 
technical or practical difficulties”856.
For efficient entry, charges were to be based on Long-Run Incremental Costs (LRIC)857 
plus a mark-up to account for costs common to the line and to other BT services858, 
reflecting the economic value o f a line in a market o f competitively supplied loops. A
856 Oftel 7/99, para.5.4
857 On the basis o f incurred forward-looking costs; Oftel 12/98, para.5.20
858 Oftel 7/99, para.5.3
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uniform LRIC+ charge also addressed the very different profitability of different customer 
lines, given the tariff structure. Charging arrangements should balance the development 
and take-up of broadband services over BT’s network (option 4), and motivating BT and 
OLOs to invest in competing delivery routes providing greater choice medium-term 
(option 2)859.
Oftel’s LLU preference under recendy appointed DGT, David Edmonds860, had other 
implications. The consultation portrayed unbundling as, eventually, fulfilling the statutory 
primary duty of securing telecoms service provision to whoever made a reasonable demand 
for it across the country, plus the secondary duties of promoting consumers interests, and 
competition. Responses indicated broadband demand would develop. So, Oftel complied 
with its statutory goals when making the case for ‘regulatory action’.
Yet, LLU was not strictly one o f Oftel’s formal duties, indicating a specific policy choice. 
How to implement competition was unspecified in statutory arrangements, and the 
previous DGT Don Cruickshank had pursued it very differently. Since the telecoms 
market liberalisation under the Conservative Government, competition had been pursued 
through the creation of alternative networks861, rather than over BT’s network, which Oftel 
proposed with LLU instead. Cable operators were licensed following the 1991 Duopoly 
Review. Nti stressed the policy change in its LLU consultation response, indicating that 
Oftel had explicitly rejected that OLOs access BT’s loop when unbundling had been 
previously considered for basic telephony, as did other OLOs862.
When Edmonds took over as DGT, Oftel’s policy was that LLU would be, at best, a 
distraction from achieving competition through different competing networks. Few 
European regulators were actively pursuing unbundling863. However, in December 1998, 
Oftel indicated that, while circumstances differed from elsewhere given the approach of 
encouraging constructing alternative telecoms networks, the UK should not lose its 
competitive advantage, revising the regulatory approach applied until then.
859 Oftel 7/99 AnnexC, paras.2,13
860 March 1998
861 Hulsink 1999, p.133; Thatcher 1999, pp.206-208,210,212; HarperJ 1997, “Monopoly and competition in 
British telecommunications: the past, the present, and the future”, Pinter
862 Ntl response 3/99, “Access to bandwidth”; Energis response 3/99, “Access to bandwidth”
863 Memorandum submitted by Oftel” 8/12/00, Appendix 19, HC90 20/3/01
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BT expected to supply broadband within months. Alternative supply routes, such as cable 
networks, were not expected to deliver residential broadband before the medium-term864, 
making most users reliant on services supplied over BT’s local network until then. So, by 
July 1999, Oftel indicated that other companies should have the opportunity to specify the 
type o f broadband services to be run over BT’s local loop rather than simply follow BT 
when it felt it was commercially interesting to make them.
The new D G T’s policy was to intervene directly on BT’s local access network dominance, 
sustaining its primacy. At the end of 2000, Patricia Hewitt stated: “the policy of the last 
administration and the policy o f previous directors general of Oftel was against local loop 
unbundling.. .The policy w as...to pursue infrastructure competition through the cable 
companies, so that there would be an alternative network...rather than competition on the 
local loop. It was David Edm onds.. .in 1998, who changed that policy”865.
Indeed, while Oftel issued the first consultation, SoS Peter Mandelson launched a 
publication containing the Government’s objectives of creating a knowledge-based 
economy and making the UK the best place to do business electronically by 2002866, 
without public references to LLU867. The White Paper advocated competition and 
consumer interests, which unbundling was meant to bring. Yet, the Government publicly 
prioritised e-commerce, suggesting that it was ‘indifferent’868 about how this was achieved. 
Hewitt first endorsed LLU publicly but briefly at the end of 1999869. Similarly, background 
support from the European Commission870 became important when the EU Regulation 
was formulated in 2000.
The TISC showed preference convergence earlier. By August 1999, the committee 
indicated its support for Oftel’s proposal, agreeing “that BT’s monopoly ownership and 
control o f the local loop could restrict the roll-out o f vital new high-bandwidth services”871. 
Oftel was told to be proactive about competition in the UK’s telecoms infrastructure. 
Residential users and SMEs should benefit from a choice of broadband technologies from
864 Interviews B,C
865 HC66-i 15/12/00, para.15
866 DTI Competitiveness White Paper 1998, “Our Competitive Future: Building the knowledge driven 
economy”, Cm.4176
867 Brown,K and Cane,A. 21/12/98, “Mandelson signals more industry deregulation”, FT
868 Nordlinger considers indifference non-divergence
869 Hammersley 6 /12 /99
870 Cane 2 /12 /98 , Oftel 12/98
871 HC648 9 /8 /9 9 , “Tenth report”; ‘Summary o f recommendations and conclusions - Recommendation(M)’
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different operators. Therefore, an important ‘state’ actor expressed its convergence with 
Oftel.
Support from industry actors was, broadly, overwhelming. Responses were highly detailed; 
OLOs were natural policy beneficiaries. The circa sixty responses to Oftel’s first two LLU 
publications raised inevitable differences872. Nevertheless, OLOs welcomed the discussion 
framed by the regulator873. Both before and after July 1999, their overall preferred options 
were 2 and 4874. Major UK-based OLOs, like C&W and Energis among others, strongly 
advocated them, as did ntl though with some reservations about the need for regulatory 
intervention.
More specifically, Energis, for instance, preferred option 2 over option 1 due to the more 
clearly defined contractual relationship with BT, adding that customer benefits would be 
the same but would cost less875. C&W believed option l ’s lack of service guarantees made it 
commercially unattractive. Co-location and spectrum management issues for option 2 were 
not insurmountable876. Oftel’s expectation that loops would be available by July 2001 
seemed the single unsupported issue. MCI Worldcom found the timetable “overly 
pessimistic”877, “with commitment and hard work from all parties, (LLU was achievable) 
before July 2001”878.
Despite LLU not requiring significant investments by BT, the incumbent was clearly 
preference divergent with Oftel. BT strongly opposed unbundling options, defining them 
“inappropriate”879, indeed issuing ‘comments on comments’ of its competitors880. BT 
claimed regulatory intervention was unnecessary, demand was being met, and Oftel and 
OLOs should focus on its wholesale ADSL product; trials and commercial negotiations 
were already occurring. Besides raising operational difficulties, BT questioned whether it
872 Oftel 7/99, Annex A
873 Cane 11/12/98; 7 /7 /99; 1 /12 /99
874 Oftel 11/99, “Access to Bandwidth: Delivering Competition for the Information Age” paras.2.10-2.16, 
Annex A
875 Energis 3/99
876 Cable&Wireless response, 3/99, “Access to bandwidth”
877 MCI Worldcom 1 /9 /99 , “Access to bandwidth: Proposals for Action”
878 Cane 1 /12 /99
879 BT 3/99 “Access to Bandwidth”
880 BT’s Comments on Responses to Access to Bandwidth, 26 /3 /99
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could be forced to provide access to loops and exchange facilities881, subsequendy stressing 
the need to define regulatory arrangements “satisfactorily”882.
IV. Process
This section shows that, despite significant formal authority, Oftel persistently prioritised 
persuasion and negotiation to shift BT’s preference divergence, consistent with Type II 
autonomy. The regulator eschewed available powers from the outset, choosing instead to 
use internal expertise, pool industry policy views without resorting to statutory 
consultations first, and discuss privately with the key preference divergent actor to obtain 
consent. Oftel built on ‘empowerment-reinforcement’ beyond collecting supportive 
consultation views from OLOs.
The regulator repeatedly avoided imposition of its unbundling preference even after 
introducing a specific condition in BT’s licence, exploiting the support of convergent actors 
that confronted BT instead. Oftel used the input o f OLOs, which knew what entry terms 
could advance LLU broadband competition, to analyse and then address issues with BT, 
through dialogue. Subsequently, under public pressure from OLOs and the TISC about 
implementation delays, the regulator harnessed ‘informal’ meetings with a junior Minister 
to further its case. Patricia Hewitt confronted BT privately, asking it to comply with the 
binding EU-deadline the European Commission framed with Oftel’s input.
During the different policy stages, Oftel’s prevailing stance was one o f extensive 
negotiations with BT based on agency expertise and on influential policy support it 
harnessed to persuade the incumbent. In November 1999, Oftel confirmed plans to deliver 
by July 2001, at the latest, unbundling in line with option 2 which BT opposed 
unequivocally, besides wholesale ADSL option 4, which BT supported. Nevertheless, 
having collected and disseminated information based on exchanges lasting almost a year, 
Oftel stated that unbundling would be introduced through a modification o f BT’s licence 
following more informal pre-modification discussions883.
881 BT 3/99
882 BT 9/99 “Response to Oftel’s second Access to Bandwidth Consultation”
883 Oftel 11/99, para.4.18,AnnexC17
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Oftel disregarded Energis’ considerations regarding specific BT licence provisions 
appropriate to introduce unbundling884. More significantly, option 2 was a regulated 
“telecoms service not consisting in voice services” as defined in the Telecoms Act 1984, 
enforceable through existing condition 43.2885. Yet, Oftel understood the significance of 
introducing LLU for BT and OLOs. The service had to be clear to all for transparency and 
avoidance of doubt886.
Thus the regulator proposed that a new condition be inserted in BT’s licence, specifying 
services to be provided to OLOs, enabling it to determine a clear pricing regime. Oftel 
framed issues to pursue its preference before applying the formal framework, turning its 
authority into a default, backstop mechanism - an approach that persisted throughout 
policy development. It intentionally avoided mentioning making a reference to the 
Competition Commission despite BT’s divergence887. Besides being a long process, the 
outcome of a reference was “never clear cut”, hence, represented “a risk”888.
Accordingly, Oftel sought BT’s consent to pursue its preference, deviating from formal 
arrangements. Oftel intended to consult further informally and publish the new condition 
for formal consultation by April 2000, but acknowledged that discussions had already 
begun889. Similarly, following the first consultation, written responses aside, BT had 
“developed its case in further presentations to Oftel”890 confirming intense exchanges 
between them.
Oftel created a persuasive case since proposing five options in December 1998, 
distinguishing between competition arising from unbundling and that from wholesale 
broadband access products, identifying the distinct implications. Four different but inter­
related arguments were formulated nonetheless, ‘asking’ whether intervention was 
necessary for local loop access.
884 Energis 21/10/99, argued LLU could be required o f BT, as a Significant Market Power (SMP) operator, 
under licence conditions implementing Article 4(2) o f the Interconnection Directive and/or Article 16 of the 
Revised Voice Telephony Directive
885 Oftel 11/99, AnnexC5
886 Oftel 11/99, para.4.17
887 HC90 20/3/01, para.5; see ch.3 on formal licence modification
888 Interviews B,C
889 Oftel 11/99, para.4.18,AnnexC17
890 Oftel 7/99, para.1.6
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Thus, although BT was undertaking trials for its wholesale ADSL access product, gaining 
first-mover advantage, Oftel did not force a focus on LLU. Days after the DGT described 
as “drastic” an EU proposal to compel SMP operators to rent local loops to rivals at cost- 
based prices891, Oftel stressed that it was not setting out a preferred approach892. It 
presented arguments justifying discussing LLU instead. Rapidly expanding new 
technologies delivering services over copper loop infrastructure, notably DSL, made LLU 
attractive. BT’s loop control was the best way to reach end-users and needed to be opened. 
Other arguments were less technology-related. The second was the upcoming 1999 EU 
telecoms law review. The European Commission intended to define rules for end-user 
access, including via unbundling, requiring industry and consumer views.
Thirdly, the Government valued a ‘knowledge-based’ economy for competitiveness and 
wanted to spread the benefits of new technologies893. Oftel implied that both infrastructure 
and services had to be provided, making LLU a policy contender. Fourthly, new rules were 
needed to ensure access to consumers and for the UK not to lose its competitive 
advantage, given US and EU regulatory changes. With limited network alternatives for 
broadband competition nationally, Oftel’s complementary arguments fuelled the rationale 
for LLU.
Oftel strengthened its case by exploiting convergent actors forming an “issue coalition”894, 
seeking consensus and support over the options to advance. It ‘empowered’ potential new 
entrants interested in accessing the incumbent’s loops, otherwise unable to, by providing a 
public platform, hence visibility, to raise relevant arguments and put pressure on BT.
OLOs’ input supporting Oftel’s unbundling initiative helped narrow the options from five 
to two in July 1999895. Unlike the first consultation, Oftel specified the desirable options, 
stressing many respondents’ agreement. While welcoming BT’s investments developing its 
wholesale ADSL product, it was “not right simply to leave” BT to provide services as and 
when it found it commercially interesting896. The broadband access product would likely
891 Cane 2/12/98
892 Oftel 12/98, para. 1.5; Cane 11/12/98
893 DTI 12/98; Brown and Cane 21/12/98
894 see ch i on Nordlinger’s Type II options
895 Oftel 7/99, AnnexA; presented anonymously in the consultation
896 Oftel 7/99
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allow BT to dominate the wholesale broadband market against Oftel’s competition 
preference and consumer interests897.
Given its expert understanding of policy choices, Oftel ‘bargained’ with BT to accept its 
unbundling preference. BT could develop its wholesale ADSL access product on a 
voluntary basis or it could be required to do so, with a timetable. Allowing BT to start 
selling the wholesale ADSL product without constraints, except existing service provision 
obligations, was a bargaining tool in exchange for accepting unbundling898.
Oftel presented the two options as a reciprocally advantageous exchange899 but the analysis 
furthered its preference. OLOs should be able to specify the type of broadband services to 
be run over BT’s local loop and to make the necessary investments, avoiding being BT’s 
followers. Economic arguments by a non-state actor other than OLOs strengthened Oftel’s 
case. Analysys consultants’ cost-benefit analysis estimated LLU benefits between £120m 
and -£440m900. Thus, besides eschewing powers, when deploying its formally-allocated 
budget, Oftel chose to bolster arguments supporting its preference.
Oftel’s public and private persuasion brought some shift by July 1999. Publicly, BT kept 
arguing the wholesale ADSL product was most effective for ‘broadband Britain’. Yet, 
notwithstanding “the right to maintain this position”, BT would “work closely with Oftel 
and the industry to develop the commercial, technical and operational arrangements 
necessary (were unbundling to be) mandated following completion of the consultation 
process”901. BT’s Group Managing Director for UK operations, Bill Cockbum, expressed 
resignation over LLU being introduced shortly after Oftel’s November 1999 statement. 
Subject to no fixed voice market distortion, BT would agree to licence modification902.
BT’s Chief Executive, Sir Peter Bonfield, highlighted the dialogue with Oftel in early 2000, 
when then Chancellor Gordon Brown publicly opposed BT’s ‘foot-dragging’ given the July 
2001 deadline, which he and especially OLOs considered too late903. Bonfield strongly 
rejected Brown’s intervention, stating: “there will be no change to this date without our
897 Interviews B,C
898 Oftel 7/99, paras.4.5-5.1
899 see ch.l; Nordlinger
900 Oftel 11/99, para.2.29
901 Oftel 7/99, para.1.11
902 Cane 1/12/99
903 Cane 16/2/00
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agreement. That would anyway be a matter for Oftel and BT - not for the Treasury”904. BT 
accepted to introduce LLU only by Oftel’s target deadline.
Meanwhile, practical unbundling complexities were discussed by industry advisory focus 
groups set-up as Oftel had proposed. So, besides putting LLU on the agenda and giving 
them a say, Oftel facilitated convergent OLOs’ organising efforts and their effective use of 
resources by establishing quasi-public advisory committees905. Oftel encouraged the 
Operator Policy Forum (OPF) and the Network Interoperability Consultative Committee 
(NICC) to resolve operational and technical factors shaping commercial delivery with BT 
since July 1999906.
Although BT’s licence already required key co-location forms907, Oftel expected such 
technical implementation issues, order handling and spectrum management among others, 
would be agreed through contractual arrangements between BT and OLOs908. Securing 
BT’s commitment, followed by licence modification, was envisaged by MCI Worldcom909, 
which eventually chaired the OPF LLU subgroup. BT chaired the NICC DSL Task group.
With industry discussions shaping implementation, in December 1999, elected officials 
(who did not have powers to order the regulator to attend hearings) put their doubts to 
Oftel regarding LLU’s negotiated pace of development. The parliamentary select 
committee reminded Edmonds that he had stated LLU would be addressed within six 
months in January 1999. Oftel’s BT’s licence modification timetable had been established 
30th November910.
Edmonds indicated LLU had not been considered in the UK until twelve months earlier. 
Oftel had limited practical experience with LLU issues and faced significant information
904 Cane 17/2/00
905 see ch.l; Nordlinger
906 In Oftel 12/98, only NICC was mentioned
907 Oftel 11/99, ch.7. OLOs needed to ‘co-locate’ to interconnect with the circuit; renting space at BT sites to 
install equipment and use facilities. Oftel identified three types: (i) Thysical co-location’ - at a BT local 
exchange building. OLO were provided separate rooms, or several could share a single room with cages 
protecting equipment. Reasonable access to rooms containing equipment was needed; (ii) ^Distant co- 
location’ - at a nearby suitable site, not managed by BT, connected to the exchange by a tie circuit. N o direct 
access to BT’s facilities was required; (iii) ‘Virtual co-location’ - BT managed OLOs equipment, relaying 
specific set-up and configuration instructions. For a level-playing field, BT should provide physical co- 
location where space was available
908 Oftel 11/99, paras.2.32-2.39,4.1 -4.15
909 MCI Worldcom 1 /9 /99
910 HC93-i 25/1/00, para.56
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asymmetry vis-a-vis BT911. Accordingly, it worked privately to ‘induce’ its preference and 
publicly spoke o f the incumbent in ‘conciliatory’ terms notwithstanding available licence 
powers.
Asked if BT was ‘dragging its feet’ in the midst o f negotiations before the formal 
consultation, Edmonds replied that BT was responding very effectively in terms of ADSL 
roll-out of its own network912. Mandating unbundling with a “quite tough” timescale had 
not been foreseen and, pointing to implementation practicalities, if ADSL trials proved 
successful, July 2001 would be the “very outside limit for the introduction o f real 
competition”.
Edmonds showed unwillingness to affect working relations with the incumbent since it had 
to curtail BT’s chances o f exploiting informational and structural advantages. Accordingly, 
it was “much better to get agreement which would lead to effective implementation”, with 
an agreed timetable and a licence amendment indicating in detail the framework mandating 
LLU by April 2000913. Oftel’s November 1999 statement “contained a large degree of 
agreement by BT”. Thus, when questioning Oftel about slow delivery a year later, the TISC 
publicly scrutinised BT’s Chief Executive and its Regulatory Affairs Director, Ian Morfett 
too914, albeit more mildly.
Instead, in her December 2000 TISC hearing, Patricia Hewitt expressed full confidence in 
Edmonds’ approach. The Government had just reappointed him915; around two-and-a-half- 
years from the initial three-year appointment916, despite the maximum term being five 
years917. The Minister stressed the European Commission’s view that “Oftel is regarded by 
many other national regulatory authorities as the benchmark for an independent, efficient, 
competent and pro-active regulatory authority”918.
Hewitt had hardly expressed previous policy backing publicly, indicating the informal 
exchanges between regulator and the Minister after Oftel exploited its informal ties with
911 Interviews B,C
912 HC93-i para.61
913 HC93-i 25 /1/00, paras.56-57
914 HC90 20/3 /01 , paras.307-359; WardA 20/12/00 “MPs praise BT for speeding up unbundling” FT
915 Roberts,D & Shrimsley,R 1/11/00 ‘Telecoms regulator has contract extended” FT
916 EdmondsJD 27 /3 /03  “Memorandum by Oftel” in House o f Lords, HC68-II, 17/12/03 “Constitution 
Minutes o f  Evidence”
917 see ch.3
918 HC66-i 15/12/00, para.15
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BT. She became actively involved, despite having no direct formal authority over Oftel, 
well after the new condition required BT to unbundle and the operational impasse between 
BT and OLOs.
Oftel’s account o f events persuaded Hewitt, who bolstered Oftel’s policy primacy. It had 
the necessary resources, associated with recruiting and retaining regulatory staff with “very 
valuable expertise”, to do the job. The DGT gained Hewitt’s support despite not acting 
firmly and formally with BT, and notwithstanding her concerns, from the end of summer 
2000, about the absence of “sensible working relationships between the engineers and the 
other staff of the different operators”. After meeting Edmonds, she privately confronted 
BT over unsatisfactory progress with LLU919.
Thus, having proposed LLU adoption, between the end o f 1999 and the end of 2000 TISC 
hearings, the regulator exploited its ties with the influential Minister after driving policy 
development aided by convergent industry actors, rather than through its powers. In March 
2000, MCI Worldcom’s international affairs vice-president, Richard Feasey, stated: “Oftel 
is a good model o f a regulator that takes its decisions transparently and independently (of 
political concerns)”920. Feasey praised Oftel’s laissez-faire approach; Continental European 
agencies applied quasi-judicial procedures. Oftel had largely developed the framework 
through informal collaboration since the initial consultation, when it pursued LLU 
“informed by responses”921.
Yet, telecoms executives expressed increasing dissatisfaction with Oftel for not fully 
exercising its formal powers. Despite issue complexity, BT’s obstructive behaviour922 and 
operators having “teams o f lawyers just to handle Oftel”923, OLOs became frustrated924. 
Eventually, many complained to the TISC. Thus Pic claimed that it was not until OLOs 
“specifically asked the Director General to invoke” that Edmonds sought the licence 
modification prescribing unbundling ‘condition 83’; ongoing “co-regulation” reflected 
“regulation by Oftel and BT”925.
919 ibid, paras.18-19
920 Parkes,S 15/3/00 “New government curbs on competitive madness” FT
921 Oftel 12/98
922 HC90 20/3/01: Memoranda submitted by: Energis Communications (8/11/00); WorldCom Appendix 11 
(9/11/00); Colt Telecommunications, Appendix 16 (13/11 /00)
923 Parkes 15/3/00
924 ibid; Purton,P 21 /6 /00  “Woddwide pressures to unbundle grow stronger”, FT
925 HC90 20/3 /01 , “Memorandum submitted by Thus Pic”, Appendix 14 (13/11/00)
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Kingston complained Oftel had relied excessively on BT’s subjective policy information 
and only reacted to the latter’s reluctance to unbundle. The process and its speed had been 
mishandled prompting too many determinations and complaints926. The CSSA described 
regulatory failure; a “stunning example o f the captured regulator”927.
In practice, Oftel aimed to minimise the extent BT would exploit its resources928, including 
refusing licence modification engendering a reference to the Competition Commission but 
also information asymmetries929. Dialogue was prioritised as Oftel launched the March 
2000 formal consultation930, to have the new condition in place by June 2000 (subject to the 
consultation outcome), for it to come into effect on a date that the D G T would 
determine931. The DGT expressed satisfaction with BT’s and industry’s commitment while 
consulting. Similarly; “Oftel will continue to work with BT to see if the timetable can be 
improved”932.
Oftel was actually given new enforcement powers under the Competition Act 1998, 
prohibiting anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominance933, including fines for 
anti-competitive behaviour up to 10% of UK turnover for each year of infringement, for a 
maximum of 3 years934. However, Oftel’s strategy and forecasting Director, Alan Bell, 
claimed the threat of fines placed the responsibility “for fair trading squarely where it 
belonged - with the operators”935.
Competition law was not useful since assembling relevant evidence was complex, making 
possible imposition of sanctions a lengthy process, especially since unbundling had been 
introduced under the Telecoms Act936. Oftel expected OLOs to mobilise more resources 
and to be informed when BT’s behaviour echoed the forbidden ‘prohibitions’, signalling 
that it was not motivated to negate BT’s interests937.
926 “Memorandum submitted by Kingston Communications” 11/00
927 “Memorandum submitted by the Computing Services and Software Association”, Appendix 2, 3 /11/00
928 see ch.l; Nordlinger
929 Interviews B,C
930 Oftel 10/3/00, “Statutory consultation on local loop unbundling licence condition”
931 OPR 10/3/00, “Oftel announces a key new stage towards unbundling the local loop”
932 ibid
933 see ch.3
934 para.2.21
935 Parkes 15/3/00
936 Interview: C
937 see ch.l; Nordlinger
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Implementation and commercial delivery were advanced regardless. In early-April 2000, 
before unbundling was formally required, industry had selected 14 companies to participate 
in trials938. Operators would place initial orders to rent space and co-locate in exchanges 
from September 2000. BT would build facilities within exchanges to house OLOs’ 
equipment.
Then, Oftel obtained BT’s agreement to insert licence condition 83939 setting out service 
requirements; the ‘Access Network Facilities’ (ANF) agreement940 providing legal certainty 
at a time when OLOs started signalling dissatisfaction. Edmonds complimented again BT 
on having “co-operated with Oftel”, “this important work continues to move forward at a 
rapid pace”941. BT would not provide services only if the D G T felt it was unreasonably 
impractical. Reasons in writing were required when refusing or ceasing to provide a service, 
and reasonable notice had to be given when actions risked affecting OLOs’ use o f services 
adversely. Loop and internal tie circuit charges, determined by Oftel following consultation, 
had to be cost-oriented. Charges for other services would only be determined following 
unsuccessful commercial negotiations942.
Having achieved significant consent, Oftel tailored formal decision-making, selecting what 
and when to intervene on. Unbundled loop prices would be reviewed “regularly”943, but, as 
Kingston complained, Oftel used part o f BT’s work to refine the proposal as the regulator 
balanced OLOs’ need not to be commercially penalised by charges with BT’s cost- 
recovery.
BT’s unique ‘physical’ asset made new statutory resources useful subject to the regulator’s 
willingness to redress any non-compliance ex post but, equally importantly, subject to 
Oftel’s ability to analyse and understand ex ante when and how BT could inhibit entry.
938 Colt, CWC, Easynet, Eircom, Energis, Fibemet, First Telecom, Global Crossing, Kingston 
Communication, MCI Worldcom, NTL, Telewest, Telinco, Thus. OPR 5 /4 /00 , “Oftel announces significant 
progress on local loop unbundling”; The Guardian 6 /4 /00 , “On message”
939 OPR 28/4/00, “Legal framework for local loop unbundling now in place”
940 Oftel 4/00, “Requirement to provide access network facilities [83]”. Services supplied upon request
included: Metallic Path Facilities (the loops); internal tie circuits linking MPFs in BT sites (or MDF (Main 
Distribution Frames) and OLOs’ systems; co-location; external tie circuits linking MPFs and OLOs systems 
outside sites (for distant location); spectrum management information; charges
941 OPR 28 /4 /00
942 Oftel 4/00,para.l7
943 Oftel 5/00,para.12
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Accordingly, OLOs were ‘invited’ to provide evidence to redress information asymmetries, 
directly contributing to their entry and limiting Oftel’s use of formally-allocated resources.
The emphasis on dialogue was evident when Oftel consulted on Condition 83 provisions 
coming into force on 8th August944. The condition provided the legal framework so that “if  
any problems occur, Oftel can intervene swiftly, so that the timetable...remains on 
course”945. BT had to accept co-location orders from 1st September and complete work 
enabling OLOs to launch consumer services by July 2001946. Sir Iain Vallance, BT’s then 
Chairman, claimed BT worked with OLOs, but that the July 2001 deadline was too tight947.
However, in May 2000 the European Commission adopted a Recommendation, and 
proposed a Regulation in mid-July948, asking Member States to mandate unbundling by 31 
December 2000949. Edmonds had advocated the rapid framing of a Regulation with the 
European Commissioner950, with DTI support951, before seeking BT’s licence modification 
consent. Thus just as Oftel’s persuasion of BT occurred largely privately, informal 
exchanges with EU policy-makers952, over whom Oftel had no authority, resulted in a 
formally stronger national position. I f  BT resisted LLU once the proposed Regulation 
became hard law, it would breach European law.
Though unable to mandate national adoption, the Commission’s framing of EU LLU 
policy, late but sooner than the UK’s regulator had expected953, pressured the British 
Government to be seen to support the initiative, thereby helping Oftel. Information 
Society Commissioner Erkki Liikanen’s spokesman remarked that the Commission was 
“acting upon the unanimous consensus o f the heads of state in Lisbon. A clear political
944 Oftel 7/00, “Draft determination under condition 83.27 of schedule 1 to the Public Telecommunications 
Licence granted to British Telecommunications PLC concerning the entry into force o f the condition 
‘Requirement to provide Access Network Facilities’”; OPR 8 /8 /00 , “Oftel brings into force on local loop 
unbundling licence condition”
945 OPR 11/7/00 “Oftel proposes to bring local loop unbundling condition into force” (italics added)
946 ibid; Thackray,R 12/7/00 “Oftel gives BT September deadline”, The Independent
947 Vallance,118/7/00, “Taking a robust approach to unbundling”, FT
948 European Commission 7/00, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and o f the council on 
unbundled access to the local loop” COM(2000)394
949 Official Journal o f the European Communities 29 /6 /00  “Commission Recommendation 2000/417/EC of 
25 May 2000” Art 1.2
950 Edmonds 14/11/00, HC90, para.6
951 Hewitt 13/12/00, para.28
952 OPR 12/7/00, “Oftel Statement on European Commission's proposed Regulation on Local Loop 
Unbundling”
953 Edmonds 14/11/00, para.6; Interviews B,C
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message was given from the highest level”954. The proposed Regulation was subject to 
adoption by the Council o f Ministers and European Parliament, but, given the new EU 
deadline and since BT insisted that July 2001 was the “earliest feasible target”, several 
OLOs considered taking group legal action955.
Notwithstanding the imminent EU deadline, Oftel continued working towards LLU 
services becoming available largely through informal instruments956. Having flagged the 
proposed Regulation and with condition 83 to be brought into force957, in July 2000 Oftel 
published draft ‘guidelines’ listing all facilities and services that BT had to offer by start- 
September958. The DGT planned to follow the guidelines not part o f the licence, and 
without legal scope959.
Therein, Oftel indicated that regarding relevant LLU product information provision, for 
instance on the physical co-location ‘Hostel’ for entrants’ equipment, BT could only avoid 
disclosing confidential information on its customers or affecting reasonable security960. 
Oftel ignored BT’s resistance to non-binding guidelines on co-location delivery times. 
Loops were to be provided within three to five days once equipment was installed961.
Otherwise Oftel kept ‘heightening policy advantages’ to BT and showed it did not wish to 
‘negate’ BT’s interests962. When Condition 83 setting out BT’s obligations came into force, 
Oftel conceded that not all required products would have been available simultaneously 
given the dependence on other unavailable services963. Oftel expected, sequentially: a 
reference offer; order acceptance; co-location delivered; maximum number o f loops 
delivered as soon as practically possible, even with systems not fully in place to process 
initial orders. Thus, while BT published a reference offer by August 2000964 amply
954 Hirst,C 9 /7 /0 0  “Clock counts down for BT monopoly; Brussels cuts high-speed internet deadline by 
half”, The Independent
955 HylandA 20/7/00, “BT faces court over access” The Guardian
956 Mathieson,C 12/7/00, “Local loop cannot be freed faster, says Oftel”, The Times
957 Thackray,R 12/7/00 “Oftel gives BT September deadline”, The Independent
958 Oftel 31 /7 /00  “Access Network Facilities - Oftel draft guidelines on Condition 83 o f BT’s Licence”; 
Hyland A  1 /8/00, “BT must open up to rivals next year” The Guardian; Arthur,C 1 /8 /00 , “BT made to 
speed local competition” The Independent
959 Oftel 9/00 “Access Network Facilities: Oftel Guidelines on Condition 83 o f BT’s Licence”
960 A space fitted-out in a room with no separation between co-locating OLOs’ equipment. Bespoke 
arrangements could be requested for special needs
961 OPR 21/9/00, “Oftel sets out timetable and conditions for Local Loop Unbundling”
962 see ch.l; Nordlinger
963 Oftel 8/00(1) “Bringing Condition 83 into effect”, para.9
964 Oftel 8/00(2) “Access to Bandwidth: Conclusions on charging principles and further indicative charges”
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complying with the EU Regulation deadline965 (Oftel rejected proposed annual rental and 
connection charges966), Oftel’s implementation efforts did not involve the significant 
application of new formal arrangements.
Indeed, pursuing its preference consistent with Type II autonomy, in September, Oftel 
made a significant operational compromise aiding BT when announcing that 28 OLOs 
could co-locate in 361 exchanges, but excluding those where demand for space exceeded 
supply; OLOs agreed967. Originally, OLOs asked the Electoral Reform Society to act as a 
neutral channel for their applications to access BT’s exchanges. It ranked exchanges by 
popularity and passed the top 360 to BT to prepare space, but left unresolved how BT 
allocated oversubscribed sites968. Oftel, therefore, intervened upon request by the 
‘empowered’ OLOs mobilising their resources969, to avoid that excess demand and 
indecision impeded entry. Decisions over excluded sites, which could be imposed, were 
postponed to November.
Edmonds claimed the location and nature of unbundling could not be left to BT. He 
would use powers wherever necessary, given complaints about BT’s restrictive and 
ambiguous contract clauses. Yet, the DG T “insisted” that unfair terms be removed first970, 
again relying on OLOs’ policy input, and refraining from enforcing applicable provisions 
despite BT not heeding requests to comply.
OLOs planned to sign BT’s revised contracts but, frustrated by Oftel’s slow intervention as 
they tried raising capital971, considered lodging a formal complaint with the regulator given 
the incumbent’s “cosmetic” changes972. OLOs blamed Edmonds for underestimating BT’s 
skill in “playing regulatory politics” and arranged to meet him privately; the media reported 
unfavourable comparisons with his predecessors973.
965 OPR 16/8 /00  “Oftel sets out charging principles for provision o f  local loop unbundling”
966 Oftel 8/00(2) paras.3.23-3.24
967 OPR 19/9/00 “Operators allocated first exchanges for local loop unbundling”
968 Daniel,C 14/9/00 “Unusual role for Electoral Reform Society”, FT
969 see ch.l; Nordlinger
970 OPR 19/9/00
971 Daniel,C 14/9 /00  “Kingston considers Pounds lbn expansion project”, FT; Bennett,R & RobertsJD 
19 /9 /00  ‘Telecom group says regulator is suffocating internet growth”, FT; ShillingfordJ 21 /9 /00  “Energis 
plans placing to raise Pounds 400m”, FT
972 Hirst,C 10/9/00 “BT rivals look to Europe for help” The Independent
973 Durman,P 17/9/00, ‘Telecoms firms accuse Oftel o f thwarting competition”, The Sunday Times; 
DowardJ 17/9/00, “'Toothless' Oftel fails Blair's vision”, The Observer; The Independent 19/9/00 “Oftel 
shambles”
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BT had created a site “blacklist” requiring extensive work which delayed entry, while 
finding room for its own DSL equipment974. As OLOs pulled out975, or waited to see how 
LLU developed before entering the market976, the D GT acknowledged that intervention 
should have come earlier, and “stuck our oar in harder” in September 2000977. Yet, as 
policy terms were set, Edmonds defended his agency from public pressure too978 and, 
despite dissipating industry support for its approach with BT, clearly attracted the key 
support of Patricia Hewitt979.
Before defending Edmonds at her TISC hearing, the Minister responded publicly to the 
head of cabinet for European Information Commissioner Liikanen, Olli Rehn’s980, criticism 
o f Oftel and the Treasury’s dissatisfaction with Oftel’s handling of BT981. In a letter to the 
Financial Times, Hewitt emphasised: “It was the present director-general of Oftel, David 
Edmonds (not the European Commission), who decided that unbundling should happen 
and who negotiated the necessary licence amendment with British Telecom, which took 
effect...four months before the Commission’s proposed (unbundling) deadline”982.
In addition to consulting on shared access, or ‘line-sharing’983, required of EU fixed line 
incumbents984, Oftel proceeded with domestic entry-related practicalities985. While few 
chose distant location986, Oftel refined the ‘Bow Wave’ procedure for allocating space 
within selected exchanges987. Revised ‘recommendations’ taking into account consultants’ 
technical expertise and industry views granted a larger number of entrants physical co­
974 Roberts,D 29 /9 /00  “Going the last mile”, FT
975 Bennett & Roberts 19/9/00; Mathieson,C 25/9 /00 , “Rivals may fight shy of joining BT loop”, The Times
976 McIntosh,B 22/9/00, “Oftel responds to criticism of local loop unbundling”, The Independent
977 Roberts,D 20 /9 /00  “Leaving the opposition out of the loop”, FT
978 Edmonds,D 21/9/00, “Right of Reply: Oftel shambles” The Independent
979 McIntosh,B 23 /9 /00  “Delay in unbundling of BT’s local loop ‘threatens 15bn in investment’”, The 
Independent
980 EU Enlargement Commissioner at the time o f  writing
981 Bennett,R & Roberts,D 22 /9 /00  “Telecoms watchdog 'dictated to by B T ”, FT; Roberts,D 23 /9 /00  “BT 
unlikely to meet terms for break-up”, FT
982 Hewitt,P 3 /10/00  “Letters to the Editor - UK on track for first unbundled loops”, FT
983 Besides OLOs’ LLU broadband, customers could receive telephony from them or BT
984 Oftel 24/10/00 “Access to bandwidth: shared access”; not in condition 83
985 Partridge,C 3 /10 /00  “Is Oftel failing the industry?”, The Times
986 OLOs agreed to exclude it from Bow Wave to ease ordering processes; Oftel 10/00 para.1.7. Teather,D 
26 /9 /00 , “Redstone avoids BTs local loop obstacles” The Guardian
987 Oftel 10/00, “Consultation on Local Loop Unbundling ‘Bow Wave Process’” For detail, Oftel 11/00, 
“Statement and Determination on local loop unbundling ‘Bow Wave Process’”. It would help select popular 
BT exchange batches for co-location, until demand stabilised making it unnecessary. Initially its use was 
expected at three-month intervals. The next was due in December. para.2.5&3.31
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location access988. Edmonds noted the allocation method’s complexity but highlighted the 
success; other EU regulators were not experiencing similar demand989. The process was “on 
the basis of a collective industry view”990. Thus the regulator continued negotiating 
solutions, but produced results.
BT exploited operational advantages, controversially avoiding binding itself to the Bow 
Wave Code o f Conduct selection process OLOs underwent. However, Oftel determined 
that non-discrimination requirements BT had consented to should not be breached, and 
thus that the Code applied to the incumbent991. Subsequently, BT told the TISC that it was 
“happy to have reached agreement with Oftel”992. Previous negotiations about space 
allocation and the ANF’s ‘quality’, between BT and OLOs, had not resolved differences993.
Oftel’s persuasion of BT was evident since LLU terms largely endorsed OLOs views 
regarding physical access to BT’s network. BT “was not reasonable” in important areas994. 
^Proposals’ included an ‘independent’ expert verifying claims o f space shortages and co- 
location charges. BT was bound to timescales and providing OLOs the same service it 
supplied its own business. Earlier in November, Oftel’s draft annual rental and connection 
charges per loop995, respectively higher and lower than BT’s proposal, satisfied OLOs 
too996. Oftel still avoided imposing reductions on all items, capitalising upon ways in which 
it promoted divergent interests997.
A few days later Oftel Deputy Director and former DTI official Anne Lambert announced 
BT’s agreement to unbundle at least 600 loops by 1 July 2001, hence, beyond the EU year- 
end deadline, with 200 per month to follow thereafter. Preparing exchanges required “a lot
988 Initially, Oftel proposed that OLOs bid for three or six equipment racks within an exchange according to 
weighted priorities; Oftel 11/00, para.2.11. Ultimately, OLOs would bid in three-rack increments with 
additional racks awarded a lower priority, if  room remained available; ch.3
989 Edmonds^) 20 /10/00 “Oftel and BT” The Times
990 Oftel 11/00
991 Oftel 11/00, BowWave ch.4 and AnnexD
992 HC90 20/3/01 paras.348-9, stated 13/12/00
993 Oftel 11/2000, “Local Loop Unbundling - Proposed Determination o f the Terms o f an Access Network 
Facilities Agreement”
"4 OPR 23/11/00, “Terms and conditions for Local Loop Unbundling published today by Oftel”
995 Oftel 11/2000, “Consultation and draft Determination on charges for Metallic Path Facilities and Internal 
Tie-cables”
996 Teather,D 7 /11 /00  “Loop levy points to pounds 10 a month bill” The Guardian; Mein tosh,B 7 /11/00  
“Oftel proposes charge levels for BT loop access” The Independent
997 see ch.l; Nordlinger
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more work to be done”. Yet, BT proposed a Service Level Agreement incorporating 
financial payments for late delivery, which Oftel would revise if unsatisfactory998.
So, Oftel’s activity increased after summer 2000 without a marked change in its negotiating 
stance, notwithstanding mounting domestic pressure and the then non-binding draft 
Regulation’s tighter deadline. Heightened national implementation efforts, while the 
supranational formal framework developed, saw Patricia Hewitt become involved. With 
10% of the network expected to be open to competition by July 2001999, TISC members 
publicly questioned what they deemed limited progress before hearing Oftel1000, without 
powers to do so1001.
Edmonds rejected the claim that Oftel only acted in response to TISC views, but showed 
the influence o f the select committee’s critical public scrutiny despite its limited powers 
over Oftel, as he recounted his persuasion of BT. The D G T stressed the absence of a 
European Regulation1002 and o f primary domestic legislation requiring BT to unbundle. He 
argued that had the Regulation been in place the previous year, he could have “looked to 
statutory powers”1003, without mentioning the available licence condition overlooked at the 
end of 1999.
Negotiating seemed faster than asking Government for new powers1004. Furthermore, the 
level of detail undertaken to address BT’s resistance was “some o f the most intrusive 
Regulation that any British company has ever suffered”1005, substantiating the DGT’s Type 
II approach. Edmonds referred to “trench warfare” with BT over allocating OLOs space in 
its exchanges, finding tempting sending its executives to jail, if given the powers1006. 
Nonetheless the imposition o f an obligation was not taken lightly1007. Otherwise, defending 
selecting low-priority exchanges first, advantaging BT, Edmonds stressed that upon no 
industry agreement he rapidly produced a transitional allocation methodology however 
suboptimal, thus making a compromise proposal.
998 OPR 10/11/00 “Oftel announces further progress towards local loop unbundling”
999 600 out of about 6,000 local exchanges
1000 Roberts,D & Bennett,R 13/11/00 “MPs to probe watchdog over 'problems with BT'”, FT
1001 see ch.3
1002 Previously in 25 /9 /00  “LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: Facts speak for themselves”, FT
1003 HC90 20/3/01, paras.5-6
1004 ibid, para. 12
io°5 ibid, para.10
1006 HC90 20/3 /01 , paras.35-37; WardA 15/11/00 “BT 'held up' introduction o f competition”, FT
1007 “Memorandum submitted by Oftel”, 8 /12/00, Appendix 19
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The DGT’s informal input persuaded Patricia Hewitt who, before defending Oftel from 
the TISC, talked to unhappy operators once progress between BT and OLOs stalled. The 
Minister chaired a DTI meeting with OLOs to grasp the problems in early October 2000, 
then met Sir Peter Bonfield and his senior BT colleagues specifically on LLU, 
notwithstanding regular meetings with them. She presented the domestic implementation 
timetable’s urgency given the Regulation, exhibiting her influence.
Following Oftel’s and DTI officials’ input, Hewitt took direct action, putting pressure on 
BT’s management privately to ensure their speeding up o f LLU roll-out given the EU end 
of 2000 deadline. She told Bonfield that BT envisaged a very small number o f exchanges 
open to OLOs by July 2001. “From the Government’s point o f view that was not 
acceptable” and it “wanted to see...certainly no less than 600...opened up...no later than 
July 2001 ”1008.
Although Hewitt lacked licence enforcement powers, she showed how ministerial ‘menage- 
a-trois’ ties with the former state monopoly and the regulator still mattered by referring to 
the precise number of exchanges that the DGT had argued OLOs should be able to access 
by July 20011009. The Bow Wave determination did not formally specify how many 
exchanges had to be opened. So, though the DGT had indicated 600 exchanges, BT’s 
decision should have been of an exclusively commercial nature.
Thus Oftel used its informal ties and policy expertise to shape Hewitt’s views on how BT 
was impeding the process, influencing her approach with the incumbent. Similarly, given a 
“professional discussion (and) relationship” with Oftel1010, Bonfield accepted the requests 
of its officials despite the reluctance and the view that it may not have been possible1011. He 
did not deny the legitimacy o f OLOs complaint that BT had blacklisted exchanges to place 
its DSL equipment1012. Indeed Hewitt met BT’s management few days before her hearing 
to ensure their ongoing commitment, and spoke to OLOs who acknowledged progress “as
1008 HC66-i 15/12/00, para.19; hearing held 13/12/00
1009 OPR 27/11/00
1010 HC90 20/3/01, paras.310. Hearing held days after Hewitt’s hearing; 19/12/00
1011 ibid.paras.322-23
1012 HC90 20/3/01, paras.321,343
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a result of the D TI’s intervention and Oftel’s action”1013. OLOs were “having direct one- 
to-one meetings” with BT too1014.
The private impact of the junior Minister on the former state monopoly proved highly 
useful to Oftel as BT offered to work towards the EU timetable and OLOs moderated 
their dissatisfaction. Furthermore, while considering Oftel’s intervention “too little, too 
late”, indicating that preference convergence does not entail ‘capture’, key OLOs expressed 
gratitude to Hewitt and Oftel at their hearing1015.
Indeed, Hewitt’s support of Oftel came within months of OLOs asking that BT’s 
wholesale network operations and retail business be structurally separated1016. BT’s 
wholesale division could pass OLOs’ operational details onto the retail division providing 
broadband, generating further competitive advantages. After hearing DTI officials, the 
DGT, and OLOs, Hewitt spoke incisively to BT without publicly proposing separation 
through the SoS’s licensing powers, or Oftel’s licence modifications powers1017.
Thus while using persuasion and negotiation with BT, besides using OLOs’ convergence 
and operational expertise to pursue its policy preference, Oftel privately harnessed the 
Minister’s support, whose informal confrontational approach helped make BT more 
amenable to LLU.
TISC scrutiny and the impending EU deadline focussed Oftel’s attention on BT’s 
operational advantages rather than fuelling the regulator’s activity. Subsequendy, Oftel 
received OLOs’ praise for introducing compensation measures1018. A second bidding round 
for BT’s “most popular” exchanges was announced in December1019. With the Regulation 
adopted 18th December, Oftel finalised charges, increasing annual rental but reducing the 
connection charge1020, and defined shared access terms1021.
1013 HC66-i 15/12/00, para.19
1014 ibid
1015 HC90 20/3/01, para.176; Bill Allan, Thus Pic Chief Executive
1016 'The Independent 3 /10/00  “e-commerce will only thrive when we break-up BT” ; Hirst,C 29/10/00  
“Break-up BT now, say rivals” The Independent
1017 Oftel 11/00, ANF ch.3. Oftel considered it “not proportionate”
1018 ShillingfordJ 24/11/00 “Oftel gets tough with BT after rivals complain of obstruction”, FT
1019 OPR 13/12/00 “Oftel welcomes allocation o f more BT exchanges for local loop unbundling”
1020 Oftel 29/12/00, “Determination under Condition 83.16 of the licence o f British Telecommunications pic 
relating to the final charges for the provision o f metallic path facilities and associated internal tie cables”
1021 Oftel 29/12/00, “Access to bandwidth: Shared access to the local loop”
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Yet, the decisions were announced only two days before the Regulation came into force. 
Shared access could have been mandated earlier, based on Interconnection Directive 
97/33/EC. Moreover, charges would be determined in April 2001, deviating from formal 
EU requirements despite shared access being one of the “minimum list of items” required 
in BT’s end o f 2000 reference offer1022. This section has thus shown that the regulator 
avoided fully using statutory instruments and imposing decisions on BT, deploying 
persuasion and negotiating instead, and exploiting influential convergent actors to pursue 
its LLU preference.
V. Time-length of decision-making
Oftel conducted LLU policy in the UK from the outset, strongly opposed by BT. It did so 
primarily by means other than the formal instruments possessed through BT’s licence and 
the Competition Act 1998. BT predictably hindered LLU1023, causing delays1024. Indeed the 
regulator did not fully abide by the EU Regulation end o f 2000 timeframe notwithstanding 
pursuing its preference for over two years and timescale powers at disposal, consistent with 
Type II autonomy.
When undertaking licence modifications or enforcement, Oftel had to grant at least 28 days 
for affected parties to express views; no more. Even after informally obtaining BT’s 
consent to the statutory licence modification consulted upon 10 March 2000, it eschewed 
applying the 28-days minimum to expedite policy1025. Besides allowing representations until 
7 April, Oftel granted eighteen more days according to its acknowledged ‘informal’ 
“practice... to allow further time (usually 14 days) for comments on these 
representations”1026. Meanwhile, operators like First Telecom and KPNQwest were starting 
DSL provision in Germany, suggesting the UK was two years behind on LLU1027.
1022 e c  2887/2000 30/12/00, Annex
1023 Teather 7/7 /99; HC90 20/3/01, para.46. TISC officials surmised Oftel should have realised it
1024 For example, asking that inappropriate cost components be included in charges or drafting unfair ANF  
terms
1025 oftel 10/3/00
1026 Oftel 11/99, Annex C l7
i°27 HylandA 24/3/00, “Oftel first to offer consumer protection”, The Guardian. Germany had relevant 
primary legislation since 1997; HC90 20/3/01, para.39
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When condition 83 was accepted and inserted in BT’s licence1028, almost one-and-a-half- 
years had passed since the December 1998 consultation. Oftel granted almost four months 
for respondents to express their views on the detailed initial proposals, to be simply 
supported or opposed, including fourteen days for ‘comments-on-comments’. During this 
lengthy period, BT told Oftel that it would work closely with Oftel and industry to develop 
unbundling arrangements. The regulator proceeded without haste nonetheless, exhibiting 
considerable forbearance.
In July 1999, Oftel consulted on options 2 and 4 already raised in December 1998, 
projecting an implementation timeframe of two more years for option 2, albeit as a 
maximum. While recognising the complexity of delivering LLU, preference convergent 
OLOs emphasised that July 2001 was too late a deadline and needed shortening by six to 
nine months, especially if BT was allowed to exploit option 4 products meanwhile1029. Yet, 
Oftel took almost five months, two-and-a-half for responses, before issuing the November 
statement confirming the introduction of LLU1030. Although working groups discussed 
technical and commercial issues meanwhile, rather than launching the statutory 
consultation formalising the framework immediately, Oftel prolonged the process by about 
three months, retaining the informal practice of fourteen days for comments.
Furthermore, once condition 83 had been accepted, despite powers to establish when it 
would apply, Oftel decided to grant BT three more months (28 April-S* August) during 
which provisions would not be complied with, after seventeen months spent creating a 
framework. The mid-July announcement1031 came one day before the European 
Commission’s ‘proposed’ Regulation setting the end-2000 deadline was published. With a 
deadline six months ahead, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament 
signalled urgency.
The condition would apply months before the Regulation’s adoption. Accordingly 
Edmonds expressed confidence that the legal framework would be in place before the end 
o f 20001032. The Regulation did not have to be transposed into national law. It applied
1028 OPR 28/4 /00
i°29 oftel 11/99, Annex A4-A6; Carew,S and CraigA 28 /7 /99  “Telcos slam Oftel for delaying DSL” 
Network News
103° Initially intended for October. Oftel 7/99, para.5.9
1031 OPR 11/7/00
1032 o p r  12/ 7/00
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directly1033, but the deadline was intended for providing unbundled loops1034 rather than to 
finalise a legal framework as Oftel suggested, and which made it retain its initial timetable 
aiding BT. In July, OLOs like UK-based Colt knew they would offer DSL in Germany and 
the Netherlands by December 20001035.
Oftel gave BT every chance to alter public officials’ preferences, not undertaking policy 
“unless and until” BT was persuaded1036. The eight-month period between deciding to open 
BT’s exchanges to competition in November 1999 and August 2000 exemplified Oftel’s 
reluctance to expedite LLU. Edmonds claimed he was “heavily engaged” from the moment 
the licence was published in April through the summer1037. Yet, he proposed unbundling 
and by making a reference to the Competition Commission could have obtained the 
modification in less time, over the same period.
The Competition Commission was formally allowed six months to evaluate a reference. If 
upheld, Oftel would have then had to grant 28 days for representations before applying the 
modification1038, totalling a period of seven months if the reference was made when the 
statement was published. So, unless the Commission concluded that BT’s local access 
control was not against the public interest, Oftel could have obtained a faster modification 
than negotiations achieved. The SoS could pose a veto, but the DTI, especially Patricia 
Hewitt, publicly supported the agency1039. Moreover, Oftel could have pushed BT to 
comply rapidly through directions thereafter1040.
So, Oftel avoided hastening the formal consultation within weeks of Gordon Brown 
announcing that the agency would try expediting delivery. Meanwhile, BT exploited its 
network access by equipping 416 sites to try offering DSL in April, and planned to reach 
33% households, or 50% of internet users, by end-June through various forms of 
‘wholesale’ products direcdy to users and ISPs1041. Oftel rarely used 28 days as benchmark 
to request comments on ‘informal’ consultations, indicating further discretion over 
timescales. Oftel allocated longer than the formally set timescale regardless o f development
1033 Lambert HC90 20/3/01, para.3
1034 EC 2887/2000, 30/12/00, Art.3(2)
1035 Hyland 20 /7 /00
1036 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1037 HC90 20/3 /01 , para.8
1038 see ch.3
1039 Hammersley 6/12/99; HC66-i 15/12/00
1040 see ch.3
1041 Scales,! 13 /4 /00  “BT slams down phone on net rivals”, The Times
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phases: when first raising issues; before BT accepted condition 83; and after the
acceptance, prior to the EU deadline cutting Oftel’s timeframe.
Oftel faced pressure from UK elected officials, OLOs and the EU. Allocating 28 days 
remained exceptional. For example, the May 2000 indicative pricing principles consultation 
allowed for responses within that period, but final prices were actually due for December. 
The same timeframe was also allowed for OftePs proposed June ANFP. Yet, this was 
following industry’s inability to reach spectrum management consensus over seven months. 
A further case o f 28 days consultation was the draft direction excluding distant location 
from Bow Wave, requested by the OPF after lengthy discussions. Indeed, since Oftel 
announced the 600 exchanges with unbundled loops by July 2001 a few days before a 
hearing, the TISC questioned timing, suggesting that Oftel acted according to the 
committee’s concerns1042. Only two months before the EU Regulation came into force, 
respondents on shared access were still granted the additional fourteen days.
Media reports claimed that Oftel tried delaying the European timetable, with Hewitt’s 
support when telecoms Ministers met over the proposed Regulation in October 20001043. 
Reports included Member States amending proposals to avoid forcing LLU six months 
earlier than Britain planned, allowing national regulators to proceed more slowly in case of 
“technical problems”1044. Hewitt denied the claims1045, though the Regulation indicated that: 
“Requests shall only be refused on the basis of objective criteria, relating to technical 
feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity”1046. In practice, with no unbundled 
loops expected by start-2001 except at two trial exchanges1047 and line-sharing planned well 
into 2001, Oftel openly prospected delays beyond the Regulation’s deadline, despite its 
criticism o f BT, that o f OLOs, the Government, the Conservative Party and the European 
Commission1048.
1042 HC90 20/03/01, para. 10
1043 The Independent 7 /10 /00  “Outlook: Meddling Ministers”
1044 Harvey,F & Roberts^) 27 /9 /00  “Move to water down EU telecoms legislation”; Roberts,D 3/10/00, 
“UK claims victory over pace o f European phone network reforms”, FT
1045 Hewitt,P 11/10/00 “Letter: Loop Unbundling”, The Independent
1846 EC 2887/2000 Art.3(2)
1047 TreanorJ 30 /12 /00  “BT begins to let rivals in”, The Guardian
1048 Hirst,C 17/12/00, “Rivals attack BT over high-speed net access” The Independent
230
VI. Outcomes
At the start o f 2001, Oftel notified BT of the Regulation’s enactment. The SoS and the 
D GT considered whether Condition 83 needed changes to remove inconsistencies with 
EU provisions, superseding it1049. In practice, in late-December 2000 BT had opened its 
first exchanges to competitors, allowing initial installation. Energis claimed about four 
months were necessary between entering exchanges and commercial delivery, making late 
July a likely date for earliest OLO provision1050.
In January, the D G T publicly stressed that LLU would be a key project in 20011051. Oftel 
brought forward access to BT’s most popular exchanges and started investigating co- 
location space costs as fewer orders were placed than anticipated1052. MCI Worldcom, 
Global Crossing and Telewest withdrew1053, some deterred by obstacles delaying access to 
exchanges, as BT exploited its network advantage and rolled out retail products1054. Others 
feared unprofitability, given high costs and difficult equity markets faced by telecoms firms; 
many lacked finance following heavy infrastructure investment1055.
So, while BT attributed delays to OLOs not meeting deadlines for commissioning 
exchange surveys and agreeing on allocation, Energis planned scaling back DSL 
commitments given the uncertainty surrounding space allocation and the slow pace of 
access1056. Several OLOs expressed interest for ‘distant location’ instead of physical co- 
location, given lower costs of placing equipment outside BT exchanges1057. Some OLOs 
showed interest; regulatory shortcomings were not limited to the UK1058. Yet, as Oftel’s 
comparative research depicted the UK’s residential broadband prices unfavourably1059, BT’s 
obstruction combined with worsening market conditions that reduced demand for 
exchange space.
1049 LambertA 3 /1 /01  “Letter to Ian Morfett Esq, Group Director, Regulatory Affairs, BT”
1050 WardA 17/1/01 “BT accused of foot dragging”, FT
1051 Edmonds JD 17/1/01 “Letters to the Editor - A complex and difficult process”, FT
1052 OPR 18/1/01, “Oftel most popular exchanges to be brought forward for local loop unbundling”
1053 ShillingfordJ 17/1/01(1), “Battle for the local loop”, FT
1054 Ward A  17/1/01, “BT accused of foot dragging”, FT
1055 Malkani,G 19/1/01, “Oftel orders BT to open up exchanges”, FT
1056 Ward 17/1/01
1057 ShillingfordJ 17/1/01(2), “Locations will not come cheaply”, FT
loss Shillingford 17/1/01(1)
1°59 OPR 26/1 /01  “Oftel publishes survey o f international prices for high bandwidth services”; Roberts,D 
27/1 /01 , “Internet users in UK 'paying more for high-speed access'” FT
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The progressive fall in OLOs, including some significantly involved from early on1060, led to 
Bow Wave ending in April1061, when applications for space in exchanges could go direct to 
BT1062. In February, Oftel made amendments to Bow Wave, including allowing operators 
to joindy change terms without the DGT1063, and finalised LLU service terms (ANF) 
focussing on competitive measures1064, such as transfers of co-location space between 
OLOs to avoid inefficient use.
Oftel told BT to respect timescales and ensure service quality when making sites available, 
repairing or maintaining loops1065. BT and OLOs would negotiate further service level 
measures, but BT’s failure to meet established levels would be compensated with specified 
standard rates. Significantly, Oftel signalled that physical separation between BT and 
OLOs’ equipment was unnecessary where physical co-location space did not allow 
partitioning; in such situations BT had to provide ‘bespoke’ options1066.
Thus Oftel anticipated its June draft Direction requiring BT to satisfy reasonable ‘co- 
mingling’ requests1067. The initiative, not specified in the EU Regulation1068, entailed 
significant cost and time savings regarding equipment installation. Oftel priced shared 
access too1069. Having decided that BT’s reference offer did not meet earlier requirements, 
Oftel set service compensation levels, proposing £10 per working day an unbundled loop 
was unavailable and £80 per operator per working day’s delay in providing co-location 
facilities1070.
By then, the TISC compiled its LLU report describing stakeholder views and key events. 
The abandonment o f the Bow Wave procedure, devised to indicate to BT which exchanges 
to prepare first and the order in which spaces would be allocated in cases o f insufficient
1060 Roberts,D 1 /2 /01 , “Kingston hangs up on internet contest with BT”, FT; Barker,T. Nicholson,M and 
Roberts,D 6 /2 /01 , “Broadband setback as another group quits”, FT
1061 HC197 20/7/01, “Local Loop Unbundling - Oftel response”, Appendix 3B, in “First Special Report”
1062 This was anticipated by the media in mid-February. Cane,A 19/2/01 “Oftel 'unbundling' pledge”, FT; 
TeatherJD 19/2/01, “Oftel cuts red tape around local loop”, The Guardian
1063 Oftel 2/01, “Statement and Direction on Local Loop Unbundling ‘Bow Wave Process’”
1064 oftel 21/2/01, “Local Loop Unbundling; The Terms o f the Access Network Facilities Agreement 
Statement and Determination”
1065 ibid.ch.4
i°66 ibid.ch.3.5
1067 Oftel 6/01 ‘Local Loop Unbundling; provision of co-location in the form of co-mingling”
1068 Oftel 10/01 “Local Loop Unbundling; provision o f co-location in the form o f co-mingling”,paras.2.19-20
1069 OPR 27/6/01 “Oftel announces further measures to support local loop unbundling”
1070 OPR 23/8/01 “Local loop unbundling: service level commitments and compensation”
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room due to excess OLO demand, was defined “farcical”1071. Nevertheless, Oftel had 
started delivering LLU, against BT’s preference.
In April 2001, about two-and-a-half years since Oftel’s first LLU publication, but ahead of 
its own timetable, the first commercial LLU facilities were handed over, as were 15 distant 
location facilities1072. The European Commission’s 7th Implementation report identified the 
regulator’s achievements1073. While Oftel’s difficulties were indicated, the report described 
how, despite most being inactive at the time, thirty operators had an agreement for full 
unbundling in place with BT, and that since July 2001 a total of 163 lines, though mosdy 
trials, were unbundled1074. Shared access had not been requested1075. Yet, the report 
recognised that low LLU uptake was not necessarily only related to practical problems. It 
could, at least partially, be attributed to other factors, such as a worsening financing 
climate1076. Having put the process in place, but not being disposed to dictate what 
operators should and should not do1077, Oftel delivered unbundling by largely eschewing 
deploying formal resources throughout.
1071 HC90 20/3/01, paras.21-22
1072 HC197 20/7/01, Appendix3B
1073 European Commission 28/11/01, pp.20-1
1074 Annex3.15, p.301
1075 Annex2, pp.71. Many EU countries did not provide shared access at all
1076 Annex3.15 p.296
1077 Barker,T 27/7/01 “BT has handed over only 163 lines to rivals” FT
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Table 9; Oftel’s LLU Type II autonomy
Empirical
Ind icators
Level 1 - N ordlinger’s  s ta te  level Level 2 -R eg u la to ry  level Level 3 - C ase  s tu d y  - LLU UK: Type II
Partic ipan ts 
and  re so u rce s
Range of societal actors: those 
divergent from the state, seeking to 
obstruct its preferences: also actors 
with similar preferences to the state 
supporting it (convergent) and those 
without strong expressed preferences
At s ta r t of regulatory  policy, key re so u rces  
sp re ad  am ong d istinct actors; with preferences 
similar to regulator and with divergent ones. Different 
partic ipan ts have valuable re so u rces  to exert 
influence
D ispersed  re so u rce s  and no sing le  influential g roup:
- incumbent (BT) dominant in 'local access '
- DGT of Oftel had unique licence enforcement powers, but licence 
modification powers subject to Secretary of State
- Parliamentary committee (TISC) could just ask for papers, records. But 
publicly questioned Oftel and junior Minister who intervened
- ‘new entrants’ key for competition; influence mainly expertise and ties
- EU institutions’ authority mainly from supranational powers
P referen ces C om bination of divergence, 
indifference, convergence
P re feren ces of influential participan ts differ over
regulator’s proposals. But not only influential 
d ivergen t p references; som e influential su pport
from outset for agency to shift preferences
A gency not iso lated , with su p p o rt of influential a c to rs  from sta rt: 
Oftel w anted LLU for new e n tra n ts  to com pete  in b roadband . BT 
anti-LLU to advance its broadband position. No s ta te d  G overnm ent 
preference  on LLU initially (sh a red  later) but favoured knowledge- 
based (ICT) economy from start. Yet, like new entrants, TISC favoured 
LLU for market entry. EC p re ference  c lear later
P ro c e ss S tate shifts preferences of societal 
actors overtim e, by: (i) inducem ent; 
(ii) appeasem ent-conciliation ; (iii) 
en franch isem en t; (iv) 
em pow erm ent-rei n forcem ent
To alter preferences of opponents or restrain their 
use of key resources, regulator prioritises 
negotiation  over im position. Preferences shifted 
by: (i) making com prom ise  p roposa ls; (ii) using 
p e rsu asio n , repeated bargaining; (iii) exploiting 
influential a c to rs  with convergen t p references to 
avoid confrontation
A gency avoids im position and  th rough  dialogue gradually  sh ifts  
p re fe ren ces of o p p o n en ts :
licence ch an g e  so u g h t with c o n se n t from start. Framed broad 
consultation, proposed 5 options, c h o se  2. BT strongly opposed key one. 
Despite provisions in place, Oftel n ego tia ted  licence terms. Informal 
ex ch a n g es  with BT sen io r m anagem ent; non-hierarchical. No 
obligation to attend TISC hearings and bear pressure, but LLU difficulties 
raised political interest. Still Oftel limited imposition. E xchanges with EU 
officials on EC Regulation, but key ones with junior M inister who told 
BT to expedite
Tim e-length of 
dec is io n ­
m aking
Public policy not undertaken ‘unless 
and until’ actors with divergent 
preferences are persuaded
T im escale pow ers largely neglected; policy 
fo rbearance
Lengthy regu lato ry  p ro c e ss  since, to obtain BT consent, Oftel g ran ted  
longer re sp o n se  tim esca les  than forcibly possible; con tinued  after it 
p e rsu ad ed  BT to accept new  licence condition
O utcom es State preferences translated into 
public policy after those of divergent 
actors are shifted to make them 
‘congruent or consonant’
R egulator’s  p references im plem ented after actors 
with divergent ones had been persuaded to shift 
theirs, with som e c o n ce ss io n s
Despite key BT divergence, p re ference  fulfilled after negotiating  
licence change. Oftel accepted co n sid e rab le  operational delays
VII. Conclusions
The chapter has examined LLU policy in the UK, providing a clear case of Type II 
regulatory autonomy, and thus challenging the importance of formal institutional 
arrangements. Having identified BT, OLOs, the TISC, DTI Minister Hewitt and the EU as 
key participants, the chapter firstly depicts how, aside from Oftel, local loop unbundling 
policy was not developed by actors possessing formal resources laid down in the Telecoms 
Act 1984 governing sectoral regulation. Indeed apart from EU institutions holding 
supranational powers, producing the Regulation, policy progress was determined through 
non-statutory resources.
The policy centred on BT’s unique ‘physical’ asset, the national local access network, and 
the related key information needed to implement unbundling and develop broadband 
competition. OLOs had operational and technical expertise to establish the necessary entry 
terms and facilities. The TISC raised the public exposure o f its policy assessments, drawing 
the attention of senior elected officials and media. Hewitt exploited access and ties to 
policy actors without having formal authority over them, including Oftel. So, no policy 
participant could formally determine the regulator’s decision-making. The SoS did not veto 
the licence modification. However, distinct participants possessed resources that influenced 
the policy.
Oftel proposed LLU, clearly signalling its preference. LLU constituted a significant policy 
change from the network competition approach o f previous DGTs, and was not directly 
attributable to the duties set out in the formal institutional arrangements. The process of 
Oftel’s preference fulfillment was influenced by BT’s divergence. Nonetheless, Oftel 
avoided applying an existing licence condition to impose LLU provision and avoided 
making a reference to the Competition Commission as permitted in the Telecoms Act.
Instead, the regulator sought BT’s agreement on a specific condition defining the 
unbundling framework through negotiation. Oftel undertook persuasive steps to shift 
divergence by constructing an informed case for unbundling through several ‘informal’ 
public consultations first, instead of statutory ones, and private meetings explaining why, to 
provide consumer choice in competitive broadband services across the UK, LLU 
constituted the preferable option.
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Exchanging and understanding operational information regarding complex choices was a 
decisive factor to introduce unbundling. Besides deploying internal expertise, as the 
incumbent exploited its exclusive network access to prepare DSL consumer products, 
Oftel harnessed OLOs’ analysis of specific issues to be addressed which they provided 
voluntarily. In contrast, the regulator limited the deployment of formally-allocated 
resources to pursue its preference, including budgetary ones.
While addressing unbundling issues, the regulator avoided fully imposing its authority on 
BT and ‘negating its interests’ even when the LLU licence condition came into effect, 
leaving confrontation to convergent OLOs. Rather than ‘going by the book’ to prevent 
delaying tactics, Oftel repeatedly sought dialogue with BT to ensure implementation, 
compromising on the order OLOs would receive services too, and thereby not fully 
inhibiting BT’s first-mover advantage.
Subsequendy, as BT stalled policy development, and the parliamentary TISC publicly 
exposed Oftel’s forbearance critically and requested more forceful action, the regulator 
harnessed the ministerial support of Patricia Hewitt. The junior Minister privately exhorted 
BT to respect the shorter deadline required by the EU Regulation, for the end o f 2000, and 
commit to faster access provision to its competitors. She publicly defended Oftel’s activity 
from critical preference convergent actors too.
Thus, the chapter provides a clear Type II autonomy case (see Table 9 above). Despite no 
public divergence from the state actor that could formally prevent licence modification 
from occurring (the SoS), Oftel pursued its policy preference without focussing on its 
statutory instruments. The regulator used its knowledge of the telecoms market, and 
particularly the prospects of the incipient broadband segment, to propose unbundling, and 
that of convergent actors to argue in favour o f its introduction with little reliance on 
existing formal institutional arrangements.
The regulator’s exchanges with participants able to contribute to the policy, through its 
informal ties, led to a framework developed over time and according to key practical 
information. Significantly, this was obtained without statutory imposition or its formally- 
allocated funding being disbursed. When implementation faltered, key senior political 
officials who urged BT privately, and publicly spoke of and put pressure on its obstructive 
conduct, helped Oftel deliver unbundled loops before its own July 2001 deadline,
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unconstrained by supranational requirements, albeit at a slow pace and weakened 
commercial demand.
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Chapter 7: The ART and LLU Policy in France
I. Introduction
This chapter examines the regulatory independence, or autonomy, in practice of the 
Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART) regarding the introduction of local 
loop unbundling (LLU) in France. As explained in chapter 6, LLU constitutes a salient 
telecoms policy because of its potential to expand the provision of high-speed, broadband, 
internet nationally. At the height of the ‘internet boom’, France’s narrowband internet 
market was growing very rapidly, given strong demand1078. The regulator sought to open 
France Telecom’s (F-T) national local access network to competition from new entrants, 
which would apply ADSL technologies to F-T’s telephone lines, to provide high-speed 
internet to end-users across France.
The chapter argues that despite facing opposition from key policy actors, the ART took 
‘authoritative action’ to introduce unbundling, without initially having the necessary formal 
powers. In contrast to previous sub-cases, it provides a clear Type I autonomy case 
whereby, consistent with Nordlinger’s framework, the regulator acted on its preference 
despite the critical resources deployed by divergent actors. In statutory terms, the ART had 
a largely advisory regulatory role, seriously challenging conceptualisations associating 
agency independence with degrees of formal independence.
The ART launched France’s LLU policy in the late 1990s, and overcame the divergent 
preference of the key Government Minister. This was the case despite the fact that the 
Minister possessed overriding regulatory authority and initially favoured F-T’s first-mover 
ADSL advantage. It also overcame opposition from left-wing parliamentary officials siding 
with the ‘public operator’. F-T opposed granting rivals access to its local loops throughout 
policy development, to avoid losing market share. The ART exploited information and ties 
with convergent actors, namely ‘private’ entrants and eventually the crucially important 
European Commission (EC), to generate a framework. Implementation efforts, pursued 
also but not only through the powers acquired, were restrained nonetheless by the main 
preference divergent actor, F-T, due to its ownership o f the key ‘physical’ asset.
1078 ART 7/01, “Rapport Annuel d’Activite 2000 - L’integral:Tome 1”, p.5
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Outline o f Events
After raising LLU in its first annual report to Government and Parliament in mid-1998 and 
asking an advisory body to analyse its scope in October 1998, the ART launched a 
consultation comprising five options for the supply of broadband services across France, 
including LLU, in April 1999. The Government Minister with key statutory powers had 
first spoken against unbundling in early 1999 and did so subsequently. However, having 
drawn overwhelming public industry support except from incumbent operator F-T, the 
regulator published a document focussing on LLU in October 1999. Under significant 
public pressure from entrants campaigning for LLU through the summer of 1999, the 
French Government backtracked, stating that some form of unbundling would take place 
and would be discussed in Parliament in 2000.
Meanwhile, between the end of 1999 and in 2000, the ART set up national working groups 
to discuss implementation issues, and worked with the European Commission to develop 
an EU-wide framework that would bind Member States to a deadline of end 2000. Thus, 
the regulator was not impeded by left-wing members o f the centre-left Government 
coalition. Their actions contributed to the Minister withdrawing a law amendment 
introducing LLU in April 2000. Nonetheless, as the EU unbundling policy that the ART 
helped frame was consolidated, the Government passed a decree in September 2000, while 
holding the EU Presidency. F-T continued obstructing the ART, leading to four revised 
reference offers and several operators dropping out o f the process before the July 2001 
offer was deemed reasonable.
II. Participants and Resources
This section shows that, at the start o f LLU policy in France, key resources to exert 
influence were held by a few, tighdy affiliated (‘state’) actors, marking a Type I autonomy 
scenario. F-T owned the key ‘physical’ asset of the local network. Moreover, the incumbent 
operator was majority state-owned, which was of significance to the Government that 
possessed the authority to determine sectoral policy, and particularly to its left-wing 
coalition members, that retained important ties with the company. Instead the very recent 
liberalisation meant that ‘non-state’ entrants had built rather limited operations in France 
and, apart from enforcing existing licence provisions, the ART’s role was largely advisory. 
Nevertheless, since policy exchanges required specific knowledge to discuss the
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implications and development of LLU, elected officials, including Telecoms Minister 
Christian Pierret possessing relevant powers, participated intermittently1079. The EC became 
involved comparatively late, but framed supranational policy-making with ART input.
Headed by President Jacques Chirac’s appointee Jean-Michel Hubert1080, who had 
previously worked for France Telecom’s CNET research centre1081, the ART led LLU 
policy from the outset. The ART first raised the issue o f LLU, which would allow new 
entrants to reach end-users and provide services including broadband using F-T’s local 
network, in mid-19981082. Following the advisory work of the Commission Consultative des 
Reseaux et Services de Telecommunications (CCRST)1083 identifying key questions on LLU 
development from October 1998, in April 1999 the ART launched a public consultation 
discussing its merits to provide new services1084. The French internet market’s revenue- 
growth approximated 112% in 1998-99 and 109% in 1999-001085, signalling prospective 
broadband demand. Five options allowing the deployment of DSL technologies were 
identified; ‘unbundling’ plus variations explained below.
Thirty-six diverse ‘non-state’ actors plus F-T responded to the local access competition 
consultation1086; no elected officials with or without formal authority did, and thus any 
views they might have had were expressed privately. Entrants lacked market prominence 
since competition was limited to long distance telephony, with sixty licensees acquiring 3- 
5% of the market segment over one year1087. Yet the data market was growing faster than 
that for voice, with local end-user access proving important. The ART claimed that around 
7% of local communications reflected internet traffic in 19981088, approximately 12% in 
19991089 and estimated 50% within four years1090.
1079 Ministere de l'industrie 29/10/99 “Le developpement des telecommunications et de la societe de 
l'information en France”; Les Echos 3 0 /1 1 //9 9  “Christian Pierret: “Le degroupage sera introduit d’ici a 
2001 ”
108° JacquierJ-F 3 /1 /98  “Les sages de l’ART”, Le Point(nr.l320)
1081 Centre National d'Etudes des Telecommunications. See, Thatcher,M October 2007 “Regulatory agencies, 
the state and markets: a Franco-British comparison”, p.1038, Journal o f European Public Policy 14(7), 
pp.1028-47
1082 ART 7/98, “Rapport annuel d’activite 1997 - L’integral”; Gadault,T 6 /7 /98 , “L’ART veut faciliter l’acces 
a l’abonne aux operateurs prives” La Tribune
i°83 'j'he Telecoms Minister named the CCRST’s twenty-one members (seven each of: network owners and 
service providers; service users; and, ‘qualified individuals’) upon recommendation from the ART; see ch.3
1084 ART 2/4/1999, “Consultation publique sur le developpement de la concurrence sur le marche local”
loss a r t  7/01
1086 ART 10/99, “Le developpement de la concurrence sur le marche local: synthese de la consultation 
publique”, Liste des contributeurs
1087 Le Gales,Y 18/5/99, ‘Telecommunications: la concurrence va s’accelerer” Le Figaro
1088 Barroux,D 1 /6/99, “L’ART tente de casser le monopole de France Telecom sur internet”, Les Echos
1089 ART 6/00, “Rapport annuel d’activite 1999 - L’integrakTomel”, pp.8-9; excluded interconnection 
services
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Different types of entrants signalled interest in the innovative telecoms market segment. 
Despite recent liberalisation and the infancy of competition1091, entrants knew the 
unbundled facilities, services and conditions needed to deliver retail broadband and 
compete with F-T, even without extensive French market activity. Internet service 
providers (ISPs), reliant on F-T’s network until then1092, took an interest in LLU adoption 
and made their case.
Most respondents were network operators, some with international capabilities. Large 
companies such as Lyonnaise Communication o f the French multi-utility company Suez 
replied, as did multinationals MCI Worldcom, involved in LLU in the UK, Belgian majority 
state-owned Belgacom France, and Tele2 France, part o f the Tele2 companies.
A few also had media affiliations enabling the public exposure of opinion-shaping issues of 
interest to achieve their preferences. Notably, Cegetel, France’s second largest operator1093, 
was part of the global media conglomerate Vivendi Universal/CegeteL ‘Directeur-General’ 
Philippe Germond expressed his views and attracted policy attention through interviews1094.
Telecoms associations AFOPT (Association Fran£aise des Operateurs Prives en 
Telecommunications)1095 and AOST (Association des Operateurs de Services de 
Telecommunications), comprising individual respondents but providing a unitary 
viewpoint, replied too1096. However, neither included F-T, highlighting the industry divide 
between the incumbent and entrants.
Indeed, all industry entrants required F-T’s participation to develop broadband through 
LLU. The incumbent’s unique local access network was the key ‘physical’ resource 
determining the need to implement LLU to deliver ADSL competitively. Clearly, F-T could 
exploit its network ahead of all other actors, unobstructed. Control of the national local 
access market had highly advantageous financial implications. Chairman Michel Bon openly
1090 Barroux 1 /6 /99
1091 Le Gales 18/5/99
1092 See Grolier Interactive Europe’s complaint, during the consultation, about F-T’s preferential treatment 
towards its provider Wanadoo, to the Conseil de la concurrence (hereafter, the ‘Conseil’) competition 
authority; “Decision n°99-MC-06 du 23 juin 1999 relative a une demande de mesures conservatoires 
presentee par la societe Grolier Interactive Europe/Online Groupe”. The ART was involved too
1093 Le Gales 18/5/99
1094 Barroux,D 20/7 /99  “Philippe Germond: Les regies du jeu concurrentiel sont faussees”, Les Echos
1095 AFOPT comprised 9Telecom, Bouygues Telecom, Cegetel Entreprises, Colt Telecommunications France, 
Completel, GTS Omnicom, Mediareseaux-UPC, LD Com, SFR. AOST comprised 9Telecom, AT&T, BT 
France, Cegetel, MCI Worldcom, Siris.
1096 Gadault,T 27 /7 /99  ‘Les operateurs prives portent plainte contre l’Etat”, La Tribune
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acknowledged F-T’s structural and market dominance1097. The ART defined it an 
advantageous asymmetry requiring particular regulation only a few months later1098.
Bon recognised some market share loss from 100% was inevitable. Full competition was 
allowed from 1998. In practice, it remained limited. In 1998, F-T incurred the decade’s 
highest volume growth at 6.6% and 5.2% revenue growth to 24.6bn euros (FF161.7bn)1099. 
When the ART consulted on unbundling in mid-1999, hence with one year of added 
growth, Cegetel forecast significandy lower revenues o f FF30bn1100.
F-T’s sectoral role was not confined to unmatched infrastructure and financial strength. It 
remained a state actor, regardless of sectoral liberalisation in 1996, when two relevant laws 
were passed1101. Whilst one law led to the ART’s creation, for competition and regulation 
purposes1102, the other one established F-T’s partial privatisation1103. F-T continued being 
majority state-controlled during LLU policy development, embedding ties between the 
incumbent and Members of Parliament (MPs) especially sensitive to policies affecting it1104.
The law transforming F-T from a fully state-owned monopoly into a majority state-owned 
‘national enterprise’ did not fully dissociate key elected officials from the broad running of 
the company. The President and Prime Minister nominated the Chairman by decree1105. F- 
T’s capital stock on 31 December 1996, just before shares were sold to the market, was 
established by the Finance and Telecoms Ministers1106. In 1997, around 25% of the 
company’s shares were sold1107. A share exchange with Deutsche Telekom and an increase 
in capital left the state with 62% in 19981108. Thus, the interests of Government and F-T’s 
management were somewhat aligned, with the former entitled to represent its views at the 
highest company level.
Centre-left elected officials retained considerable ties with F-T in particular. Successive 
Governments had delayed liberalisation given repeated trade union opposition over civil
1097 La Croix 15/2/99, “Le prix des appels vers les mobiles doit baisser”
1098 ART 7/99, “Rapport annuel d’activite 1998 - L’integral: Tome 1”, pp.7,11-12
1099 La Croix 1 5 /2 / 99
1100 Les Echos 2-3/7/99, “Acces a la boucle locale: le ton monte entre les operateurs de telecoms”
1101 See Thatcher 1999, especially pp.152-164, on the evolution o f France’s telecoms liberalisation, including 
the ART’s creation
1102 see ch.3
1103 LOI no.96-660 du 26/7 /96
1104 The distinct state actors identified here sustain the chapter 2 analysis regarding the state’s fragmentation, 
hence the decision to examine specific participants and resources in this thesis
1105 Thatcher 1999, p. 164
1106 LOI n.96-660 26/7/96, Art.l
1107 Hulsink 1999, p.258
1108 Thatcher 1999, p.163
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servant employees losing privileged job conditions, supported by the Socialist and 
Communist parties. Partial privatisation had thus occurred with significant concessions to 
unions and political parties. Indeed, in February 1999, to cover high costs due to excess 
staff, F-T planned expanding operations rather than reducing staff1109. Business decisions 
were tied to electorally sensitive issues.
Thus, F-T owned the central ‘physical’ asset, was financially powerful and, unlike most 
entrants, its management had access to senior Government officials. Within weeks of being 
appointed as Finance Minister in spring 2000, Laurent Fabius met F-T Chairman Michel 
Bon1110. Fabius, and his predecessors Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Christian Sautter, 
headed the Ministry comprising the telecoms portfolio. Accordingly, while access did not 
always lead to agreement or similar interests, policy impacting on F-T’s operations made 
the Government an interested party directly and indirectly. The Government’s regulatory 
authority and its ties with F-T meant that the arrival o f industry entrants created two 
distinct, unequal sides; one sheltered and one relatively unprotected1111. The ART had to 
regulate both.
The ART’s regulatory role was to enforce industry actors’ licences1112. Otherwise its formal 
remit was largely advisory. So, in 1998, out of sixteen negative ART evaluations regarding 
new service charges F-T proposed, the Telecoms Minister rejected 50%1113. The Telecoms 
Minister also held licensing powers1114. The ART, in formal terms, simply evaluated them. 
Similarly, it was consulted by the Government on bills, decrees and regulations, and 
published an annual report to the Government, Parliament and to the postal and telecoms 
commission (CSSPPT), advising regulatory or legislative changes relating to sectoral and 
competition developments, such as raising unbundling. The Government retained the 
formal authority to adopt policy proposals.
Thus, when considering formal arrangements alone, the regulator’s overall LLU role before 
policy adoption was giving advice. While the ART laid out an informal consultation, 
determining a framework was for Lionel Jospin’s Government, formed by a coalition
1109 La Croix 1 5 /2 / 99
1110 Ministere de l'Economie 14 /4 /00
1,11 For a wider discussion on France’s industrial policy regarding technology firms, Zysman 1977, p.49
1112 see ch.3
1113 BarrouxJD 13/7/99, “L’ART menace d’user de son pouvoir de sanction”, Les Echos; a power the 
Finance Minister shared, see ch.3
1114 see ch.3
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comprising left-wing parties1115. Indeed, left-wing politicians, part of the Government 
majority with formal authority over the ART, influenced the introduction of a national 
framework. By being able to publicly question or support the Government’s policy-making, 
put pressure and vote, their views regarding opening F-T’s local access market to 
competition mattered significantly to Ministers within public parliamentary debates. This 
was the case with the spring 2000 “nouvelles regulations economiques” Government bill 
raising unbundling (see the Trocess’ section below)1116.
The European Commission’s supranational work influenced the national LLU debate and 
the ART’s endeavours in 2000 too, well after the regulator raised the policy domestically. 
The Commission’s prominence over LLU emerged when, under the Portuguese 
Presidency, EU Governments set the March 2000 Lisbon Strategy emphasising the 
‘knowledge-based economy’. One o f the European Council’s March 2000 conclusions was 
specifically to call on Member States to work with the Commission on LLU before the end 
o f 20001117. France would hold the six-monthly EU Presidency starting in July 2000. The 
French Government was therefore about to hold a position of policy leadership, 
scrutinised for its stance and domestic results on key policies such as the Lisbon Strategy 
vis-a-vis fellow European Member States.
By then, without getting involved in national unbundling policy discussions but by issuing a 
working document repeatedly emphasising the role o f national regulators1118, the European 
Commission collected views on LLU, including the ART’s1119. The ART had regular 
informal contacts and developed relations with the Commission since its inception1120. The 
Commission could generate non-binding policy Recommendations to Member States, and 
did so in May 20001121.
I,15 Thatcher 1999, p.162
ni6 por parliamentary debate on LLU including questions to Telecoms Minister Pierret: Marcovitch,D 
“Question N°: 1950 publiee au JO le: 16/3/2000”, p.2003; on the bill, BaertJD and Billard,C “ASSEMBLEE 
NATIONALE - 3e SEANCE D U  25 AVRIL 2000” ; de Chazeaux,0 “Question N°: 2045 publiee au 
JO: 3 /5 /2000”, p.3627
II,7 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 23-24/3/00, para. 11
1118 European Commission DG  Information Society Working Document 9 /2 /00 , “Unbundled access to the 
local loop”
1119 ART 15/3/00, “Reponse de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications sur le projet de 
recommandation de la Commission concernant le degroupage de la boucle locale”
ii2° ART 7/98, pp.210,212,213,254
1121 Official Journal o f the European Communities 29/6/00, “Commission Recommendation o f 25 May 2000 
On Unbundled Access to the Local Loop: Enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic 
communications services including broadband multimedia and high-speed Internet”; C(2000)1259. Pierret 
and the ART’s website portray the Recommendation’s adoption occurring 26 April 2000. This was the 
Commission’s Communication; C(2000)1059
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Still, given F-T’s local access dominance, its key ties to senior elected officials as majority 
state-owned operator and the Government’s formal powers to determine LLU, early in the 
regulatory policy, influential resources were held by a few affiliated national actors.
III. Preferences
This section shows that, consistent with Type I autonomy, in the early stages o f policy 
development, predominant influential actors were preference divergent with the ART 
regarding introducing LLU in France. Both the majority state-owned F-T, whose local 
network the ART wanted to open to competition, and the Government, possessing the 
formal powers to adopt the policy, opposed the regulator’s proposal. With market entrants 
the only convergent actors, at the start, the ART had no influential support.
The ART’s April 1999 consultation defined opening the local access network to 
competition between France Telecom and new entrants as “essential”. LLU was indicated 
as a competitive solution for existing local voice telephony services1122, and especially for 
innovative broadband ones through new technologies like DSL1123. The incumbent planned 
to launch commercial ADSL services within weeks. Without competitive pressures, F-T 
could gain a dominant position in the emerging broadband market, limiting innovation and 
downward price trends.
Similarly to the UK sub-case, the French regulator listed five different options (see Table 
10 below1124), for entrants to exploit operational and commercial conditions similar to F-T. 
The ART’s option 1, the unbundled local loop1125, entailed F-T providing paired copper- 
wires to competitors to incorporate into their networks. Entrants would co-locate 
(physically, distantly or virtually) and attach equipment to the local loop, thus accessing 
end-users homes. Entrants would build their networks, based on operational terms 
established with F-T. Issues included: the definition o f what lines entrants could ask F-T to 
unbundle; whether it had to provide extra or new lines when asked. Respective operational 
responsibilities of F-T and entrants had to be delimited.
1122 As opposed to competition limited to long distance telephony then
1123 ART 2 /4 /99 , Introduction
1124 To note the differences between the UK’s and France’s five options, jointly look at Tables 8 and 10
1125 Hereafter, ‘unbundling’ entails option 1
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Under option 2, entrants would ‘co-locate’ at F-T’s exchanges, but the incumbent would 
install and operate DSL equipment on each access line. Entrants would not install their 
equipment at either end of a loop, hence, not access end-user homes. Entrants would 
connect to the data stream provided by F-T at its local exchange building, where they 
would co-locate equipment to take data onto their networks. End-users could choose to 
have broadband and telephony from the entrant, broadband from entrants and voice from 
F-T, or vice-versa.
Option 3 was a Permanent Virtual Circuit access service1126; a data service between 
customer lines and entrants’ own sites. This would not be provided at an exchange building 
but at a different part o f F-T’s network. End-users could either have just broadband, or 
broadband and telephony from entrants too. Instead option 4 constituted the simple resale 
o f local traffic for voice and data, with F-T billing the competitor rather than end-users; 
entrants charged as they chose. Option 5 entailed the resale of local traffic with the 
additional management of unspecified customer services, extending the entrant’s 
management o f the commercial relationship with customers.
Given different degrees o f access to F-T’s local network, the options entailed flexibility to 
invest in competing networks and services as entrants preferred1127. However the regulator 
intended to maximise local competition. Resale options 4 and 5 meant that marketing and 
prices were the only elements that entrants could be distinguished by vis-a-vis the 
incumbent. By reselling F-Ts products, entrants could not differentiate services.
Options 2 and 3, which did not grant access to F-T’s paired copper-wires, represented 
access to transmission capacities1128. Option 2’s competitive nature was limited because F-T 
controlled end-user access. Entrants would, moreover, need to invest significantly in their 
own network. Under Option 3, entrants would not need to invest in significant 
infrastructure at F-T exchanges, entailing faster commercial delivery. Moreover, F-T 
retaining end-user access meant that, unlike option 1, entrants avoided spectrum 
management complexities regarding interference1129.
However, by relying on the incumbent’s network particularly at users’ end, the flexibility of 
entrants’ service provision under options 2 and 3, hence competitiveness, would be
1126 Like Oftel’s option 4
1127 ART 2 /4 /99 , s.3.1
1128 ART 2 /4 /99 , s.2
1129 ART 2 /4 /99 , p.19
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impaired. Instead, by being in control o f all service elements except the actual circuit 
remaining F-T’s responsibility under option 1, entrants would determine their own, 
flexible, provision o f competitive broadband and voice telephony. Accordingly, unbundling 
option 1 best promoted the regulator’s goal o f local access competition.
Table 10: Summary Features of 5 ART Options Proposed
O ptions
A dvantages 1 D isadvantages
1 - Innovation/service differentiation 
promoted
- Dependence on incumbent to 
define service provision and 
deployment timetable minimised
- Direct commercial relationship 
with end-users
- Slow & very costly to implement
- N o national coverage
- Dependence on co-location offer 
(delays)
- Shared spectrum/ interference 
management
2 - Spectrum management/ 
interference managed by incumbent
- Dependence on incumbent re: 
technology & deployment timetable
- Entrants face commercial risk;
F-T equipment at end-user’s home
- Little service differentiation from 
incumbent
- Entrant loses some control of service 
quality
3 - National offer possible. 
Speeded up spreading o f offers
- See option 2
4 & 5 - Completed long distance 
telephony providers’ portfolio
- Fast commercial presence possible
- N o commercial differentiation from 
incumbent
Source: ART 10/99
Yet, neither the national ‘Code des postes et telecommunications’, comprising the 1996 
telecoms regulation law provisions, nor European legislation permitted the imposition of
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unbundling1130. Thus, rather than proposing a policy adhering to the law, the regulator’s 
preference meant that the law needed changing. Competition, which was why the regulator 
considered unbundling F-T’s local loop important, was a statutory duty. However, the 
ART’s seven statutory duties, all shared with the Telecoms Minister in the 1996 telecoms 
law1131, were not ranked in importance.
The centre-left Government, o f a different political orientation from President Jacques 
Chirac’s who had appointed Hubert, did not share the ART’s preference o f promoting 
telecoms markets competition broadly1132. Specifically, in mid-1997, Socialist Prime 
Minister Jospin formulated a broad internet policy and the Information Society’s scope for 
France. While indicating the importance of effective regulation, Jospin suggested that F-T 
in particular was to find solutions to migrate existing communications services to internet- 
enabled networks1133. Similarly, the Government emphasised F-T’s key role in service 
supply in its 1998 action programme emphasising the importance of increasing 
transmission speeds o f each network component including local access1134. When he first 
raised unbundling in the ART’s mid-1998 annual report, Hubert faced negative 
Government reactions1135.
Thus, the Government had different preferences from the ART, which posed a significant 
obstacle for the regulator given formal arrangements limiting its ability to determine policy. 
The Government’s wish to spread the internet across France, promoting the Information 
Society objective, involved F-T’s competitors far less than the ART intended, despite 
competition being a duty for the Telecoms Minister too. Even before the consultation, in 
January 1999, Secretary for Industry Christian Pierret, the single elected official with most 
formal powers vis-a-vis the ART, stated his opposition to unbundling F-T’s local loop, 
praising the incumbent’s diligence over ‘public service’ duties instead1136.
Besides stressing that LLU was neither laid out in domestic nor in European legislation, the 
Minister emphasised there were other policy options for end-user access. The Government 
favoured investments in alternative network infrastructure, referring to wireless local loop 
tests the ART launched; unbundling would be unfair towards operators undertaking
1130 Barroux,D 24/6/99, “Boucle locale: les parlementaires appuient France Telecom”, Les Echos
1131 see ch.3
1132 Interview: Hubert
1133 JospinL 25/8/97, “Discours prononce lors de l'inaugurarion de l'Universite de la Communication: 
Preparer l'entree de la France dans la societe de l'information, a Hourtain (Gironde)”
1134 Government action programme 1/98, “Preparing France’s entry into the inform@tion society”, p.50
1135 Interview: Hubert
1136 Le Gales,Y and Renault^MC 8 /1 /9 9  “Christian Pierret: ' Favoriser les prix les plus bas possibles'” Le 
Figaro
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massive cable networks expenditure1137. Pierret reprised the arguments, adding that 
Parliament was not discussing changes to the telecoms law1138. In formal terms, the ART 
appeared isolated. The Minister overseeing the sector and who could sponsor the ART 
initiative across Government to introduce legislation expressed divergence long into 1999.
In June 1999, Pierret asked F-T to deliver ADSL to the market as rapidly as possible with 
Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn1139. They were, therefore, obstructing the 
purpose of the regulator’s initiative, to enable entrants to compete in the broadband market 
with the incumbent by regulating its asymmetric network advantages1140. Allowing F-T to 
get a head-start challenged the incentives o f entrants to make the necessary investments to 
exploit LLU. Yet, in mid-July, Strauss-Kahn and Pierret applied their formal authority, 
approving F-T’s charges for the ADSL product planned for autumn1141, thus supporting the 
incumbent’s broadband advancement notwithstanding the anti-competitive implications.
F-T, which controlled 99% of the local access market estimated at FF50bn1142, strongly 
opposed the ART’s full local access competition preference1143. Without waiting for the 
ART’s consultation responses’ publication, F-T’s Chairman Michel Bon publicly stated that 
“the wealth, investment and innovation created by unbundling equalled zero”1144.
Bon stated regulation had a crucial role in directing investments1145 but, in the consultation 
response, F-T claimed it should not “bear the regulatory burden” alone1146. If  unbundling 
was adopted, any operational delays required for implementation purposes would have to 
be accepted and a trial period undertaken1147. Yet Bon subsequently claimed that F-T would 
commercialise ADSL as soon as possible, echoing Government Ministers’ earlier 
statements; France could not delay introducing a service contributing to an Information 
Society1148.
1137 ibid
1138 Barroux 24/6/99; La Tribune 12 /7/99, “Pierret: 'II n'y a pas lieu de reviser profondement la loi sur les 
telecoms'”; 13/7/99 “Le marche local, enjeu de la concurrence”
in9 pierret,C “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - 1 “ SEANCE DU 2 JUIN 1999”
1140 Jakubyszyn,C 7 /8 /99 , “L’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications lance une offensive contre 
France Telecom”, Le Monde
1141 Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'lndustrie 12/7/99, “Acces a Internet a haut debit”
1142 La Tribune 13/7/99
1143 Interview: Hubert; ART 29/10/99 “L’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications publie la synthese 
de la consultation sur le developpement de la concurrence sur le marche local”; La Tribune 18/8/99 "France 
Telecom se refuse au degroupage”; 17/11/99 France Telecom garde la haute main sur l'Internet rapide
1144 Les Echos 2-3/7/99
1145 ibid
1146 ART 10/99, p.12
iw7 ART 10/99, p.21
1148 Le Gales,Y 3 /12/99 “France Telecom n’a pas de monopole sur le telephone local” Le Figaro
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Left-wing MPs, publicly sustaining F-T’s opposition to unbundling, added to the ART’s 
significant challenge a few months later. Communist MP Claude Billard unequivocally 
challenged the scope of introducing ADSL competition through LLU; other technologies 
could be deployed. Unbundling constituted “a legal constraint on the ‘public operator’”1149 
given the cost-benefits accruing to ‘private operators’ accessing F-T’s network to offer their 
services, while weakening the ‘public’ ‘state’ operator. Without directly questioning 
unbundling, Socialist MP Dominique Baert argued that the regulator should not replace 
Government and Parliament and decide on the politics of telecoms1150.
The only openly preference convergent actors with the ART from the start were market 
entrants relying on the regulator and the Government for a framework, indicating their low 
influence. Different network facilities, shaping their needs, made entrants advocate diverse 
uses of F-T’s network. Yet, almost all defined F-T’s local access monopoly position as a 
‘durable obstacle’ to competition, given the incumbent’s economies of scale1151. So, third- 
party access to F-T’s network was largely considered the only solution to develop 
competition.
Two issues furthered F-T’s local access advantages. Firstly, prolonged and exclusive access 
to end-users allowed targeting markets in greater demand, limiting entrants’ ability to 
maximise returns upon investing in these markets. Secondly, F-T enjoyed rights-of-way, 
allowing network investments, acquired under more favourable conditions than those 
entrants faced. Given the investments required to develop competing networks, entrants 
advocated direct regulatory action providing a degree o f market certainty. Some argued 
through the media that F-T could cross-subsidise more competitive segments where it lost 
market share, such as long distance telephony1152.
Numerous consultation respondents1153 advocated maximum flexibility to widen their 
potential market, offer different services and choose between customer bases and costs1154. 
However, ‘full’ unbundling was widely identified as the preferable competitive route. 
Vivendi and Cegetel chief, Jean-Marie Messier, qualified unbundling as a “priority”, as 
wireless local loop was not expected to represent over 10% of the local access market1155.
1149 Billard 25 /4 /00
1150 Baert 25 /4 /00
1151 ART 10/99, p.4
1152 Including Cegetel’s Germond, see Barroux 20/7/99; Les Echos 2-3 /7 /99
1153 ART/ARCEP officials explained electronically that responses were not publicly available
1154 ART 10/99, p.26
1155 Les Echos 2-3/7/99
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Cegetel’s Directeur-General Germond added that local competition was essential to stop F- 
T ’s increasing consumer prices1156. Respondents only considered option 3 a desirable 
complement. Entrants could compete in the consumer broadband market rapidly, reaching 
otherwise difficult geographic areas, while unbundling was being implemented1157.
Advocates of unbundling considered implementation in 2000 possible, but stressed that F- 
T  should not commercialise ADSL, which it planned for November1158, prior to 
unbundling being introduced1159. Entrants wanted specific and detailed unbundling terms, 
with the ART responsible for dispute resolution1160. F-T’s dominant position made 
negotiations prevailing in a competitive environment difficult, and thus wide-ranging 
prescription should include: communication o f network information; service timeframes 
and quality; spectrum management1161. Physical co-location was favoured to supply the 
most competitive services, as were cost-oriented charges, which economist and ART board 
member Dominique Roux described as highly effective to regulate for competition1162.
Thus the ART faced preference divergence from key actors. The operator at the centre of 
unbundling opposed it, as did the sectoral Minister with key powers, whose support was 
fundamental to turn the policy into legislation. Left-wing Government coalition members 
opposed unbundling too. The only convergence at the start was of entrants aiming to 
operate in the local access market. The EC did not display active adherence to LLU until 
2000.
IV. Process
Unlike the earlier sub-cases, this section argues that, as it faced divergent actors central to 
introducing LLU in France, the regulator did not try shifting policy preferences. Consistent 
with Type I autonomy, the ART acted on its preference nonetheless. The ART firmly 
proceeded with its local access competition preference, notwithstanding its advisory role 
and pervasive divergence among influential state actors. Without formal powers to
1156 Barroux 20 /7 /99
1157 ART 10/99, pp.l 1-12
1158 Faucon,B 30/9/99, “Les concurrents de France Telecom reclament plus de transparence”, Figaro- 
Economie; Barroux,D 2 /11/99  “La France evoque un ‘degroupage total du reseau de’ France Telecom”, Les 
Echos
1159 ART 10/99, p.32; Arabian,B 3/12/99, “Notre combativite a pese dans l’inflechissement du ministre” Le 
Figaro
1160 ART 10/99, p.34
1161 ibid.pp.35-36
1162 RouxJD 15/6/99, “Telecommunications l’analyse des couts, outil de regulation”, Les Echos
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determine policy between 1998 and late-2000, the ART challenged F-T. It used policy 
information and expert analysis, and exploited useful domestic and supranational ‘informal 
ties’ to address obstruction and create a formal framework. Eventually, formal resources 
were applied where required. Thus, the agency alternated formal and informal instruments 
to pursue its preference.
To advance its preference without powers to determine a new policy, the regulator 
identified and exposed from the outset F-T-controlled resources as an obstacle in the local 
access market, mirroring Type I autonomy’s “best endowed actors who predominate’1163. 
The ART raised unbundling in July 1998, using its very first annual report due to 
Government and Parliament, which could determine policy1164. It indicated the importance 
o f F-T’s network to reach end-users and provide a full range of services rather than just 
long distance telephony. Besides highlighting that few actors competed over the local loop 
and that LLU would help entrants create broadband competition1165, it subtly compared 
France to Germany, which intended to apply unbundling to deploy new technologies like 
ADSL.
However, with the Government envisaging that F-T should spearhead the Informiation 
Society nationally, Hubert firmly took more action1166 to counterbalance and offset the 
constraining lack of formal authority and the significance of the incumbent’s key ‘physical’ 
asset. To prepare to launch a consultation on local access competition, the ART first 
requested the CCRST to analyse the scope o f LLU in October 19981167. The role o f the 
commission specialised in networks and services was purely consultative1168. Yet, given its 
widely-sourced twenty-one-member composition, CCRST findings aided the ART’s policy- 
shaping intentions.
Despite F-T’s policy centrality, by entering into discussions jointly with F-T and other 
actors providing input1169, the regulator diluted the incumbent’s issue-framing role. The 
regulator set up two CCRST working groups establishing key development issues1170; on 
the economics, and technical and operational aspects1171. Only F-T’s Eric Debroeck was a
1163 see ch.l, Nordlinger’s Type I autonomy
1164 see ch.3
lies a r t  7/98, p.262
H66 Interview: Hubert
1167 ART 2 /4 /9 9 , Introduction
1168 see ch.3
1169 Interview: Hubert
1170 HubertJM “SIRCOM - 25 novembre 1998, Intervention de M. Jean-Michel HUBERT”
1171 ART 2 /4 /9 9
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CCRST member1172. Thus, the ART employed ‘state’ resources or those controlled by it, in 
the form of the expert CCRST1173, to offset information imbalances benefiting F-T and 
neutralise its resources. Furthermore, it selected a decision site whose occupants were 
relatively insulated from pressures1174. The divergent incumbent neither conducted nor set 
terms of discussion.
ART Chairman Hubert spoke publicly about LLU at end-1998 too, broadening audiences 
before the April 1999 consultation which allowed F-T to officially counter the ART’s and 
convergent actors’ arguments1175. There was no exploratory public consultation suggesting 
an open-ended exchange on LLU1176, portrayed as having significant implications for 
employment and investment; beyond Hubert’s formal remit, but part of the divergent 
Government’s.
To crystallise policy, the ART exploited another instrument not in the law, thus creating 
non-statutory devices to pursue unbundling. Reprising CCRST analyses, the agency 
launched its only public unbundling consultation, pooling more expertise and furthering 
debate as F-T announced its plan to launch retail ADSL. Therein, after citing the 
Government’s Information Society objective and the EC’s 4* report assessing telecoms 
regulation and the grounds for LLU, the ART compared France’s implementation stage 
again, but much more unfavourably than in the annual report. Besides emphasising the 
German experience, it pointed to the UK’s plans and to the US’ 1996 Telecommunications 
Act allowing LLU.
Without the formal authority to introduce unbundling, the regulator tried fracturing the 
unity o f coalition members1177, notably the Government’s backing o f F-T. By reiterating 
that France lagged behind other Member States, thus combining the national and EU 
unbundling dimensions, the ART disaggregated the respective reasons for the Government 
and F-T to oppose LLU, isolating what ultimately proved distinct preferences. F-T wanted 
to retain dominance. The Government wanted to develop an Information Society as fast as 
possible, which it considered F-T the single likeliest operator to advance. The ART referred 
to EU discussions about reviewing the Open Network Provision (ONP) Directive in 1999, 
including the Commission’s exploration o f LLU. The Government was thus warned that it
1172 Journal Officiel 3 /6 /9 7  ,“Arrete du 26 mai 1997 portant nomination a la commission consultative des 
reseaux et services de telecommunications”, until mid-2000
1173 The article in the law refers to ‘qualified’ individuals and the ‘competent’ committee
1174 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1175 Hubert 25/11/98
1176 Unlike the UK’s Oftel
1,77 see ch.l; Nordlinger
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may be forced by supranational regulation to create a framework requiring F-T to 
unbundle.
The consultation raised five options to redress the threat F-T posed in the emerging 
broadband market, but option l ’s endorsement was focussed on and effectively anticipated. 
Unlike with Type II autonomy, policy information was not selected to shift divergent 
preferences through persuasive exchanges. Questions on how to develop local access 
competition were given answers delineating likely advantages or difficulties according to 
the ART’s preference.
The negative aspects of options 2 and 3 were highlighted upfront1178. They had neither 
been utilised nor attempted before1179, unlike option 1 which had been adopted in Germany 
and USA. The regulator indicated how entrants expressed concerns about option 2 
technical difficulties before receiving responses, thus presenting a selective analysis before 
non-sectoral actors lacking the knowledge to understand the implications, such as MPs, 
assessed them.
The ART largely explored option 1 issues as though distinguishing between options was 
unnecessary. Evidence that the ART anticipated introducing option 1 was provided by the 
consultation’s section on co-location; a key unbundling feature1180. Co-location was 
mentioned around twenty-five times, before responses on the options were received1181. O f 
the other four options, 2 also entailed co-location. However, the ART did not promote its 
adoption. Three months before publishing the consultation responses summary, Hubert 
reiterated that LLU was “indispensable” to develop effective local access competition1182.
By eliciting preferences and crystallising debate, the ART’s consultation exacerbated 
divisions between those favouring and those opposing LLU1183, especially since F-T 
planned to deliver retail ADSL through its own ISP shortly1184. The regulator formally 
asked F-T to provide retail ADSL only upon supplying competing operators with the same 
technical elements and other ISPs the same service conditions as its own, thus delaying F-
1178 ART 2 /4 /99 , p.16
1179 ibid, pp.14-15
1180 ibid s.2.2
1181 Oftel’s first unbundling consultation mentioned co-location once, the follow-up around ten times
1182 Barroux 13/7/99; La Tribune 13/7/99
1183 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1184 Jakubyszyn,C and Renault,E 29/12/99 “Le gendarme du telephone denonce l’attitude de France Telecom 
dans l’intemet rapide”, Le Monde
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T1185. Rival network operators could not supply wholesale ADSL to ISPs without 
unbundling, entailing F-T could exploit a decisive first-mover advantage in the wholesale 
and retail ADSL markets, supported by Ministers1186.
Thus, the regulator remained steadfast1187 and, while not planning to overstep its powers 
after the Government warned that LLU was a decision for legislators, at a time when EU 
institutions appeared unwilling to impose unbundling legislation on Member States1188, 
attracted mounting support from entrants. Following the annual report, CCRST findings 
and subsequent exchanges, the consultation showed that to develop policy the regulator’s 
formally-allocated budget did not matter when it had the expertise to understand and frame 
issues, and convergent actors deployed their resources.
Entrants’ ties with, and hence likelihood of privately influencing, senior elected officials did 
not match F-T’s1189. However, the ART allowed entrants to capitalise on its consultation 
and campaign for unbundling over the summer o f 19991190. Through the media, Cegetel 
accused Minister Pierret o f acting as F-T shareholder first, by siding with F-T and 
dismissing unbundling, rather than as consumer champion1191. Another operator claimed 
that unbundling would not occur without a “military coup”1192. Entrants, including the 
AFOPT, exerted public and private pressure, protesting against their exclusion from 
Government discussions shaping local access investments1193. They threatened to refer the 
matter to the Conseil de la concurrence if unable to provide ADSL when F-T was able to 
do so.
The Government increasingly backtracked. In early-September, Pierret specified that 
‘unbundling’ would only provide entrants with the broadband component of lines, not 
voice telephony1194. By end-September, his Ministry commissioned a report indicating that
1185 Avis n°99-582 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 7 juillet 1999 sur les 
decisions tarifaires de France Telecom n°99077 E relative a la creation des services Netissimo et Turbo IP et 
n°99078 E relative a l’experimentation du service Turbo LL
1186 pierret 2 /6 /99; Ministere de l'Economie 12/7/99; Jakubyszyn and Renault 29/12/99
1187 Interview: Hubert
1188 La Tribune 18/8/99
1189 Barroux 24/6 /99
1190 Les Echos 2-3 /7 /99
1191 Barroux 20/7 /99
1192 La Tribune 18/8/99
1193 Faucon 30/9 /99
1194 Le Figaro 4 /9 /99 , “Christian Pierret favorable a l'ouverture de la boucle locale”; Les Echos 6 /9 /9 9  “Le 
secretaire d'Etat a l'lndustrie se dit pour la premiere fois favorable au degroupage ADSL”
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the regulation of competition among broadband suppliers, including local loop operators, 
deserved attention1195.
The regulator showed little intention of negotiating over its unbundling preference. In 
early-October Pierret reiterated that neither EU legislation nor French telecoms law 
prescribed LLU1196, claiming the Government favoured measured progress. Only a 
restricted form o f ‘unbundling’ would be introduced, preventing entrants from installing 
equipment at F-T’s exchanges1197. Pierret tellingly specified that the measure was not aimed 
at increasing competition but at spreading ADSL usage1198.
Nevertheless, once ART consultation findings exposing F-T as a lasting obstacle were 
published, Pierret indicated that the ART’s work to fracture the Minister and incumbent’s 
unity had prevailed1199. Referring to ART findings, Pierret praised the “important work 
carried out”. Developing broadband access for business and residential users was a 
Government priority and operators intending to invest in broadband had to be able to 
access the local loop; competition would occur soon1200. Intended adoption seemed to 
exclude voice services1201, but Pierret pledged that the Government would promote LLU by 
discussing it with relevant parties, taking into account the ART’s work1202.
While public pressure mounted, Hubert had met privately Pierret many times, presenting 
the arguments for unbundling and insisting that it was the ART’s role to develop regulatory 
policies in France, adding that France was part of the European Union, which was looking 
into LLU1203. Ultimately Pierret accepted Hubert’s position. Since the law did not prescribe 
unbundling, the key implication was constructing a framework redressing the lack of local 
access competition, which was not within the ART’s powers, as F-T was about to launch 
retail ADSL1204.
1195 Ministere de l'industrie 29 /9 /99 , “Le devenir des technologies de l'information et de la communication et 
le developpement des reseaux”
1196 Le Figaro, 12/10/99 “Paris veut ouvrir l'ADSL a la concurrence”
1197 Les Echos, 12/10/99 “Christian Pierret preconise une ouverture a minima du reseau de France Telecom 
se refuse au degroupage”
1198 Ministere de l'industrie 7 /10 /99  “Mission de JC. Bourdier sur le developpement des reseaux a haut debit 
et leurs usage”
1199 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1200 Ministere de l'industrie 29/10/99
1201 Barroux,D 2 /12 /99  (1) “L’ART se donne un an pour metre fin au monopole de France Telecom sur le 
local”, Les Echos
1202 Ministere de l'industrie 29/10/99; Les Echos 2 /11 /99  “La France evoque un 'degroupage 'total du reseau 
de France Telecom”
1203 Interview: Hubert
1204 Barroux 2 /11 /99
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Having pooled information and vocal support, the ART thus mitigated the extent and 
effectiveness with which F-T could deploy its resources, by disengaging or co-opting one 
of the divergent leaders or group members (F-T and the Government)1205. In the LLU 
consultation, unlike in the 3G one, the Government was never mentioned directly and no 
common purpose was suggested either. Moreover, responses were presented anonymously, 
except F-T’s.
The ART exploited its discretionary formulation of policy responses, presenting overall 
agreement with the issues relating to its preference, and hence legitimising its intervention. 
The document outlined how to address operational issues, but was almost the same length 
as the consultation. A critical issue such as charging methodology, fuelling support for 
cost-orientation, was barely allocated two pages. The selected detail raised LLU obligations 
convergent entrants wanted F-T to bear, such as providing technical information regarding 
F-T’s network1206.
Though formally weak vis-a-vis this policy, the regulator highlighted the underlying 
unbundling conflict, identifying F-T as the cause. F-T’s comments were not given 
significant consideration except on technical aspects, such as minimising the complexities 
of operators using equipment and sharing spectrum1207. Definite policy conclusions were 
not drawn. Yet, by end-November, Pierret indicated the Government’s commitment, 
anticipating parliamentary debate in the first half of 2000 and implementation by 2001. The 
unbundling law had to place France ahead among countries pursuing an Information 
Society favouring equal access to all1208, suggesting that the ART raising the example of 
other countries’ LLU policies to fracture the unity of coalition members1209 (F-T and the 
Government) had worked.
Meanwhile, the ART deployed powers to prevent F-T from gaining an excessive advantage 
in ADSL markets before LLU became available, thus alternating formal and informal 
instruments to pursue its preference. F-T ignored the ART’s 7 July ‘recommendation’ 
requiring that the incumbent request to expand ADSL services and, in November, planned
1205 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1206 a r t  10/99, pp.35-6
1207 ibid p.21-2
i2°8 Leg Echos 30/11/99 “Christian Pierret Le degroupage sera introduit d’ici a 2001’
1209 see ch.l; Nordlinger
257
service delivery without competition. It was ordered to suspend the product by 10 January 
20001210.
The ART continued structuring a LLU framework by collecting information from policy 
supporters1211. Following Pierret’s indication about a forthcoming law, Hubert asked 
operators to send him operational issues needing prioritising, before discussing them in 
working groups1212. Hubert expected long and complex discussions on pricing and co- 
location, and wanted the decision-making rationale to be clear before the parliamentary 
debate1213; difficulties over the passing of legislation were anticipated.
Statutory adoption would not resolve delivery complexities. Pierret considered LLU a 
“political decision” of which “France Telecom was starting to see the merits”1214. However, 
Michel Bon reiterated his divergence, insisting that F-T had no local communications 
monopoly1215, thus insisting that there were no grounds for LLU.
The ART pursued unbundling implementation regardless. In February 2000, it set up a 
working group chaired by Alcatel’s Alain Bravo. Four sub-groups were created, with 
allocated chairs. The ‘tests’ sub-group was delegated to F-T, the ‘technical’ one to Lucent 
Technologies. The regulator gained policy control by chairing the ‘operational’ and ‘pricing’ 
sub-groups1216, enabling it to prioritise entry terms structuring F-T’s eventual reference 
offer, hence, whether entrants would find unbundling commercially attractive. The ART’s 
initiative was not o f formal significance. F-T’s network information was critical. The 
incumbent could not be coerced into participating, and uncertainty persisted over when 
legislation would be adopted.
Thus, following the Minister’s indication that a law on unbundling would be introduced, F- 
T  decoupled its public opposition to legislative developments and its involvement in LLU 
sub-groups1217. The regulator’s working group initiative secured the incumbent’s
1210 Decision n°99-1153 en date du 24 decembre 1999 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications 
portant mise en demeure de France Telecom. F-T’s prices were subject to ministerial approval following the 
regulator’s recommendation
1211 Arabian 3/12/99; Cegetel’s Germond claimed credit for the campaigning helping the Government’s 
policy change, though conceding that comparable EU states’ situation mattered too
1212 Barroux 2 /12 /99
1213 ibid
1214 HenniJ 1/12/99, “Le gouvernement impose le degroupage a France Telecom avant fin 2000” La Tribune 
claims F-T’s ADSL product was launched 3 November 1999
1215 LeGales 3/12/99. Pogorel,G 1996, “Dominance, Regulation and Competitive” Communications and 
Strategies 23, pp.7-13, had noted the general unwillingness o f former telecoms monopolies to recognise their 
market dominance when regulators introduce competition
1216 ART 16 /2 /00  “Premiere reunion du groupe de travail sur le degroupage ”
1217 HenniJ 28 /4/00, “Degroupage: les prives sont sous le choc”, Les Echos
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involvement, entailing some informal exchanges further jeopardising the operator’s 
position vis-a-vis rival actors1218. As chair of key sub-groups, the regulator could serve as 
mediator, playing F-T and entrants against each other, developing implementation issues, 
manipulatively negotiating compromises favouring convergent groups1219. Thirty sub-group
meetings in three months furnished considerable operational knowledge to determine LLU
1220terms
In 2000, F-T increasingly faced the conflation of domestic developments, shaped by the 
ART’s LLU consultation and entrants’ supportive responses, and evolving EU negotiations 
which had already combined to influence the Minister’s position1221. The European 
Commission proposed an EU-wide ‘Recommendation’ on unbundling that the ART fully 
exploited by contributing its own input and perspective to shape a formal national 
framework, as explained below. By end-April, the Recommendation Communication 
invited Member States to adopt “appropriate legal and regulatory measures” by end-2000 
where full unbundling was unavailable1222.
Though non-binding, the Recommendation was of significance. France would take-over 
the EU Presidency in July 2000, making its policy commitment especially visible. The text 
aimed for legislation in Member States soon after Governments pledged to make the EU 
“the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” given their 
Lisbon Strategy1223.
The European Commission’s Information Society Directorate-General (DG INFSO) had 
issued a working document on a LLU Recommendation in February 2000; “a basis for 
discussion with interested parties. It (did) not represent a formal position or legal 
analysis”1224. Nevertheless, national regulatory agencies’ policy role was raised repeatedly, as 
three means of local loop access were indicated: full unbundling; shared access; and 
‘Bitstream’ access1225.
1218 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1219 ibid
122° ART 30/5/00, “Progression des groupes de travail et preparation des experimentations”
1221 Electronic exchange, Senior Management, France Telecom 5/09
1222 C(2000)1059 26 /4 /00
1223 Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok 11/04,“Facing the challenge - The Lisbon 
strategy for growth and employment”
1224 European Commission 9 /2 /00
1225 See above and especially ch.6 for more technical detail on these options
259
Echoing its regular exchanges with the Commission1226, the ART exploited the informal 
opportunity to comment on the working document’s three solutions to shape the policy- 
framing Recommendation facilitating formal LLU adoption in France. Shared access had 
not been raised nationally. However, the Commission’s solutions 1 and 3 mirrored the 
ART options raised one year earlier, and a supranational framework would supersede 
national legislative preferences1227.
Thus the ART bypassed national constraints to determine policy, exploiting ongoing 
domestic exchanges and building on ties with the European Commission, notwithstanding 
the latter’s lack o f powers to impose LLU on Member States. The ART advanced its 
preference through informal arrangements with the supranational body despite having 
secured the originally divergent Government’s commitment to a national framework, 
further avoiding dialogue with F-T consistent with Type I autonomy. The regulator 
advocated precise rules to address incumbency and competition levels, and a clarified legal 
framework for each option, to strengthen the Recommendation.
Within the context of international regulatory exchanges, in March 2000, the ART sent 
officials on a mission to learn LLU lessons from its US counterpart, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)1228, obtaining input that proved highly relevant 
subsequently. In the US, co-location had represented the key obstacle, especially space 
allocation at exchanges, pricing, site preparation delays and proper access conditions. The 
FCC had not defined strict formal procedures other than a non-discrimination principle 
and access within reasonable delays, since entrants provided different services.
However, ART exchanges with the European Commission proved fundamental since 
supranational activity expedited the introduction of a framework, undermining remaining 
national challenges. On the day the ART published its Recommendation response, Pierret 
informed Parliament that the Government was drafting a law for all operators who wanted 
to invest in ADSL technologies through unbundling from 20011229. In April the Minister 
presented to Parliament the law amendment authorising LLU. Spreading retail broadband 
was a Government priority1230.
1226 a r T 7/ 98j pp.210,212,213,254
1227 ART 15/3 /00
1228 ART 5/00, “Degroupage: les conclusions de la mission menee par l’Autorite aux Etats-Unis en mars 
2000”
1229 Pierret,C “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - l e SEANCE DU 15 MARS 2000”
1230 HenniJ 26 /4 /00 , “Le gouvernement presente un texte autorisant le degroupage”, Les Echos
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Left-wing MPs in the Government coalition forestalled the LLU debate soon after the 
amendment’s submission1231. Communist MP Billard argued it should be “really” debated, 
not presented as a Government bill amendment1232. The “request by certain groups o f the 
majority”1233 led Pierret to withdraw the law amendment the next day, despite centre-right 
MPs - including the Industry, Post and Telecoms Minister at the time the ART was created 
- subsequently revealing that they favoured unbundling too1234. Hubert claimed that F-T 
requested that the Government present the bill to Parliament, aware that its private 
influence with left-wing MPs would produce a favourable amendment delaying 
adoption1235. Two weeks earlier F-T’s Chairman Michel Bon had met Finance Minister 
Laurent Fabius, whose Ministry comprised the telecoms portfolio1236.
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the law amendment, which left-wing MPs secured, only 
benefited F-T temporarily. As Pierret told Parliament, the initiative was being pursued by 
the EC and national regulators1237. Thus, through its exchanges on the amended 
Recommendation text in spring 2000, the ART was able to overcome national legislative 
constraints1238, with the Government passing a decree in September 2000 establishing that 
LLU would occur by the end of the year. Consistent with Type I autonomy, the regulator’s 
informal actions shaping a binding supranational framework pressured the Government to 
adopt it at the expense o f F-T, notwithstanding dissenting coalition members.
Thus, the lack o f domestic statutory authority vis-a-vis the divergent Government 
comprising actors that publicly opposed LLU did not prevent the ART from achieving the 
formal adoption of its preference. Channelling policy through the convergent Commission 
which, albeit late in the process, exercised its EU advisory role, proved equally useful to the 
ART.
1231 Henni 26 /4 /00
1232 Billard 25 /4 /00
1233 Pierret,C “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - l e SEANCE DU 26 AVRIL 2000”; HenniJ 27/4/00, 
“Concurrence dans le telephone local: le gouvemement fait marche arriere”, Les Echos
1234 Borotra,F. Loos,F and Leroy,M “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - SEANCE DU 31 MAI 2000” Borotra’s 
portfolio comprised the telecoms department junior Minister Fillon ran
1235 Henni 28/4/00; Renault,E 28/4/00, “L’ouverture du marche des communications locales est retardee”
Le Monde
1236 Ministere de l'Economie 14/4/00
1237 pierret 26/4/00; DocquiertJ 27 /4 /00  “Bruxelles entend imposer 1’ouverture du telephone local a la 
concurrence”, Les Echos reports Information Society Commissioner Erkki Liikanen promoting the proposed 
EU telecoms regulatory framework package comprising unbundling
1238 ART 4/00, “Commentaires de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications sur le projet de 
recommandation de la Commission sur le degroupage de la boucle locale”
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The European Commission’s proposal in July 2000 that the European Parliament and 
Council approve a binding Regulation1239 followed the non-binding May 2000 
Recommendation. The proposed Regulation, adopted in December 2000 and binding 
Member States, reprised the input o f national regulators, such as the ART, advocating a 
“strong legal base” to mandate LLU by 31 December 2000.
The importance o f the regulator’s supranational exchanges to overcome divergent domestic 
MPs and ministerial uncertainty showed since the French Government’s draft decree 
emerged almost in parallel to the proposed Regulation text1240. Unsurprisingly, the ART 
formally expressed its favourable ‘opinion’ on the draft decree1241, as it had done for the 
Government’s withdrawn bill1242. Yet, practical exchanges still lay ahead.
The ART’s July 2000 draft decree response comprised policy issues raised domestically, 
through which it helped frame the EU Recommendation and proposed Regulation 
sustaining the provisions it wanted the Government to adopt. The agency exploited the 
thrust o f national and supranational convergence to influence the framing o f a national 
statute, since the LLU Regulation was still a proposal, and hence non-binding for 
Governments1243. The ART heard F-T’s Chairman and AFOPT’s President Richard 
Lalande before responding to the draft decree, seemingly as mediator between opposing 
groups1244, but ultimately urged the adoption of statutory measures contrasting with F-T’s 
preference1245.
When in April 2000 the ART had produced a new set of comments on the revised EU 
Recommendation, it welcomed that the European Commission had taken into account 
significant elements of its March 2000 analysis on DG  INFSO’s February working 
document1246. In March, as the Recommendation was being developed, the regulator had 
stressed the urgency of a clear and flexible legal framework.
1239 e g  COM(2000)394 12/7/00, “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL on unbundled access to the local loop (presented by the Commission)”
1240 The opposition proposed a law amendment to avoid that the policy rest on challengeable legal grounds. 
Martin-Lalande,P, De Chazeaux,0 “ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE - 3e SEANCE DU 28 JUIN 2000”
1241 Avis n°00—748 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 21 juillet 2000 sur l’avant- 
projet de decret modifiant le code des postes et telecommunications et relatif a l’acces a la boucle locale
1242 Avis n°00—347 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 5 avril 2000 sur 
l’avant—projet de loi relatif au degroupage de la boucle locale. Not made public
1243 Official Journal o f the European Union 29/12/06 “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community”, Art.249
1244 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1245 ART 21/7/00, p.3
1246 ART 4/00
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In April, the ART also welcomed that the Commission had assessed implementation 
aspects, highlighting F-T’s network centrality. The regulator argued incumbents should 
make network information accessible on non-discriminatory bases some six months before 
launching LLU to help entrants plan deployment. It wanted no single cost-orientation 
charging method prescribed. It thus sought to obtain maximum information from F-T, 
while retaining maximum discretion on how to use it to promote entry.
Echoing the US’ FCC’s insights, the ART pressed the Commission to set out that virtual 
and distant location only be permitted where space shortages prevented physical co- 
location1247. Closer access to local loops, hence end-users, enhanced entrants’ competitive 
position. It also recommended specifying data transmission obligations, particularly for 
distant location, to help entrants provide similar service quality to F-T.
Thus, instead of formally removing entry barriers which it still could not do, to jeopardise 
F-T’s influential ‘position vis-a-vis rivals’1248, the ART exploited expertise acquired through 
informed exchanges and a non-binding Recommendation constructed with the aim of 
formalising policy.
EU-level exchanges on implementation mirrored domestic progress the ART advanced 
through the Bravo “tests” sub-group. Two trial phases were announced1249 days after the 
European Commission adopted the Recommendation addressed to Member States in May 
20001250. One, in July, saw twenty-seven operators testing several DSL technologies in 
seven sites including Paris. The second was held in September, following first trial results 
ascertaining ordering processes, co-location and after-sale services among others.
The ART, whose powers included evaluating experimental network licence requests for the 
Telecoms Minister, expanded the range of actors accessing F-T’s local loop, by opening 
tests to licensed and unlicensed operators despite no framework in place yet and F-T being 
the sub-group chair. Licences lasted throughout trials, gauging competition prospects. 
Besides Cegetel, the first phase involved international actors interested since the outset, like 
MCIWorldcom, and new players like Cable&Wireless and KPNQwest.
1247 Physical co-location was emphasised more in the Commission’s Recommendation than in the Regulation 
(see Annexes; Sections B), though non-discrimination terms meant entrants should not face less favourable 
access to exchanges than incumbents
1248 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1249 ART 30/5 /00
1250 EC 25 /5 /00
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Ongoing exchanges with industry and the European Commission allowed the regulator to 
shape what the Government, uninvolved in implementation, inserted in the July 2000 draft 
decree. Through its non-binding ‘recommendation’, the ART forged more obligations than 
originally suggested although F-T remained preference divergent and possessed key 
structural and informational resources, which remained critical after the ART obtained 
LLU powers.
The regulator ‘proposed’ measures precluding compromise with F-T, consistent with Type 
I autonomy. ‘Shared access’, which had been omitted from the ART’s consultation but was 
in the European Commission’s Recommendation, received significant attention. F-T’s 
proposal was dismissed for the Commission’s simpler, pro-entrant, solution. To ensure 
affordability, the ART accepted that cost-oriented charges contribute to F-T’s line-renewal 
costs1251, but not those inhibiting entry. The ART favoured the cost-accounting method 
already applied and reflecting costs borne1252, limiting reliance on F-T’s unclear 
‘replacement costs’ model1253.
The US experience was drawn upon too. The regulator wanted that F-T provide, within 
reasonable periods, network information for entrants’ investment plans and co-location 
orders, to abide by the start-2001 deadline. Requirements should apply at least six months 
before unbundling was delivered. Citing the EC Recommendation’s Art. 12, the ART 
advocated that the decree prescribe that reference offers fully describe facilities, terms, 
conditions and prices1254. So, the regulator sought formal instruments to impose terms, and 
force development1255.
The Government adopted the decree requiring unbundling by start-2001 in mid-September 
20001256, during France’s EU Council of Ministers’ Presidency1257. Powers applied from 
start-2001, but the ART could formally require F-T to provide entrants with necessary 
information from 1 October. F-T had to produce a reference offer by 1 December1258, one 
month before the EU requirement. The ART announced that it would publish the list of
1251 ART 21/7/00, p.7
1252 ibid p.8
1253 Assumed cost-recovery evaluation based on new technologies, rather than on the network’s actual state or 
on savings from new facilities
1254 ART 21/7/00, p .ll
1255 Interview: Hubert
1256 Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise n.212, 13/9/00, “Decret n°2000-881 du 12 septembre 2000 
modifiant le code des postes et telecommunications et relatif a l'acces a la boucle locale”
1257 ART 12/9/00, “L'Autorite se felicite de la publication du decret”
1258 Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'industrie, 13/9/00 “Decret du Gouvemement sur le 
degroupage de la boucle locale pour permettre le developpement rapide de l'intemet a haut debit en France”
264
relevant costs and define the methodology to calculate Long Run Average Incremental 
Costs (LRAIC) by 1 November1259, thus giving F-T one month. Elements of the costing 
methodology which the ART had originally rejected1260 were included1261, showing F-T’s 
resistance and the Government’s passive support. Nevertheless, cost-orientation was 
retained. The ART had dispute resolution powers to redress eventual breaches upon 
request1262.
One striking difference with the UK was that while both regulators issued broad charging 
principles, in France the incumbent set loop charges, not the regulator. The ART 
determined cost-calculation methods, but F-T interpreted and applied them. This caused 
delays to entry, particularly as F-T was the key cost-information source1263, notwithstanding 
the requirements that F-T publish a reference offer at start-December and provide 
information from October, for the regulator to verify non-compliance.
Significant elements of the ‘informal’ information-driven Type I approach, exploited by the 
ART before the Regulation came into force, persisted nonetheless. Soon after the decree’s 
adoption, information exchanges still occurred without applying formal provisions. The 
ART met the Bravo working group to launch the planned second test phase, in four more 
sites, comprising twelve more operators1264. The importance o f informal exchanges 
continued since, besides creating an internal LLU unit following developments from 
November, the ART issued guidelines, or ‘recommendations’1265.
‘Recommendations’ were more than suggestive. F-T was to respect these non-legally 
binding guidelines changeable whenever necessary1266. The guidelines delineated 
expectations on many entry-related operational issues, including redress measures, showing 
how the regulator alternated formal and informal instruments. The essential general 
information to be provided, such as physical co-location space availability, was separated 
from detailed information on end-user service provision. ‘Recommendations’ included that
1259 ART 12/9/00
1260 ART 21/7/00, pp.7-9
1261 HenniJ 13 /9 /00  “Le decret autorisant le degroupage doit paraitre aujourdTiui”, Les Echos
1262 ibid; also ch.3
1263 Le Figaro 13/9/00, “Degroupage: dialogue difficile entre France Telecom et ses concurrents”
1264 ART 29/9 /00 , “Apres la publication du decret, l'Autorite reunit le groupe de travail “degroupage” et 
lance une 2° phase d'experimentations”
1265 ART 30/10/00(1), “Recommandations de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications relatives a la 
definition des prestations d’acces a la boucle locale et a sa mise en oeuvre operationnelle”
1266 ART 30/10/00(2), “L'Autorite edicte des Recommandations pour la mise en oeuvre de la boucle locale”
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F-T supply detailed line information, with entrants assessing whether they could offer DSL 
without placing definite orders.
The ART continued jeopardising F-T’s predominance vis-a-vis rivals1267. F-T had to create 
and transfer new lines where unbundled ones were unavailable, or justify service refusals 
only allowed in extreme cases. Service timescales, such as eight days for line-transfers to 
entrants, were set without relevant powers. The regulator confirmed its informal ties with 
entrants, acknowledging that various participants except F-T wanted the ‘guidelines’.
The significance of this informal instrument was considerable since the decree’s 
requirement that F-T unbundle applied from start-2001, consistent with the EU 
Regulation. Yet, the ART set non-statutory ‘recommendations’ before knowing whether 
the EU Regulation would be adopted. The ART referred to the proposed EU Regulation’s 
provision ‘requiring’ that the reference offer was sufficiendy itemised, which allowed 
entrants’ to avoid unnecessary services.
F-T’s 2001 12.1% capital remuneration rate1268, cost-items due in the reference offer such 
as unbundled access and co-location costs, and applicable cost-oriented calculations were 
set formally1269. However, with F-T’s reference offer due by 1st December and no 
indications of negotiations, the ART chose a method resembling F-T’s “for reasons of 
pragmatism and efficiency”1270. Charges could not be derived from costs without making 
other hypotheses1271. A top-down model reflecting F-T’s existing network architecture was 
adopted1272, and originally rejected ‘replacement costs’ were partly included1273, highlighting 
the complexity o f regulating the incumbent’s unique ‘physical’ and informational resources 
with formal powers.
Detailed non-binding guidelines on cost-information expected of F-T were established. 
Corresponding international reference offers and evidence o f estimates and invoices of
1267 see ch.l; Nordlinger
1268 This considered entrants’ average cost if undertaking F-T’s activities, comprising average interconnection 
costs, considered comparable to LLU. ART “Decision n°00-1067 de l’Autorite de regulation des 
telecommunications en date du 11 octobre 2000 fixant le taux de remuneration du capital pour l’annee 2001 
prevu par Particle D.99-24 du code des postes et telecommunications”
1269 ART 31/10/00(1), “Decision n°00-1171 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 
31 octobre 2000 etablie en application de Particle D.99-24 du code des postes et telecommunications”
1270 ART 31/10/00(l),s.IV
1271 ibid s.II-1
1272 The EC recommended jointly applying top-down and bottom-up modelling to avoid that the bottom-up 
approach’s efficiency principle, because o f its lesser dependence on the incumbent’s choices, was lost (s.I-2)
1273 ART 31/10/00(1), Annex II-III(English version)
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costs supporting its cost-modelling, would help verify cost-orientation. A certifying 
authority could be sought1274. Thus, after expanding its statutory authority, key ART 
resources remained internal analysis, entrants’ operational indications and bilateral 
exchanges with F-T to examine and price access, identifying costs that only F-T knew 
precisely.
F-T’s first, late-November, line-rental offer at 17euros per month compared unfavourably 
with the approximately 13euros in other EU states1275 - the highest charge in Europe1276. 
Notwithstanding his initial divergence with the ART on LLU, during France’s presidency 
o f the EU, Minister Pierret, who ignored the analytical complexities the regulator faced, 
reacted publicly. Pierret stressed that broadband constituted a Government priority, 
expressing dissatisfaction with terms and prices. Pierret wanted F-T’s offer to mirror EU 
partners’, and pressured it to approach the ART to review conditions allowing “less 
onerous development o f broadband for all”1277.
Yet, F-T continued obstructing unbundling after EU Governments adopted the Regulation 
in December 20001278. Following entrants’ requests for sanctions1279, F-T was ordered to 
provide operational information that had been withheld. The ART sought to avoid the US 
experience as entrants possessed no information on co-location space availability. Still, its 
new formal resources, at best, complemented non-formal ones1280, without resolving all 
entry-related issues. As the ART worked towards a reasonable reference offer, achieved in 
July 2001, statutory authority was exercised to deter F-T’s persistent obstruction. This 
section has thus shown that, to introduce LLU in France despite no relevant powers, the 
regulator exposed F-T as a policy obstacle and especially exploited supranational ties to 
construct a formal framework, whilst developing forceful implementation terms informally. 
F-T exploited its key resources to delay entry, requiring deterrent measures.
1274 ART 31/10/00(2), “Derision n°00-1176 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 
31 octobre 2000 adoptant des lignes directrices relatives a la verification de 1’orientation des tarifs vers les 
couts dans le cadre de l’acces a la boucle locale”, Annex
1275 Collen,V 24/11/00, “Degroupage: bras de fer entre le gouvernement et France Telecom” Les Echos
1276 HenniJ V 2 /1 /01 , “Le reseau local de France Telecom ouvert a la concurrence” Les Echos
1277 Ministere de l'industrie 23/11/00 “Offie de reference de France Telecom pour le degroupage de la boucle 
locale”
1278 EC 2887/2000, 18/12/00
1279 ART “Decision n°00-1326 en date du 14 decembre 2000 de l'Autorite de regulation des 
telecommunications portant mise en demeure de France Telecom, en application de l'article L.36-11 du code 
des postes et telecommunications, de se conformer aux obligations de l’avant dernier alinea de l’article D.99- 
23 du code des postes et telecommunications”
1280 It issued non-binding shared access ‘guidelines’; 22/12/00 “Recommandations de l’Autorite de regulation 
des telecommunications relatives a la definition des prestations d’acces partage a la boucle locale et a sa mise 
en oeuvre operationnelle”
267
V. Time-length of decision-making
The ART conducted LLU policy in France resisted by F-T and elected officials, including a 
key Government Minister initially. It did so by means other than formal powers, which 
were only acquired late in the process. Before the decree, the regulator lacked powers to 
expedite policy and work towards the end-2000 EU deadline. Despite no powers to impose 
LLU, the ART achieved a framework within one-year-and-a-half of its consultation, a 
similar time-period to Oftel, which had wider powers from the outset. Thus, the ART 
produced a framework relatively quickly without powers.
Yet, with Government support missing, as F-T hindered progress after the decree, four 
formal revisions were required to establish a workable reference offer notwithstanding the 
extensive Art.4 Regulation “power to impose changes”. Policy development took well over 
two years before the ART deemed a F-T reference offer reasonable. This section shows 
that, once acquired, the ART applied available powers to expedite LLU implementation but 
faced forced delays, consistent with Type I autonomy.
In licence enforcement terms, the 1996 Telecoms law specified that for licence breaches 
the regulator could serve formal notices, ordering parties to take remedial action by a 
deadline it decided, as with F-T for not providing entrants with required information in 
December 2000. However, before the decree, the ART lacked the powers to set the LLU 
policy-making pace. It pursued its preference with considerable momentum nonetheless.
When the ART indicated the plan in its mid-1998 annual report, one-year-and-a-half years 
since its inception, the timing of the proposal surprised Minister Pierret and his aides1281. 
Yet, within three months, the ART asked the CCRST to explore LLU. By April 1999, it 
hastened the process by taking over policy development and launching its only 
consultation, despite the Government’s and F-T’s divergence.
Having launched a consultation, which was not within its formal powers, the ART 
published a summary of responses directing policy within seven months notwithstanding 
no powers to determine timeframes. In comparison, Oftel’s two ‘informal’ consultations 
spanned eleven months (December 1998-November 1999), in addition to the March 2000 
statutory consultation. Thus, despite narrower powers, the ART took less time to construct
1281 Gadault 6/7/98
268
a similar policy to its UK counterpart. Both left significant operational work until after 
frameworks were finalised.
Without formal authority to expedite policy, and indeed facing divergence from elected 
officials with powers, the ART took seventeen months from the consultation launch to the 
September 2000 decree. Oftel took the same time to insert the condition in BT’s licence. 
Yet, Oftel had the faster option, resonating with Type I autonomy, of seeking licence 
amendment without consent, granting interested parties no more than the required 28 days 
for views.
Accordingly, the ART tried advancing LLU policy before obtaining relevant powers. The 
ART’s seventeen-month period included the four-and-a-half-months forced delay between 
Pierret’s end-April 2000 bill withdrawal and the decree. Within two weeks, the ART 
launched a second test phase and instructed F-T to publish a reference offer by 1st 
December 2000 at the latest. This tight timescale aimed at expediting entry and competitive 
ADSL provision led to the difficult compromise o f accepting F-T’s top-down model for 
cost-calculation o f 2001 LLU charges1282. Therefore the ART proceeded steadfasdy after 
the decree.
The regulator hastily applied its new powers from December 2000 onwards as the EU 
Regulation was passed. Following the December 2000 order requiring information, and 
written exchanges1283, between February and June 2001 the regulator formally required F-T 
to revise its offer four times, specifying operational and pricing requirements. Orders to 
comply within set deadlines were issued, and a sanctions procedure initiated, although not 
seen through. Jean-Michel Hubert deemed statutory threats useful to speed-up 
implementation1284.
First, in February 2001, F-T was asked to take action over several issues in the October 
2000 ‘informal’ operational guidelines, thus formalising ‘recommendations’. The ART had 
established that general network information would be provided within seven days of 
requests. Requirements comprised providing new lines within eight days of requests, 
purposely-created where necessary. Delays would be fined.
1282 a r t  31/10/00(1)
1283 ART “Decision n°01—135 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 8 fevrier 2001 
demandant a France Telecom d’apporter des modifications a son offre de reference pour l’acces a la boucle 
locale”
1284 Interview: Hubert
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LLU required huge investments, operators were highly indebted and financial markets 
dried up1285. So, since F-T had included unauthorised costs, the ART also imposed 
significant charge cuts, including monthly rental for unbundled lines (15%) and for shared 
access (33%).
Thus, terms were specified to stop F-T from making entry conditions unattractive. It had 
two weeks to publish a compliant offer. On the same day F-T published a new reference 
offer, 23rd February, the ART announced that its relevant analysis would be forthcoming. 
The regulator stated at the same time that the offer did not comply with several aspects of 
the 8th February decision, which F-T had appealed against1286. Within ten days, all but one 
appeal claims were rejected1287.
Otherwise, F-T’s February offer ignored requirements despite communications to External 
Relations Director Marc Fossier. A sanctions procedure requiring a compliant offer within 
nine days was initiated in April1288. The ART requested price modifications to the 23 
February offer too, avoiding excess charging1289. Some charges had to be eliminated, some 
had to be revised within nine days. Three weeks later, the ART endorsed AFOPT and 
AOST allegations that co-location requests were not processed as required, ordering F-T to 
deal with requests in non-discriminatory terms within two weeks1290.
Therefore, the ART unmasked the limitations of statutory intervention as it used formal 
measures to hasten entry except fines. F-T’s network helped postpone implementation, 
alleged breaches had to be verified. F-T claimed that around 27% sites in the twenty largest 
urban areas could not be opened to physical co-location, whilst installing its equipment
1285 Girard,L 2 /1 /0 1 ,“Faux depart pour la concurrence totale dans les telecommunications” Le Monde
1286 ART 23/2/01, “L'ART va examiner dans les plus brefs delais le recours gracieux depose par France 
Telecom a propos de sa nouvelle offre de reference”
1287 ART 2 /3 /01 , “L’Autorite se prononce sur le recours gracieux de France Telecom”. F-T then appealed to 
the Conseil d’Etat; Renault,CM 3/3 /01 , “Degroupage:France Telecom saisit le Conseil d’Etat” Le Figaro; Les 
Echos 5 /3 /01 , “Degroupage:France Telecom saisit le Conseil d’Etat contre l’ART”
1288 ART “Decision n°01-354 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 4 avril 2001 
portant mise en demeure de France Telecom en application de l’article L.36-11 du code des postes et 
telecommunications de se conformer a certaines dispositions de la decision n°01-135 de l’Autorite en date du 
8 fevrier 2001 demandant a France Telecom d’apporter des modifications a son offre de reference pour 
l’acces a la boucle locale”
1289 ART “Decision n°01-355 de l’Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 4 avril 2001 
demandant a France Telecom d’apporter des modifications a son offre de reference pour l’acces a la boucle 
locale”
1290 ART “Decision n°01-377 en date du 26 avril 2001 de l'Autorite de regulation des telecommunications 
portant mise en demeure de France Telecom, en application de l'article L.36-11 du code des postes et 
telecommunications, de se conformer aux obligations de l’avant dernier alinea de l’article D.99-23 du code 
des postes et telecommunications”
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therein. So, by the end of April, F-T had installed equipment in over 500 sites and planned 
over 1,400 sites by end-2001.
By the end of January 2001, entrants had still not received feasibility studies for intended 
orders, which preceded signing contractual agreements, made in October 20001291. By end- 
March, 468 feasibility studies had been ordered and 78 firm orders placed by operators for 
33 Paris sites. Yet equipment could not be installed before August at thirty o f them. The 
eight-week estimate period was respected very inconsistently.
So, by administering access to its key ‘physical’ asset and relevant information, F-T 
controlled entry timescales. To facilitate the process, the ART asked F-T to send estimates 
o f available sites within two weeks, hastening it where possible. F-T was told to deal with 
entrants’ co-location requests as though it handled its own needs; “by installing their 
equipment in existing F-T rooms”1292. Since neither the EU Regulation nor the decree set 
out either way, F-T had to stop separating its equipment from that o f entrants. Without 
explicitly mentioning ‘co-mingling’1293, which could cut installation times significantly, the 
ART dismissed F-T’s network security arguments. Existing badge-entry arrangements 
sufficed.
In April, F-T published a revised offer, but more operational obstruction emerged1294. ART 
terms were not respected so a fourth order to comply was issued in June1295. F-T 
endangered the range and number of entrants, hence innovation, and the ART ordered the 
removal of constraints. F-T did not commit to eight-day provision, nor respected the four- 
month co-location works timescale. The ART ordered F-T to comply by 20 June, but the 
reference offer was delayed until 16 July1296.
Thus, aside from exercising powers available before the decree, the regulator repeatedly 
used its acquired formal authority to ensure entry as rapidly as possible. While creating a 
framework comparatively fast without powers, the ART’s additional powers did not avoid
1291 ART 26/4 /01 , pp.3,8 (English version)
1292 ibid.p.7
1293 see ch.6
1294 ART “Decision n°01-521 de l'Autorite de regulation des telecommunications en date du 6 juin 2001 
portant mise en demeure de France Telecom en application de l'article L.36-11 du code des postes et 
telecommunications de se conformer a certaines dispositions de la decision n°01-135 de l'Autorite en date du 
8 fevrier 2001 demandant a France Telecom d'apporter des modifications a son offre de reference pour 
l'acces a la boucle locale”
1295 Les Echos 13/6/01, “Degroupage: France Telecom mis en demeure pour la quatrieme fois”
1296 EC 28/11/01, pp.20-1
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F-T’s significant delays, provoked through its unique structural and informational access to 
its ‘physical’ network asset, to postpone competition.
VI. Outcomes
ART decisions thus led to a reference offer by mid-2001, creating the conditions for 
entrants to start competing on the local loop despite continuing operational obstacles. F-T 
claims that it would deliver necessary infrastructure by end-June and that by late-July seven 
operators would have access to 900,000 subscribers1297, contrasted with 600 available trial 
lines in July 20011298. Nonetheless, trials proceeded. Jean-Michel Hubert warned that co- 
location should not just focus on Paris, but indicated that considerable co-location was 
occurring in the French capital1299. Hubert depicted the uncompromising Type I autonomy 
resolve, defining discussions with F-T as “rough, privileging pragmatism and market 
efficacy”1300.
The frustration of major entrants, such as Cegetel1301, mirrored F-T’s unaltered preference 
of hindering implementation, even blaming ART decision-making for complaints about 
high charges1302. Difficult entry terms, and unfavourable financial conditions, saw 
approximately forty entrants involved in tests and expressing firm interest in 2000 fall to 
nine in mid-20011303. While Minister Pierret advocated further action facilitating 
competition, five operators, including UK-based Colt and Easynet, signed an agreement 
with F-T1304. Jean-Michel Hubert rejected criticism stressing that the ART launched policy 
debate, that implementation was proceeding albeit slowly, that it had been the first 
regulator to revise reference offers and that despite dissatisfaction France was not far 
behind EU partners1305.
In fact, the EC’s November 2001 7th Implementation Report was relatively critical o f ART 
decision-making. With 20 fully unbundled lines by end-October1306, it questioned the
1297 La Tribune 21 /6/01, “France Telecom se defend de retarder le degroupage”
1298 e c  28/11/01, Annex2 p.72
1299 ART 24/8/01, “22eme Universite d’ete de la Communication”
1300 ART 3 /9 /01 , “Des avancees tout a fait reelles sur le degroupage”
1301 Les Echos 28/9/01, “Cegetel pret a annoncer son retrait du degroupage”
1302 Renault,MC, 23/10/01, “Les principaux points d’affrontement” Le Figaro
13°3 EC 28/11/01, Annex3 p.187
1304 RenaultJVIC 23/10/01, “Degroupage: les operateurs prives divises” Le Figaro
1305 Les Echos 31/10/01, “Des possibilites de partage de reseau existent dans l’UMTS”
1306 EC 28/11/01, p.21
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effectiveness of ART involvement in 2001, “in the absence o f clear and effective sanction 
procedures”1307. The ART’s ‘considerable efforts’, and quick action, were acknowledged but 
entrants’ unhappiness with tariffs and implementation problems inhibiting competition was 
raised. Notably, LLU charges created a price squeeze, with contractual conditions not in 
the reference offer, such as insurance risk levels, also impacting cost-wise. Meanwhile, F-T 
benefited from its first-mover advantage in retail ADSL provision, resisting changes to 
wholesale charges. By late-2001, eight operators had signed agreements. Their co-location 
requests equated to 1% of switches, more than twice of those operational for LLU1308, 
allowing testing and installation at 83 co-location sites, covering 16% of all French fixed 
lines1309.
1307 EC 28/11/01, Annex3, p.187
^ 8  EC 28/11/01, Annex2, p.72
1309 EC 28/11/01, Annex3, p.188
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Table 11: The ART’s LLU Type I autonomy
E m pirical
In d ica to rs
Level 1 - N ord linger’s  s ta te  level Level 2 - R egu la to ry  level Level 3 - C a se  s tu d y  - LLU F ran ce : T ype I
P a rtic ip an ts  
a n d  r e so u rc e s
R ange of actors but predom inant 
societal actors hold preferences 
divergent from the sta te  and obstruct 
its p references
At s ta r t  of regu la to ry  policy, key re so u rc e s  to 
ex ert in fluence  held  by  few a c to rs  with divergent 
preferences (dissimilar from regulator)
Key r e so u rc e s  held  by  a  g ro u p  of affiliated a c to rs , th u s  in fluence  
co n ce n tra ted :
- incumbent (F-T) dom inant in 'local a c c e s s ’, ties to senior politicians; 
majority state-ow ned
- Minister key licensing powers; G overnm ent special ties with F-T given 
majority state-control
- MPs could publicly question agency policymaking
- ART largely advisory but had enforcem ent and dispute resolution 
powers
- EU institutions' authority mainly from supranational powers
- 'new (private) en tran ts’, som e expertise, low influence
P re fe re n c e s P red o m in an tly  d iv e rg en ce , similar 
preferences in the background
P re fe re n c es  of influential p a rtic ip an ts  differ from  
a g e n c y  proposals. At start only influential 
d iv erg en t p re fe ren ces; insufficient influential 
support to shift preferences
A gency  to  p u rsu e  p re fe re n ce  at e x p e n s e  of influential a c to rs :
ART w anted local a cc ess  co m p etitio n  via LLU, for broadband. F-T 
anti-LLU to advance its ADSL position. G o v ern m en t re lied  o n  F-T for 
its Inform ation S o c ie ty  preference: initially c o n tra ry  to  s c o p e  of LLU.
New entrants strongly pro-LLU. EC su p p o r t  for LLU clear at later stage
P ro c e s s S ta te  transla tes preferences into 
authoritative action when state- 
society are  divergent by: (i) 
c o u n te rb a lan c in g -o ffse ttin g ; (ii) 
o b s tru c tio n ; (iii) co n fro n ta tio n - 
d is in cen tiv e
To diminish the  constraining effects of influential 
actors with divergent preferences: agency alternates 
inform al w ith form al ap p ro ach , deploying e ith e r 
to  e n a c t its  p re fe ren ces. Acting on preferences by: 
(i) identifying and w idely e x p o sin g  o b s ta c le s  to  
d irec t policy  a s  p referred ; (ii) exploiting  tie s  to  
c o n s tru c t  a  fram ew ork, a g a in s t d ivergen t 
p re fe re n ce s; (iii) d e te rren c e  to  a d d re s s  non- 
co m p lian ce
A gency  a c ts  h ierarch ically , im p o s in g  p re fe re n ce  o n  o p p o n e n ts :  
no  pow er to  in tro d u ce  but formally requested  'expert' com m ission's 
views. Launched consultation, not in law. C h an n elled  LLU a d o p tio n  
a g a in s t influential o p p o n e n ts :  F-T; Governm ent initially supporting F-T; 
left-wing MPs who o b s tru c te d  LLU bill. ART se t-u p  implementation 
w orking g ro u p s; chaired key ones. B ypassed national formal 
constraints; e x c h a n g e s  with EC, s h a p e d  EU R egu la tion . Governm ent 
forced to apply by start-2001, unity with F-T fractured. With d e c re e , ART 
defined terms
T im e-length  of 
d e c is io n ­
m aking
Public policy undertaken accepting 
that s ta te  and societal preferences 
a re  divergent
A vailable tim esca le  po w ers app lied ; d e lay s 
fo rced
L eng thy  p ro c e s s  given n o  p o w ers  to  ex p ed ite  until decree. Then 
provisions applied; tight deadline application at ex pense  of competition 
too. 4 re fe ren ce  o ffer rev iew s req u ired . F-T slo w ed  p ro c e s s  given 
ne tw ork  a d v an tag e
O u tc o m e s S tate  preferences translated into 
public policy without a  shift in those  of 
divergent actors
P re fe re n c e  fulfilled w ithout in tention  to 
co m p ro m ise
ART p re fe ren ce  fulfilled a g a in s t p re fe re n ce  of F-T, d e sp ite  re p ea te d  
o b s tru c tio n  forcing significant delays
VII. Conclusions
The chapter has examined the ART’s LLU policy in France, providing a Type I regulatory 
autonomy case. It clearly challenges the association between agency independence and 
formal institutional arrangements establishing the statutory powers and instruments 
delegated to regulators, but does so differently from the previous three sub-cases.
Initially key resources were concentrated among few actors. Introducing unbundling 
entailed providing market entrants with access to the unique national local access network 
o f France Telecom, the key ‘physical’ asset, which policy centred on. Furthermore, new 
Government legislation was necessary to create a national framework and as the majority 
state-owned incumbent operator, F-T had strong ties with ‘other state’ actors, comprising 
especially vocal left-wing MPs. F-T and senior elected officials thus held key resources. The 
ART neither possessed the formal authority to impose access to F-T’s local network nor to 
instruct senior elected officials to provide it with the necessary statutory instruments. Its 
policy role was mainly advisory.
When the regulator first revealed its local loop competition preference, which was not 
prioritised or indeed prescribed among its formal objectives, it faced opposition from the 
actor with the asset which unbundling centred on and by ‘other state’ actors with the 
formal authority to force the policy. The only convergence was from ‘non-state’ entrants 
lacking both F-T’s network capabilities and formal authority. Thus, to introduce LLU, the 
ART had to overcome actors who held key statutory resources, including the Telecoms 
Minister and Government coalition members, and those with key non-statutory resources, 
notably F-T’s local access network reaching end-users across France.
The regulator did not negotiate and shift the preferences o f the influential divergent actors 
nonetheless. Instead, it developed policy through expertise and ties with convergent actors, 
without exploiting formally-allocated budgetary resources in the process. After raising the 
issue with Government and Parliament in its first annual report, the ART first collected 
‘expert’ CCRST recommendations on LLU, then launched policy discussions on the scope 
o f local access competition via consultation, an instrument not set out in formal 
arrangements. It publicly divulged information that broadened debate on policy options, 
negatively depicting F-T as a lasting obstacle to competition in the emerging ADSL market 
increasingly important in the EU and beyond. Regulatory action harnessing entrants 
actively campaigning for unbundling, notably through media, pressured the Telecoms 
Minister who suddenly accepted to discuss legislation.
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Still without formal powers, the agency pre-empted the formal framework, setting up an 
unbundling working group. Informed exchanges over operational, technical and pricing 
terms were developed with industry, including divergent F-T possessing exclusive 
knowledge about its facilities. The expertise accrued domestically and additional insight 
obtained from its US counterpart allowed the ART to exploit fully and decisively ties and 
exchanges with the European Commission, which became involved in early-2000.
The ART actively shaped the non-binding Recommendation to create supranational terms 
before the French Government withdrew its April 2000 unbundling bill under left-wing 
coalition members’ pressure. Prospects of a binding EU Regulation led the Government 
holding the EU Presidency to pass a decree defining the national unbundling framework 
nonetheless, regardless o f domestic party positions. The decree included significant powers 
for the ART. The adoption of the supranational Regulation, requiring LLU implementation 
by end-2000, followed.
Thereafter, with elected officials uninvolved implementation-wise, the ART recurrently 
applied its authority uncompromisingly, mostly ‘going by the book’ to address F-T’s 
persistently non-compliant reference offers. However, the regulator’s use o f its newly- 
acquired powers did not per se diminish the centrality of accessing F-T’s network and 
related information, essential for entrants to compete. With its initial preference 
unchanged, F-T exploited network ownership extensively, delaying procedures, hence, 
obstructing local loop competition, while advancing its ADSL first-mover advantage. The 
ART repeatedly and hastily found in favour o f entrants but never fined the incumbent 
despite available powers, and only after mid-2001 saw entrants sign agreements and install 
equipment in order to exploit the few unbundled lines available.
The chapter therefore indicates how the regulator’s preference was hindered by actors with 
wider formal resources but especially by F-T, an actor which, through its non-statutory 
resources, influenced policy development decisively. Just as F-T succeeded in delaying LLU 
adoption through convergence with influential MPs and access to policy-shaping network 
information, the ART overcame the shortage of formal powers through policy expertise 
and ties with convergent entrants, and fellow regulatory bodies in the US and, more 
importantly, in Europe to obtain a framework. The ART succeeded in furthering its 
preference, acquiring formal resources despite divergence in the process.
Indeed, consistent with Type I autonomy (see Table 11 above), this chapter highlights the 
importance of informal ties with bodies that can exercise authority, or shape it, beyond
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national boundaries, further challenging the argument that national formal institutional 
arrangements determine agency independence. In this case, ties with a supranational 
regulatory body, the European Commission, which itself lacked formal authority to impose 
unbundling nationally, proved a fundamental resource for the French regulator to construct 
a framework and pursue its preference despite opposition domestically. The value o f the 
powers the ART obtained was nevertheless inhibited by the preference of the incumbent 
operator controlling the central non-statutory policy resource, its national local access 
network making the national supply of ADSL broadband easiest.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
I. Introduction
This thesis has examined the independence of regulatory agencies in practice and 
particularly the extent to which it reflects formal independence, by assessing the regulation 
of telecommunications across two countries based on two similar policies. It has indicated 
how Oftel and the ART developed 3G and local loop unbundling regulatory policies 
despite different national formal institutional arrangements. To do so, Nordlinger’s 
preference-based approach to state autonomy has been developed and refined, in that, 
while he focusses primarily on ‘strategies’ used in the face of different preference-scenarios, 
here the resources used by regulators to further these ‘strategies’ have been looked at.
The research has shown the centrality of actor preferences in regulatory policy-making 
compared to formal institutional arrangements. With respect to the research question in 
particular, findings have demonstrated that different national formal institutions, defining 
agencies’ statutory resources, alone do not determine independence in practice. All sub­
cases have shown that select non-statutory, informal, resources were central to regulatory 
agencies’ pursuit of specific policy preferences.
The thesis has demonstrated how sector-specific ‘physical’ assets, whether controlled by 
the ‘state’ or privately and whether held by divergent or convergent actors, shaped the 
selected regulatory agencies’ efforts to fulfill their competition policy-related preferences. 
Most importantly, the four sub-cases have substantiated that regulatory agencies facing 
divergence largely pursued their preferences through expert policy understanding and ties 
with key policy participants, including those possessing formal authority or shaping it 
through public influence and pressure. The fact that Governments, whether initially 
convergent or divergent, used retained statutory authority consistent with agency 
preferences further substantiates that formal independence is a highly unsatisfactory 
explanatory tool to measure independence in practice.
Variation in the regulators’ processes to fulfill respective preferences has been revealed. In 
three sub-cases, regulators worked to shift divergent preferences, in the fourth, the 
regulator developed policy despite key actors’ preference divergence and notwithstanding 
insufficient statutory authority. Thus, while the thesis has shown that the French and UK 
regulators showed dissimilar types of autonomy on one policy (LLU), it has crucially shown
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too that, despite dissimilar formal institutional arrangements, the two regulators 
demonstrated the same type of autonomy on another policy (3G). France’s ART 
demonstrated different types of autonomy to develop the two national policies, 
notwithstanding the same set o f formal resources to fulfill its preferences.
This chapter firstly reviews, in brief, how the research question was answered, challenging 
primarily the formal institutionalist approaches by testing the new analytical preference- 
based framework developed in this thesis. The chapter goes on to provide a summary of 
the findings from the four sub-cases, in order to draw wider theoretical implications.
II. Theoretical Approach and Research Question Restated
Given the emergence of independent regulatory agencies as part of the ‘regulatory state’ 
Majone describes, it has been argued that “a detailed operationalisation of agency 
independence...is very much needed because, so far, we have had only a blurred 
understanding of what independence means”1310. Formal institutionalist scholars have 
nonetheless focussed on the extent o f delegation of authority undertaken by elected 
officials, with only some differences in indicators1311. Their approach to ‘measure’ 
independence, sometimes applied comparatively, has been to examine controls or veto 
powers retained over regulators by elected officials, and powers allocated to agencies for 
internal organisation purposes and for policy-making. Formal institutionalists limit their 
analysis by concentrating on static statutory arrangements, without investigating the 
deployment of formal agency resources in practice, the existence of other non-statutory 
policy resources and of outcomes1312. Thus, their approach overlooks influential regulatees, 
and does not allow for the unveiling o f any regulatory ‘capture’.
This thesis has argued accordingly that a new approach to study agency independence and 
what shapes it in practice is necessary. One not associated with the regulation literature has 
been refined and applied. Nordlinger has claimed that the state is ‘autonomous’ from 
‘societal actors’ when it achieves its preferences through a range o f strategies and options, 
including largely unspecified “capacities” and “resources”1313 not exclusively tied with 
formal authority. He has suggested that the state can demonstrate three different types of
1310 Gilardi 2002,p.874
i3n Gilardi 2002,p.880; 2005,pp. 145-9; Edwards and Waverman 2006,pp.25,28,37,41,42
1312 Edwards and Waverman 2006 is a partial exception
1313 Nordlinger 1981,pp.100,122,129
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autonomy. Type III autonomy arises when state preferences are achieved when the “best 
endowed private actors” are non-divergent, allowing “public officials...to act as they see 
fit” , since the state faces no opposition1314. When opposition to a policy is encountered, the 
state can either resolve to shift the preferences of divergent actors (Type II), or act 
authoritatively contrary to the divergent preferences of “best endowed actors who 
predominate” (Type I)1315.
To ascertain regulatory agency independence, the thesis has thus developed and then 
applied a suitably adapted version of Nordlinger’s approach, examining whether regulators 
achieve their policy preferences. One particularly valuable aspect o f the approach 
compared to that of formal institutionalists is that Nordlinger acknowledges the variation 
in types of autonomy. When the state has a policy preference, other actors may be 
convergent or divergent. Accordingly, to fulfill its preferences, the state may work to 
maintain convergence, shift divergent preferences, or take action notwithstanding 
divergence. The implication of a ‘state’ actor showing different types of autonomy is that 
policy-making cannot be put down to a single explanatory variable. The approach entails 
integrating key dynamic factors such as preferences and ‘strategies’ to explore policy 
outcomes, rather than solely measuring agencies’ formal independence.
Nordlinger’s useful initial template was nonetheless shown to be incomplete to 
‘operationalise’ and assess regulators’ ability to pursue specific policy preferences 
successfully over a continuum. A new tailored framework based on five indicators 
removing incongruities with the state-society dichotomy has been created from his 
analytical foundations, and then systematically applied. Firsdy each sub-case has identified 
policy-specific participants precisely because, unlike Nordlinger’s unitary state, sectoral 
regulators can incur divergence from ‘other state’ actors as well as from ‘private’ actors. 
Nordlinger refers to “best endowed” actors that “predominate”. However, with the state as 
his focus, the terms only relate to “societal” or “private” actors, excluding ‘other state’ 
actors potentially objecting to agency preferences.
Identifying actors and the resources possessed to influence policy via the sub-cases has 
been shown to be essential given the wider range of potential participants at the regulatory 
level than at the state level; whether in the ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ domains. ‘State’ and ‘non­
state’ actors interested in aspects of a policy but without deployable resources do not have
1314 ibid.pp.74,77
1315 ibid.p.l 18
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the ability to see their preferences through. Indeed, the statutory controls that ‘state’ actors 
possess over the agency are the ‘resources’ that make formal institutionalists examine 
agency independence from Government or other senior elected officials. Similarly ‘capture’ 
theorists assert that regulatory policy is influenced decisively by non-statutory resources of 
powerful industry actors1316, as have others in more nuanced ways1317.
By discussing distinct sets of actors with resources enabling them to oppose agencies 
successfully, both theories question, more or less subtly, the ability of regulators to conduct 
policy in pursuit of their own preferences. Thus the emphasis in the thesis has been on 
actors possessing formal powers, but the sub-case analysis identified all relevant policy 
resources to examine their impact. Policy participants and, even more interestingly, their 
specific resources constitute an invaluable indicator omitted by Nordlinger, but which have 
been included in this thesis.
Subsequently, preferences guiding what use participants intended to make o f available 
resources were identified in each sub-case. Well-resourced actors without specific policy 
preferences will not exercise their potential influence unless they are given a reason to do 
so. Thus, besides revealing how, indeed whether, statutory objectives guide regulatory 
policy, preferences informed whether the type o f autonomy was of a non-divergent nature 
(Type III) or o f a divergent one (Type II or Type I). Preferences, which are central to 
Nordlinger’s approach, determine whether a regulator has full support on a given issue or 
whether it faces some opposition.
When preference divergence occurs, which policy participant opposes the regulator 
becomes clear. Having already identified policy participants and their resources, sub-case 
preferences indicated the distribution of key resources between convergent and divergent 
actors, including the statutory powers that are emphasised by formal institutionalists. 
Preferences o f differendy resourced actors determined the significance o f support and 
opposition that regulators faced when pursuing their preferences.
Upon examining what purposes participants wanted to deploy their resources for, the 
individual sub-cases sought to indicate whether formal resources were or were not 
determinant in practice within each policy’s ‘regulatory space’. Developing the ‘process’ 
indicator has required refining the multiple and occasionally overlapping ‘strategies’
1316 Srigler 1971; Peltzman 1989
1317 Bernstein 1955
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suggested by Nordlinger. The prime objective of examining regulatory agencies’ processes 
has been to establish whether formal resources possessed by elected officials were deployed 
in policy-making. In particular, this thesis has examined whether these statutory resources 
were used to stop agencies from achieving their preferences, or whether agencies holding 
significant statutory authority applied their formal powers to pursue their preferences. 
Conversely, examining processes helped to explain how agencies without significant formal 
resources pursued their preferences, particularly in the case of divergence.
The significance of formal authority, or lack o f it, has been unpicked systematically, in 
order to analyse the impact of non-statutory resources to emerge during policy processes. 
Verifying the time-length o f regulators’ decision-making complements the process 
indicator. It substantiates whether agencies took time to fulfill their preferences, in an 
attempt to persuade other participants consistent with Type II autonomy, or acted hastily 
given the disinterest for dialogue with divergent actors reflecting Type I.
Gilardi has claimed that regulators “do not suffer from the short time-horizons imposed by 
the democratic process”1318 on elected officials. The cases have assessed whether, once 
regulators revealed their preferences, they applied available formal timescale powers to 
expedite policy or not and, if they had none, whether they tried and managed to hasten 
policy development nonetheless. Outcomes have indicated that regulators may accept 
compromises or make concessions to adopt selected policies. Where this was the case, it 
has been stated whether this was largely voluntary or forced, and if such decisions were 
determined by the formal institutional arrangements in place.
III. The Selected Case-Study
The regulation o f telecoms in France and the UK was the case study selected to analyse 
regulatory agency independence in practice in two comparable countries with different 
sectoral institutional arrangements. A considerable body of scholarly work has explored 
telecoms liberalisation and regulation in France and the UK during the past decade1319, 
including analyses of formal independence1320. Part o f the explanation is a long history of 
direct government involvement in the industry, as the origins o f both telegraph and
1318 Gilardi 2002,p.876
1319 Hulsink 1999; Thatcher 1999, Hood et al 2000, Coen et al 2002; DaBler and Parker 2004
1320 Gilardi 2002,2005; Edwards and Waverman 2006
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telephone networks were tied up with the state in most countries1321. Thus, with specific 
research on agency independence in practice neglected, telecoms provided a good case to 
further the study of sectoral regulation of an industry o f economic and ‘strategic’ 
importance raising significant interest.
Accordingly, the licensing of third generation mobile telephony (3G) and the unbundling 
o f incumbent network operators’ local loop (LLU) constituted especially valuable sub-cases 
to study regulatory agency independence through the preference-based framework 
explained. Firstly, the two policies were salient at the time and, by relating to the rapidly 
increasing demand for and usage of new multimedia services, and hence the importance of 
digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) providing high-speed 
broadband internet, remain highly topical. The policy impact o f fast electronic 
communications has extended beyond sectoral boundaries over time, especially to financial 
services markets1322; perhaps an interesting topic of research in regulation in relation to the 
2007-09 globial financial crisis. Indeed, large banking institutions showed interest in Oftel’s 
unbundling consultation at the time1323. Secondly, these novel markets constituted directly 
relevant and applicable sub-cases as they were developed in both countries around the 
same time.
Thus, the broadband internet-related sub-cases made studying the independence in practice 
of regulatory agencies in France and the UK interesting and comparable. Both countries’ 
Governments subscribed to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy objectives to create a ‘knowledge- 
based economy’. The selection of similar policies was especially useful to reveal whether 
dissimilar formal institutional arrangements led the regulators to generate different 
outcomes and demonstrate different types of autonomy.
Furthermore, the two regulatory policies related to distinct segments o f the heterogeneous 
telecoms market, thus avoiding inferring in-depth conclusions from sub-cases imbued with 
selection bias, or indeed constituting a unique set o f events. While both sub-cases related to 
the development o f high-bandwidth networks and services, 3G entailed the mobile 
transmission of advanced telecoms services, whereas LLU was intended for competitive 
high-speed internet provision through fixed telecoms networks of incumbent operators.
1321 Firth and Kelly 2001,p.3. Hulsink 1999; Thatcher 1999
1322 Marsden 2001
1323 see ch.6
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The sub-cases have thus involved different participants and key resources. 3G licensing 
relates to the allocation of scarce spectrum by the state, whereas adopting LLU required the 
involvement o f the dominant national industry actor for access to its local network. 
Accordingly, the 3G sub-case meant that senior Government officials were in charge of the 
key policy-defining ‘physical’ asset, providing a scenario in which regulators’ preferences 
could be obstructed by authoritative Ministers through formal means. In contrast, LLU 
entailed that former state-monopoly incumbents, without formal powers over the 
regulatory agencies, controlled the central ‘physical’ resource shaping policy. The different 
sub-cases have, therefore, exposed the dynamics of how regulators pursued their 
preferences, and in particular the significance of their formal resources, given the varying 
preferences o f respective participants, some of which controlled policy-shaping assets.
IV. Summary of Findings and Arguments
Based on the selected sub-cases, this thesis has shown that associating regulatory agency 
independence in practice with formal independence is inadequate and can be simplistic. 
Applying the preference-based framework developed from Nordlinger has demonstrated 
that formal institutional arrangements cannot be considered the determinant explanatory 
variable of agency independence, once independence is newly defined arid understood as 
the regulator’s ability to fulfill a set policy preference.
Despite rather different statutory resources, the UK’s Oftel and the French ART did not 
consistendy demonstrate dissimilar types o f autonomy in practice. Three of the four sub­
cases examined reflect preference-shifting Type II autonomy scenarios. So, the regulators 
showed different autonomy types for local loop unbundling. However, both agencies 
demonstrated Type II autonomy for 3G licensing policy, despite variation in formal 
independence.
The thesis has thus found that regulators’ types of autonomy do not have to vary across 
countries even though formal arrangements1324 might shape different processes and even if 
their powers differ. This finding contrasts with both Gilardi’s independence index 
attributing different scores to Oftel and the ART: 0.74 and 0.65 respectively; and Edwards 
and Waverman’s respective 0.48 and 0.54. Furthermore, the thesis has shown variation in
1324 For instance, licence modification with consent in the UK, omitted in France
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one regulatory agency’s types of autonomy notwithstanding the same set of formal powers. 
The single Type I autonomy sub-case has shown that the ART acted resolutely on 
unbundling despite key divergence and no relevant formal authority for a significant part o f 
the policy. The finding that the ART exhibited the ‘stronger’ autonomy type for 
unbundling without possessing relevant statutory powers undermines Gilardi’s higher score 
for Oftel, as well as Edwards and Waverman’s low ART score.
In fact by demonstrating both Type II and Type I autonomy, the French regulator has 
shown that, unlike formal institutionalists suggest, agencies can achieve their preferences in 
different ways. It has thus been demonstrated that regulators can pursue their preferences 
through different processes, the two found being persuasion, and taking authoritative 
action even without sufficient statutory powers. It is accordingly clear that a set of other 
conditions and, especially, resources cause regulators to develop targeted policies.
The refining of Nordlinger’s approach has revealed, case-by-case, the causal significance o f 
factors other than the statutory authority delegated to regulatory agencies. The combination 
of preferences and identifiable resources has been documented. Clearly, the actors in 
control of the policy-defining ‘physical’ assets o f 3G spectrum, the ‘state’ British and 
French Governments, and national local access networks eliciting LLU adoption, 
incumbent operators BT and F-T, were highly influential. These actors had property rights 
over exclusive, economically invaluable, telecoms network assets that other policy 
participants wanted to ‘physically’ access in the absence of comparable alternatives to 
provide market broadband internet services. Sole control of national 3G spectrum meant 
that late involvement did not affect the French Government’s policy centrality.
The convergence and divergence of participants controlling the key physical assets heavily 
influenced the course followed by the selected regulators to achieve policy preferences 
distinctly from formal arrangements. Findings in all sub-cases have shown that for the 
regulators to construct their favoured policies, an expert understanding of key issues was a 
decisive resource. Policy expertise helped the agencies to create persuasive arguments and 
undertake negotiating efforts to shift divergent preferences in the three Type II sub-cases. 
It helped to raise, expose and forcefully address key issues, urging non-divergent actors to 
act against divergent ones too, in the Type I sub-case.
The sub-cases have shown that policy expertise allowed the regulators to curb information 
asymmetries or use them to their advantage. Ties with other participants, divergent and
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non-divergent, were shown to be highly influential too, whether to exchange useful 
information, meet and discuss relevant issues, or engender different forms o f support. 
Finally, the ability to influence public opinion regarding the preferences o f actors 
controlling the key physical assets, through media or parliamentary initiatives, impacted on 
how policies evolved too.
IV.l Summary of Arguments on Regulatory Policies in the UK
The UK telecoms regulator’s preferences regarding 3G licensing and LLU related to entry 
measures promoting competition. The promotion of competition was only one of eight 
secondary formal objectives. Thus, the regulator used its discretion to prioritise 
competition among a range of non-primary statutory goals, and decided specifically how to 
carry it forward.
Pursuing market entry preferences rendered Oftel divergent with the predominant industry 
actors in both sub-cases. Previous research has indicated comparatively close and friendly 
relations between regulators and regulatees in Britain1325. Findings in this thesis clearly show 
that such close relations do not imply similar preferences. Indeed, besides suggesting that 
‘capture’ was not occurring, preference divergence with key industry actors gave the 
regulator scope to apply available statutory powers. The four incumbent mobile operators 
opposed Oftel’s 3G entry measures. Crucially, given its control o f the central policy 
resource, BT opposed the competitive implications of Oftel’s local loop unbundling’s 
initiative providing entrants with access to its local network. Furthermore, while developing 
a policy opposed by the key industry actor, the regulator showed it was not acting as 
though ‘captured’ by new entrants expressing dissatisfaction either.
Conversely, Government officials, other MPs and, in the case of 3G policy, the 
Government’s RA were convergent and collaborated closely with the regulator, albeit with 
differences in processes deployed. Previous work depicted UK regulators as the most 
“depoliticised” of the four largest EU economies, suggesting limited links and public 
distance with Government1326.
1325 Thatcher Dec.2002, p.964
1326 Thatcher July 2005, p.364; Dec.2002, pp.959-60
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So, while for LLU the actor controlling the policy-defining asset (BT) was divergent, 
making preference fulfillment difficult, in the case o f 3G, the British Government, which 
controls spectrum, was convergent. The convergence between the British Government and 
Oftel meant that, in practice, limits to the regulator’s statutory powers were not of 
significance since Ministers overseeing the sector acted consistently with the regulator’s 
preferences.
The sub-cases have thus substantiated that formal authority possessed by convergent 
actors, such as Government Ministers, and used in support of the regulator’s policy 
preferences is as useful to an agency as if  it possessed those powers. This corroborates the 
inadequacy of formal agency independence as a measure of independence in practice. Both 
sub-cases have, moreover, shown that Oftel exploited policy expertise and informal ties 
with convergent and divergent actors, rather than enacting formal institutional 
arrangements and exercising powers, to achieve its preferences through persuasion and 
negotiation.
IV.1.1 OfteVs 3G Policy and Type I I  Autonomy
The sub-case about 3G policy in the UK has demonstrated that preference convergence 
over market entry between the regulator and the Government from the start was highly 
influential for the agency’s ability to achieve its preferences. Convergence meant the 
regulator’s preference was not impeded by the fact the state controlled the policy-defining 
spectrum, nor by ministerial powers to license spectrum, or powers to veto the regulator’s 
modification of incumbents’ licences to further new entry.
The uniqueness of 3G spectrum meant that, to gain access to it, divergent actors had to 
come to terms with preferences opposite to theirs. Ultimately the Government decided to 
license five operators, thus allowing one new operator to compete with the four established 
2G operators, an option which they opposed but which the regulator strongly favoured. 
Meanwhile, instead of seeking to introduce the roaming measure through a formal 
reference to the Competition Commission, the regulator exploited expertise and ties 
persuasively and obtained key divergent actors’ consent, displaying Type II autonomy.
In practice, the Government’s spectrum agency, which had no formal authority over Oftel, 
conducted 3G policy. The RA chaired meetings among 3G working group members, most
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of whom industry licensees Oftel formally regulated. Yet, Oftel’s officials attended all 
meetings and interacted with actors, including divergent ones. The RA, acting on the 
Government’s behalf, shared the regulator’s preference for promoting competition and 
actively supported it. At meetings, the RA circulated Oftel’s policy-related documents, the 
Director General’s statements and views. It drew attention to Oftel’s related entry powers 
and measures providing access to 2G networks for 3G entrants, to avoid discouraging 
entrants from bidding for a 3G licence, months before the regulator formally consulted on 
a new roaming licence condition for the four incumbents.
Thus, the regulator advanced its preference through its involvement in a setting, with a 
Government agency and regulatees, in which it was not formally making policy. Different 
3G spectrum issues beyond Oftel’s statutory authority were covered, but the regulator 
influenced their direction nonetheless. Oftel was neither in charge of licensing under the 
Wireless Telegraphy and Telecoms Acts nor of spectrum issues. However, how many 
operators could be accommodated, hence licensed, within the available spectrum was 
discussed. Spectrum allocation had clear competitive implications of interest to the 
Government, which would license it, as well as to Oftel. Relevant expertise was deployed 
to define the maximum number of licences that could be auctioned. The RA’s external 
consultants on technical issues found that five licences could be feasibly fitted1327.
Nevertheless, the RA substantiated the ties between the agencies, and acknowledged the 
regulator’s expertise. Having paid for consultants’ advice1328, the RA sought Oftel’s views 
on the number of licences to auction1329. Oftel advocated the sale of five licences, rather 
than the four initially assumed by the working group. In its February 1999 review of 
competition in the mobile market, Oftel identified 3G licensing as an opportunity for new 
entry by mobile network operators.
Thus the regulator exploited ties and policy expertise to ensure that the RA and the 
Government, which held statutory powers and a convergent preference, as well as 
controlling the policy-defining asset, worked towards its preferred licensing outcome. Oftel 
advanced its competition preference without deploying formal powers, as the Government 
decided to apportion spectrum to allow for five licences, moreover allocating the largest 
one to the new entrant. Furthermore, the regulator’s formal budget was of no significance
1327 UACG(98)17; UACG minutes 13/11/98
1328 NAO 2001,p.30
1329 ibid,p.37; Interview: Hendon
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since the RA and the Government covered policy expenses through their funding 
resources.
Convergence was also significant given the Government’s powers to veto the regulator’s 
work to modify the four mobile incumbents’ licences, to allow a 3G entrant to roam on 
their existing 2G networks until it developed an adequate network of its own to compete. 
Oftel eschewed using existing licence conditions, which entailed applying principles similar 
to roaming on the two largest operators, as the Minister expressed urgency to mandate the 
entry measure on 2G incumbents bidding for 3G licences.
In practice, Oftel achieved roaming through informed dialogue and private exchanges. It 
avoided the Government’s more confrontational approach, which within one-and-a-half- 
years o f the Director General’s appointment suggests limits to agency responsiveness to 
senior elected officials. Although Oftel pursued a preference that the influential 
incumbents opposed, thus acting contrary to capture claims, instead of exerting available 
powers, the regulator overcame regulatees’ divergence through persuasion and negotiation. 
Oftel consulted informally on a draft version o f the roaming condition and non-legally 
binding guidelines setting out the DGT’s likely enforcement approach. It had previously 
issued, simultaneously, two separate consultations relating to mobile competition, 
highlighting the disparity between network coverage and services of 2G incumbents and 
that o f a 3G entrant, but giving the right-to-reply.
While establishing terms, to persuade divergent incumbents to accept roaming, the 
regulator made voluntary concessions that proved effective. Oftel redrafted and amended 
the draft roaming condition after considering the input received, by the time it launched 
the May 1999 statutory consultation; three months after the Minister’s statement. After 
negotiating minor changes to another condition producing the same outcome, the regulator 
removed three formal provisions that it considered could be done without. Moreover, 
while 0ne2 0 n e  appealed to a court against the Government’s position and the latter 
sought “an early ruling by the courts to avoid delaying the auction” in response1330, the 
regulator was successful in its persuasive efforts with the two larger, hence more influential, 
divergent network operators. This led the Government to reconsider imposing the 
condition on the two smaller incumbents if Vodafone or BTCellnet won a 3G licence, 
given their network reach.
133°  DTI p /99/549 ,23/6/99
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The sub-case has thus demonstrated the centrality of expertise and informal ties for a 
regulatory agency to achieve its preferences in practice. Vodafone and BTCellnet, which 
could have been compelled to accept new conditions under existing formal powers, 
accepted the regulator’s roaming condition, applicable until the end of 2009, instead. 
Through dialogue, Oftel prevented the largest mobile operators from rejecting licence 
modification, thus avoiding a reference to the Competition Commission aimed at imposing 
roaming on the operators.
IV.1.2 OfteVs LLU  Policy and Type I I  Autonomy
The sub-case on local loop unbundling in the UK has demonstrated that BT’s preference 
divergence was critically important for Oftel’s market entry preference, given the 
incumbent operator’s control of the policy-defining local access network. Similarly to 3G 
spectrum policy, the network’s exclusivity, hence, property rights over a unique physical 
resource in high demand shaped the policy. The industry incumbent’s preference regarding 
the asset’s use represented the key impediment to expanding competitive provision o f 
broadband internet in the UK. Despite the incumbent’s prolonged obstruction, the 
regulator overcame divergence and allowed entry without relying on existing statutory 
powers. Rather than applying available provisions, the agency exploited policy expertise 
and sectoral ties, and introduced competition via unbundling through persuasion and 
negotiation consistent with Type II autonomy. A supranational formal framework 
expedited the process.
Preferences shaped policy decisively. The regulator did not face divergence from elected 
officials with formal powers regarding launching local loop unbundling. Thus, the Secretary 
of State’s powers to veto Oftel’s modification of BT’s licence were not an obstacle towards 
the regulator’s preference fulfillment. A junior Minister actively intervened long after the 
regulator initiated LLU policy, signalling Government convergence by supporting the 
Director General’s central role. Despite never indicating LLU as a clear objective 
previously, the Government Minister publicly supported the regulator’s policy almost two 
years after Oftel raised it. The Minister’s intervention in support o f the regulator’s policy, 
after consulting the DGT and industry, occurred through private ties, discussions and 
pressure on the incumbent rather than by formal authority.
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Instead, Members of the Parliamentary Trade and Industry Select Committee (TISC) 
favoured unbundling from the start. The TISC held several hearings of the regulatory 
agency based on an informal understanding that civil servants appear as witnesses, rather 
than on the authority to do so, in which members voiced their preference and divulged 
publicly influential views on policy development, based on relevant industry information.
The regulatory agency again demonstrated the ability to pursue its preference, to ensure 
that BT would unbundle, without using its powers given by existing licence provisions1331. 
The regulator outlined in detail five policy options based on internal expertise. It collected 
comprehensive views, framed policy development and generated considerable support for 
its preferred solution. It elaborated policy, taking the divergent incumbent’s concerns into 
consideration. Indeed, it privately interacted with BT officials to discuss key issues 
throughout policy development.
Delegated statutory resources were, therefore, not used. The case for unbundling was made 
through staff expertise, information gathered from convergent consultation respondents 
and informal meetings. Early consultations were informal. Oftel used its budget only to 
bolster the argument and proceed with option 2 by presenting a cost-benefit analysis from 
external consultants. By then, divergent BT had already indicated that it would work closely 
with the regulator and industry to develop the necessary arrangements despite ongoing 
divergence.
The agency thus persuaded the incumbent not to reject a new licence condition, clarifying 
the exact nature of the service for all operators, and avoiding the statutory option of 
referring the matter to the Competition Commission. So, preference fulfillment was not 
shaped by the regulator’s use of formal powers. In fact the agency’s persistence with 
negotiation led to operational compromises and delays regarding entrants’ access to the 
incumbent’s network resource and to relevant information essential to plan investments, 
notwithstanding the new condition in BT’s licence. To redirect policy-making, industry 
entrants and the TISC, without any formal authority, placed significant public pressure on 
the regulator to use its powers.
In practice, addressing BT’s asymmetric network resource through unbundling required 
complex and detailed operational knowledge that only the incumbent possessed. Industry
1331 Oftel 11/99
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entrants were unable to deal with the incumbent’s reticence to disclose information and 
provide physical access through the negotiations the regulator advocated. They were 
equally unable to agree on a space allocation method that suited them given their 
competing demands. As the incumbent deferred operational progress to exploit first-mover 
broadband ADSL market advantage, the agency’s forbearance delayed competitors’ access 
to local exchanges. Accordingly, the regulator intervened to produce a space allocation 
method, albeit a sub-optimal one that excluded BT’s prime sites initially, inhibiting the 
competition preference in the short-term.
Public reports and exposure of the regulator’s unbundling policy-making had another 
important effect. Prospective EU LLU legislation, to which Oftel had contributed to 
informally, required domestic adoption sooner than the regulator had planned. Criticism 
about policy stalling, including that from senior European Commission officials, induced 
convergent junior Minister Patricia Hewitt to influence progress through the Government’s 
informal ties with sectoral actors. Notwithstanding the regulator’s newly inserted 
unbundling licence condition, Hewitt met policy participants privately to expedite progress.
The regulator conveyed its informed judgments about policy constraints before the 
Minister expressed her dissatisfaction with BT’s progress behind closed-doors and obtained 
that the incumbent commit to faster, increased network access for competitors. Despite 
further obstruction, the agency continued exploiting sectoral knowledge and private 
exchanges rather than formal resources when addressing competition issues. Ultimately, 
Oftel achieved market entry according to its initial timetable.
V.l Summary Arguments on the Regulator’s Policies in France
Like the UK, the French regulator’s preferences were not specifically prescribed in formal 
institutional arrangements. Unlike the UK, however, the ART’s preferences, a ‘beauty 
contest’ to license 3G spectrum and unbundling to remove entry barriers in the local access 
market, in both cases, fuelled divergence with ‘state’ actors, including senior Government 
officials. Thus, as previously claimed1332, French state actors were heavily involved in the 
policy-making o f the regulatory authority, highlighting the intra-state fragmentation that 
Nordlinger’s analysis does not include. Nonetheless, findings show that, despite possessing
1332 DaBler and Parker 2004,p. 10
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decisive policy rule-setting and veto powers, the Government did not inhibit the regulator’s 
pursuit o f its preferences.
The ART’s preferred 3G licensing method excluded auctions that could have been highly 
lucrative, and therefore desirable, for the Government which had the powers to impose 
them. Similarly, senior French Government officials largely supported the incumbent’s 
opposition to the competition implications o f the ART’s unbundling initiative. Conversely, 
industry actors, particularly ‘non-state’ ones, were always convergent with the regulator. 
The three 2G incumbent mobile operators actively supported the agency on adopting a 
beauty contest’ allowing the regulator to select 3G spectrum licences. Similarly, industry 
entrants were convergent about the adoption of local loop unbundling. However, the most 
powerful industry actor, F-T, clearly disagreed with the ART, challenging suggestions of 
capture.
The preferences o f senior members of the centre-right coalition Government that had 
appointed ART board members but who, except for President Jacques Chirac, were in 
opposition when the ART developed the selected policies were relatively ambiguous. 
Rather than supporting or opposing the regulator, senior centre-right officials’ views 
emerged at advanced policy stages and seemed primarily driven by party-political 
opposition to the centre-left Government.
Thus, for instance, former centre-right Telecoms Minister Francois Fillon first stressed in 
Parliament the important financial impact that selling 3G licences would have on state 
revenues, but then questioned the ideological incongruence o f a left-leaning Government 
considering auctioning spectrum. One report claimed he welcomed a beauty contest after 
the centre-left Government took the decision. Yet, centre-right officials not in 
Government at the time o f ART appointments, who included Fillon’s ministerial 
predecessor, did favour 3G auctions. Thus, on given policies, senior officials from both 
sides of the political spectrum were divergent with the regulator.
More importantly, respective policy preferences entailed that, in both sub-cases, the ART 
faced divergence from the actors with the central policy resources: (i) the Government for 
3G spectrum; and (ii) F-T for unbundling. Fulfilling its preferences was, therefore, 
especially challenging for the ART. Unlike in the equivalent UK sub-case, the French 
regulator lacked support from the Government over 3G licensing. In fact, the divergence 
between the French Government and the ART in both sub-cases, at least initially, meant
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that the agency’s limited statutory powers should have been o f decisive importance. 
Instead, notwithstanding divergent Ministers’ formal authority, the agency fulfilled its 
preferences.
The French sub-cases have demonstrated the significance of selected non-statutory agency 
resources, but equally the importance of formal and informal resources deployed by non- 
divergent actors for the regulator to achieve its preferences. Thus, notwithstanding 
dissimilar formal regulatory arrangements, the French sub-cases have substantiated, like the 
UK’s, the inadequacy o f formal agency independence as a measure of independence in 
practice.
Both sub-cases have shown that the ART exploited primarily policy expertise and informal 
ties with convergent and divergent actors, rather than exerting powers, to achieve its 
preferences. Expertise and ties proved to be key resources whether to apply persuasion and 
negotiation (Type II), or to act resolutely and without seeking compromises by contributing 
to the creation o f EU-wide formal arrangements (Type I). The use of public pressure by 
convergent actors had an important impact too.
V.1.1 The ART's 3G Policy and Type II  Autonomy
The French 3G policy sub-case has shown that the regulator’s non-statutory resources and 
those of preference convergent key industry actors were central to the adoption of the 
beauty contest licensing method. The significance o f this sub-case is possibly more telling 
than the UK sub-cases, since the French Government controlled the central policy 
resource, the spectrum, and was divergent. The regulator’s limited authority, confined to 
proposing the licensing method, was formally insufficient to pursue its preference. The 
divergent Government possessed exclusive 3G spectrum, and had licensing powers. 
Nevertheless, the agency achieved its preference, namely a beauty contest to allocate four 
3G licences.
The regulator displayed Type II autonomy. Its formal 3G policy role was to propose to the 
Government terms and conditions governing spectrum licensing procedures and to 
evaluate licence applications on behalf of the Telecoms Minister. Moreover, the 
Government could introduce specific legislation to control allocation. Yet, the agency used 
policy expertise and informal interaction to generate a persuasive case, thereby shifting the
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position of divergent Ministers, while convergent industry actors exploited private meetings 
and media influence to pressure them. Ultimately the Government decided to license four 
operators and formally adopted the licensing method the regulator wanted, thus forgoing 
the higher revenues expected from auctions and collecting the increased beauty contest 
fixed licence fees instead. Convergent preferences, policy expertise and informal ties 
proved decisive for the ART.
The French telecoms regulator conducted 3G policy with the contribution of key industry 
actors, following a report from the ‘state’ advisory consultative commission responsible for 
radio-communication issues, with no authority over the ART, the CCR. The regulator had 
been actively involved in the ‘expert’ CCR working group created in early 1998 on how to 
develop 3G in France, with the three 2G mobile incumbents.
The regulator’s licensing proposal to the Government was based on a high level of 
information. It comprehensively addressed policy issues and generated considerable 
industry agreement, following the ART’s ‘informal’ consultation mirroring the CCR’s 
‘expert’ policy exchanges. By meeting with established operators and exchanging views on 
3G, the regulator consolidated informal policy ties with convergent actors it regulated. It 
thus set out the policy long before the Government published licensing terms in mid-2000.
The Government’s divergent preference posed a threat to the agency’s intentions. The 
lucrative outcome o f the UK’s 3G auctions alerted French Ministers to the possibility o f 
raising larger sums than the ART initially proposed. However, the ART overcame the 
divergence over the preferred licensing method, by publicly and privately reiterating to the 
Government that the sectoral and wider economic arguments for a beauty contest 
remained unchanged. Thus, the regulator prevailed, notwithstanding ministerial rule-setting 
powers.
The regulator’s persuasiveness was complemented by the well-connected industry actors 
who publicly contested auctions’ merits and privately exploited ties with senior elected 
officials, including the French President, to put pressure on Ministers. Moreover, by 
indicating the possibility of higher fixed-fees than those initially proposed, an issue it had 
not openly indicated as a priority, the regulator achieved that the Government accept the 
beauty contest licensing method.
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In developing its preference, the regulator neither drew upon its budgetary resources, nor 
seemed to decide according to the policy stance of a key elected official belonging to the 
centre-right Government that had appointed the majority of the regulator’s senior board 
members. Former Telecoms Minister Fillon welcomed the incumbent Government’s 
choice after the beauty contest decision was taken, whereas he had been previously 
ambiguous.
V.1.2 T h e A R T ’s  L L U  P o lic y  a n d  T yp e  I  A u to n o m y
The sub-case on local loop unbundling in France has shown that, given its control o f the 
central local access network resource, the incumbent operator’s divergence was critically 
important for the regulator’s market entry preference. The policy centred on the network’s 
exclusivity, and hence, property rights over a unique physical resource in high demand. The 
industry incumbent’s preference concerning the use of its asset hindered the expansion of 
competitive broadband internet provision in France. Preferences proved highly important 
also because, as for 3G, the Government opposed the regulatory agency’s proposal. 
Ministers had the authority to impose the policy, thus compounding the incumbent’s 
prolonged obstruction.
The French 3G sub-case is particularly interesting since, unlike the other three, the agency 
demonstrated Type I autonomy. It forcefully pursued and obtained the adoption of 
unbundling. The regulator overcame divergence despite the lack of statutory powers at its 
disposal to allow the entry o f convergent operators. Notwithstanding the different 
autonomy type, the agency still developed the policy through policy expertise, and sectoral 
ties with entrants that put the Government under significant pressure, especially through 
the media. Furthermore, the regulator worked closely with the European Commission to 
produce a binding supranational framework that required the national Government to 
introduce unbundling.
The regulatory agency acted resolutely from the outset notwithstanding its lack of statutory 
powers and the divergent preferences of key Government officials who expected F-T to 
drive national broadband policy. The ART first advanced policy by requesting that the 
advisory CCRST ‘expert’ network and services consultative commission analyse the scope 
of LLU. Then the regulator broadened attention at public events and in April 1999
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launched a consultation, which was not formally prescribed, to gather more information 
and support.
The agency elaborated policy by focussing on its preferred unbundling option out of the 
five proposed, neglecting the divergent incumbent’s position. Furthermore, the ART 
exercised its advisory role with the competition authority to restrain F-T from exploiting its 
unique first-mover retail ADSL advantage and increasing entry barriers.
The sub-case has also revealed how the agency did not use its formally-allocated budget to 
proceed with unbundling either. Besides building on its expertise to exploit available 
information, including consultation findings towards the end of 1999, the regulator gave 
convergent entrants a platform to deploy their resources. National and international 
pressure, including unfavourable media reports, saw the Government reluctantly revise its 
stance on unbundling. The ART’s approach led to the Minister, who had reiterated that 
neither EU nor national law required unbundling, accepting to discuss a law based on its 
work.
Similarly, the spring 2000 policy veto of divergent left-wing MPs in the Government 
coalition, regarding a law amendment introducing LLU, was made temporary and relatively 
ineffective by the regulator. By then, industry actors had discussed what operational issues 
needed prioritising at the working group that the agency had set up. The regulator chaired 
sub-groups framing pricing and operational issues to shape policy. F-T also participated in 
these sub-groups. Thus ART officials had essential informal exchanges on implementation 
with the incumbent, which remained the policy fulcrum given its exclusive network, despite 
divergence. The agency pooled the expertise of regulatory colleagues in the USA too, to 
draw upon unbundling policy lessons.
Crucially, through policy expertise and ties with other sectoral actors, the regulator 
bypassed the French Government by contributing to the creation of a supranational 
framework according to national specificities. The agency exchanged views with the 
European Commission (EC) on the latter’s unbundling initiative, initially in the non­
binding form of an EU Recommendation and subsequently as a Regulation that was 
binding for Member States. An EU framework counteracted national obstacles, including 
the opposition o f left-wing coalition Government members.
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Developing LLU policy at the EU level led the Government to adopt a national decree in 
September 2000 that translated the supranational requirement into domestic law, by which 
time some centre-right support for unbundling had emerged nationally. The ART set out 
what provisions needed sharpening through an ‘opinion’, effectively instructing the 
Government without possessing relevant powers, because of its policy understanding. The 
accumulated expertise allowed the regulator to work on measures defining entry conditions 
prior to the Regulation becoming enforceable at the end o f 2000. To ensure 
implementation, the agency launched trials that included non-licensed operators, before 
commenting on the draft decree.
The sub-case has demonstrated that the regulator did not require formal LLU powers to 
follow a forceful approach. The impending EU requirement led the Government to enact 
the agency’s request to make two key provisions in the decree applicable before the EU 
Regulation came into force: the incumbent granting network information to competitors 
upon request; and a detailed reference offer. The agency published ‘guidelines’ which, while 
non-binding, were highly prescriptive, gave it significant decision-making discretion and 
carried an implicit threat of sanctions. Ultimately, formal powers were exercised to redress 
the incumbent’s repeated delays through non-compliant reference offers. The orders to 
comply reflected an operational understanding o f the obstruction, and identified 
implementation requirements for market entry to occur, consistent with the regulator’s 
preference.
VI. Concluding Arguments on Independence in Practice for the UK and France
The findings from the application of the preference-based analytical framework developed 
in this thesis, following Nordlinger’s conceptualisation of state autonomy, have 
demonstrated that there are stark limitations to the argument that agency independence in 
practice reflects formal independence. Firstly, evidence indicates that policy preferences 
formulated by the selected regulators could not be specifically read off statutes. The 
vagueness o f statutory objectives, though somewhat inevitable, contributes to significant 
policy-making discretion for agencies, granting them considerable freedom to interpret and 
choose objectives1333.
1333 see Goodhart 1993
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Secondly sub-case evidence has repeatedly and unequivocally shown that centre-left 
Governments in both the UK and France did not apply veto powers. This was not because 
o f lack o f oversight mechanisms such as ‘fire alarms’1334. On the one hand, these findings 
demonstrate the significant value of choosing a preference-based framework since 
Governments that are convergent do not veto regulators, as was the case for both UK 
policies.
O n the other hand, the two French sub-cases have shown that even when a Government is 
preference divergent, ex post powers to veto or over-rule need not be applied. The 
divergent Government’s statutory controls did not inhibit, in either sub-case, the French 
regulator’s ability to achieve its preferences. Cases o f a divergent Government eschewing 
veto or over-ruling powers clearly demonstrate how formal authority must not be assumed 
to define an agency’s ability to pursue preferences.
Thirdly, and crucially, the thesis has documented comprehensively that regulators pursuing 
policy preferences consistent with Type II or Type I autonomy scenarios do so notably 
through specific non-statutory resources. In practice, all four selected sub-cases have 
explained the centrality of informal ties and expertise for regulators to pursue their 
preferences in practice.
The sub-cases have shown that informal agency ties, providing access to divergent and 
non-divergent key elected officials and industry actors, were critical for the regulators to 
achieve preferred policy outcomes. The agencies developed policy largely by collecting 
relevant information through public consultations from industry actors which, in fact, the 
ART was not formally entided to deploy but did nonetheless in both sub-cases.
Regulators had regular informal exchanges aiding their policy pursuits within advisory 
bodies and working groups, or privately. Key policy information and analyses were 
exchanged voluntarily, including by divergent predominant industry actors BT and F-T. 
Similarly, regulators had access to and meetings with Ministers or senior Government 
officials, and discussed policy issues privately with them rather than simply using formal 
powers. They also used informal ties with supranational actors to achieve their preferences.
1334 McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987
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Thus when policies were hindered or stalled, the ties o f Oftel and ART staff allowed 
private interaction with key non-divergent actors to call upon their resources. They also 
used their ties with divergent actors, either to attempt persuasion or to assert firm 
intentions vis-a-vis state or non-state actors.
Crucially, the four sub-cases show that agency officials were able to frame, pursue and 
achieve their preferences. Regulators employed staff able to carry out intended policies that 
required an understanding of complex issues. They used and benefited from this resource 
both when formal arrangements were of hindrance to their preference fulfillment and 
when they were not. Furthermore, when Oftel employed consultants to produce a LLU 
cost-benefit analysis, findings, which were disclosed after the regulator had developed a 
case for its preference, bolstered the argument.
In the process, despite previous studies attributing significant importance to agency 
finances1335, evidence about budgets’ limited importance has emerged herein, given the 
largely voluntary provision of information. The use o f budgets has not stood out as a 
determinant resource for the two regulators’ pursuit of policy preferences over a significant 
period of their lives, undermining ex ante formal controls regarding funding sources 
incorporated in Gilardi’s, and Edwards and Waverman’s independence indices.
What the sub-cases do suggest instead, given the significance of agency expertise and ties, is 
that, if applied, formal controls over the management o f  regulators’ personnel policy and 
budgets, which Gilardi raises, might influence an agency’s ability to fulfill its preferences in 
practice. For instance, by stopping agencies from targeting their financial resources to 
attract staff with sectoral expertise, given prior regulatory or commercial experience, and 
with industry or Government ties.
Fourthly, previous studies have also attributed significant importance to Government 
appointment powers as a measure of regulators’ independence1336. Although assumed to 
entail the selection of senior “right-minded people”1337, in practice, influence through 
nomination of board members remains unsubstantiated by evidence regarding both 
agencies. Although preferences were non-divergent in the UK’s case, there is no conclusive
1335 Moe 1982, Noll 1989
1336 McCubbins, Calvert & Weingast 1989; Wood and Waterman 1991; Majone 1996,p.38
1337 Moe 1982
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evidence that the appointment powers exercised by the incumbent Labour Government 
over Oftel’s Director General had a direct bearing on the regulator’s policy-making.
With regard to 3G, and roaming in particular, Oftel promoted its entry preference in its 
own distinct way. The regulator did not show the same urgency as the Government. In 
contrast, the then newly appointed Director General initiated unbundling, as the Minister 
stressed subsequently. The Government acted as though it was uninterested until the policy 
stalled, only intervening following significant domestic pressure from new entrants and 
parliamentary (TISC) officials, and because of EU-wide policy and impending legislation. 
Oftel had advocated the rapid framing o f an EU Regulation to the European Commission 
before seeking BT’s licence modification.
As explained in section V.I above, evidence about preference alignment between senior 
representatives of the French centre-right Government that had nominated ART board 
members, and the regulator remains ambiguous and inconclusive. Thus, no direct link can 
be assumed between ART preferences and those of centre-right elected officials part o f the 
Government that had appointed agency board members, despite the latter’s relatively 
higher ‘politicisation’ in France than in the UK1338.
Rather than stating a preference, Francois Fillon, Telecoms Minister in the Juppe 
Government that had created the ART, challenged the centre-left Government’s 
“ideological” coherence for considering 3G auctions. Right-leaning MPs had supported 3G 
auctions, entailing divergence with the regulator. Fillon apparently welcomed the left-wing 
Government’s beauty contest decision after it was taken suggesting his convergence with 
the regulator was not emphatic. Regarding unbundling, centre-right officials including 
former Industry Minister Franck Borotra, whose portfolio had comprised Fillon’s telecoms 
department, signalled policy convergence more clearly, but also did so at a late policy stage. 
Thus, as UK Ministers with Oftel, significant French centre-right elected officials appear 
not to have been divergent with the ART. There is no evidence that the Government that 
appointed ART board members influenced the agency’s 3G and LLU preferences. The 
centre-right Government’s appointment o f both Michel Bon as F-T Chairman and, 
subsequently, of ART board members did not translate into similar unbundling 
preferences.
1338 Thatcher Dec.2002, p.960
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Lastly, the thesis has analysed the explanatory role o f formal powers, which elected officials 
delegated to regulators, with respect to the agencies’ preference fulfillment. Besides 
examining agencies’ activity in practice vis-a-vis senior elected officials retaining formal 
controls, the sub-cases have shown regulators’ interaction and, at times close, relations with 
industry actors when pursuing preferences.
However, thesis evidence does not support ‘capture’ theory assumptions. The regulators 
pursued preferences which the most powerful industry actors opposed in three sub-cases 
out o f four (Oftel’s 3G and LLU policies, and the ART’s LLU one that showed Type I 
autonomy). In the fourth sub-case, to fulfill its 3G beauty contest preference the ART 
indicated that the divergent Government could fix higher fees, thus going against the 
preference o f the convergent 2G operators for minimising entry costs. Accordingly, 
convergent industry actors faced regulators’ decisions that they wanted to avoid. Indeed, 
new entrants were aided by Oftel’s LLU initiative, but heavily criticised the regulator 
nonetheless, indicating that convergence does not entail capture. The evidence 
demonstrates that the regulators and industry participants actively interacted with each 
other as they did with senior elected officials, mutually exploiting available informal ties, to 
further respective preferences.
VII. Wider Theoretical Implications of Findings and Future Research
The preference-based framework applied in this thesis based on a refined version of 
Nordlinger’s state autonomy theory has helped to examine the independence in practice of 
regulatory agencies, and particularly the regulation o f telecoms in France and the UK. 
Having allowed for the additional participants that occupy the ‘regulatory space’, their 
resources and specific policy processes undertaken by agencies, the thesis has identified the 
centrality of preferences of actors participating in public policy for the independence of 
regulators in practice.
The thesis has clearly demonstrated the importance of preferences and the ability o f 
putting them into practice. Preferences have been shown to guide the application of formal 
institutional powers and instruments. In specific instances, they have influenced the 
addition of formal provisions. In fact, regardless o f what formal institutions allowed, 
variation in preferences has been shown to be crucial in actors’ deployment of available 
resources.
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The thesis has challenged in depth the conceptualisation o f regulatory independence in 
practice as a reflection of formal independence. It has documented that the delegation of 
statutory authority from Governments to agencies responsible for the sectoral regulation of 
markets is an inadequate and therefore unsatisfactory measure of agency independence in 
practice. The thesis has rejected the conceptualisation of regulatory agency independence as 
an endowment, arguing instead that it is a dynamic practice.
To fulfill their policy preferences, regulators deploy a range o f useful resources, frequently 
non-statutory ones and often not directly their own. Indeed the importance of non- 
statutory resources in particular, namely policy expertise and ties, was such that their 
application was critical regardless of the different processes the agencies applied. Findings 
arising from the analysis developed elicit important considerations on existing theories, 
providing a cue for further research.
V II.l The Role of Preferences in Examining Agency Independence
The conceptualisation of autonomy developed and applied in this thesis has been based on 
preferences and their achievement with respect to all interested policy participants, whether 
divergent or non-divergent. The application o f a preference-based framework based on 
Nordlinger’s work to examine the types of autonomy that selected regulators showed, has 
indeed revealed that the selected agencies fulfilled policy preferences notwithstanding the 
divergence of both key industry actors and senior elected officials.
As chapter 1 explains, other approaches have similarly examined agencies’ preferences and 
their pursuit. Namely, ‘principal-agent’ analysis examines whether elected officials, who 
have no reason to allow agencies to administer policies over which they have no control if 
agencies do not follow the principals’ preferences1339, manage to direct agencies’ policy 
activity. ‘Capture’ theory claims powerful regulatees direct agencies’ policies.
In his dichotomous state-society analysis, Nordlinger insists that there is excessive reliance 
on societal constraint assumptions and that society’s preferences should not be taken as a 
vantage point when considering state autonomy. Thus, applying the preference-based
1339 McCubbins, Noll Weingast 1987,1989; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Coen and Thatcher 2005
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framework presented here to a larger number of cases, over time, may provide insights to 
test theories which seek to explain that regulatory agencies act according to the preferences 
o f a select group of other policy participants.
There is significant scope for far greater longitudinal examinations of the variation between 
policy preferences o f regulatory agencies and other actors through the process-tracing of 
many more cases providing further answers to the question ‘independence from whom?’, 
while analysing types of autonomy. Another interesting avenue of research could be to 
investigate whether preference convergence between political ‘principals’ and agencies 
varies in relation to different degrees of specificity o f formal objectives.
VII.2 Agency Independence and the Role of Non-Statutory Resources
The second and possibly most important issue arising from the thesis is the significance of 
resources that are not set out in formal institutional arrangements but shape the ability of 
regulators to achieve their preferences. The significance of non-statutory resources 
emerging from the framework applied constitutes a direct response to formal 
institutionalist analyses of agency independence. Associating independence with the formal 
powers political principals delegate to regulatory agencies is a hypothesis which the thesis 
has examined and found to be inadequate.
Rather, policy expertise and ties, allowing collecting and exploiting influential information 
among other things, have been identified as critical resources for agencies to influence 
policy and achieve their preferences. The causal importance of these non-statutory 
resources is substantiated by their relevance in both Type II and Type I autonomy 
scenarios. In fact while the thesis has documented process variation both by a single 
national regulator and between two agencies across countries, which some scholars may 
find of distinct interest per se, the impact o f one process or another on preference 
achievement relates to resources at the regulator’s disposal.
Thus, processes to achieve preferences may differ, but the deployment of selected 
resources remains essential for agencies to deal with specific policy asymmetries, 
informational or other. Indeed, the non-statutory resources identified have also been 
shown, through the Type I sub-case, to help regulators expand their formal resources, 
without possessing the authority to do so.
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Overlooking agency expertise, as formal institutionalist analyses do, whether evaluated 
through relevant academic qualifications1340, prior commercial experience or both, neglects 
the importance of making an effective case to persuade divergent actors in Type II cases or 
of understanding how to circumvent them in Type I cases. Considering that regulatory 
regimes increasingly require sophisticated responses1341, from all participants, studies 
specifically examining the professional skills and policy expertise o f agencies are exceptions 
in the field of regulation that should be expanded upon1342. Analyses of regulatory experts 
working for national sectoral agencies vis-a-vis those in relevant Government departments, 
or comparisons o f sector-specific regulatory agencies’ experts across countries, would 
provide a useful input for future research on agency independence in practice.
Meanwhile, thesis findings sustain the scope for the increased scholarly attention to the 
importance of ties, or ‘relations’ between agencies and other policy actors1343. Indeed, 
whereas the focus of the ‘revolving door’ literature has been on relational aspects of 
regulation regarding ‘capture’ assumptions1344, the door can swing the other way. The 
expertise acquired by agencies recruiting company professionals, given business-regulator 
relations, can contribute to agencies’ policy expertise1345.
The thesis has demonstrated that preference divergence between regulators and powerful 
industry actors or senior elected officials subjected to strongly opposed agency policies 
does not imply severing key ties. Even in the Type I autonomy sub-case, to make 
operational progress and ensure a framework imposing its policy preference without the 
necessary powers, the French regulator exploited “clear lines of access”1346 with the 
divergent actor, as well as key ones with all non-divergent participants.
Research has nonetheless found that the ‘revolving door’ is more present in certain 
countries than in others. Indeed notwithstanding similar numbers o f legal challenges 
brought by regulatees, indicating equivalent levels of conflict and hostility in France and in 
the UK against regulators’ decisions, in the UK the revolving door is much more
1340 Goodhart, Schoenmaker and Dasgupta 2002
1341 Coen and Willman 1998,p.32
1342 Goodhart et al 2002
1343 Black 1976; Coen and Willman 1998; Coen et al 2002
1344 Makkai and Braithwaite 1992
1345 Coen and Thatcher 2005; Coen et al 2003
1346 Coen and Willman 1998, p.32
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present1347. It therefore seems appropriate that future research ask whether regulators with 
strong ties to industry, like the UK’s, are less likely to show a Type I autonomy process 
than regulators without such strong ties.
VIII. Final Remarks
To examine the independence of regulatory agencies in practice, the thesis has investigated 
a sector, the telecoms ‘network industry’, characterised by actors with especially asymmetric 
resources both in ‘physical’ and informational terms. The findings presented have indicated 
that these unique sectoral resources are important. Analyses about the regulation of other 
network industries, such as energy and rail, abound, substantiating the interest in die 
regulation of the strategic telecoms industry. Having covered a strategic network industry 
in this thesis, there is significant analytical scope to apply the framework on the 
independence of regulators in practice developed here, to different regulated industries and 
sectors.
Finally and consistendy with Nordlinger’s premise, the thesis has focussed on an analysis of 
agency independence in ‘democratic’ states; France and the UK. There is extensive scope 
to apply and address the merits and the limits of this approach by investigating agency 
independence in practice in other states with different regulatory institutions and at 
different stages o f market liberalisation, further testing the conclusions reached here.
1347 Thatcher Dec.2002, pp.963-965
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List of Interviewees (interviewer: P.S. Dasgupta)
Carey, N. 15/04/00, National Audit Office 3G Report Study Manager 2000-2001 
Hendon, D. 01/04/09 Chief Executive, Radiocommunications Agency 
Hubert, JM. 07/05/09 ART Chairman (president) 1997-2003 (Telephone interview) 
Interviewee A (anonymous), 13/03/09, Middle Management Oftel/Ofcom 
Interviewee B (anonymous), 25/03/09, Senior Management Oftel/Ofcom 
Interviewee C (anonymous), 25/03/09, Middle Management O ftel/Ofcom
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